question_text: who are the judges on the fisa court

question_tokens: who are the judges on the fisa court

text: FISA warrants[edit]

text: Each application for one of these surveillance warrants (called a FISA warrant) is made before an individual judge of the court. The court may allow third parties to submit briefs as amici curiae. When the U.S. Attorney General determines that an emergency exists, the Attorney General may authorize the emergency employment of electronic surveillance before obtaining the necessary authorization from the FISC, if the Attorney General or their designee notifies a judge of the court at the time of authorization and applies for a warrant as soon as practicable but not more than seven days after authorization of such surveillance, as required by 50 U.S.C. § 1805.

text: If an application is denied by one judge of the court, the federal government is not allowed to make the same application to a different judge of the court, but may appeal to the United States Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review. Such appeals are rare: the first appeal from the FISC to the Court of Review was made in 2002 (In re Sealed Case No. 02-001), 24 years after the founding of the court.

text: Also rare is for FISA warrant requests to be turned down. During the 25 years from 1979 to 2004, 18,742 warrants were granted, while only four were rejected. Fewer than 200 requests had to be modified before being accepted, almost all of them in 2003 and 2004. The four rejected requests were all from 2003, and all four were partially granted after being submitted for reconsideration by the government. Of the requests that had to be modified, few were before the year 2000. During the next eight years, from 2004 to 2012, there were over 15,100 additional warrants granted, and another seven being rejected. Over the entire 33-year period, the FISA court granted 33,942 warrants, with only 12 denials – a rejection rate of 0.03 percent of the total requests.[5] This does not include the number of warrants that were modified by the FISA court.[6]

text:
FISA warrant requests for electronic surveillance[a][7]

Year
# Requests
submitted
# Requests
approved
# Requests
modified
# Requests
denied

1979[8]
199
207
0
0

1980
319
322
1
0

1981
431
433
0
0

1982
473
475
0
0

1983
549
549
0
0

1984
635
635
0
0

1985
587
587
0
0

1986
573
573
0
0

1987
512
512
0
0

1988
534
534
0
0

1989
546
546
0
0

1990
595
595
0
0

1991
593
593
0
0

1992
484
484
0
0

1993
509
509
0
0

1994
576
576
0
0

1995
697
697
0
0

1996
839
839
0
0

1997
749
748
0
0

1998
796
796
0
0

1999
886
880
0
0

2000
1,005
1,012
1
0

2001
932
934
4
0

2002
1,228
1,228
 2  0 [b]
0

2003
1,727
1,724
79
4 [c]

2004
1,758
1,754
94
0

2005
2,074
2,072
61
0

2006
2,181
2,176
73
1

2007
2,371
2,370
86
4

2008
2,082
2,083
2
1

2009
1,329
1,320
14
2

2010
1,511
1,506
14
0

2011
1,676
1,674
30
0

2012
1,789
1,788
40
0

2013
1,588
1,588
34
0

TOTALS
35,529
35,434
533
12

text: Notes:

text:
Jump up ^ Excludes physical searches
Jump up ^ Two modifications that were later reversed by the United States Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review, in a case entitled In re Sealed Case No. 02-001.
Jump up ^ All four were later partially granted, after being submitted for reconsideration by the government.

text: On May 17, 2002, the court rebuffed Attorney General John Ashcroft, releasing an opinion that alleged that the FBI and Justice Department officials had "supplied erroneous information to the court" in more than 75 applications for search warrants and wiretaps, including one signed by FBI Director Louis J. Freeh.[9] Whether this rejection was related to the court starting to require modification of significantly more requests in 2003 is unknown.

text: On December 16, 2005, The New York Times reported that the Bush administration had been conducting surveillance against U.S. citizens without the knowledge of the court since 2002.[10] On December 20, 2005, Judge James Robertson resigned his position with the court, apparently in protest of the secret surveillance,[11] and later, in the wake of the Snowden leaks of 2013, criticized the court-sanctioned expansion of the scope of government surveillance and its being allowed to craft a secret body of law.[12] The government's apparent circumvention of the court started prior to the increase in court-ordered modifications to warrant requests.

text: In 2011, the Obama administration secretly won permission from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court to reverse restrictions on the National Security Agency's use of intercepted phone calls and e-mails, permitting the agency to search deliberately for Americans' communications in its massive databases. The searches take place under a surveillance program Congress authorized in 2008 under Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. Under that law, the target must be a foreigner "reasonably believed" to be outside the United States, and the court must approve the targeting procedures in an order good for one year. But a warrant for each target would thus no longer be required. That means that communications with Americans could be picked up without a court first determining that there is probable cause that the people they were talking to were terrorists, spies or "foreign powers". The FISC also extended the length of time that the NSA is allowed to retain intercepted U.S. communications from five years to six years with an extension possible for foreign intelligence or counterintelligence purposes. Both measures were done without public debate or any specific authority from Congress.[13]

text: Secrecy[edit]

text: Because of the sensitive nature of its business, the court is a "secret court" – its hearings are closed to the public. While records of the proceedings are kept, they also are unavailable to the public, although copies of some records with classified information redacted have been made public. Due to the classified nature of its proceedings, usually only attorneys licensed to practice in front of the US government are permitted to appear before the court. Because of the nature of the matters heard before it, court hearings may need to take place at any time of day or night, weekdays or weekends; thus, at least one judge must be "on call" at all times to hear evidence and decide whether or not to issue a warrant.

text: A heavily redacted version of a 2008 appeal by Yahoo![14] of an order issued with respect to NSA's PRISM program had been published for the edification of other potential appellants. The identity of the appellant was declassified in June 2013.[15]

text: Criticism[edit]

text: There has been growing criticism of the court since the September 11, 2001 attacks. This is partly because the court sits ex parte – in other words, in the absence of anyone but the judge and the government present at the hearings.[4] This, combined with the minimal number of requests that are rejected by the court has led experts to characterize it as a rubber stamp (former National Security Agency analyst Russ Tice called it a "kangaroo court with a rubber stamp").[16] The accusation of being a "rubber stamp" was rejected by FISA Court president Reggie B. Walton who wrote in a letter to Senator Patrick J. Leahy: "The annual statistics provided to Congress by the Attorney General ... – frequently cited to in press reports as a suggestion that the Court's approval rate of application is over 99% – reflect only the number of final applications submitted to and acted on by the Court. These statistics do not reflect the fact that many applications are altered to prior or final submission or even withheld from final submission entirely, often after an indication that a judge would not approve them."[17] He added: "There is a rigorous review process of applications submitted by the executive branch, spearheaded initially by five judicial branch lawyers who are national security experts and then by the judges, to ensure that the court's authorizations comport with what the applicable statutes authorize."[18] In a following letter Walton stated that the government had revamped 24.4% of its requests in the face of court questions and demands in time from July 1, 2013 to September 30, 2013.[19][20][21] This figure became available after Walton decided in the summer of 2013 that the FISC would begin keeping its own tally of how Justice Department warrant applications for electronic surveillance fared – and would track for the first time when the government withdrew or resubmitted those applications with changes.[21] Some requests are modified by the court but ultimately granted, while the percentage of denied requests is statistically negligible (11 denied requests out of around 34,000 granted in 35 years – equivalent to 0.03%).[7][16][22][23] The accusation that the FISC is a "rubber stamp" court was also rejected by Robert S. Litt (General Counsel of Office of the Director of National Intelligence): "When [the Government] prepares an application for [a section 215 order, it] first submit[s] to the [FISC] what's called a "read copy", which the court staff will review and comment on. [A]nd they will almost invariably come back with questions, concerns, problems that they see. And there is an iterative process back and forth between the Government and the [FISC] to take care of those concerns so that at the end of the day, we're confident that we're presenting something that the [FISC] will approve. That is hardly a rubber stamp. It's rather extensive and serious judicial oversight of this process."[24]

text: A 2003 Senate Judiciary Committee Interim Report on FBI Oversight in the 107th Congress by the Senate Judiciary Committee: FISA Implementation Failures cited the "unnecessary secrecy" of the court among its "most important conclusions":

text: The secrecy of individual FISA cases is certainly necessary, but this secrecy has been extended to the most basic legal and procedural aspects of the FISA, which should not be secret. This unnecessary secrecy contributed to the deficiencies that have hamstrung the implementation of the FISA. Much more information, including all unclassified opinions and operating rules of the FISA Court and Court of Review, should be made public and/or provided to the Congress.[25]

text: Allegations of bias[edit]

text: In a July 2013 interview, Senator and privacy advocate Ron Wyden described the FISC warrant process as "the most one-sided legal process in the United States". "I don't know of any other legal system or court that really doesn't highlight anything except one point of view", he said. Later in the interview he said Congress should seek to "diversify some of the thinking on the court".[26]

text: Elizabeth Gotein, a co-director of the Liberty and National Security Program of the Brennan Center for Justice at the New York University School of Law, has criticized the court as being too compromised to be an impartial tribunal that oversees the work of the NSA and other U.S. intelligence activities. Since the court meets in secret, hears only the arguments of the government prior to deciding a case, and its rulings cannot be appealed or even reviewed by the public, she has argued that: "Like any other group that meets in secret behind closed doors with only one constituency appearing before them, they're subject to capture and bias." [27]

text: A related bias of the court results from what critics such as Julian Sanchez, a scholar at the Cato Institute, have described as the near certainty of the polarization or groupthink of the judges of the court. Since all of the judges are appointed by the same person (the Chief Justice of the United States), as of 2013 nearly all currently serving judges are of the same political party (the Republican Party), hear no opposing testimony and feel no pressure from colleagues or the public to moderate their rulings, group polarization is almost a certainty. "There's the real possibility that these judges become more extreme over time, even when they had only a mild bias to begin with", Sanchez said.[27]

text: Appointment process[edit]

text: The court's judges[28] are appointed solely by the Chief Justice of the United States without confirmation or oversight by the U.S. Congress.[29] This gives the chief justice the ability to appoint like-minded judges and create a court without diversity.[30][31] "The judges are hand-picked by someone who, through his votes on the Supreme Court, we have come to learn has a particular view on civil liberties and law enforcement", Theodore Ruger, a professor at the University of Pennsylvania Law School, said with respect to Chief Justice John Roberts. "The way the FISA is set up, it gives him unchecked authority to put judges on the court who feel the same way he does."[29] And Stephen Vladeck, a law professor at the University of Texas School of Law, added, "Since FISA was enacted in 1978, we've had three chief justices, and they have all been conservative Republicans, so I think one can worry that there is insufficient diversity."[32] Since May 2014, however, four of the five judges appointed by Chief Justice Roberts to the FISA Court were appointed to their prior federal court positions by Presidents Bill Clinton and Barack Obama.

text: There are some reform proposals. Senator Richard Blumenthal from Connecticut proposed that each of the chief judges of the 12 major appeals courts select a district judge for the surveillance court; the chief justice would still pick the review panel that hears rare appeals of the court's decisions, but six other Supreme Court justices would have to sign off. Another proposal authored by Representative Adam Schiff of California would give the president the power to nominate judges for the court, subject to Senate approval, while Representative Steve Cohen proposed that Congressional leaders pick eight of the court's members.[33]

text: Judicial and public oversight[edit]

text: Stephen Vladeck, a professor at the University of Texas School of Law, has argued that, without having to seek the approval of the court (which he has said merely reviews certifications to ensure that they –  and not the surveillance itself –  comply with the various statutory requirements), the U.S. Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence can engage in sweeping programmatic surveillance for one year at a time.[34] There are procedures used by the NSA to target non-U.S. persons[35] and procedures used by the NSA to minimize data collection from U.S. persons.[36] These court-approved policies allow the NSA to do the following:[37][38]

text:
keep data that could potentially contain details of U.S. persons for up to five years;
retain and make use of "inadvertently acquired" domestic communications if they contain usable intelligence, information on criminal activity, threat of harm to people or property, are encrypted, or are believed to contain any information relevant to cybersecurity;
preserve "foreign intelligence information" contained within attorney–client communications; and
access the content of communications gathered from "U.S. based machine[s]" or phone numbers in order to establish if targets are located in the U.S., for the purposes of ceasing further surveillance.

text: Jameel Jaffer, the ACLU's deputy legal director, said in light of revelations that the government secured telephone records from Verizon and Internet data from some of the largest providers that safeguards that are supposed to be protecting individual privacy are not working.[18] Elizabeth Goitein, co-director of the Liberty and National Security Program at the Brennan Center for Justice in New York, wrote in the Wall Street Journal that when courts make mistakes, the losing party has the right to appeal and the erroneous decision is reversed. "That process cannot happen when a secret court considers a case with only one party before it."[18]

text: According to The Guardian, "The broad scope of the court orders, and the nature of the procedures set out in the documents, appear to clash with assurances from President Obama and senior intelligence officials that the NSA could not access Americans' call or email information without warrants".[37] Glenn Greenwald, who published details of the PRISM surveillance program, explained:

text: that this entire process is a fig leaf, "oversight" in name only. It offers no real safeguards. That's because no court monitors what the NSA is actually doing when it claims to comply with the court-approved procedures. Once the Fisa court puts its approval stamp on the NSA's procedures, there is no external judicial check on which targets end up being selected by the NSA analysts for eavesdropping. The only time individualized warrants are required is when the NSA is specifically targeting a US citizen or the communications are purely domestic. When it is time for the NSA to obtain Fisa court approval, the agency does not tell the court whose calls and emails it intends to intercept. It instead merely provides the general guidelines which it claims are used by its analysts to determine which individuals they can target, and the Fisa court judge then issues a simple order approving those guidelines. The court endorses a one-paragraph form order stating that the NSA's process "'contains all the required elements' and that the revised NSA, FBI and CIA minimization procedures submitted with the amendment 'are consistent with the requirements of [50 U.S.C. § 1881a(e)] and with the fourth amendment to the Constitution of the United States'". As but one typical example, The Guardian has obtained an August 19, 2010, Fisa court approval from Judge John D. Bates which does nothing more than recite the statutory language in approving the NSA's guidelines.

text: Once the NSA has this court approval, it can then target anyone chosen by their analysts, and can even order telecoms and internet companies to turn over to them the emails, chats and calls of those they target. The Fisa court plays no role whatsoever in reviewing whether the procedures it approved are actually complied with when the NSA starts eavesdropping on calls and reading people's emails. The guidelines submitted by the NSA to the Fisa court demonstrate how much discretion the agency has in choosing who will be targeted. ... The only oversight for monitoring whether there is abuse comes from the executive branch itself: from the DOJ and Director of National Intelligence, which conduct "periodic reviews ... to evaluate the implementation of the procedure". At a hearing before the House Intelligence Committee Tuesday afternoon, deputy attorney general James Cole testified that every 30 days, the Fisa court is merely given an "aggregate number" of database searches on US domestic phone records. ... The decisions about who has their emails and telephone calls intercepted by the NSA is made by the NSA itself, not by the Fisa court, except where the NSA itself concludes the person is a US citizen and/or the communication is exclusively domestic. But even in such cases, the NSA often ends up intercepting those communications of Americans without individualized warrants, and all of this is left to the discretion of the NSA analysts with no real judicial oversight.[39]

text: Deputy Attorney General James M. Cole and NSA Deputy Director John C. Inglis cited the court's oversight in defending the constitutionality of the NSA's surveillance activities before during a hearing before the House Judiciary Committee in July 2013. Representative Jerrold Nadler, challenged Cole's defense of the program's constitutionality, and he said the secrecy in which the court functioned negated the validity of its review. "The fact that a secret court unaccountable to public knowledge of what it's doing ... may join you in misusing or abusing the statutes is of no comfort whatsoever", Nadler said.[40] Orin Kerr, a law professor at George Washington University, said the secrecy that comes along with national security makes it difficult to evaluate how the administration carries out the wide authority Congress has given it. "FISA court judges hear all of this and they think it’s legal," Kerr said. "What we really don't know, though, are what the FISA court’s opinions say."[18]

text: Secret law[edit]

text: In July 2013, The New York Times published disclosures from anonymous government whistleblowers of secret law written by the court holding that vast collections of data on all Americans (even those not connected in any way to foreign enemies) amassed by the NSA do not violate the warrant requirements of Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. It reported that anyone suspected of being involved in nuclear proliferation, espionage or cyber-attacks, according to the court, may be considered a legitimate target for warrantless surveillance. Acting like a parallel U.S. Supreme Court, the court greatly broadened the "special-needs" exception to do so.[2]

text: The newspaper reported that in "more than a dozen classified rulings, the nation's surveillance court has created a secret body of law giving the National Security Agency the power to amass vast collections of data on Americans".[2][a] It also wrote, with respect to the court:

text: In one of the court's most important decisions, the judges have expanded the use in terrorism cases of a legal principle known as the 'special needs' doctrine and carved out an exception to the Fourth Amendment's requirement of a warrant for searches and seizures ... The special needs doctrine was originally established in 1989 by the Supreme Court in a ruling allowing the drug testing of railway workers, finding that a minimal intrusion on privacy was justified by the government's need to combat an overriding public danger. Applying that concept more broadly, the FISA judges have ruled that the N.S.A.'s collection and examination of Americans' communications data to track possible terrorists does not run afoul of the Fourth Amendment, the officials said. That legal interpretation is significant, several outside legal experts said, because it uses a relatively narrow area of the law –  used to justify airport screenings, for instance, or drunken-driving checkpoints –  and applies it much more broadly, in secret, to the wholesale collection of communications in pursuit of terrorism suspects.[2]

text: The "special-needs" doctrine is an exemption to the Fourth Amendment's Warrants Clause which commands that "no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be and seized". The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized an exemption to the Warrants Clause "outside the foreign intelligence context, in so-called 'special-needs' cases. In those cases, the Court excused compliance with the Warrant Clause when the purpose behind the governmental action went beyond routine law enforcement and insisting upon a warrant would materially interfere with the accomplishment of that purpose. See, Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 653 (1995) (upholding drug testing of highschool athletes and explaining that the exception to the warrant requirement applied "when special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause requirement[s] impracticable (quoting Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987))); Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs. Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 620 (1989) (upholding regulations instituting drug and alcohol testing of railroad workers for safety reasons); cf. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 23-24 (1968) (upholding pat-frisk for weapons to protect officer safety during investigatory stop)".[41] The U.S. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review concluded on August 22, 2008, in the case In re Directives [redacted text] Pursuant to Section 105B of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, that the "special-needs" doctrine applied by analogy to justify a foreign intelligence exception to the warrant requirement for surveillance undertaken for national security purposes and directed at a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power reasonably believed to be located outside the U.S.[41][42][43][44]

text: James Robertson –  a former judge for the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, who, in 2004, ruled against the Bush administration in the Hamdan v. Rumsfeld case, and also served on the FISC for three years between 2002 and 2005 –  said he was "frankly stunned" by the newspaper's report that court rulings had created a new body of law broadening the ability of the NSA to use its surveillance programs to target not only terrorists but suspects in cases involving espionage, cyberattacks and weapons of mass destruction.[45] Geoffrey R. Stone, a professor of constitutional law at the University of Chicago, said he was troubled by the idea that the court is creating a significant body of law without hearing from anyone outside the government, forgoing the adversarial system that is a staple of the American justice system. He said, "That whole notion is missing in this process".[2]

text: The court concluded that mass collection of telephone metadata (including the time of phone calls and numbers dialed) does not violate the Fourth Amendment as long as the government establishes a valid reason under national security regulations before taking the next step of actually examining the contents of an American's communications. This concept is rooted partly in the special needs doctrine. "The basic idea is that it's O.K. to create this huge pond of data", an unnamed U.S. official said, "but you have to establish a reason to stick your pole in the water and start fishing".[2] Under the new procedures passed by the U.S. Congress in the FISA Amendments Act of 2008, even the collection of metadata must be considered "relevant" to a terrorism investigation or other intelligence activities. The court has indicated that while individual pieces of data may not appear "relevant" to a terrorism investigation, the total picture that the bits of data create may in fact be relevant, according to U.S. officials with knowledge of the decisions.[2]

text: A secret ruling made by the court that redefined the single word "relevant" enabled the NSA to gather phone data on millions of Americans. In classified orders starting in the mid-2000s, the court accepted that "relevant" could be broadened to permit an entire database of records on millions of people, in contrast to a more conservative interpretation widely applied in criminal cases, in which only some of those records would likely be allowed.[46] Under the Patriot Act, the Federal Bureau of Investigation can require businesses to hand over "tangible things", including "records", as long as the FBI shows it is reasonable to believe the things are "relevant to an authorized investigation" into international terrorism or foreign intelligence activities. The history of the word "relevant" is key to understanding that passage. The Supreme Court in 1991 said things are "relevant" if there is a "reasonable possibility" that they will produce information related to the subject of the investigation. In criminal cases, courts previously have found that very large sets of information did not meet the relevance standard because significant portions –  innocent people's information –  would not be pertinent. But the court has developed separate precedents, centered on the idea that investigations to prevent national-security threats are different from ordinary criminal cases. The court's rulings on such matters are classified and almost impossible to challenge because of the secret nature of the proceedings. According to the court, the special nature of national-security and terrorism-prevention cases means "relevant" can have a broader meaning for those investigations, say people familiar with the rulings.[46]

text: People familiar with the system that uses phone records in investigations have said that the court's novel legal theories allow the system to include bulk phone records, as long as there are privacy safeguards to limit searches. NSA analysts may query the database only "when there is a reasonable suspicion, based on specific facts, that the particular basis for the query is associated with a foreign terrorist organization", according to Director of National Intelligence James Clapper.[46] The NSA database includes data about people's phone calls –  numbers dialed, how long a call lasted –  but not the actual conversations. According to Supreme Court rulings, a phone call's content is covered by the Constitution's Fourth Amendment, which restricts unreasonable searches, but the other types of data are not.[46]

text: "Relevant" has long been a broad standard, but the way the court is interpreting it, to mean, in effect, "everything", is new, said Mark Eckenwiler, a lawyer who until December 2012 was the Justice Department's primary authority on federal criminal surveillance law. "I think it's a stretch" of previous federal legal interpretations, said Eckenwiler. If a federal attorney "served a grand-jury subpoena for such a broad class of records in a criminal investigation, he or she would be laughed out of court".[46] Given the traditional legal definition of relevant, Timothy Edgar, a former top privacy lawyer at the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and the National Security Council in the Bush and Obama administrations, noted it is "a fair point" to say that someone reading the law might believe it refers to "individualized requests" or "requests in small batches, rather than in bulk database form". From that standpoint, Edgar said, the reinterpretation of relevant amounts to "secret law".[46]

text: Controversies[edit]

text: 2013 NSA controversy[edit]

text: In June 2013, a copy of a top-secret warrant, issued by the court on April 25, 2013, was leaked to London's The Guardian newspaper by NSA contractor Edward Snowden.[47][48][49][50][51] That warrant orders Verizon Business Network Services to provide a daily feed to the NSA containing "telephony metadata" – comprehensive call detail records, including location data[52] – about all calls in its system, including those that occur "wholly within the United States, including local telephone calls".[53] The Obama administration published on July 31, 2013[54][55] a FISA Court ruling supporting an earlier order requiring a Verizon subsidiary to turn over all of its customers' phone logs for a three-month period, with rules that must be followed when accessing the data.[56]

text: The document leaked to The Guardian acted as a "smoking gun" and sparked a public outcry of criticism and complaints[47][57][58] that the court exceeded its authority and violated the Fourth Amendment by issuing general warrants.[59] The Washington Post then reported that it knew of other orders, and that the court had been issuing such orders, to all telecommunication companies, every three months since May 24, 2006.[60]

text: Since the telephone metadata program[61] was revealed, the intelligence community, some members of Congress, and the Obama administration have defended its legality and use. Most of these defenses involve the 1979 Supreme Court decision Smith v. Maryland which established that people do not have a "reasonable expectation" of privacy for electronic metadata held by third parties like a cellphone provider.[62] That data is not considered "content", theoretically giving law enforcement more flexibility in collecting it.[63]

text: On July 19, 2013, the court renewed the permission for the NSA to collect Verizon customer records en masse.[64][65] The U.S. government was relying on a part of American case law known as the "third-party doctrine". This notion said that when a person has voluntarily disclosed information to a third party — in this case, the telephony metadata — the customer no longer has a reasonable expectation of privacy over the numbers dialed nor their duration. Therefore, this doctrine argued, such metadata can be accessed by law enforcement with essentially no problem.[66] The content of communications are, however, subject to the Fourth Amendment. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court held in October 2011, citing multiple Supreme Court precedents, that the Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures applies to the contents of all communications, whatever the means, because "a person's private communications are akin to personal papers".[67]

text: Former FISC judge Colleen Kollar-Kotelly, who provided the legal foundation for the NSA amassing a database of all Americans' phone records, told associates in the summer of 2013 that she wanted her legal argument out.[68] Rulings for the plaintiff in cases brought by the ACLU on September 10 and 12, 2013, prompted James Clapper to concede that the government had overreached in its covert surveillance under part 215 of FISA and that the Act would likely be amended to reflect Congressional concern.[69]

text: The American Civil Liberties Union, a customer of Verizon, asked on November 22, 2013 a federal district court in Lower Manhattan, New York to end the NSA phone call data collection program. The ACLU argued that the program violated the U.S. Constitution's guarantees of privacy and information as well as exceeding the scope of its authorizing legislation, Section 215 of the Patriot Act. The U.S. government countered that the program is constitutional and that Congress was fully informed when it authorized and reauthorized Section 215. Moreover, a government lawyer said, the ACLU has no standing to bring the case because it cannot prove that its members have been harmed by the NSA's use of the data.[70]

text: 2016 presidential election controversy[edit]

text: In November 2016, Louise Mensch reported on the news website Heat Street that, after an initial June 2016 FBI request was denied, the FISA court had granted a more narrowly-focused October request from the FBI "to examine the activities of 'U.S. persons' in Donald Trump’s campaign with ties to Russia".[71] On 12 January 2017, BBC journalist Paul Wood reported that, in response to an April 2016 tip from a foreign intelligence agency to the CIA about "money from the Kremlin going into the US presidential campaign", a joint taskforce had been established including representatives of the FBI, the Department of the Treasury, the Department of Justice, the CIA, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and the National Security Agency; and in June 2016 lawyers from the Department of Justice had applied to the FISA court for "permission to intercept the electronic records from two Russian banks". According to Wood, this application was rejected, as was a more narrowly focussed request in July, and the order was finally granted by a different FISA judge on 15 October, three weeks before the presidential election.[72] On January 19 the New York Times reported that one of its sources had claimed "intelligence reports based on some of the wiretapped communications had been provided to the White House".[73]

text: On 13 March, the Senate Intelligence Committee demanded that the Trump administration provide evidence to support the US president's claim,[74] and on 16 March the committee reported that they had seen no evidence to support Trump's accusation that the Obama administration tapped his phones during the 2016 presidential campaign.[75]

text: On Fox News on March 14, commentator Andrew Napolitano said, "Three intelligence sources have informed Fox News that President Obama went outside the chain of command. ... He used GCHQ. What is that? It's the initials for the British intelligence spying agency. Simply by saying to them, 'The president needs transcripts of conversations involving candidate Trump's conversations' he's able to get it and there's no American fingerprints on this." Two days later, on March 16, White House press spokesperson, Sean Spicer, read this claim to the press. A GCHQ spokesman responded: "Recent allegations made by media commentator Judge Andrew Napolitano about GCHQ being asked to conduct 'wiretapping' against the then president elect are nonsense. They are utterly ridiculous and should be ignored."[76] On March 17, the US made a formal apology to Britain for the accusation.[77]

text: On April 11, the Washington Post reported that the FBI had been granted a FISA warrant in the summer of 2016 to monitor then Trump adviser Carter Page.[78] According to the report, "The FBI and the Justice Department obtained the warrant targeting Carter Page's communications after convincing a Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court judge that there was probable cause to believe Page was acting as an agent of a foreign power, in this case Russia, according to the officials." The report also states that the warrant has been renewed multiple times since its first issue.

text: Composition[edit]

text: When the court was founded, it was composed of seven federal district judges appointed by the Chief Justice of the United States, each serving a seven-year term, with one judge being appointed each year. In 2001, the USA PATRIOT Act expanded the court from seven to eleven judges, and required that at least three of the Court's judges live within twenty miles (32 km) of the District of Columbia. No judge may be appointed to this court more than once, and no judge may be appointed to both the Court of Review and the FISA court.

text: As of 2017, Chief Justice John Roberts has appointed all of the current judges, four of whom were nominated to their District Court judgeships by a Democratic President.[2]

text: Membership[edit]

text: (as of 19 May 2017[update])

text:
Judge
Judicial district
Date appointed
Term expiry
Reference

Collyer, RosemaryRosemary Collyer
District of Columbia
000000002013-03-08-0000March 8, 2013
000000002020-03-07-0000March 7, 2020
[79]

000000002016-05-19-0000May 19, 2016
Presiding

Boasberg, JebJeb Boasberg
District of Columbia
000000002014-05-19-0000May 19, 2014
000000002021-05-18-0000May 18, 2021
[79][80]

Contreras, RudolphRudolph Contreras
District of Columbia
000000002016-05-19-0000May 19, 2016
000000002023-05-18-0000May 18, 2023
[81]

Conway, AnneAnne Conway
Middle District of Florida
000000002016-05-19-0000May 19, 2016
000000002023-05-18-0000May 18, 2023
[81]

Dearie, RaymondRaymond Dearie
Eastern District of New York
000000002012-07-02-0000July 2, 2012
000000002023-07-01-0000July 1, 2023
[79]

Eagan, ClaireClaire Eagan
Northern District of Oklahoma
000000002013-02-13-0000February 13, 2013
000000002019-05-18-0000May 18, 2019
[79]

Jones, JamesJames Jones
Western District of Virginia
000000002015-05-19-0000May 19, 2015
000000002022-05-18-0000May 18, 2022
[82]

Kugler, RobertRobert Kugler
District of New Jersey
000000002017-05-19-0000May 19, 2017
000000002024-05-18-0000May 18, 2024
[83]

Mosman, MichaelMichael Mosman
District of Oregon
000000002013-05-04-0000May 4, 2013
000000002020-05-03-0000May 3, 2020
[79]

Russell, ThomasThomas Russell
Western District of Kentucky
000000002015-05-19-0000May 19, 2015
000000002022-05-18-0000May 18, 2022
[82]

Saylor, DennisDennis Saylor
District of Massachusetts
000000002011-05-19-0000May 19, 2011
000000002018-05-18-0000May 18, 2018
[79]

text: Former members[edit]

text:
[hide]Judge
Judicial district
Date appointed
Term expiry
Ref

Aronovitz, SidneySidney Aronovitz
Southern District of Florida
000000001989-06-08-0000June 8, 1989
000000001992-05-18-0000May 18, 1992
[84]

Baker, HaroldHarold Baker
Central District of Illinois
000000001998-05-19-0000May 19, 1998
000000002005-05-18-0000May 18, 2005
[84]

Bates, JohnJohn Bates
District of Columbia
000000002006-02-22-0000February 22, 2006
000000002013-02-21-0000February 21, 2013
[84]

000000002009-05-19-0000May 19, 2009
Presiding

Benson, DeeDee Benson
District of Utah
000000002004-04-08-0000April 8, 2004
000000002011-04-07-0000April 7, 2011
[84]

Bonsal, DudleyDudley Bonsal
Southern District of New York
000000001981-12-02-0000December 2, 1981
000000001984-05-18-0000May 18, 1984
[84]

Broomfield, RobertRobert Broomfield
District of Arizona
000000002002-10-01-0000October 1, 2002
000000002009-05-18-0000May 18, 2009
[84]

Brotman, StanleyStanley Brotman
District of New Jersey
000000001997-07-17-0000July 17, 1997
000000002004-05-18-0000May 18, 2004
[84]

Bryan, AlbertAlbert Bryan
Eastern District of Virginia
000000001979-01-01-0000January 1, 1979
000000001986-01-01-0000January 1, 1986
[84]

Cacheris, JamesJames Cacheris
Eastern District of Virginia
000000001993-09-10-0000September 10, 1993
000000002000-05-18-0000May 18, 2000
[84]

Carr, JamesJames Carr
Northern District of Ohio
000000002002-05-19-0000May 19, 2002
000000002008-05-18-0000May 18, 2008
[84]

Carroll, EarlEarl Carroll
District of Arizona
000000001993-02-02-0000February 2, 1993
000000001999-05-18-0000May 18, 1999
[84]

Coffman, JenniferJennifer Coffman
Eastern District of Kentucky
000000002011-05-19-0000May 19, 2011
000000002013-01-08-0000January 8, 2013
[84]

Conway, JohnJohn Conway
District of New Mexico
000000002002-05-19-0000May 19, 2002
000000002003-10-30-0000October 30, 2003
[84]

Cyr, ConradConrad Cyr
District of Maine
000000001987-05-19-0000May 19, 1987
000000001989-11-20-0000November 20, 1989
[84]

Daugherty, FrederickFrederick Daugherty
Northern District of Oklahoma
000000001981-05-19-0000May 19, 1981
000000001988-05-18-0000May 18, 1988
[84]

Davis, MichaelMichael Davis
District of Minnesota
000000001999-05-19-0000May 19, 1999
000000002006-05-18-0000May 18, 2006
[84]

Devitt, EdwardEdward Devitt
District of Minnesota
000000001985-01-11-0000January 11, 1985
000000001992-11-10-0000November 10, 1992
[84]

Feldman, MartinMartin Feldman
Eastern District of Louisiana
000000002010-05-19-0000May 19, 2010
000000002017-05-18-0000May 18, 2017
[79]

Freedman, FrankFrank Freedman
District of Massachusetts
000000001990-05-30-0000May 30, 1990
000000001994-05-18-0000May 18, 1994
[84]

Gorton, NathanielNathaniel Gorton
District of Massachusetts
000000002001-05-19-0000May 19, 2001
000000002008-05-18-0000May 18, 2008
[84]

Green, JoyceJoyce Green
District of Columbia
000000001988-05-19-0000May 19, 1988
000000001995-05-18-0000May 18, 1995
[84]

000000001990-05-19-0000May 19, 1990
Presiding

Hart, GeorgeGeorge Hart
District of Columbia
000000001979-05-19-0000May 19, 1979
Presiding
000000001982-05-18-0000May 18, 1982
[84]

Hilton, ClaudeClaude Hilton
Eastern District of Virginia
000000002000-05-19-0000May 19, 2000
000000002007-05-18-0000May 18, 2007
[84]

Hogan, ThomasThomas Hogan
District of Columbia
000000002009-05-19-0000May 19, 2009
000000002016-05-18-0000May 18, 2016
[79][85]

000000002014-05-19-0000May 19, 2014
Presiding

Howard, MalcolmMalcolm Howard
Eastern District of North Carolina
000000002005-05-19-0000May 19, 2005
000000002012-01-08-0000January 8, 2012
[84]

Kazen, GeorgeGeorge Kazen
Southern District of Texas
000000002003-07-15-0000July 15, 2003
000000002010-05-18-0000May 18, 2010
[84]

Keenan, JohnJohn Keenan
Southern District of New York
000000001994-07-24-0000July 24, 1994
000000002001-05-18-0000May 18, 2001
[84]

Kollar-Kotelly, ColleenColleen Kollar-Kotelly
District of Columbia
000000002002-05-19-0000May 19, 2002
Presiding
000000002009-05-18-0000May 18, 2009
[84]

Lacey, FrederickFrederick Lacey
District of New Jersey
000000001979-05-19-0000May 19, 1979
000000001985-05-18-0000May 18, 1985
[84]

Lamberth, RoyceRoyce Lamberth
District of Columbia
000000001995-05-19-0000May 19, 1995
Presiding
000000002002-05-18-0000May 18, 2002
[84]

MacBride, ThomasThomas MacBride
Eastern District of California
000000001979-05-19-0000May 19, 1979
000000001980-05-18-0000May 18, 1980
[84]

MacMahon, LloydLloyd MacMahon
Southern District of New York
000000001985-07-05-0000July 5, 1985
000000001989-04-08-0000April 8, 1989
[84]

McGarr, FrankFrank McGarr
Northern District of Illinois
000000001979-05-19-0000May 19, 1979
000000001983-05-18-0000May 18, 1983
[84]

McLaughlin, MaryMary McLaughlin
Eastern District of Pennsylvania
000000002008-05-19-0000May 19, 2008
000000002015-05-18-0000May 18, 2015
[79]

Meredith, JamesJames Meredith
Eastern District of Missouri
000000001979-05-19-0000May 19, 1979
000000001981-05-18-0000May 18, 1981
[84]

Miles, WendellWendell Miles
Western District of Michigan
000000001989-09-21-0000September 21, 1989
000000001996-05-18-0000May 18, 1996
[84]

Murray, HerbertHerbert Murray
District of Maryland
000000001986-05-19-0000May 19, 1986
000000001993-05-18-0000May 18, 1993
[84]

Noland, JamesJames Noland
Southern District of Indiana
000000001983-05-19-0000May 19, 1983
000000001990-05-18-0000May 18, 1990
[84]

000000001988-05-19-0000May 19, 1988
Presiding

O'Kelley, WilliamWilliam O'Kelley
Northern District of Georgia
000000001980-05-19-0000May 19, 1980
000000001987-05-18-0000May 18, 1987
[84]

Pierce, LawrenceLawrence Pierce
District of Columbia
000000001979-05-19-0000May 19, 1979
000000001981-01-01-0000January 1, 1981
[84]

Robertson, JamesJames Robertson
District of Columbia
000000002002-05-19-0000May 19, 2002
000000002008-12-19-0000December 19, 2008
[84]

Schwartz, CharlesCharles Schwartz
Eastern District of Louisiana
000000001992-08-05-0000August 5, 1992
000000001999-05-18-0000May 18, 1999
[84]

Scullin, FrederickFrederick Scullin
Northern District of New York
000000002004-05-19-0000May 19, 2004
000000002011-01-08-0000January 8, 2011
[84]

Smith, JohnJohn Smith
District of Columbia
000000001982-05-19-0000May 19, 1982
Presiding
000000001988-05-18-0000May 18, 1988
[84]

Stafford, WilliamWilliam Stafford
Northern District of Florida
000000001996-05-19-0000May 19, 1996
000000002003-05-18-0000May 18, 2003
[84]

Thompson, RalphRalph Thompson
Western District of Oklahoma
000000001990-06-11-0000June 11, 1990
000000001997-05-18-0000May 18, 1997
[84]

Vinson, RogerRoger Vinson
Northern District of Florida
000000002006-05-04-0000May 4, 2006
000000002013-05-03-0000May 3, 2013
[84]

Walton, ReggieReggie Walton
District of Columbia
000000002007-05-19-0000May 19, 2007
000000002014-05-18-0000May 18, 2014
[86]

000000002013-02-22-0000February 22, 2013
Presiding

Webber Wright, SusanSusan Webber Wright
Eastern District of Arkansas
000000002009-05-19-0000May 19, 2009
000000002016-05-18-0000May 18, 2016
[79]

Zagel, JamesJames Zagel
Northern District of Illinois
000000002008-05-19-0000May 19, 2008
000000002015-05-18-0000May 18, 2015
[79]


document_title: History of the Philippines (1965–86)

question_text: when did martial law in the philippines end

root

text: History of the Philippines (1965–86)

text: The Marcos administration (1965–72)[edit]

text: First term[edit]

text: In 1965, Ferdinand Marcos won the presidential election and became the 10th President of the Philippines. His first term was marked with increased industrialization and the creation of solid infrastructure nationwide, such as the North Luzon Expressway and the Maharlika Highway. Marcos did this by appointing a cabinet composed mostly of technocrats and intellectuals, by increasing funding to the Armed Forces, and mobilizing them to help in construction. Marcos also established schools and learning institutions nationwide, more than the combined total of those established by his predecessors.[citation needed]

tag: p

text: In 1968, Senator Benigno S. Aquino Jr. warned that Marcos was on the road to establishing "a garrison state" by "ballooning the armed forces budget", saddling the defense establishment with "overstaying generals" and "militarizing our civilian government offices". These were prescient comments in the light of events that would happen in the following decade.[1] Marcos also sent 10,450 Filipino soldiers to Vietnam during his term, under the PHILCAG (Philippine Civic Action Group). Fidel Ramos, who was later to become the 12th President of the Philippines in 1992, was a part of this expeditionary force.

text: Second term[edit]

text: In 1969, Marcos ran for a second term (allowable under the 1935 constitution then in effect[2]), and won against 11 other candidates.

text: Marcos' second term was marked by economic turmoil brought about by factors both external and internal, a restless student body who demanded educational reforms, a rising crime rate, and a growing Communist insurgency, among other things.

text: At one point, student activists took over the Diliman campus of the University of the Philippines and declared it a free commune, which lasted for a while before the government dissolved it. Violent protesting continued over the next few years until the declaration of martial law in 1972. The event was popularly known as the First Quarter Storm.

text: During the First Quarter Storm in 1970 the line between leftist activists and communists became increasingly blurred, as a significant number of Kabataang Makabayan ('KM') advanced activists joined the party of the Communist Party also founded by Jose Maria Sison.[3] KM members protested in front of Congress, throwing a coffin, a stuffed alligator, and stones at Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos after his State of the Nation Address. On the presidential palace, activists rammed the gate with a fire truck and once the gate broke and gave way, the activists charged into the Palace grounds tossing rocks, pillboxes, Molotov cocktails. In front of the US embassy, protesters vandalized, arsoned and damaged the embassy lobby resulting to a strong protest from the U.S. Ambassador.[3][4][5] The KM protests ranged from 50,000 to 100,000 in number per weekly mass action.[3] In the aftermath of the January 1970 riots, at least two activists were confirmed dead and several were injured by the police. The mayor of Manila at the time, Antonio Villegas, commended the Manila Police District for their "exemplary behavior and courage" and protecting the First Couple long after they have left. The death of the activists was seized by the Lopez controlled Manila Times and Manila Chronicle, blaming Marcos and added fire to the weekly protests.[6] Students declared a week-long boycott of classes and instead met to organize protest rallies.[4]

text: Rumors of coup d’etat were also brewing. A report of the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee said that shortly after the Philippine presidential election, 1969, a group composed mostly of retired colonels and generals organized a revolutionary junta with the aim of first discrediting President Marcos and then killing him. As described in a document given to the committee by Philippine Government official, key figures in the plot were Vice President Fernando Lopez and Sergio Osmena Jr., whom Marcos defeated in the 1969 election.[7] Marcos even went to the U.S. embassy to dispel rumors that the U.S. embassy is supporting a coup d’etat which the opposition liberal party was spreading.[6] While the report obtained by the NY Times speculated saying that story could be used by Marcos to justify Martial Law, as early as December 1969 in a message from the U.S. Ambassador to the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State, the U.S. Ambassador said that most of the talk about revolution and even assassination has been coming from the defeated opposition, of which Adevoso (of the Liberal Party) is a leading activist. He also said that the information he has on the assassination plans are 'hard' or well-sourced and he has to make sure that it reached President Marcos.[8][9]

text: In light of the crisis, Marcos wrote an entry in his diary in January 1970:[6] "I have several options. One of them is to abort the subversive plan now by the sudden arrest of the plotters. But this would not be accepted by the people. Nor could we get the Huks (Communists), their legal cadres and support. Nor the MIM (Maoist International Movement) and other subversive [or front] organizations, nor those underground. We could allow the situation to develop naturally then after massive terrorism, wanton killings and an attempt at my assassination and a coup d’etat, then declare martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus – and arrest all including the legal cadres. Right now I am inclined towards the latter."

text: Plaza Miranda bombing[edit]

text: On August 21, 1971, the Liberal Party held a campaign rally at the Plaza Miranda to proclaim their Senatorial bets and their candidate for the Mayoralty of Manila. Two grenades were reportedly tossed on stage, injuring almost everybody present. As a result, Marcos suspended the writ of habeas corpus in order to arrest those behind the attack. He rounded up a list of supposed suspects, Escabas, and other undesirables in an effort to eliminate rivals in the Liberal Party.

text: Based on interviews of The Washington Post with former Communist Party of the Philippines Officials, it was revealed that "the (Communist) party leadership planned -- and three operatives carried out -- the attack in an attempt to provoke government repression and push the country to the brink of revolution... (Communist Party Leader) Sison had calculated that Marcos could be provoked into cracking down on his opponents, thereby driving thousands of political activists into the underground, the former party officials said. Recruits were urgently needed, they said, to make use of a large influx of weapons and financial aid that China had already agreed to provide."[10]

text: Martial law (1972–1981)[edit]

text: In September 23, 1972, then Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile was ambushed while en route home. This assassination attempt (which was widely believed to have been staged but denied by Enrile himself[11][12][13]) together with the general citizen disquiet, were used by Marcos as reasons to issue Presidential Proclamation No. 1081, proclaiming a State of martial law in the Philippines on September 21.[14] Rigoberto Tiglao, former press secretary and a former communist incarcerated during the martial law,[15] argued that the liberal and communist parties provoked martial law imposition.[16] Enrile said that "The most significant event that made President Marcos decide to declare martial law was the MV Karagatan incident in July 1972. It was the turning point. The MV Karagatan involved the infiltration of high powered rifles, ammunition, 40-millimeter rocket launchers, rocket projectiles, communications equipment, and other assorted war materials by the CPP-NPA-NDF on the Pacific side of Isabela in Cagayan Valley." The weapons were shipped from Communist China which at that time was exporting the communist revolution and supported the NPA's goal to overthrow the government.[17]

text: Marcos, who thereafter ruled by decree, curtailed press freedom and other civil liberties, abolished Congress, controlled media establishments, and ordered the arrest of opposition leaders and militant activists, including his staunchest critics Senators Benigno Aquino Jr. and Jose W. Diokno, virtually turning the Philippines into a Totalitarian Dictatorship with Marcos as its Supreme Leader. Initially, the declaration of martial law was well received, given the social turmoil of the period. Crime rates decreased significantly after a curfew was implemented. Political opponents were given the opportunity to go into exile. As martial law went on for the next nine years, the excesses committed by the military increased. In total, there were 3,257 extrajudicial killings, 35,000 individual tortures, and 70,000 were incarcerated. It is also reported that 737 Filipinos disappeared between 1975 and 1985.[18]

text: I am president. I am the most powerful man in the Philippines. All that I have dreamt of I have. More accurately, I have all the material things I want of life — a wife who is loving and is a partner in the things I do, bright children who will carry my name, a life well lived — all. But I feel a discontent.

text: Though it was made clear that Martial law was no military take-over of the government, the immediate reaction of some sectors of the nation was of astonishment and dismay, for even if everyone knew that the gravity of the disorder, lawlessness, social injustice, youth and student activism and other disturbing movements had reached a point of peril, they felt that martial law over the whole country was not yet warranted. Worse, political motivations were ascribed to be behind the proclamation, since the then constitutionally non-extendable term of President Marcos was about to expire. This suspicion became more credible when opposition leaders and outspoken anti-administration media people were immediately placed under indefinite detention in military camps and other unusual restrictions were imposed on travel, communication, freedom of speech and of the press, etc. In a word, the martial law regime was anathema to no small portion of the populace.[20]

text: It was in the light of the above circumstances and as a means of solving the dilemma aforementioned that the concept embodied in Amendment No. 6[clarification needed] was born in the Constitution of 1973. In brief, the central idea that emerged was that martial law might be earlier lifted, but to safeguard the Philippines and its people against any abrupt dangerous situation which would warrant the exercise of some authoritarian powers, the latter must be constitutionally allowed, thereby eliminating the need to proclaim martial law and its concomitants, principally the assertion by the military of prerogatives that made them appear superior to the civilian authorities below the President. In other words, the problem was what may be needed for national survival or the restoration of normalcy in the face of a crisis or an emergency should be reconciled with the popular mentality and attitude of the people against martial law.[21]

text: In a speech before his fellow alumni of the University of the Philippines College of Law, President Marcos declared his intention to lift martial law by the end of January 1981.[22]

text: The reassuring words for the skeptic came on the occasion of the University of the Philippines law alumni reunion on December 12, 1980 when the President declared: "We must erase once and for all from the public mind any doubts as to our resolve to bring martial law to an end and to minister to an orderly transition to parliamentary government." The apparent forthright irrevocable commitment was cast at the 45th anniversary celebration of the Armed Forces of the Philippines on December 22, 1980 when the President proclaimed: "A few days ago, following extensive consultations with a broad representation of various sectors of the nation and in keeping with the pledge made a year ago during the seventh anniversary of the New Society, I came to the firm decision that martial law should be lifted before the end of January, 1981, and that only in a few areas where grave problems of public order and national security continue to exist will martial law continue to remain in force."[23]

text: Economy[edit]

text: According to World Bank Data, the Philippine's Gross Domestic Product quadrupled from $8 billion in 1972 to $32.45 billion in 1980.[24] Indeed, according to the U.S. based Heritage Foundation, the Philippines enjoyed its best economic development since 1945 between 1972. The economy grew amidst the two severe global oil shocks following the 1973 oil crisis and 1979 energy crisis - oil price was $3 / barrel in 1973 and $39.5 in 1979, or a growth of 1200% which drove inflation. All in all despite the 1984-1985 recession and despite criticisms of growth not benefiting the masses, GDP on a per capita basis more than tripled from $175.9 in 1965 to $565.8 in 1985 at the end of Marcos' term.[25][25][26][27] The Heritage Foundation pointed that when economy began to weaken 1979, the government did not adopt anti-recessionist policies and instead launched risky and costly industrial projects.[28]

text: The government had a cautious borrowing policy in the 1970s.[29] Amidst high oil prices, high interest rates, capital flight, and falling export prices of sugar and coconut, the Philippine government borrowed a significant amount of foreign debt in the early 1980s.[29] The country's total external debt rose from US$2.3 billion in 1970 to US$26.2 billion in 1985. Marcos' critics charged that policies have become debt-driven, along with corruption and plunder of public funds by Marcos and his cronies. This held the country under a debt-servicing crisis which is expected to be fixed by only 2025. Critics have pointed out an elusive state of the country's development as the period is marred by a sharp devaluing of the Philippine Peso from 3.9 to 20.53. The overall economy experienced a slower growth GDP per capita, lower wage conditions and higher unemployment especially towards the end of Marcos' term after the 1983-1984 recession. The recession was triggered largely by political instability following Ninoy's assassination,[30] high global interest rates,[31] Severe global economic recession, and significant increase in global oil price, the latter three of which affected all indebted countries in Latin America, Europe, and the Philippines was not exempted.[32][33] Critics claimed that poverty incidence grew from 41% in the 1960s at the time Marcos took the Presidency to 59% when he was removed from power.[29][34][35][36][37][38][39]

text: Parliamentary elections[edit]

text: The first formal elections since 1969 for an interim Batasang Pambansa (National Assembly) were held on April 7, 1978. Sen. Aquino, then in jail, decided to run as leader of his party, the Lakas ng Bayan party, but they did not win any seats in the Batasan, despite public support and their apparent victory. The night before the elections, supporters of the LABAN party showed their solidarity by setting up a "noise barrage" in Manila, creating noise the whole night until dawn.

text: The Fourth Republic (1981–1986)[edit]

text: The opposition boycotted the June 16, 1981 presidential elections, which pitted Marcos and his Kilusang Bagong Lipunan party against retired Gen. Alejo Santos of the Nacionalista Party. Marcos won by a margin of over 16 million votes, which constitutionally allowed him to have another six-year term. Finance Minister Cesar Virata was elected as Prime Minister by the Batasang Pambansa.

text: In 1983, opposition leader Benigno "Ninoy" Aquino Jr. was assassinated at Manila International Airport upon his return to the Philippines after a long period of exile in the United States. This coalesced popular dissatisfaction with Marcos and began a series of events, including pressure from the United States, that culminated in a snap presidential election on February 7, 1986. The opposition united under Aquino's widow, Corazon Aquino, and Salvador Laurel, head of the United Nationalists Democratic Organizations (UNIDO). The election was marred by widespread reports of violence and tampering with results by both sides.

text: The official election canvasser, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), declared Marcos the winner, despite a walk-out staged by disenfranchised computer technicians on February 9. According to the COMELEC's final tally, Marcos won with 10,807,197 votes to Aquino's 9,291,761 votes. By contrast, the partial 70% tally of NAMFREL, an accredited poll watcher, said Aquino won with 7,835,070 votes to Marcos's 7,053,068.[40][41]

text: End of the Marcos regime[edit]

text: The fraudulent result was not accepted by Aquino and her supporters. International observers, including a U.S. delegation led by Senator Richard Lugar, denounced the official results. General Fidel Ramos and Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile then withdrew their support for the administration, defecting and barricading themselves within Camp Crame. This resulted in that peaceful 1986 EDSA Revolution that forced Marcos into exile in Hawaii while Corazon Aquino became the 11th President of the Philippines on February 25, 1986. Under Aquino, the Philippines would adopt a new constitution, ending the Fourth Republic and ushering in the beginning of the Fifth Republic.


document_title: List of winners of the New York City Marathon

question_text: who won the marathon in new york city

question_tokens: who won the marathon in new york city

text: Men's open division[edit]

text:
Year
Winner
Country
Time
Notes

1970
Gary Muhrcke
 United States
2:31:38
Course record

1971
Norman Higgins
 United States
2:22:54
Course record

1972
Sheldon Karlin
 United States
2:27:52

1973
Tom Fleming
 United States
2:21:54
Course record

1974
Norbert Sander
 United States
2:26:30

1975
Tom Fleming
 United States
2:19:27
Course record, 2nd victory

1976
Bill Rodgers
 United States
2:10:10
Course record

1977
Bill Rodgers
 United States
2:11:28
2nd victory

1978
Bill Rodgers
 United States
2:12:12
3rd victory

1979
Bill Rodgers
 United States
2:11:42
4th victory

1980
Alberto Salazar
 United States
2:09:41
Course record

1981
Alberto Salazar
 United States
2:08:13
World record, 2nd victory

1982
Alberto Salazar
 United States
2:09:29
3rd victory

1983
Rod Dixon
 New Zealand
2:08:59

1984
Orlando Pizzolato
 Italy
2:14:53

1985
Orlando Pizzolato
 Italy
2:11:34
2nd victory

1986
Gianni Poli
 Italy
2:11:06

1987
Ibrahim Hussein
 Kenya
2:11:01

1988
Steve Jones
 United Kingdom
2:08:20

1989
Juma Ikangaa
 Tanzania
2:08:01
Course record

1990
Douglas Wakiihuri
 Kenya
2:12:39

1991
Salvador García
 Mexico
2:09:28

1992
Willie Mtolo
 South Africa
2:09:29

1993
Andrés Espinosa
 Mexico
2:10:04

1994
Germán Silva
 Mexico
2:11:21

1995
Germán Silva
 Mexico
2:11:00
2nd victory

1996
Giacomo Leone
 Italy
2:09:54

1997
John Kagwe
 Kenya
2:08:12

1998
John Kagwe
 Kenya
2:08:45
2nd victory

1999
Joseph Chebet
 Kenya
2:09:14

2000
Abdelkader El Mouaziz
 Morocco
2:10:09

2001
Tesfaye Jifar
 Ethiopia
2:07:43
Course record

2002
Rodgers Rop
 Kenya
2:08:07

2003
Martin Lel
 Kenya
2:10:30

2004
Hendrick Ramaala
 South Africa
2:09:28

2005
Paul Tergat
 Kenya
2:09:30

2006
Marílson Gomes dos Santos
 Brazil
2:09:58

2007
Martin Lel
 Kenya
2:09:04
2nd victory

2008
Marílson Gomes dos Santos
 Brazil
2:08:43
2nd victory

2009
Meb Keflezighi
 United States
2:09:15

2010
Gebregziabher Gebremariam
 Ethiopia
2:08:14

2011
Geoffrey Mutai
 Kenya
2:05:06
Course record

2012
Cancelled due to Hurricane Sandy

2013
Geoffrey Mutai
 Kenya
2:08:24
2nd victory

2014
Wilson Kipsang
 Kenya
2:10:59

2015
Stanley Biwott
 Kenya
2:10:34

2016
Ghirmay Ghebreslassie
 Eritrea
2:07:51

2017
Geoffrey Kamworor
 Kenya
2:10:53

tag: table

text: Women's open division[edit]

text:
Year
Winner
Country
Time
Notes

1972
Nina Kuscsik
 United States
3:08:41
Course record

1973
Nina Kuscsik
 United States
2:57:07
Course record, 2nd victory

1974
Kathrine Switzer
 United States
3:07:29

1975
Kim Merritt
 United States
2:46:14
Course record

1976
Miki Gorman
 United States
2:39:11
Course record

1977
Miki Gorman
 United States
2:43:10
2nd victory

1978
Grete Waitz
 Norway
2:32:30
Course record

1979
Grete Waitz
 Norway
2:27:33
Course record, 2nd victory

1980
Grete Waitz
 Norway
2:25:42
Course record, 3rd victory

1981
Allison Roe
 New Zealand
2:25:29
Course record

1982
Grete Waitz
 Norway
2:27:14
4th victory

1983
Grete Waitz
 Norway
2:27:00
5th victory

1984
Grete Waitz
 Norway
2:29:30
6th victory

1985
Grete Waitz
 Norway
2:28:34
7th victory

1986
Grete Waitz
 Norway
2:28:06
8th victory

1987
Priscilla Welch
 United Kingdom
2:30:17

1988
Grete Waitz
 Norway
2:28:07
9th victory

1989
Ingrid Kristiansen
 Norway
2:25:30

1990
Wanda Panfil
 Poland
2:30:45

1991
Liz McColgan
 United Kingdom
2:27:32

1992
Lisa Ondieki
 Australia
2:24:40
Course record

1993
Uta Pippig
 Germany
2:26:24

1994
Tegla Loroupe
 Kenya
2:27:37

1995
Tegla Loroupe
 Kenya
2:28:06
2nd victory

1996
Anuţa Cătună
 Romania
2:28:18

1997
Franziska Rochat-Moser
 Switzerland
2:28:43

1998
Franca Fiacconi
 Italy
2:25:17

1999
Adriana Fernandez
 Mexico
2:25:06

2000
Lyudmila Petrova
 Russia
2:25:45

2001
Margaret Okayo
 Kenya
2:24:21
Course record

2002
Joyce Chepchumba
 Kenya
2:25:56

2003
Margaret Okayo
 Kenya
2:22:31
Course record, 2nd victory

2004
Paula Radcliffe
 United Kingdom
2:23:10

2005
Jeļena Prokopčuka
 Latvia
2:24:41

2006
Jeļena Prokopčuka
 Latvia
2:25:05
2nd victory

2007
Paula Radcliffe
 United Kingdom
2:23:09
2nd victory

2008
Paula Radcliffe
 United Kingdom
2:23:56
3rd victory

2009
Derartu Tulu
 Ethiopia
2:28:52

2010
Edna Kiplagat
 Kenya
2:28:20

2011
Firehiwot Dado
 Ethiopia
2:23:15

2012
Cancelled due to Hurricane Sandy

2013
Priscah Jeptoo
 Kenya
2:25:07

2014
Mary Keitany
 Kenya
2:25:07

2015
Mary Keitany
 Kenya
2:24:25
2nd victory

2016
Mary Keitany
 Kenya
2:24:26
3rd victory

2017
Shalane Flanagan
 United States
2:26:53
Fifth US woman to win; first since 1977

text: Men's wheelchair division[edit]

text:
Year
Winner
Country
Time
Notes

2000
Ayari, KamelKamel Ayari
 Tunisia
1:53:50
[1]

2001
Mendoza, SaúlSaúl Mendoza
 Mexico
1:39:29
Course record[2]

2002
Schabort, KrigeKrige Schabort
 South Africa
1:38:27
Course record[3]

2003
Schabort, KrigeKrige Schabort
 South Africa
1:32:19
Course record, 2nd victory[4]

2004
Mendoza, SaúlSaúl Mendoza
 Mexico
1:33:16
2nd victory[5]

2005
van Dyk, ErnstErnst van Dyk
 South Africa
1:31:11
Course record[6]

2006
Fearnley, KurtKurt Fearnley
 Australia
1:29:22
Course record[7]

2007
Fearnley, KurtKurt Fearnley
 Australia
1:33:58
2nd victory[8]

2008
Fearnley, KurtKurt Fearnley
 Australia
1:44:51
3rd victory[9]

2009
Fearnley, KurtKurt Fearnley
 Australia
1:35:58
4th victory

2010
Weir, DavidDavid Weir
 United Kingdom
1:37:29

2011
Soejima, MasazumiMasazumi Soejima
 Japan
1:31:41

2012
Cancelled due to Hurricane Sandy

2013
Hug, MarcelMarcel Hug
 Switzerland
1:40:14

2014
Fearnley, KurtKurt Fearnley
 Australia
1:30:55
5th victory (Note that the course was shortened by 3 miles at the start)

2015
van Dyk, ErnstErnst van Dyk
 South Africa
1:30:54
2nd victory

2016
Hug, MarcelMarcel Hug
 Switzerland
1:35:44
2nd victory

2017
Hug, MarcelMarcel Hug
 Switzerland
1:37.17
3rd victory

text: Women's wheelchair division[edit]

text:
Year
Winner
Country
Time
Notes

2000
Xuan, Anh Nguyen ThiAnh Nguyen Thi Xuan
 Vietnam
2:46:47
[1]

2001
Porcellato, FrancescaFrancesca Porcellato
 Italy
2:08:51
Course record[10]

2002
Blauwet, CheriCheri Blauwet
 United States
2:14:39
[3]

2003
Blauwet, CheriCheri Blauwet
 United States
1:59:30
Course record, 2nd victory[4]

2004
Hunkeler, EdithEdith Hunkeler
 Switzerland
1:53:27
Course record[5]

2005
Hunkeler, EdithEdith Hunkeler
 Switzerland
1:54:52
2nd victory[6]

2006
McGrory, AmandaAmanda McGrory
 United States
1:54:19
2 seconds ahead of 2nd-place finisher[7]

2007
Hunkeler, EdithEdith Hunkeler
 Switzerland
1:52:38
Course record, 3rd victory[8]

2008
Hunkeler, EdithEdith Hunkeler
 Switzerland
2:06:42
4th victory[9]

2009
Hunkeler, EdithEdith Hunkeler
 Switzerland
1:58:15
5th victory

2010
McFadden, TatyanaTatyana McFadden
 United States
2:02:22

2011
McGrory, AmandaAmanda McGrory
 United States
1:50:25
Course record

2012
Cancelled due to Hurricane Sandy

2013
McFadden, TatyanaTatyana McFadden
 United States
1:59:13
2nd victory

2014
McFadden, TatyanaTatyana McFadden
 United States
1:42:16
3rd victory (Note that their course was shortened by 3 miles at the start)

2015
McFadden, TatyanaTatyana McFadden
 United States
1:43:04
4th victory; course record

2016
McFadden, TatyanaTatyana McFadden
 United States
1:47:43
5th victory

text: Victories by nationality[edit]

text:
Country
Men's
Open
Women's
Open
Men's
Wheelchair
Women's
Wheelchair
Total

 United States
14
7
0
9
30

 Kenya
14
10
0
0
24

 Norway
0
10
0
0
10

 Mexico
4
1
2
0
7

 United Kingdom
1
5
1
0
7

  Switzerland
0
1
3
5
9

 Italy
4
1
0
1
6

 Australia
0
1
5
0
6

 South Africa
2
0
4
0
6

 Ethiopia
2
2
0
0
4

 Brazil
2
0
0
0
2

 New Zealand
1
1
0
0
2

 Latvia
0
2
0
0
2

 Morocco
1
0
0
0
1

 Tanzania
1
0
0
0
1

 Germany
0
1
0
0
1

 Poland
0
1
0
0
1

 Romania
0
1
0
0
1

 Russia
0
1
0
0
1

 Tunisia
0
0
1
0
1

 Vietnam
0
0
0
1
1

 Eritrea
1
0
0
0
1


document_title: Protein structure

question_text: how many levels of protein structure are there

text: Protein structure

text: Levels of protein structure[edit]

text: There are four distinct levels of protein structure.

text: Primary structure[edit]

text: The primary structure of a protein refers to the sequence of amino acids in the polypeptide chain. The primary structure is held together by peptide bonds that are made during the process of protein biosynthesis. The two ends of the polypeptide chain are referred to as the carboxyl terminus (C-terminus) and the amino terminus (N-terminus) based on the nature of the free group on each extremity. Counting of residues always starts at the N-terminal end (NH2-group), which is the end where the amino group is not involved in a peptide bond. The primary structure of a protein is determined by the gene corresponding to the protein. A specific sequence of nucleotides in DNA is transcribed into mRNA, which is read by the ribosome in a process called translation. The sequence of amino acids in insulin was discovered by Frederick Sanger, establishing that proteins have defining amino acid sequences.[3][4] The sequence of a protein is unique to that protein, and defines the structure and function of the protein. The sequence of a protein can be determined by methods such as Edman degradation or tandem mass spectrometry. Often, however, it is read directly from the sequence of the gene using the genetic code. It is strictly recommended to use the words "amino acid residues" when discussing proteins because when a peptide bond is formed, a water molecule is lost, and therefore proteins are made up of amino acid residues. Post-translational modification such as disulfide bond formation, phosphorylations and glycosylations are usually also considered a part of the primary structure, and cannot be read from the gene. For example, insulin is composed of 51 amino acids in 2 chains. One chain has 31 amino acids, and the other has 20 amino acids.

text: Secondary structure[edit]

text: Secondary structure refers to highly regular local sub-structures on the actual polypeptide backbone chain. Two main types of secondary structure, the α-helix and the β-strand or β-sheets, were suggested in 1951 by Linus Pauling and coworkers.[5] These secondary structures are defined by patterns of hydrogen bonds between the main-chain peptide groups. They have a regular geometry, being constrained to specific values of the dihedral angles ψ and φ on the Ramachandran plot. Both the α-helix and the β-sheet represent a way of saturating all the hydrogen bond donors and acceptors in the peptide backbone. Some parts of the protein are ordered but do not form any regular structures. They should not be confused with random coil, an unfolded polypeptide chain lacking any fixed three-dimensional structure. Several sequential secondary structures may form a "supersecondary unit".[6]

text: Tertiary structure[edit]

text: Tertiary structure refers to the three-dimensional structure of monomeric and multimeric protein molecules. The α-helixes and β-pleated-sheets are folded into a compact globular structure. The folding is driven by the non-specific hydrophobic interactions, the burial of hydrophobic residues from water, but the structure is stable only when the parts of a protein domain are locked into place by specific tertiary interactions, such as salt bridges, hydrogen bonds, and the tight packing of side chains and disulfide bonds. The disulfide bonds are extremely rare in cytosolic proteins, since the cytosol (intracellular fluid) is generally a reducing environment.

text: Quaternary structure[edit]

text: Quaternary structure is the three-dimensional structure consisting of the aggregation of two or more individual polypeptide chains (subunits) that operate as a single functional unit. In this context, the quaternary structure is stabilized by the same non-covalent interactions and disulfide bonds as the tertiary structure. Complexes of two or more polypeptides (i.e. multiple subunits) are called multimers. Specifically it would be called a dimer if it contains two subunits, a trimer if it contains three subunits, a tetramer if it contains four subunits, and a pentamer if it contains five subunits. The subunits are frequently related to one another by symmetry operations, such as a 2-fold axis in a dimer. Multimers made up of identical subunits are referred to with a prefix of "homo-" (e.g. a homotetramer) and those made up of different subunits are referred to with a prefix of "hetero-", for example, a heterotetramer, such as the two alpha and two beta chains of hemoglobin.

text: Domains, motifs, and folds in protein structure[edit]

text: Proteins are frequently described as consisting of several structural units. These units include domains, motifs, and folds. Despite the fact that there are about 100,000 different proteins expressed in eukaryotic systems, there are many fewer different domains, structural motifs and folds.

text: Structural domain[edit]

text: A structural domain is an element of the protein's overall structure that is self-stabilizing and often folds independently of the rest of the protein chain. Many domains are not unique to the protein products of one gene or one gene family but instead appear in a variety of proteins. Domains often are named and singled out because they figure prominently in the biological function of the protein they belong to; for example, the "calcium-binding domain of calmodulin". Because they are independently stable, domains can be "swapped" by genetic engineering between one protein and another to make chimera proteins.

text: Structural and sequence motif[edit]

text: The structural and sequence motifs refer to short segments of protein three-dimensional structure or amino acid sequence that were found in a large number of different proteins.

text: Supersecondary structure[edit]

text: The supersecondary structure refers to a specific combination of secondary structure elements, such as β-α-β units or a helix-turn-helix motif. Some of them may be also referred to as structural motifs.

text: Protein fold[edit]

text: A protein fold refers to the general protein architecture, like a helix bundle, β-barrel, Rossman fold or different "folds" provided in the Structural Classification of Proteins database.[7] A related concept is protein topology that refers to the arrangement of contacts within the protein.

text: Superdomain[edit]

text: A superdomain consists of two or more nominally unrelated structural domains that are inherited as a single unit and occur in different proteins.[8] An example is provided by the protein tyrosine phosphatase domain and C2 domain pair in PTEN, several tensin proteins, auxilin and proteins in plants and fungi. The PTP-C2 superdomain evidently came into existence prior to the divergence of fungi, plants and animals is therefore likely to be about 1.5 billion years old.

text: Protein folding[edit]

text: Once translated by a ribosome, each polypeptide folds into its characteristic three-dimensional structure from a random coil.[9] Since the fold is maintained by a network of interactions between amino acids in the polypeptide, the native state of the protein chain is determined by the amino acid sequence (Anfinsen's dogma).[10]

text: Protein structure determination[edit]

text: Around 90% of the protein structures available in the Protein Data Bank have been determined by X-ray crystallography.[11] This method allows one to measure the three-dimensional (3-D) density distribution of electrons in the protein, in the crystallized state, and thereby infer the 3-D coordinates of all the atoms to be determined to a certain resolution. Roughly 9% of the known protein structures have been obtained by nuclear magnetic resonance (NMR) techniques.[citation needed] For larger protein complexes, cryo-electron microscopy can determine protein structures. The resolution is typically lower than that of X-ray crystallography, or NMR, but the maximum resolution is steadily increasing. This technique is still a particularly valuable for very large protein complexes such as virus coat proteins and amyloid fibers.

text: General secondary structure composition can be determined via circular dichroism. Vibrational spectroscopy can also be used to characterize the conformation of peptides, polypeptides, and proteins.[12] Two-dimensional infrared spectroscopy has become a valuable method to investigate the structures of flexible peptides and proteins that cannot be studied with other methods.[13][14] A more qualitative picture of protein structure is often obtained by proteolysis, which is also useful to screen for more crystallizable protein samples. Novel implementations of this approach, including fast parallel proteolysis (FASTpp), can probe the structured fraction and its stability without the need for purification.[15] Once a protein's structure has been experimentally determined, further detailed studies can be done computationally, using molecular dynamic simulations of that structure.[16]

text: Protein Sequence Analysis: Ensembles[edit]

text: Proteins are often thought of as relatively stable structures that have a set tertiary structure and experience conformational changes as a result of being modified by other proteins or as part of enzymatic activity. However proteins have varying degrees of stability and some of the less stable variants are intrinsically disordered proteins. These proteins exist and function in a relatively 'disordered' state lacking a stable tertiary structure. As a result, they are difficult to describe in a standard protein structure model that was designed for proteins with a fixed tertiary structure. Conformational ensembles have been devised as a way to provide a more accurate and 'dynamic' representation of the conformational state of intrinsically disordered proteins. Conformational ensembles function by attempting to represent the various conformations of intrinsically disordered proteins within an ensemble file (the type found at the Protein Ensemble Database).

text: Protein ensemble files are a representation of a protein that can be considered to have a flexible structure. Creating these files requires determining which of the various theoretically possible protein conformations actually exist. One approach is to apply computational algorithms to the protein data in order to try to determine the most likely set of conformations for an ensemble file.

text: There are multiple methods for preparing data for the Protein Ensemble Database that fall into two general methodologies – pool and molecular dynamics (MD) approaches (diagrammed in the figure). The pool based approach uses the protein’s amino acid sequence to create a massive pool of random conformations. This pool is then subjected to more computational processing that creates a set of theoretical parameters for each conformation based on the structure. Conformational subsets from this pool whose average theoretical parameters closely match known experimental data for this protein are selected.[17]

text: The molecular dynamics approach takes multiple random conformations at a time and subjects all of them to experimental data. Here the experimental data is serving as limitations to be placed on the conformations (e.g. known distances between atoms). Only conformations that manage to remain within the limits set by the experimental data are accepted. This approach often applies large amounts of experimental data to the conformations which is a very computationally demanding task.[17]

text:
Protein
Data Type
Protocol
PED ID
References

Sic1/Cdc4
NMR and SAXS
Pool-based
PED9AAA
[18]

p15 PAF
NMR and SAXS
Pool-based
PED6AAA
[19]

MKK7
NMR
Pool-based
PED5AAB
[20]

Beta-synuclein
NMR
MD-based
PED1AAD
[21]

P27 KID
NMR
MD-based
PED2AAA
[22]

text: (adapted from image in "Computational approaches for inferring the functions of intrinsically disordered proteins"[17])

text: Protein structure databases[edit]

text: Protein structure database is a database that is modeled around the various experimentally determined protein structures. The aim of most protein structure databases is to organize and annotate the protein structures, providing the biological community access to the experimental data in a useful way. Data included in protein structure databases often includes 3D coordinates as well as experimental information, such as unit cell dimensions and angles for x-ray crystallography determined structures. Though most instances, in this case either proteins or a specific structure determinations of a protein, also contain sequence information and some databases even provide means for performing sequence based queries, the primary attribute of a structure database is structural information, whereas sequence databases focus on sequence information, and contain no structural information for the majority of entries. Protein structure databases are critical for many efforts in computational biology such as structure based drug design, both in developing the computational methods used and in providing a large experimental dataset used by some methods to provide insights about the function of a protein.[23]

text: Structure classification[edit]

text: Protein structures can be grouped based on their similarity or a common evolutionary origin. The Structural Classification of Proteins database[24] and CATH database[25] provide two different structural classifications of proteins. Shared structure between proteins is considered evidence of evolutionary relatedness between proteins and is used group proteins together into protein superfamilies.[26]

text: Computational prediction of protein structure[edit]

text: The generation of a protein sequence is much easier than the determination of a protein structure. However, the structure of a protein gives much more insight in the function of the protein than its sequence. Therefore, a number of methods for the computational prediction of protein structure from its sequence have been developed.[27] Ab initio prediction methods use just the sequence of the protein. Threading and homology modeling methods can build a 3-D model for a protein of unknown structure from experimental structures of evolutionarily-related proteins, called a protein family.