document_title: India–United States Civil Nuclear Agreement

question_text: when did the parliament of india adopt the indo us civil nuclear deal

question_tokens: when did the parliament of india adopt the indo us civil nuclear deal

text: India–United States Civil Nuclear Agreement

text: Overview[edit]

text: The Henry J. Hyde United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act of 2006, also known as the Hyde Act, is the U.S. domestic law that modifies the requirements of Section 123 of the U.S. Atomic Energy Act to permit nuclear cooperation with India and in particular to negotiate a 123 Agreement to operationalize the 2005 Joint Statement.[22][23] As a domestic U.S. law, the Hyde Act is binding on the United States. The Hyde Act cannot be binding on India's sovereign decisions although it can be construed as prescriptive for future U.S. reactions. As per the Vienna Convention, an international agreement such as the 123 Agreement cannot be superseded by an internal law such as the Hyde Act.[24][25][26]

text: The 123 agreement defines the terms and conditions for bilateral civilian nuclear cooperation, and requires separate approvals by the U.S. Congress and by Indian cabinet ministers. The agreement will also help India meet its goal of adding 25,000 MW of nuclear power capacity through imports of nuclear reactors and fuel by 2020.[27]

text: After the terms of the 123 agreement were concluded on July 27, 2007,[28] it ran into trouble because of stiff opposition in India from the communist allies of the ruling United Progressive Alliance.[29] The government survived a confidence vote in the parliament on July 22, 2008 by 275–256 votes in the backdrop of defections by some parties .[30] The deal also had faced opposition from non-proliferation activists, anti-nuclear organisations, and some states within the Nuclear Suppliers Group.[31][32] In February 2008, U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said that any agreement would be "consistent with the obligations of the Hyde Act".[33] The bill was signed on October 8, 2008.

text: Background[edit]

text: Parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) have a recognized right of access to peaceful uses of nuclear energy and an obligation to cooperate on civilian nuclear technology. Separately, the Nuclear Suppliers Group has agreed on guidelines for nuclear exports, including reactors and fuel. Those guidelines condition such exports on comprehensive safeguards by the International Atomic Energy Agency, which are designed to verify that nuclear energy is not diverted from peaceful use to weapons programs. Though neither India, Israel, nor Pakistan have signed the NPT, India argues that instead of addressing the central objective of universal and comprehensive non-proliferation, the treaty creates a club of "nuclear haves" and a larger group of "nuclear have-nots" by restricting the legal possession of nuclear weapons to those states that tested them before 1967, who alone are free to possess and multiply their nuclear stockpiles.[34] India insists on a comprehensive action plan for a nuclear-free world within a specific time-frame and has also adopted a voluntary "no first use policy".

text: Led by the U.S., other states have set up an informal group, the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), to control exports of nuclear materials, equipment and technology.[35] Consequently, India was left outside the international nuclear order, which forced India to develop its own resources for each stage of the nuclear fuel cycle and power generation, including next generation reactors such as fast breeder reactors and a thorium breeder reactor[36][37] known as the Advanced Heavy Water Reactor. In addition to impelling India to achieve success in developing these new reactor technologies, the sanctions also provided India with the impetus to continue developing its own nuclear weapons technology with a specific goal of achieving self-sufficiency for all key components for weapons design, testing and production.

text: Given that India is estimated to possess reserves of about 80,000–112,369 tons of uranium,[38] India has more than enough fissile material to supply its nuclear weapons program, even if it restricted Plutonium production to only 8 of the country's 17 current reactors, and then further restricted Plutonium production to only 1/4 of the fuel core of these reactors.[39] According to the calculations of one of the key advisers to the US Nuclear deal negotiating team, Ashley Tellis:[39]

text: Operating India’s eight unsafeguarded PHWRs in such a [conservative] regime would bequeath New Delhi with some 12,135–13,370 kilograms of weapons-grade plutonium, which is sufficient to produce between 2,023–2,228 nuclear weapons over and above those already existing in the Indian arsenal. Although no Indian analyst, let alone a policy maker, has ever advocated any nuclear inventory that even remotely approximates such numbers, this heuristic exercise confirms that New Delhi has the capability to produce a gigantic nuclear arsenal while subsisting well within the lowest estimates of its known uranium reserves.

text: However, because the amount of nuclear fuel required for the electricity generation sector is far greater than that required to maintain a nuclear weapons program, and since India's estimated reserve of uranium represents only 1% of the world's known uranium reserves, the NSG's uranium export restrictions mainly affected Indian nuclear power generation capacity. Specifically, the NSG sanctions challenge India's long term plans to expand and fuel its civilian nuclear power generation capacity from its current output of about 4GWe (GigaWatt electricity) to a power output of 20GWe by 2020; assuming the planned expansion used conventional Uranium/Plutonium fueled heavy water and light water nuclear power plants.

text: Consequently, India's nuclear isolation constrained expansion of its civil nuclear program, but left India relatively immune to foreign reactions to a prospective nuclear test. Partly for this reason, but mainly due to continued unchecked covert nuclear and missile proliferation activities between Pakistan, China[40][41] and North Korea,[42][43] India conducted five more nuclear tests in May 1998 at Pokhran.

text: India was subject to international sanctions after its May 1998 nuclear tests. However, due to the size of the Indian economy and its relatively large domestic sector, these sanctions had little impact on India, with Indian GDP growth increasing from 4.8% in 1997–1998 (prior to sanctions) to 6.6% (during sanctions) in 1998–1999.[44] Consequently, at the end of 2001, the Bush Administration decided to drop all sanctions on India.[45] Although India achieved its strategic objectives from the Pokhran nuclear tests in 1998,[46] it continued to find its civil nuclear program isolated internationally.

text: Rationale behind the agreement[edit]

text: Nuclear non-proliferation[edit]

text: The proposed civil nuclear agreement implicitly recognizes India's "de facto" status even without signing the NPT. The Bush administration justifies a nuclear pact with India arguing that it is important in helping to advance the non-proliferation framework[47] by formally recognizing India's strong non-proliferation record even though it has not signed the NPT. The former Under Secretary of State of Political Affairs, Nicholas Burns, one of the architects of the Indo-U.S. nuclear deal said "India's trust, its credibility, the fact that it has promised to create a state-of-the-art facility, monitored by the IAEA, to begin a new export control regime in place, because it has not proliferated the nuclear technology, we can’t say that about Pakistan." when asked whether the U.S. would offer a nuclear deal with Pakistan on the lines of the Indo-U.S. deal.[48][49][50] Mohamed ElBaradei, former head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, which would be in charge of inspecting India's civilian reactors has praised the deal as "it would also bring India closer as an important partner in the nonproliferation regime".[51] The reaction in the U.S. led academic community was mixed. While some authors praised the agreement as bringing India closer to the NPT regime, others argued that it gave India too much leeway in determining which facilities were to be safeguarded and that it effectively rewarded India for continuously refusing to accede to the Non-Proliferation Treaty.[52]

text: Economic considerations[edit]

text: Financially, the U.S. also expects that such a deal could spur India's economic growth and bring in $150 billion in the next decade for nuclear power plants, of which the U.S. wants a share.[53] It is India's stated objective to increase the production of nuclear power generation from its present capacity of 4,780 MWe to 20,000 MWe by 2020. India's parliament passed The Civil Liability for Nuclear Damages bill on August 25, 2010,[54][55] which allows the operator to sue the supplier in case of an accident due to technical defects in the plant.[56] After the nuclear disaster at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant in Japan, issues relating to the safety of operating nuclear power plants, compensation in the event of a radiation-leak accident, disaster clean-up costs, operator responsibility and supplier liability has once again come into the spot-light.

text: Nuclear technology[edit]

text: Dr. Siegfried S. Hecker, PhD., former Director of the Los Alamos National Laboratory, observed while testifying before a U.S. Senate Committee in 2008 that the United States might benefit from access to Indian nuclear technology: "I found that whereas sanctions slowed progress in nuclear energy, they made India self-sufficient and world leaders in fast reactor technologies. While much of the world’s approach to India has been to limit its access to nuclear technology, it may well be that today we limit ourselves by not having access to India’s nuclear technology developments. Such technical views should help to advice the diplomatic efforts with India."[57]

text: Because India's nuclear program was developed mostly indigenously, the country used unique techniques that other countries can learn from.[58]

text: Strategic[edit]

text: Since the end of the Cold War, The Pentagon, along with certain U.S. ambassadors such as Robert Blackwill, has requested increased strategic ties with India and a de-hyphenization of Pakistan with India, i.e. having separate policies toward India and Pakistan rather than just an "India-Pakistan" policy. The United States also sees India as a viable counter-weight to the growing influence of China,[citation needed] and a potential client and job creator.[59]

text: While India is self-sufficient in thorium, possessing 25% of the world's known and economically viable thorium,[60] it possesses a meager 1% of the similarly calculated global uranium reserves.[61] Indian support for cooperation with the U.S. centers on the issue of obtaining a steady supply of sufficient energy for the economy to grow. Indian opposition to the pact centers on the concessions that would need to be made, as well as the likely de-prioritization of research into a thorium fuel cycle if uranium becomes highly available given the well understood utilization of uranium in a nuclear fuel cycle.

text: Passing of Agreement[edit]

text: On March 2, 2006 in New Delhi, George W. Bush and Manmohan Singh signed a Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement, following an initiation during the July 2005 summit in Washington between the two leaders over civilian nuclear cooperation.[62]

text: Heavily endorsed by the White House, the agreement is thought to be a major victory to George W. Bush's foreign policy initiative and was described by many lawmakers as a cornerstone of the new strategic partnership between the two countries.[63]

text: On August 3, 2007, both the countries released the full text of the 123 agreement.[64] Nicholas Burns, the chief negotiator of the India-United States nuclear deal, said the U.S. has the right to terminate the deal if India tests a nuclear weapon and that no part of the agreement recognizes India as a nuclear weapons state (which would be contrary to the NPT).[65]

text: Hyde Act Passage in the U.S.[edit]

text: On December 18, 2006 President George W. Bush signed the Hyde Act into law. The Act was passed by an overwhelming 359–68 in the United States House of Representatives on July 26 and by 85–12 in the United States Senate on November 16 in a strong show of bipartisan support.[66][67][68]

text: The House version (H.R. 5682) and Senate version (S. 3709) of the bill differed due to amendments each had added before approving, but the versions were reconciled with a House vote of 330–59 on December 8 and a Senate voice-vote on December 9 before being passed on to President G.W. Bush for final approval.[69][70] The White House had urged Congress to expedite the reconciliation process during the end-2006 lame duck session, and recommended removing certain amendments which would be deemed deal-killers by India.[71]

text: In response to the language Congress used in the Act to define U.S. policy toward India, President Bush, stated "Given the Constitution's commitment to the authority of the presidency to conduct the nation's foreign affairs, the executive branch shall construe such policy statements as advisory," going on to cite sections 103 and 104 (d) (2) of the bill. To assure Congress that its work would not be totally discarded, Bush continued by saying that the executive would give "the due weight that comity between the legislative and executive branches should require, to the extent consistent with U.S. foreign policy."[72]

text: Political opposition in India[edit]

text: The Indo-US civilian nuclear agreement was met with stiff opposition by some political parties and activists in India. Although many mainstream political parties including the Congress(I) supported the deal along with regional parties like Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam and Rashtriya Janata Dal its realization ran into difficulties in the face of stiff political opposition in India. Also, in November 2007, former Indian Military chiefs, bureaucrats and scientists drafted a letter to Members of Parliament expressing their support for the deal.[73] However, opposition and criticism continued at political levels. The Samajwadi Party (SP) which was with the Left Front in opposing the deal changed its stand after discussing with ex-president of India and scientist Dr A. P. J. Abdul Kalam. The SP then supported the government and the deal. The Indian Government survived a vote of confidence by 275–256 after the Left Front withdrew their support to the government over this dispute.[74] Incidentally, results showed ten MPs belonging to the opposing BJP party cross-voting in the favor of the government.

text: As details were revealed about serious inconsistencies between what the Indian parliament was told about the deal, and the facts about the agreement that were presented by the Bush administration to the US Congress, opposition grew in India against the deal. In particular, portions of the agreement dealing with guaranteeing India a fuel supply or allowing India to maintain a strategic reserve of nuclear fuel appear to be diametrically opposed to what the Indian parliament was led to expect from the agreement: Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's statement in parliament is totally at variance with the Bush Administration's communication to the House Foreign Affairs Committee, which says India will not be allowed to stockpile such nuclear fuel stocks as to undercut American leverage to re-impose sanctions. To drive home this point, it says the 123 Agreement is not inconsistent with the Hyde Act's stipulation—the little-known 'Barack Obama Amendment' – that the supply of nuclear fuel should be "commensurate with reasonable operating requirements". The 'strategic reserve' that is crucial to India's nuclear program is, therefore, a non-starter.[75]

text: Furthermore, the agreement, as a result of its compliance with the Hyde Act, contained a direct linkage between shutting down US nuclear trade with India and any potential future Indian nuclear weapons test, a point that was factually inconsistent with explicit reassurances made on this subject by Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh, during final parliamentary debate on the nuclear deal. As professor Brahma Chellaney, an expert in strategic affairs and one of the authors of the Indian Nuclear Doctrine,[76] explained:

text: While the Hyde Act’s bar on Indian testing is explicit, the one in the NSG waiver is implicit, yet unmistakable. The NSG waiver is overtly anchored in NSG Guidelines Paragraph 16, which deals with the consequence of “an explosion of a nuclear device”. The waiver’s Section 3(e) refers to this key paragraph, which allows a supplier to call for a special NSG meeting, and seek termination of cooperation, in the event of a test or any other “violation of a supplier-recipient understanding”. The recently leaked Bush administration letter to Congress has cited how this Paragraph 16 rule will effectively bind India to the Hyde Act's conditions on the pain of a U.S.-sponsored cut-off of all multilateral cooperation. India will not be able to escape from the U.S.-set conditions by turning to other suppliers.[77]

text: Indian parliament vote[edit]

text: On July 9, 2008, India formally submitted the safeguards agreement to the IAEA.[78] This development came after the Prime Minister of India Manmohan Singh returned from the 34th G8 summit meeting in Hokkaido, Japan, where he met with U.S. President George W. Bush.[79] On June 19, 2008, news media reported that Indian Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh threatened to resign his position if the Left Front, whose support was crucial for the ruling United Progressive Alliance to prove its majority in the Indian parliament, continued to oppose the nuclear deal and he described their stance as irrational and reactionary.[80] According to The Hindu, External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee’s earlier statement said “I cannot bind the government if we lose our majority,”[81] implying that United Progressive Alliance government would not put its signature on any deal with IAEA if it lost the majority in either a 'opposition-initiated no-confidence motion' or if failing to muster a vote of confidence in Indian parliament after being told to prove its majority by the president. On July 8, 2008, Prakash Karat announced that the Left Front is withdrawing its support to the government over the decision by the government to go ahead on the United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act. The left front had been a staunch advocate of not proceeding with this deal citing national interests.[82]

text: On July 22, 2008 the UPA faced its first confidence vote in the Lok Sabha after the Communist Party of India (Marxist) led Left Front withdrew support over India approaching the IAEA for Indo-U.S. nuclear deal. The UPA won the confidence vote with 275 votes to the opposition's 256, (10 members abstained from the vote) to record a 19-vote victory.[83][84][85][86]

text: IAEA approval[edit]

text: The IAEA Board of Governors approved the safeguards agreement on August 1, 2008, and the 45-state Nuclear Suppliers Group next had to approve a policy allowing nuclear cooperation with India. U.S. President Bush can then make the necessary certifications and seek final approval by the U.S. Congress.[87] There were objections from Pakistan, Iran, Ireland, Norway, Switzerland, and Austria at the IAEA meeting.[88]

text: NSG waiver[edit]

text: On September 6, 2008 India was granted the waiver at the NSG meeting held in Vienna, Austria. The consensus was arrived at after overcoming misgivings expressed by Austria, Ireland, and New Zealand and is an unprecedented step in giving exemption to a country which has not signed the NPT and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)[89][90] The Indian team who worked on the deal includes Manmohan Singh, Pranab Mukherjee, Shivshankar Menon, Shyam Saran, M. K. Narayanan, Anil Kakodkar, Ravi Grover, and DB Venkatesh Varma.[89]

text: Versions of U.S. draft exemption[edit]

text: On August 2008 U.S. draft exemption would have granted India a waiver based on the "steps that India has taken voluntarily as a contributing partner in the non-proliferation regime".[91] Based on these steps, and without further conditions, the draft waiver would have allowed for the transfer to India of both trigger list and dual-use items (including technology), waiving the full-scope safeguards requirements of the NSG guidelines.[92]

text: A September 2008 waiver would have recognized additional "steps that India has voluntarily taken."[93] The waiver called for notifying the NSG of bilateral agreements and for regular consultations; however, it also would have waived the full-scope safeguards requirements of the NSG guidelines without further conditions.[92]

text: The U.S. draft underwent further changes in an effort to make the language more acceptable to the NSG.[94]

text: Initial support and opposition[edit]

text: The deal had initial support from the United States, the United Kingdom,[95] France,[96] Japan,[97] Russia,[98] and Germany.[99][100] After some initial opposition, there were reports of Australia,[101] Switzerland,[102] and Canada[103][104] expressing their support for the deal. Selig S. Harrison, a former South Asia bureau chief of The Washington Post, has said the deal may represent a tacit recognition of India as a nuclear weapon state,[105] while former U.S. Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Robert Joseph says the "U.S. State Department made it very clear that we will not recognize India as a nuclear-weapon state".[106]

text: Norway, Austria, Brazil, and Japan all warned that their support for India at the IAEA did not mean that they would not express reservations at the NSG. New Zealand, which is a member of the NSG but not of the IAEA Board of Governors, cautioned that its support should not be taken for granted.[32] Ireland, which launched the non-proliferation treaty process in 1958 and signed it first in 1968, doubted India's nuclear trade agreement with the U.S.[107] Russia, a potentially large nuclear supplier to India, expressed reservations about transferring enrichment and reprocessing technology to India.[108] China argued the agreement constituted "a major blow to the international non-proliferation regime".[109] New Zealand said it would like to see a few conditions written in to the waiver: the exemption ceasing if India conducts nuclear tests, India signing the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) additional protocol, and placing limits on the scope of the technology that can be given to India and which could relate to nuclear weapons.[110] Austria, Ireland, the Netherlands, Switzerland and Scandinavian countries proposed similar amendments.[111] The nuclear deal was opposed by former U.S. president Jimmy Carter, who opined that the U.S. would be making "a dangerous deal with India"[112]

text: After the first NSG meeting in August 2008, diplomats noted that up to 20 of the 45 NSG states tabled conditions similar to the Hyde Act for India's waiver to do business with the NSG.[113] "There were proposals on practically every paragraph," a European diplomat said.[113] A group of seven NSG members suggested including some of the provisions of the U.S. Hyde Act in the final waiver.[114] Daryll Kimball, executive director of the Washington-based Arms Control Association, said the NSG should at a minimum "make clear that nuclear trade with India shall be terminated if it resumes testing for any reason. If India cannot agree to such terms, it suggests that India is not serious about its nuclear test moratorium pledge."[115]

text: Reactions following the waiver[edit]

text: After India was granted the waiver on September 6, the United Kingdom said that the NSG's decision would make a "significant contribution" to global energy and climate security.[116] U.S. National Security Council spokesman Gordon Johndroe said, "this is a historic achievement that strengthens global non-proliferation principles while assisting India to meet its energy requirements in an environmentally friendly manner. The United States thanks the participating governments in the NSG for their outstanding efforts and cooperation to welcome India into the global non-proliferation community. We especially appreciate the role Germany played as chair to move this process forward."[117] New Zealand praised the NSG consensus and said that it got the best possible deal with India.[118] One of India's strongest allies Russia said in a statement, "We are convinced that the exemption made for India reflects Delhi's impeccable record in the non-proliferation sphere and will guarantee the peaceful uses of nuclear exports to India."[119] Australian Foreign Minister Stephen Smith said that the NSG granted waiver because of "India's rise as a global power" and added, "If such a request was made for another country, I don't think it would have been cleared by the NSG members."[120] During his visit to India in September 2008, Smith said that Australia "understood and respected India's decision not to join the Non-Proliferation Treaty".[121] German Foreign Ministry spokesman Jens Ploetner called India a "special case" and added, "Does this agreement send an approving message to Iran? No, it absolutely does not."[122]

text: Initially, there were reports of the People's Republic of China analyzing the extent of the opposition against the waiver at the NSG and then revealing its position over the issue.[123] On September 1, 2008, prominent Chinese newspaper People's Daily expressed its strong disapproval of the civilian agreement with India.[124] India's National Security Advisor remarked that one of the major opponents of the waiver was China and said that he would express Indian government's displeasure over the issue.[125] It was also revealed that China had abstained during the final voting process, indicating its non-approval of the nuclear agreement.[126] In a statement, Chinese delegation to the NSG said the group should address the aspirations of other countries too, an implicit reference to Pakistan.[127] There were also unconfirmed reports of India considering the cancellation of a state visit by Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi.[128] However, External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee said the Chinese Foreign Minister will be welcomed "as an honored guest".[129] The Times of India noted that China's stance could have a long-term implication on Sino-Indian relations.[130]

text: There were some other conflicting reports on China's stance, however. The Hindu reported that though China had expressed its desire to include more stern language in the final draft, they had informed India about their intention to back the agreement.[131] In an interview to the Hindustan Times, Chinese Assistant Foreign Minister Hu Zhengyue said that "China understands India's needs for civil nuclear energy and related international cooperation."[132] Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi told India's CNN-IBN, "We didn't do anything to block it [the deal]. We played a constructive role. We also adopted a positive and responsible attitude and a safeguards agreement was reached, so facts speak louder ... than some reports".[133] During a press conference in New Delhi, Yang added, "The policy was set much before that. When consensus was reached, China had already made it clear in a certain way that we have no problem with the [NSG] statement."[134] Highlighting the importance of Sino-Indian relations, Yang remarked, "let us [India and China] work together to move beyond doubts to build a stronger relationship between us."[135]

text: Indian reactions[edit]

text: Indian PM Manmohan Singh visited Washington D.C. on September 26, 2008 to celebrate the conclusion of the agreement with U.S. President George W. Bush.[136] He also visited France to convey his appreciation for the country's stance.[137] India's External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee expressed his deep appreciation for India's allies in the NSG, especially the United States, United Kingdom, France, Russia, Germany, South Africa and Brazil for helping India achieve NSG's consensus on the nuclear deal.[138]

text: Bharatiya Janata Party's Yashwant Sinha, who also formerly held the post of India's External Affairs Minister, criticized the Indian government's decision to seek NSG's consensus and remarked that "India has walked into the non-proliferation trap set by the U.S., we have given up our right to test nuclear weapons forever, it has been surrendered by the government".[139] However, another prominent member of the same party and India's former National Security Advisor Brajesh Mishra supported the development at the NSG and said that the waiver granted made "no prohibition" on India to conduct nuclear tests in the future.[140]

text: A leading advocate of the agreement was India's most eminent strategic affairs analyst K. Subrahmanyam, also known for his long and controversial championing of an Indian nuclear deterrent.[141] He argued that the convergence of strategic interests between the two nations forced such a remarkable gesture from the US, overturning its decades-long stand on non-proliferation, and that it would be unwise on India's part to spurn such an overture.[142] He also argued that not recognizing new geo-political realities would be even more foolhardy on the part of the Indian elite.[143][144]

text: Former President of India and noted Indian scientist, A. P. J. Abdul Kalam, also supported the agreement and remarked that New Delhi may break its "voluntary moratorium" on further nuclear tests in "supreme national interest".[145] However, analyst M K Bhadrakumar demurred. He said that the consensus at NSG was achieved on the "basis" of Pranab Mukherjee's commitment to India's voluntary moratorium on nuclear testing and by doing so, India has entered into a "multilateral commitment" bringing it within "the ambit of the CTBT and NPT".[146]

text: The NSG consensus was welcomed by several major Indian companies. Major Indian corporations like Videocon Group, Tata Power and Jindal Power saw a US$40 billion nuclear energy market in India in the next 10–15 years.[147] On a more optimistic note, some of India's largest and most well-respected corporations like Bharat Heavy Electricals Limited, National Thermal Power Corporation and Larsen & Toubro were eyeing a $100 billion (U.S.) business in this sector over the same time period.[147] According to Hindustan Times, nuclear energy will produce 52,000 MW of electricity in India by 2020.[148]

text: Other reactions over the issue[edit]

text: More than 150 non-proliferation activists and anti-nuclear organizations called for tightening the initial NSG agreement to prevent harming the current global non-proliferation regime.[149] Among the steps called for were:[31]

text:
ceasing cooperation if India conducts nuclear tests or withdraws from safeguards
supplying only an amount of fuel which is commensurate with ordinary reactor operating requirements
expressly prohibiting the transfer of enrichment, reprocessing, and heavy water production items to India
opposing any special safeguards exemptions for India
conditioning the waiver on India stopping fissile production and legally binding itself not to conduct nuclear tests
not allowing India to reprocess nuclear fuel supplied by a member state in a facility that is not under permanent and unconditional IAEA safeguards
agreeing that all bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements between an NSG member-state and India explicitly prohibit the replication or use of such technology in any unsafeguarded Indian facilities

text: The call said that the draft Indian nuclear "deal would be a nonproliferation disaster and a serious setback to the prospects of global nuclear disarmament" and also pushed for all world leaders who are serious about ending the arms race "to stand up and be counted."[31]

text: Dr. Kaveh L. Afrasiabi, who has taught political science at Tehran University, has argued the agreement will set a new precedent for other states, adding that the agreement represents a diplomatic boon for Tehran.[150] Ali Ashgar Soltanieh, the Iranian Deputy Director General for International and Political Affairs,[151] has complained the agreement may undermine the credibility, integrity and universality of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Pakistan argues the safeguards agreement "threatens to increase the chances of a nuclear arms race in the subcontinent."[152] Pakistani Foreign Minister Shah Mahmood Qureshi has suggested his country should be considered for such an accord,[153] and Pakistan has also said the same process "should be available as a model for other non-NPT states".[154] On July 19, 2010, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton countered Pakistan statements by saying that Pakistan's checkered history on nuclear proliferation "raises red flags" regarding nuclear cooperation with Pakistan.[155] Israel is citing the Indo-U.S. civil nuclear deal as a precedent to alter Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) rules to construct its first nuclear power plant in the Negev desert, and is also pushing for its own trade exemptions.[156]

text: Brahma Chellaney, a Professor of Strategic Studies at the New Delhi-based Centre for Policy Research, argued that the wording of the U.S. exemption sought to irrevocably tether New Delhi to the nuclear non-proliferation regime. He argued India would be brought under a wider non-proliferation net, with India being tied to compliance with the entire set of NSG rules. India would acquiesce to its unilateral test moratorium being turned into a multilateral legality. He concluded that instead of the "full" civil nuclear cooperation that the original July 18, 2005, deal promised, India's access to civil nuclear enrichment and reprocessing technologies would be restricted through the initial NSG waiver.[157]

text: Consideration by U.S. Congress[edit]

text: The Bush Administration told Congress in January 2008 that the United States may cease all cooperation with India if India detonates a nuclear explosive device. The Administration further said it was not its intention to assist India in the design, construction, or operation of sensitive nuclear technologies through the transfer of dual-use items.[158] The statements were considered sensitive in India because debate over the agreement in India could have toppled the government of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh. The State Department had requested they remain secret even though they were not classified.[159] Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice also previously told the House Foreign Affairs Panel in public testimony that any agreement would "have to be completely consistent with the obligations of the Hyde Act".[33] Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs Richard Boucher and the Former Assistant Secretary of State for Legislative Affairs Jeffrey Bergner also said the agreement would be in conformity with the Hyde Act.[160]

text: Howard Berman, chair of the U.S. House Foreign Affairs Committee, in a letter to U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice warned that an NSG waiver "inconsistent" with the 2006 Hyde Act would "jeopardise" the Indo-U.S. nuclear deal in the U.S. Congress.[161] Edward J. Markey, co-chairman of the House Bipartisan Task Force on Non-proliferation, said that there needed to be clear consequences if India broke its commitments or resumed nuclear testing.[162]

text: Passage in Congress[edit]

text: On September 28, 2008 the US House of Representatives voted 298–117 to approve the Indo-US nuclear deal.[163] On October 1, 2008 the US Senate voted 86–13 to approve the Indo-US nuclear deal.[164] The Arms Control Association said the agreement fails to make clear that an Indian nuclear test would prompt the U.S. to cease nuclear trade;[164] however, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said that any nuclear test by India would result in the “most serious consequences,” including automatic cut-off of U.S. cooperation as well as a number of other sanctions.[165]

text: After Senate approval, US President George W. Bush said the deal would "strengthen our global nuclear nonproliferation efforts, protect the environment, create jobs, and assist India in meeting its growing energy needs in a responsible manner."[166] Then-US presidential candidates Barack Obama and John McCain, as well as then-Vice Presidential candidate Joe Biden, voted in support of the bill.[167]

text: Formal signing of the deal[edit]

text: There was speculation the Indo-US deal would be signed on October 4, 2008 when U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice was in India. The deal was to be inked by Indian External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee and U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice. The two leaders were to sign the deal at 2 pm at the Hyderabad House in New Delhi.[168] But Mr. Mukherjee announced that India would wait for the U.S. President to sign the 123 agreement legislation first into law and address India’s concerns on fuel supply guarantees and the legal standing of the 123 agreement in the accompanying signing statement.[169]

text: Ms Rice was aware of the Indian decision before she left Washington. But she was very hopeful that the deal would be signed as the U.S. State Department had said that the President's signature was not prerequisite for Rice to ink the deal.[170] Rice had earlier said that there were still a number of administrative details to be worked out even as she insisted that the US would abide by the Hyde Act on the testing issue:

text: "There are a lot of administrative details that have to be worked out. This (the deal) was only passed in our Congress two days ago. The President is looking forward to signing the bill, sometime, I hope, very soon, because we'll want to use it as an opportunity to thank all of the people who have been involved in this", said Rice.[171]

text: In Washington, a Senate Democratic aide said that such a delay was not that unusual because legislation needed to be carefully reviewed before being sent to the White House.[172]

text: US President George W. Bush signed the legislation on the Indo-US nuclear deal into law on October 8.[16] The new law, called the United States-India Nuclear Cooperation Approval and Non-proliferation Enhancement Act, was signed by President Bush at a brief White House function in the presence of the Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, Energy Secretary Samuel Bodman, Vice-President Dick Cheney and the Indian Ambassador to the U.S. Ronen Sen besides a large gathering of other dignitaries.[173] The final administrative aspect of the deal was completed after Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee signed the bilateral instruments of the 123 Agreement in Washington on October 10 paving the way for operationalization of the deal between the two countries.[174] [175]

text: Chronology of the Indo-US Nuclear Deal[edit]

text: July 18, 2005: President Bush and Prime Minister Singh first announce their intention to enter into a nuclear agreement in Washington.

text: March 1, 2006: Bush visits India for the first time.

text: March 3, 2006: Bush and Singh issue a joint statement on their growing strategic partnership, emphasising their agreement on civil nuclear cooperation.

text: July 26, 2006: The US House of Representatives passes the 'Henry J Hyde United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act of 2006,' which stipulates that Washington will cooperate with New Delhi on nuclear issues and exempt it from signing the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.

text: July 28, 2006: In India, the Left parties demand threadbare discussion on the issue in Parliament.

text: November 16, 2006: The US Senate passes the 'United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation and US Additional Protocol Implementation Act' to "exempt from certain requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 United States exports of nuclear materials, equipment, and technology to India."

text: December 18, 2006: President Bush signs into law congressional legislation on Indian atomic energy.

text: July 27, 2007: Negotiations on a bilateral agreement between the United States and India conclude.

text: Aug 3, 2007: The text of the 'Agreement for Cooperation between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of India concerning peaceful uses of nuclear energy' (123 Agreement) is released by both governments.

text: Aug 13, 2007: Prime Minister Manmohan Singh makes a suo motu statement on the deal in Parliament.

text: Aug 17, 2007: The CPI(M) General Secretary Prakash Karat says the 'honeymoon (with government) may be over but the marriage can go on'.

text: Sept 4, 2007: In India, the UPA-Left committee to discuss nuclear deal set up.

text: Feb 25, 2008: Left parties in India say the ruling party would have to choose between the deal and its government's stability.

text: March 3–6, 2008: Left parties warn of 'serious consequences' if the nuclear deal is operationalised and set a deadline asking the government to make it clear by March 15 whether it intended to proceed with the nuclear deal or drop it.

text: March 7–14, 2008: The CPI writes to the Prime Minister Singh, warns of withdrawal of support if government goes ahead with the deal and puts political pressure on the Manmohan Singh government not to go with the deal.

text: April 23, 2008: The Indian Government says it will seek the sense of the House on the 123 Agreement before it is taken up for ratification by the American Congress.

text: June 17, 2008: External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee meets Prakash Karat, asks the Left to allow the government to go ahead with International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards agreement.

text: June 30, 2008: The Indian Prime Minister says his government prepared to face Parliament before operationalising the deal.

text: July 8, 2008: Left parties in India withdraw support to government.

text: July 9, 2008: The draft India-specific safeguards accord with the IAEA circulated to IAEA's Board of Governors for approval.

text: July 10, 2008: Prime Minister Manmohan Singh calls for a vote of confidence in Parliament.

text: July 14, 2008: The IAEA says it will meet on August 1 to consider the India-specific safeguards agreement.

text: July 18, 2008: Foreign Secretary Shivshankar Menon briefs the IAEA Board of Governors and some NSG countries in Vienna on the safeguards agreement.

text: July 22, 2008: Government is willing to look at "possible amendments" to the Atomic Energy Act to ensure that the country's strategic autonomy will never be compromised, says Prime Minister Singh.

text: July 22, 2008: The UPA government led by Manmohan Singh wins trust vote in the Lok Sabha in India.

text: July 24, 2008: India dismisses warning by Pakistan that the deal will accelerate an atomic arms race in the sub-continent.

text: July 24, 2008: India launches full blast lobbying among the 45-nation NSG for an exemption for nuclear commerce.

text: July 25, 2008: IAEA secretariat briefs member states on India-specific safeguards agreement.

text: Aug 1, 2008: IAEA Board of Governors adopts India- specific safeguards agreement unanimously.

text: Aug 21–22, 2008: The NSG meet to consider an India waiver ends inconclusively amid reservations by some countries.

text: Sep 4–6, 2008: The NSG meets for the second time on the issue after the US comes up with a revised draft and grants waiver to India after marathon parleys.

text: Sept 11, 2008: President Bush sends the text of the 123 Agreement to the US Congress for final approval.

text: Sept 12, 2008: US remains silent over the controversy in India triggered by President Bush's assertions that nuclear fuel supply assurances to New Delhi under the deal were only political commitments and not legally binding.

text: Sept 13, 2008: The State Department issues a fact sheet on the nuclear deal saying the initiative will help meet India's growing energy requirements and strengthen the non- proliferation regime by welcoming New Delhi into globally accepted nonproliferation standards and practices.

text: Sept 18, 2008: The Senate Foreign Relations Committee kicks off a crucial hearing on the Indo-US nuclear deal.

text: Sept 19, 2008: America's nuclear fuel supply assurances to India are a "political commitment" and the government cannot "legally compel" US firms to sell a "given product" to New Delhi, top officials tells Congressional panel.

text: Sept 21, 2008: US financial crisis diverts attention from N-deal as both the Bush Administration and the Congress are bogged down over efforts to rescue bankrupt American banks. financial crisis in the country.

text: Sept 26, 2008: PM Singh meets President Bush at the White House, but were not able to sign the nuclear deal as the Congress did not approve it.

text: Sept 27, 2008: House of Representatives approves the Indo-US nuclear deal. 298 members voted for the Bill while 117 voted against.

text: Oct 1, 2008: Senate approves the Indo-US civil nuclear deal with 86 votes for and 13 against.

text: Oct 4, 2008: Secretary of State Rice visits Delhi. India and the US unable to ink the nuclear agreement with New Delhi insisting that it would do so only after President Bush signs it into a law, an occasion when it expects certain misgivings to be cleared.

text: Oct 4, 2008: White House announces that President Bush will sign the legislation on the Indo-US nuclear deal into a law on October 8.

text: Oct 8, 2008: President Bush signs legislation to enact the landmark US-India civilian nuclear agreement.

text: Oct 10, 2008: The 123 Agreement between India and US is finally operationalized between the two countries after the deal is signed by External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee and his counterpart Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice in Washington D C.


document_title: Tablespoon

question_text: what is the meaning of tbsp and tsp

question_tokens: what is the meaning of tbsp and tsp

root

text: Tablespoon

text: History[edit]

text: Before about 1700, it was customary for people of European descent to bring their own spoons to the table. Spoons were carried as personal property in much the same way as people today carry wallets, key rings, etc. From about 1700 the place setting became popular, and with it the "table-spoon", "table-fork" and "table-knife". Around the same time the tea-spoon and dessert-spoon first appeared, and the table-spoon was reserved for eating soup.[4] The 18th century witnessed a proliferation of different sorts of spoons, including the mustard-spoon, salt-spoon, coffee-spoon, and soup-spoon. In the late 19th century UK, the dessert-spoon and soup-spoon began to displace the table-spoon as the primary implement for eating from a bowl, at which point the name "table-spoon" took on a secondary meaning as a much larger serving spoon.[5] At the time the first edition of the Oxford English Dictionary was published in 1928, "tablespoon" (which by then was no longer hyphenated) still had two definitions in the UK: the original definition (eating spoon) and the new definition (serving spoon).

tag: p

text: In the 18th century, the table-spoon became an unofficial unit of the Apothecaries' system of measures, equal to 4 drams or  1⁄2 fl oz. It was more commonly known by the Latin cochleare majus (abbreviated cochl. maj.) or, in Apothecaries' notation, f℥ss or f℥ß.[6][7][8]

text: Variants[edit]

text: A level tablespoon, the usual meaning without further qualification, is measured by filling the spoon and scraping it level. In contrast, a heaped, heaping, or rounded spoonful is not leveled off, and includes a heap above the spoon. The exact volume of a heaped tablespoon depends somewhat on the shape and curvature of the measuring spoon being used, and so is not a precise unit of measurement.

text: Common tablespoons intended for use as cutlery (called dessert spoons in the UK, where a tablespoon is always a serving spoon) usually hold 7–14 ml (0.24–0.47 US fl oz),[9] considerably less than some tablespoons used for serving.

text: Relationship to teaspoon and fluid ounce[edit]

text: In most regions (including the US, UK, most Commonwealth countries, East Asia and the Philippines), one tablespoon equals three teaspoons. In these regions, one tablespoon is 14.8 ml (0.50 US fl oz). In some places like the US, the tablespoon was historically defined as  1⁄2 US fl oz (2 tbsp. = 1 US fl oz). In Australia, a tablespoon is defined as four teaspoons, equaling to 20 ml (0.68 US fl oz). Victorian and Edwardian era tablespoons used in the UK are often 25 ml (0.85 US fl oz) or sometimes larger. They are used only for preparing and serving food, not as part of a place-setting.

text: In writing volume-based recipes, an abbreviation like tbsp. is usually used to refer to a tablespoon, to differentiate it from the smaller teaspoon (tsp.). Some authors additionally capitalize the abbreviation, as Tbsp., while leaving tsp. in lower case, to emphasize that the larger tablespoon, rather than the smaller teaspoon, is wanted. The tablespoon abbreviation is sometimes further abbreviated to "Tb." or T.

text: Traditional definitions[edit]

text: The traditional US interpretation of the tablespoon as a unit of volume is:[10]

text:
1 US tablespoon
= 4 fluid drams

= 3 teaspoons

=  1⁄2 US fluid ounce

=  1⁄3 US shot

=  1⁄8 US gill

=  1⁄16 US cup

≈ 14.8 ml[11]

tag: table

text: In nutrition labeling in the US and the UK, a tablespoon is defined as 15 ml (0.51 US fl oz).[12] A metric tablespoon is exactly equal to 15 cm3 (0.92 cu in).[13]

text: The Australian definition of the tablespoon as a unit of volume is:

text:
1 Australian tablespoon
= 20 ml

≈  2⁄3 fl. oz.

= 2 dessertspoons

= 4 teaspoons


document_title: List of NASCAR drivers

question_text: who drives the number 1 car in nascar

question_tokens: who drives the number 1 car in nascar

text: List of NASCAR drivers

text: Monster Energy NASCAR Cup Series drivers[edit]

text: All statistics used in these tables are as of the end of the 2018 GEICO 500. (Race 10/36)

text:
Key

Symbol
Meaning

*
Driver has qualified for 2018 NASCAR playoffs

(i)
Driver is not eligible for championship points

text: Full-time drivers[edit]

text:
Driver

No.
Debut
Starts
Wins
Top 5s
Top 10s
Poles
Best Points Finish

Allmendinger, A. J.A. J. Allmendinger

47
2007
345
1
10
54
4
13th (2014)

Almirola, AricAric Almirola

10
2007
254
1
11
36
1
16th (2014)

Bayne, TrevorTrevor Bayne

6
2010
176
1
5
16
0
12th (2016, 2017)

Blaney, RyanRyan Blaney

12
2014
100
1
11
30
3
9th (2017)

Bowman, AlexAlex Bowman

88
2014
91
0
1
6
2
33rd (2015)

Bowyer, ClintClint Bowyer*

14
2005
443
9
66
186
2
2nd (2012)

Buescher, ChrisChris Buescher

37
2015
88
1
3
7
0
16th (2016)

Busch, KurtKurt Busch

41
2000
622
29
132
262
23
1st (2004)

Busch, KyleKyle Busch*

18
2004
472
46
168
249
29
1st (2015)

Byron, WilliamWilliam Byron

24
2018
10
0
0
1
0
N/A

DiBenedetto, MattMatt DiBenedetto

32
2015
114
0
0
3
0
32nd (2017)

Dillon, AustinAustin Dillon*

3
2011
167
2
10
28
3
11th (2017)

Dillon, TyTy Dillon

13
2014
64
0
0
0
0
24th (2017)

Elliott, ChaseChase Elliott

9
2015
87
0
25
43
3
5th (2017)

Gaulding, GrayGray Gaulding

23
2016
39
0
0
1
0
34th (2017)

Hamlin, DennyDenny Hamlin

11
2005
444
31
136
223
26
2nd (2010)

Harvick, KevinKevin Harvick*

4
2001
620
40
175
315
23
1st (2014)

Johnson, JimmieJimmie Johnson

48
2001
589
83
223
344
35
1st (2006–2010, 2013, 2016)

Jones, ErikErik Jones

20
2015
49
0
6
18
1
19th (2017)

Kahne, KaseyKasey Kahne

95
2004
514
18
92
175
27
4th (2012)

Keselowski, BradBrad Keselowski

2
2008
315
24
92
152
14
1st (2012)

Larson, KyleKyle Larson

42
2013
157
5
38
67
4
8th (2017)

Logano, JoeyJoey Logano*

22
2008
337
19
95
162
19
2nd (2016)

McDowell, MichaelMichael McDowell

34
2008
259
0
1
6
0
26th (2017)

McMurray, JamieJamie McMurray

1
2002
556
7
62
161
11
11th (2004)

Menard, PaulPaul Menard

21
2003
409
1
19
60
1
14th (2015)

Newman, RyanRyan Newman

31
2000
594
18
112
241
51
2nd (2014)

Ragan, DavidDavid Ragan

38
2006
408
2
15
40
2
13th (2008)

Stenhouse Jr., RickyRicky Stenhouse Jr.

17
2011
194
2
13
28
2
13th (2017)

Suárez, DanielDaniel Suárez

19
2017
46
0
1
15
0
20th (2017)

Truex Jr., MartinMartin Truex Jr.*

78
2004
451
16
72
165
18
1st (2017)

Wallace Jr., DarrellDarrell Wallace Jr.

43
2017
14
0
1
2
0
N/A

text: Part-time drivers[edit]

text:
Driver

No.
Debut
Starts
Wins
Top 5s
Top 10s
Poles
Best Points Finish

Cassill, LandonLandon Cassill

00
2010
262
0
1
1
0
29th (2016)

Chastain, RossRoss Chastain (i)

15
2017
11
0
0
0
0
N/A

Cope, DerrikeDerrike Cope

99
1982
424
2
6
32
1
15th (1995)

Custer, ColeCole Custer (i)

51
2018
1
0
0
0
0
N/A

Finchum, ChadChad Finchum (i)

66
2018
1
0
0
0
0
N/A

Gase, JoeyJoey Gase (i)

00
2014
24
0
0
0
0
N/A

Gaughan, BrendanBrendan Gaughan

62
2004
56
0
1
5
0
28th (2004)

Gilliland, DavidDavid Gilliland

92
2006
333
0
4
8
3
26th (2013)

Hemric, DanielDaniel Hemric (i)

8
2018
1
0
0
0
0
N/A

Hill, TimmyTimmy Hill (i)

51
2012
66
0
0
0
0
38th (2013)

Kennington, D. J.D. J. Kennington

96
2016
10
0
0
0
0
39th (2017)

LaJoie, CoreyCorey LaJoie

72
2014
37
0
0
0
0
N/A

Long, CarlCarl Long

66
2000
26
0
0
0
0
53rd (2005)

Marks, JustinJustin Marks

51
2013
4
0
0
0
0
46th (2013)

Peters, TimothyTimothy Peters (i)

92
2018
1
0
0
0
0
N/A

Rhodes, HarrisonHarrison Rhodes

51
2018
5
0
0
0
0
N/A

Sorenson, ReedReed Sorenson

55
2005
295
0
5
15
1
22nd (2007)

Thompson, MarkMark Thompson

66
1992
3
0
0
0
0
90th (1992)

Whitt, ColeCole Whitt

72
2011
155
0
0
0
0
31st (2014, 2015)

Yeley, J. J.J. J. Yeley (i)

55
2004
259
0
2
8
1
21st (2007)

text: Free agents[edit]

text:
Driver

Debut
Starts
Wins
Top 5s
Top 10s
Poles
Best Points Finish
Previous Team

Bilicki, JoshJosh Bilicki

2017
2
0
0
0
0
N/A
No. 51 - Rick Ware Racing

Black Jr., RayRay Black Jr.

2017
3
0
0
0
0
N/A
No. 51 - Rick Ware Racing

Klutt, GaryGary Klutt

2017
1
0
0
0
0
42nd (2017)
No. 15 - Premium Motorsports

Leicht, StephenStephen Leicht

2006
18
0
0
0
0
41st (2012)
No. 83 - BK Racing

McLeod, B. J.B. J. McLeod

2015
9
0
0
0
0
N/A
No. 51 - Rick Ware Racing

Moffitt, BrettBrett Moffitt

2014
45
0
0
1
0
34th (2015)
No. 83 - BK Racing

O'Connell, KevinKevin O'Connell

2017
1
0
0
0
0
46th (2017)
No. 15 - Premium Motorsports

Patrick, DanicaDanica Patrick

2012
191
0
0
7
1
24th (2015, 2016)
No. 7 - Premium Motorsports

Regan, TommyTommy Regan

2017
1
0
0
0
0
47th (2017)
No. 55 - Premium Motorsports

Sadler, HermieHermie Sadler

1996
65
0
0
0
0
44th (2004, 2005)
No. 7 - Premium Motorsports

Smith, ReganRegan Smith

2007
213
1
4
13
0
24th (2012)
No. 43 - Richard Petty Motorsports

Starr, DavidDavid Starr

2011
7
0
0
0
0
N/A
No. 66 - MBM Motorsports

Ware, CodyCody Ware

2017
5
0
0
0
0
43rd (2017)
No. 51 - Rick Ware Racing

Weatherman, KyleKyle Weatherman

2017
2
0
0
0
0
45th (2017)
No. 51 - Rick Ware Racing

text: Xfinity Series drivers[edit]

text: All statistics used in these tables are as of the end of the 2018 Fitzgerald Glider Kits 300 (Race 7/33)

text: Full-time drivers[edit]

text:
Driver

No.
Debut
Starts
Wins
Top 5s
Top 10s
Poles
Best Points Finish

Allgaier, JustinJustin Allgaier

7
2008
247
5
56
133
6
3rd (2011, 2016, 2017)

Annett, MichaelMichael Annett

5
2008
203
0
8
41
0
5th (2012)

Bell, ChristopherChristopher Bell

20
2017
15
1
7
9
4
N/A

Bilicki, JoshJosh Bilicki

45
2016
14
0
0
0
0
44th (2017)

Boyd, SpencerSpencer Boyd

76
2016
15
0
0
0
0
48th (2017)

Chastain, RossRoss Chastain

4
2014
113
0
1
10
0
13th (2017)

Cindric, AustinAustin Cindric

22
2017
8
0
0
2
0
N/A

Clements, JeremyJeremy Clements

51
2003
273
1
2
13
0
12th (2017)

Custer, ColeCole Custer

00
2016
45
1
9
26
1
5th (2017)

Finchum, ChadChad Finchum

40
2017
14
0
0
0
0
49th (2017)

Gallagher, SpencerSpencer Gallagher

23
2016
47
0
1
6
0
19th (2017)

Gase, JoeyJoey Gase

35
2011
182
0
1
3
0
20th (2014)

Grala, KazKaz Grala

24
2018
7
0
1
1
0
N/A

Green, JeffJeff Green

93
1990
487
16
87
129
23
1st (2000)

Hemric, DanielDaniel Hemric

21
2017
40
0
10
21
2
4th (2017)

Hill, TimmyTimmy Hill

66
2011
138
0
0
2
0
17th (2011)

Jones, BrandonBrandon Jones

19
2015
78
0
1
20
1
10th (2016)

Labbé, AlexAlex Labbé

36
2016
10
0
0
0
0
67th (2016, 2017)

Leicht, StephenStephen Leicht

55
2005
89
1
3
16
0
7th (2007)

Miller, VinnieVinnie Miller

01
2017
8
0
0
0
0
73rd (2017)

Reddick, TylerTyler Reddick*

9
2017
25
2
5
11
2
18th (2017)

Reed, RyanRyan Reed

16
2013
145
2
6
19
0
6th (2016)

Sadler, ElliottElliott Sadler

1
1995
369
13
97
209
17
2nd (2011, 2012, 2016, 2017)

Shepherd, MorganMorgan Shepherd

89
1982
426
15
44
67
6
11th (1982)

Sieg, RyanRyan Sieg

38
2013
144
0
3
7
0
9th (2016)

Smithley, GarrettGarrett Smithley

0
2015
73
0
1
3
0
18th (2016)

Starr, DavidDavid Starr

52
2000
137
0
1
3
0
16th (2015)

Tifft, MattMatt Tifft

2
2015
51
0
3
22
1
7th (2017)

Truex, RyanRyan Truex

11
2010
46
0
2
12
1
22nd (2011)

Yeley, J. J.J. J. Yeley

39
2004
290
0
15
46
3
5th (2006)

text: Part-time drivers[edit]

text:
Driver

No.
Debut
Starts
Wins
Top 5s
Top 10s
Poles
Best Points Finish

Almirola, AricAric Almirola (i)

98
2006
101
3
12
37
5
4th (2011)

Baca, EnriqueEnrique Baca

TBA
2017
2
0
0
0
0
57th (2017)

Bacarella, CaesarCaesar Bacarella

8
2017
3
0
0
0
0
68th (2017)

Benjamin, KyleKyle Benjamin

18
2017
6
0
1
2
2
33rd (2017)

Black Jr., RayRay Black Jr.

99/8
2015
55
0
0
0
0
19th (2016)

Blaney, RyanRyan Blaney (i)

22
2012
66
7
39
53
2
22nd (2015)

Briscoe, ChaseChase Briscoe

60
2018
3
0
0
0
0
N/A

Brown, BrandonBrandon Brown

86
2016
14
0
0
0
0
36th (2017)

Burton, JebJeb Burton

3
2013
22
0
1
3
0
24th (2016)

Busch, KyleKyle Busch (i)

18
2003
340
91
209
245
64
1st (2009)

Cockrum, ChrisChris Cockrum

25
2014
15
0
0
0
0
44th (2016)

Currey, BayleyBayley Currey (i)

8
2018
1
0
0
0
0
N/A

Dillon, AustinAustin Dillon (i)

3
2008
137
8
63
100
17
1st (2013)

Dillon, TyTy Dillon (i)

3
2012
140
1
32
86
4
3rd (2015)

Earnhardt Jr., DaleDale Earnhardt Jr.

88
1996
139
24
67
91
10
1st (1998, 1999)

Elliott, ChaseChase Elliott (i)

88
2014
73
5
31
59
2
1st (2014)

Ellis, RyanRyan Ellis

78
2012
47
0
0
0
0
30th (2016)

Gaughan, BrendanBrendan Gaughan (i)

3
2001
216
2
20
67
1
8th (2014)

Gaulding, GrayGray Gaulding (i)

54
2016
8
0
0
0
0
N/A

Gomes, MarcosMarcos Gomes

TBA
N/A
0
0
0
0
0
N/A

Hamlin, DennyDenny Hamlin (i)

18
2004
159
17
62
98
21
4th (2006)

Harmon, MikeMike Harmon

74
1996
250
0
0
0
0
23rd (2003)

Harvick, KevinKevin Harvick (i)

98
1999
343
47
184
257
25
1st (2001, 2006)

Huffman, LandonLandon Huffman

TBA
N/A
0
0
0
0
0
N/A

Jones, ErikErik Jones (i)

18
2014
77
9
37
50
15
4th (2016)

Keselowski, BradBrad Keselowski (i)

22
2006
250
37
125
169
20
1st (2010)

Lally, AndyAndy Lally

90
2007
8
0
1
4
0
50th (2017)

Larson, KyleKyle Larson (i)

42
2013
104
9
48
72
3
8th (2013)

Lee, ShaneShane Lee

3
2018
1
0
0
0
0
N/A

Logano, JoeyJoey Logano (i)

22
2008
172
29
92
140
34
8th (2010)

Lupton, DylanDylan Lupton

28
2015
31
0
0
1
0
30th (2015, 2017)

Majeski, TyTy Majeski

60
2017
4
0
0
1
0
45th (2017)

Marks, JustinJustin Marks

42
2008
32
1
2
5
0
23rd (2016)

Martins, Tommy JoeTommy Joe Martins

8
2014
25
0
0
0
0
35th (2014)

McLeod, B. J.B. J. McLeod

78
2015
75
0
0
0
0
20th (2016)

McMurray, JamieJamie McMurray (i)

42
2000
189
8
32
70
3
6th (2002)

Menard, PaulPaul Menard (i)

22
2003
214
3
40
96
5
5th (2010)

Matt Mills

15
2017
7
0
0
0
0
N/A

Nemechek, JoeJoe Nemechek (i)

15
1989
431
16
74
126
18
1st (1992)

Nemechek, John HunterJohn Hunter Nemechek

42
2018
3
0
1
1
0
N/A

Preece, RyanRyan Preece

18
2013
43
2
6
8
1
17th (2016)

Suárez, DanielDaniel Suárez (i)

18
2014
83
3
32
54
6
1st (2016)

Ware, CodyCody Ware (i)

74
2014
15
0
0
0
0
43rd (2014)

Williams, JoshJosh Williams

90
2016
16
0
0
0
0
46th (2017)

text: Free agents[edit]

text:
Driver

Debut
Starts
Wins
Top 5s
Top 10s
Poles
Best Points Finish
Previous Team

Anderson, JordanJordan Anderson

2015
13
0
0
0
0
N/A
No. 78 - B. J. McLeod Motorsports

Armstrong, DakodaDakoda Armstrong

2012
133
0
3
8
1
12th (2015)
No. 28 - JGL Racing

Bean, DexterDexter Bean

2006
13
0
0
0
0
54th (2016)
No. 92 - King Autosport

Bell, MattMatt Bell

2012
3
0
0
0
0
83rd (2012, 2017)
No. 90 - King Autosport

Berry, JoshJosh Berry

2014
7
0
0
2
0
41st (2016)
No. 55 - NextGen Motorsports

Bodine, ToddTodd Bodine

1986
333
15
90
160
7
2nd (1997)
No. 07 - SS-Green Light Racing

Cobb, Jennifer JoJennifer Jo Cobb

2004
30
0
0
0
0
29th (2011)
No. 78 - B. J. McLeod Motorsports

Conley, CaleCale Conley

2014
42
0
0
1
0
20th (2015)
No. 24 - JGL Racing

Cowen, TimTim Cowen

2014
6
0
0
0
0
60th (2017)
No. 40 - MBM Motorsports

Earnhardt, Bobby DaleBobby Dale Earnhardt

2017
2
0
0
0
0
71st (2017)
No. 13 - MBM Motorsports

Forrister, KorbinKorbin Forrister

2015
4
0
0
0
0
N/A
No. 07 - SS-Green Light Racing

Gordon, BennyBenny Gordon

2009
27
0
1
1
0
34th (2012)
No. 44 - TriStar Motorsports

Gosselin, MarioMario Gosselin

1998
43
0
0
0
0
26th (2016)
No. 90 - DGM Racing

Hammann, NicolasNicolas Hammann

2016
3
0
0
0
0
68th (2016)
No. 17 - Rick Ware Racing

Henderson, BrianBrian Henderson

2017
1
0
0
0
0
78th (2017)
No. 90 - Brandonbilt Motorsports

Herring, DrewDrew Herring

2010
22
0
1
5
2
34th (2016)
No. 24 - JGL Racing

Hightower, BrandonBrandon Hightower

2016
10
0
0
0
0
43rd (2016)
No. 40 - MBM Motorsports

Hornish Jr., SamSam Hornish Jr.

2006
120
5
38
64
9
2nd (2013)
No. 22 - Team Penske

Houff, QuinQuin Houff

2017
5
0
0
0
0
41st (2017)
No. 46 - Precision Performance Motorsports

Jackson, JohnJohn Jackson

2011
25
0
0
0
0
61st (2015, 2016)
No. 72 - MBM Motorsports

Jones, DevinDevin Jones

2017
1
0
0
0
0
69th (2017)
No. 07 - SS-Green Light Racing

Kennedy, BenBen Kennedy

2016
17
0
1
3
0
23rd (2017)
No. 2 - Richard Childress Racing

King, ClintClint King

2016
5
0
0
0
0
50th (2016)
No. 78 - B. J. McLeod Motorsports

Koch, BlakeBlake Koch

2009
213
0
0
10
1
7th (2016)
No. 11 - Kaulig Racing

Lagasse Jr., ScottScott Lagasse Jr.

2005
68
0
0
6
0
21st (2009)
No. 3 - Richard Childress Racing

LaJoie, CoreyCorey LaJoie

2013
22
0
0
2
0
31st (2016)
No. 24 - JGL Racing

Long, CarlCarl Long

2001
117
0
0
0
0
31st (2011)
No. 13 - MBM Motorsports

Mears, CaseyCasey Mears

2001
107
1
16
34
4
20th (2007)
No. 98 - Biagi-DenBeste Racing

Brett Moffitt

2012
2
0
0
1
0
71st (2012)
No. 96 - GMS Racing

Stan Mullis

2017
1
0
0
0
0
76th (2017)
No. 40 - MBM Motorsports

Poole, BrennanBrennan Poole

2015
83
0
8
36
1
6th (2017)
No. 48 - Chip Ganassi Racing

Rhodes, HarrisonHarrison Rhodes

2013
84
0
0
2
0
24th (2015, 2017)
No. 01 - JD Motorsports

Roy, MartinMartin Roy

2014
24
0
0
0
0
35th (2016)
No. 90 - King Autosport

Ruch, AngelaAngela Ruch

2011
11
0
0
0
0
55th (2011)
No. 78 - B. J. McLeod Motorsports

Brian Scott

2009
210
0
21
79
5
4th (2014)
No. 3 - Richard Childress Racing

Smith, ReganRegan Smith

2002
206
6
30
79
1
2nd (2014)
No. 18 - Joe Gibbs Racing

Sorenson, ReedReed Sorenson

2004
207
4
38
86
2
4th (2005)
No. 15 - JD Motorsports

Young, StephenStephen Young

2017
3
0
0
0
0
61st (2017)
No. 78 - B. J. McLeod Motorsports

text: Camping World Truck Series drivers[edit]

text: All statistics used in these tables are as of the end of the 2018 Alpha Energy Solutions 250 (Race 4/23)

text: Full-time drivers[edit]

text:
Driver

No.
Debut
Starts
Wins
Top 5s
Top 10s
Poles
Best Points Finish

Jordan Anderson

3
2014
61
0
0
1
0
17th (2017)

Norm Benning

6
2002
188
0
0
0
0
17th (2014)

Wendell Chavous

49
2014
35
0
0
0
0
16th (2017)

Jennifer Jo Cobb

10
2008
154
0
0
1
0
16th (2014)

Cody Coughlin

2
2015
39
0
1
4
0
13th (2017)

Matt Crafton

88
2000
411
14
103
243
13
1st (2013, 2014)

Grant Enfinger

98
2010
41
1
13
24
1
11th (2017)

Justin Fontaine

45
2016
7
0
0
2
0
46th (2017)

Stewart Friesen

52
2016
29
0
3
7
1
14th (2017)

Noah Gragson

18
2016
29
1
6
15
3
10th (2017)

Justin Haley

24
2015
31
0
4
15
1
12th (2017)

Austin Hill

02
2014
32
0
0
4
0
23rd (2017)

Robby Lyons

15
2017
6
0
0
0
0
N/A

Brett Moffitt*

16
2013
17
2
6
9
0
27th (2016)

Josh Reaume

33
2013
18
0
0
0
0
24th (2017)

Ben Rhodes

41
2014
54
1
11
23
3
5th (2017)

Dalton Sargeant

25
2015
10
0
0
4
0
35th (2015)

Johnny Sauter*

21
2003
225
18
91
143
6
1st (2016)

Austin Wayne Self

22
2016
44
0
1
3
0
15th (2016, 2017)

Myatt Snider

13
2016
13
0
1
5
0
22nd (2017)

text: Part-time drivers[edit]

text:
Driver

No.
Debut
Starts
Wins
Top 5s
Top 10s
Poles
Best Points Finish

Kyle Benjamin (i)

54
2018
1
0
1
1
0
N/A

Harrison Burton

51
2016
8
0
1
2
0
29th (2019)

Kyle Busch (i)

51
2001
142
50
90
111
20
14th (2008, 2010)

Dawson Cram

50
2018
1
0
0
0
0
N/A

Bayley Currey

83
2017
4
0
0
0
0
43rd (2017)

Spencer Davis

4
2018
3
0
0
1
0
N/A

Austin Dillon (i)

20
2009
70
7
24
48
13
1st (2011)

Ty Dillon (i)

20
2011
56
3
20
36
5
2nd (2013)

Michel Disdier

20
2014
3
0
0
0
0
49th (2016)

Kevin Donahue

63
2016
8
0
0
0
0
39th (2017)

Kyle Donahue

83
2016
5
0
0
0
0
40th (2017)

Chris Eggleston

17
2010
6
0
0
0
0
51st (2010)

Chris Fontaine

47
2005
57
0
0
3
0
25th (2012)

Korbin Forrister

7
2014
34
0
0
0
0
18th (2015)

Joey Gase (i)

0
2018
1
0
0
0
0
N/A

Bobby Gerhart

63
1996
8
0
0
0
0
45th (2017)

David Gilliland

4
2005
11
0
0
3
1
65th (2009)

Todd Gilliland

4
2017
7
0
2
3
0
27th (2017)

Clay Greenfield

1
2010
38
0
0
2
0
34th (2012)

Mike Harmon (i)

74
2001
60
0
0
0
0
34th (2010)

Daniel Hemric (i)

20
2013
49
0
15
30
0
6th (2016)

Riley Herbst

51
N/A
0
0
0
0
0
N/A

Landon Huffman

55
2017
2
0
0
0
0
49th (2017)

Brandon Jones (i)

51
2013
35
0
7
15
0
15th (2015)

Parker Kligerman

75
2010
70
2
15
33
2
5th (2012)

Travis Kvapil

50
2001
196
9
52
86
4
1st (2003)

Scott Lagasse Jr. (i)

20
2006
28
0
2
5
0
37th (2006)

Bo LeMastus

54
2018
2
0
0
0
0
N/A

Jesse Little

97
2015
14
0
0
2
0
33rd (2017)

Justin Marks

54
2007
38
0
0
4
2
23rd (2008, 2011)

Tyler Matthews

99
2018
1
0
0
0
0
N/A

Max McLaughlin

38
N/A
0
0
0
0
0
N/A

B. J. McLeod (i)

50
2010
35
0
0
0
0
32nd (2015)

Joe Nemechek

87
1996
42
0
4
17
0
19th (2014)

John Hunter Nemechek (i)

8
2013
79
6
23
39
1
8th (2016, 2017)

Akinori Ogata

63
2014
6
0
0
0
0
47th (2015)

Timothy Peters

92
2005
239
10
57
123
8
2nd (2012)

Tommy Regan

1
2014
9
0
0
0
0
49th (2015)

Cory Roper

04
2018
1
0
0
0
0
N/A

Mike Senica

1
2017
12
0
0
0
0
35th (2017)

Scott Stenzel

63
2012
13
0
0
0
0
41st (2014)

Tanner Thorson

20
N/A
0
0
0
0
0
N/A

Tim Viens

74
2015
4
0
0
0
0
63rd (2016)

Cody Ware (i)

74
2014
7
0
0
0
0
60th (2015)

Reid Wilson

20
2018
1
0
0
0
0
N/A

Tyler Young

20
2012
78
0
0
5
0
13th (2014, 2015)

text: Free agents[edit]

text:
Driver

Debut
Starts
Wins
Top 5s
Top 10s
Poles
Best Points Finish
Previous Team

Jeffrey Abbey

2017
2
0
0
0
0
48th (2017)
No. 45 - Niece Motorsports

Rico Abreu

2015
26
0
2
5
0
13th (2016)
No. 89 - ThorSport Racing

T. J. Bell

2003
114
0
1
13
0
15th (2009)
No. 45 - Niece Motorsports

Brandon Brown

2014
22
0
1
1
0
25th (2016)
No. 44 - Martins Motorsports

Ray Ciccarelli

2017
6
0
0
0
0
38th (2017)
No. 10 - Jennifer Jo Cobb Racing

Bryan Dauzat

2014
3
0
0
0
0
66th (2017)
No. 28 - FDNY Racing

Mason Diaz

2017
1
0
0
0
0
64th (2017)
No. 86 - Brandonbilt Motorsports

Patrick Emerling

2017
2
0
0
0
0
55th (2017)
No. 83 - Copp Motorsports

Cale Gale

2007
36
1
3
12
1
12th (2012)
No. 99 - MDM Motorsports

Victor Gonzalez Jr.

2017
1
0
0
0
0
56th (2017)
No. 45 - Niece Motorsports

Jason Hathaway

2017
2
0
0
0
0
41st (2017)
No. 15 - Premium Motorsports

Brandon Hightower

2015
3
0
0
0
0
73rd (2015)
No. 1 - TJL Motorsports

Joe Hudson

2017
1
0
0
0
0
N/A
No. 74 - Mike Harmon Racing

Trey Hutchens

2017
1
0
0
0
0
57th (2017)
No. 66 - Bolen Motorsports

Terry Jones

2010
6
0
0
0
0
59th (2010)
No. 30 - Rette Jones Racing

Donnie Levister

2017
2
0
0
0
0
62nd (2017)
No. 44 - Faith Motorsports

Travis Miller

2012
5
0
0
0
0
49th (2012)
No. 99 - MDM Motorsports

Matt Mills

2016
10
0
0
0
0
42nd (2016, 2017)
No. 0 - Jennifer Jo Cobb Racing

Ted Minor

2014
7
0
0
0
0
47th (2017)
No. 63 - MB Motorsports

Camden Murphy

2014
14
0
0
0
0
32nd (2017)
No. 36 - MB Motorsports

Bryce Napier

2016
6
0
0
0
0
48th (2016)
No. 10 - Jennifer Jo Cobb Racing

Travis Pastrana

2012
3
0
0
0
0
62nd (2015)
No. 45 - Niece Motorsports

Todd Peck

2011
30
0
0
0
0
34th (2017)
No. 63 - Copp Motorsports

Bobby Pierce

2015
8
0
1
2
1
39th (2015)
No. 63 - MB Motorsports

Bobby Reuse

2017
1
0
0
0
0
59th (2017)
No. 50 - Beaver Motorsports

Ken Schrader

1995
105
1
12
37
2
19th (2007)
No. 66 - Bolen Motorsports

Justin Shipley

2016
2
0
0
0
0
65th (2017)
No. 80 - Jacob Wallace Racing

Regan Smith

2002
36
0
1
7
0
18th (2017)
No. 92 - Ricky Benton Racing

Ryan Truex

2012
42
0
10
19
2
9th (2017)
No. 16 - Hattori Racing Enterprises

Chris Windom

2017
3
0
0
0
0
51st (2017)
No. 63 - MB Motorsports

Brian Wong

2015
2
0
0
0
0
54th (2017)
No. 99 - MDM Motorsports

text: K&N Pro Series East drivers[edit]

text: All statistics used in these tables are as of the end of the 2018 Zombie Auto 150 (Race 2/14)

text: Full-time drivers[edit]

text:
Driver

No.
Debut
Starts
Wins
Top 5s
Top 10s
Poles
Best Points Finish

Anthony Alfredo

40
2018
2
0
0
0
0
N/A

Tyler Ankrum

17
2018
2
0
2
2
0
N/A

Dillon Bassett

44
2015
37
1
7
15
0
8th (2017)

Ronnie Bassett Jr.

04
2013
55
1
17
28
0
3rd (2017)

Chuck Buchanan Jr.

87
2011
20
0
0
0
0
20th (2017)

Chase Cabre

4
2017
16
0
4
7
2
6th (2017)

Spencer Davis

82
2015
22
1
9
15
1
8th (2016)

Hailie Deegan

19
2018
2
0
0
0
0
N/A

Tyler Dippel

41
2016
29
1
3
14
0
3rd (2016)

Rubén García Jr.

6
2016
30
0
4
18
0
5th (2017)

Juan Manuel Gonzalez

5
2018
2
0
0
0
0
N/A

Salvatore Iovino

32
2017
4
0
0
0
0
36th (2017)

Jesse Iwuji

36
2017
4
0
0
0
0
29th (2017)

Derek Kraus

16
2017
3
0
2
2
0
40th (2017)

Matt Levin

10
2018
2
0
0
0
0
N/A

Brandon Oakley

51
2014
7
0
0
1
0
35th (2017)

Cole Rouse

99
2018
2
0
1
1
0
N/A

Ryan Vargas

2
2018
2
0
0
0
0
N/A

text: Part-time drivers[edit]

text:
Driver

No.
Debut
Starts
Wins
Top 5s
Top 10s
Poles
Best Points Finish

Harrison Burton

12
2016
30
5
15
21
3
1st (2017)

Abraham Calderón

55
2018
1
0
0
0
0
N/A

Todd Gilliland

98
2016
21
7
15
20
2
2nd (2017)

Marcos Gomes

55
2018
1
0
0
0
0
N/A

Joe Graf Jr.

43
2018
1
0
0
0
0
N/A

Noah Gragson

54
2015
16
2
5
9
1
5th (2016)

Reid Lanpher

59
2016
3
0
0
0
0
45th (2016)

Eddie MacDonald

43
2001
196
7
36
96
2
2nd (2009)

Brandon McReynolds

74
2011
20
0
5
11
0
24th (2013)

J. P. Morgan

23
2003
15
0
0
1
0
18th (2017)

Grant Quinlan

30
2015
7
0
1
2
0
30th (2015)

Anthony Sergi

20
2017
2
0
0
1
0
59th (2017)

Tanner Thorson

28
2018
1
0
0
0
0
N/A

Max Tullman

27
2017
2
0
0
1
0
49th (2017)

Andrew Tuttle

39
2018
1
0
0
0
0
N/A

Kody Vanderwal

33
2018
1
0
0
0
0
N/A

John Wood

08
2017
4
0
0
0
0
23rd (2017)

Jimmy Zacharias

31
2018
1
0
0
0
0
N/A

text: Free agents[edit]

text:
Driver

Debut
Starts
Wins
Top 5s
Top 10s
Poles
Best Points Finish

Enrique Baca

2016
11
0
0
3
0
12th (2017)

Hunter Baize

2016
22
0
2
15
0
4th (2016)

Amber Balcaen

2017
1
0
0
0
0
68th (2017)

Kyle Benjamin

2013
32
5
14
19
6
2nd (2016)

Richard Bodmer

2014
2
0
0
0
0
64th (2014)

Matt Bowling

2017
2
0
0
0
0
32nd (2017)

David Calabrese

2016
4
0
0
0
0
37th (2016)

Justin Carroll

2017
1
0
0
1
0
51st (2017)

Travis Cope

2017
1
0
1
1
0
43rd (2017)

Noel Dowler

2012
2
0
0
0
0
64th (2017)

Andrew Engberson

2017
2
0
0
0
0
33rd (2017)

Ernie Francis Jr.

N/A
0
0
0
0
0
N/A

Scott Heckert

2013
45
4
15
21
5
2nd (2015)

John Holleman IV

2014
22
0
0
4
1
11th (2016)

Sam Hunt

2012
33
0
0
3
0
13th (2012)

Trey Hutchens

2013
31
0
0
6
0
14th (2017)

Jared Irvan

2015
2
0
0
0
0
53rd (2017)

Julia Landauer

2017
2
0
0
1
0
30th (2017)

David Levine

2017
1
0
0
0
0
61st (2017)

Jesse Little

2012
49
2
14
24
3
6th (2014)

Brandon Lynn

2017
1
0
0
0
0
63rd (2017)

Travis Miller

2012
13
1
2
3
0
15th (2017)

Dylan Murry

2017
2
0
0
2
0
26th (2017)

Max Papis

2017
1
0
0
0
0
67th (2017)

Ray Parent

2017
1
0
0
0
0
62nd (2017)

Robert Pawlowski

2017
1
0
0
0
0
60th (2017)

Will Rodgers

2017
2
2
2
2
0
22nd (2017)

Luis Rodriguez Jr.

2017
3
0
0
0
0
28th (2017)

Peyton Sellers

2006
34
1
10
20
4
3rd (2007)

Andy Seuss

2017
1
0
0
0
0
57th (2017)

Stafford Smith

2017
3
0
0
0
0
24th (2017)

Hanna Zellers

2017
1
0
0
0
0
56th (2017)

text: K&N Pro Series West drivers[edit]

text: All statistics used in these tables are as of the end of the Bakersfield 175 Presented by NAPA Auto Parts (Race 1/15)

text: Full-time drivers[edit]

text:
Driver

No.
Debut
Starts
Wins
Top 5s
Top 10s
Poles
Best Points Finish

Hailie Deegan

19
2018
1
0
0
0
0
N/A

Rich DeLong III

84
2013
48
0
0
1
0
8th (2014)

Austin Herzog

77
2018
1
0
0
0
0
N/A

Trevor Huddleston

22
2016
2
0
0
2
0
43rd (2016)

Salvatore Iovino

32
2016
11
0
0
0
0
18th (2016)

Jesse Iwuji

36
2015
30
0
0
1
0
10th (2016)

Rod Johnson Jr.

44
2011
4
0
0
2
0
48th (2017)

Bill Kann

18
2013
23
0
0
3
0
16th (2017)

Takuma Koga

11
2002
43
0
1
1
0
13th (2017)

Derek Kraus

16
2017
15
2
10
11
1
3rd (2017)

Reid Lanpher

59
2018
1
0
0
1
0
N/A

Matt Levin

10
2015
36
0
0
10
0
11th (2015, 2017)

David Mayhew

17
2007
104
10
51
74
13
2nd (2010)

Travis Milburn

08
2008
47
0
0
8
0
10th (2010)

Ron Norman

40
2015
40
0
0
8
1
11th (2016)

Ryan Partridge

9
2012
31
4
17
26
6
2nd (2016)

Will Rodgers

7
2016
21
0
9
16
1
5th (2017)

Cole Rouse

99
2016
15
0
5
13
0
8th (2016)

Todd Souza

13
2006
55
1
5
23
0
6th (2017)

Derek Thorn

6
2011
38
5
27
32
4
1st (2013)

Andrew Tuttle

39
2013
6
0
0
0
0
34th (2013, 2017)

Kody Vanderwal

43
2017
15
0
2
7
0
9th (2017)

text: Part-time drivers[edit]

text:
Driver

No.
Debut
Starts
Wins
Top 5s
Top 10s
Poles
Best Points Finish

Kevin Harvick

4
1996
24
7
15
18
8
1st (1998)

text: Pinty’s Series drivers[edit]

text: All statistics used in these tables are as of the end of the 2017 Pinty's Fall Brawl 200 (Race 13/13)

text: Full-time drivers[edit]

text:
Driver

No.
Debut
Starts
Wins
Top 5s
Top 10s
Poles
Best Points Finish

Marc-Antoine Camirand

22
2013
23
0
8
13
1
7th (2015)

J. F. Dumoulin

04
2007
49
0
7
29
0
8th (2015, 2017)

L. P. Dumoulin

47
2009
84
4
39
56
1
1st (2014)

D. J. Kennington

17
2007
134
19
82
112
13
1st (2010, 2012)

Alex Labbé

32
2012
40
6
21
28
6
1st (2017)

Kevin Lacroix

74
2015
31
8
16
22
6
2nd (2017)

Cayden Lapcevich

76
2015
31
6
17
25
1
1st (2016)

Adam Martin

9
2016
19
0
2
7
0
9th (2017)

Andrew Ranger

27
2007
107
22
58
89
22
1st (2007, 2009)

Anthony Simone

95
2008
71
0
8
23
1
8th (2009)

Alex Tagliani

18
2007
58
6
22
38
8
3rd (2016)

Brett Taylor

46
2016
6
0
0
2
0
25th (2017)

text: Part-time drivers[edit]

text:
Driver

No.
Debut
Starts
Wins
Top 5s
Top 10s
Poles
Best Points Finish

Ian Admiraal

83
2014
8
0
0
0
0
27th (2017)

Adam Andretti

44
2017
2
0
1
2
0
30th (2017)

Elie Arseneau

03
2011
14
0
1
1
0
29th (2011)

Robin Buck

43
2007
33
2
13
18
0
19th (2011)

Donald Chisholm

89
2007
21
1
4
10
2
29th (2013)

Martin Cote

11
2016
7
0
0
0
0
19th (2017)

Mark Dilley

02
2007
106
3
37
62
3
6th (2008, 2011)

Simon Dion-Viens

25
2013
17
0
0
4
0
16th (2017)

Noel Dowler

5
2011
57
0
1
23
0
7th (2013, 2014)

Jocelyn Fecteau

77
2014
10
0
0
0
0
28th (2016)

John Fletcher

28
2007
7
0
0
0
0
36th (2008)

Carl Gauthier

69
2017
1
0
0
0
0
49th (2017)

Brad Graham

56
2007
47
0
5
20
0
10th (2008)

Raymond Guay

20
2016
4
0
0
0
0
34th (2017)

Jason Hankewich

25
2012
9
0
0
0
0
34th (2015)

Charles Harvey

09
2015
3
0
0
0
0
37th (2017)

Jason Hathaway

3
2007
124
9
35
76
0
2nd (2015)

Luc Haukaas

10
2017
2
0
0
0
0
35th (2017)

Larry Jackson

25
2012
48
0
1
10
0
10th (2016)

Gary Klutt

59
2010
35
1
3
23
2
6th (2015)

Peter Klutt

42
2007
30
0
0
11
0
21st (2010)

Ryan Klutt

42
2013
8
0
0
0
0
29th (2015)

Destiny Klym

55
2017
3
0
0
0
0
29th (2017)

Stefan Klym

54
2017
3
0
0
0
0
28th (2017)

Steven Matthews

15
2009
32
0
5
10
3
13th (2014)

Joey McColm

8
2007
82
0
0
20
0
8th (2014)

David Michaud

56
2015
8
0
0
2
0
19th (2016)

Trevor Monaghan

4
2007
10
0
0
0
0
31st (2007)

Matthew Scannell

02
2013
28
0
0
4
0
11th (2015)

Trevor Seibert

69
2007
40
0
5
14
0
13th (2013)

Donald Theetge

24
2011
12
0
6
8
2
11th (2017)

David Thorndyke

67
2007
28
0
0
0
0
27th (2007)

Brandon White

99
2011
8
0
0
0
0
20th (2017)

Jason White

21
2007
88
0
2
17
0
8th (2011, 2013)

Armani Williams

28
2017
5
0
0
0
0
17th (2017)

text: PEAK Mexico Series drivers[edit]

text: All statistics used in these tables are as of the end of the 2015 RedCo 240 (Race 15/15)

text: Full-time drivers[edit]

text: Part-time drivers[edit]

text: Whelen Euro Series Elite 1 Division drivers[edit]

text: All statistics used in these tables are as of the end of the 2016 Autospeedway American Style (Race 4/12)

text: Full-time drivers[edit]

text:
Driver

No.
Debut
Starts
Wins
Top 5s
Top 10s
Poles
Best Points Finish

Marconi Abreu

47
2016
4
0
0
1
0
N/A

Wilfried Boucenna

73
2012
48
0
9
29
0
6th (2012)

Dario Caso

8
2016
4
0
0
0
0
N/A

Alon Day

54
2015
17
4
6
11
3
2nd (2015)

Eric De Doncker

98
2015
14
0
0
1
0
15th (2015)

Ulysse Delsaux

31
2016
4
0
0
1
0
N/A

Jerry De Weerdt

78
2013
15
0
0
0
0
17th (2015)

Gianmarco Ercoli

9
2015
5
0
2
2
0
20th (2015)

Thomas Ferrando

37
2016
4
0
0
2
0
N/A

Carlo Forte

6
2016
4
0
0
0
0
N/A

Gian Maria Gabbiani

12
2014
6
0
0
0
0
40th (2014)

Frédéric Gabillon

3
2013
40
6
31
33
4
2nd (2013)

Borja García

1
2013
20
1
13
16
1
5th (2014)

Riccardo Geltrude

7
2016
4
0
0
2
0
N/A

Marc Goossens

90
2016
4
0
0
2
0
N/A

Willy Gruber

26
2016
4
0
0
0
0
N/A

Anthony Kumpen

24
2014
28
4
22
26
2
1st (2014)

Mathias Lauda

66
2014
17
1
4
10
0
9th (2014)

Bert Longin

11
2014
27
0
5
15
1
6th (2014)

Barry Maessen

14
2016
2
0
2
2
0
N/A

Simone Monforte

88
2014
21
0
0
2
0
16th (2014)

Freddy Nordström

44
2012
50
0
9
29
0
7th (2013, 2014)

Florian Renauer

5
2015
16
0
1
12
0
8th (2015)

Nicolò Rocca

56
2013
37
3
10
23
4
9th (2015)

text: Part-time drivers[edit]

text:
Driver

No.
Debut
Starts
Wins
Top 5s
Top 10s
Poles
Best Points Finish

William Ayer Jr.

69
2013
16
0
0
0
0
14th (2015)

Alex Caffi

23
2016
0
0
0
0
0
N/A

Brandon Gdovic

46
2015
4
0
0
1
0
26th (2015)

Claudio Giudice

4
2016
2
0
0
0
0
N/A

Peter Gross

15
2016
0
0
0
0
0
N/A

Roman Mavlanov

15
2016
0
0
0
0
0
N/A

Colin White

21
2016
2
0
0
0
0
N/A

text: Whelen Euro Series Elite 2 Division drivers[edit]

text: Full-time drivers[edit]

text:
Driver

No.
Debut
Starts
Wins
Top 5s
Top 10s
Poles
Best Points Finish

Marconi Abreu

47
2016
4
0
0
2
0
N/A

Didier Bec

31
2013
38
0
0
4
0
11th (2015)

Hugo Bec

3
2016
4
0
1
3
0
N/A

Renzo Calcinati

12
2013
9
0
2
2
0
20th (2013)

Arianna Casoli

8
2016
3
0
0
0
0
N/A

Eric De Doncker

98
2015
14
0
0
8
0
8th (2015)

Guillaume Deflandre

56
2015
14
0
2
7
1
13th (2015)

Jerry De Weerdt

78
2014
16
0
0
3
0
14th (2015)

Martin Doubek

5
2015
12
0
0
8
0
16th (2015)

Thomas Ferrando

37
2014
28
5
20
22
2
3rd (2014, 2015)

Gabriele Gardel

24
2014
6
1
4
4
0
22nd (2014)

Riccardo Geltrude

7
2016
4
0
2
3
0
N/A

Willy Gruber

26
2016
3
0
0
1
0
N/A

Paul Guiod

73
2016
4
0
0
0
0
N/A

Freddie Hunt

66
2016
4
0
0
2
0
N/A

Justin Kunz

44
2016
3
0
0
0
0
N/A

Simone Laureti

9
2014
20
0
2
9
0
6th (2014)

Stienes Longin

11
2014
20
5
14
18
4
4th (2015)

Roman Mavlanov

88
2016
4
0
2
2
0
N/A

Marco Spinelli

6
2014
5
0
0
4
0
36th (2014)

Salvador Tineo Arroyo

54
2014
20
1
17
18
0
5th (2015)

Shawn Paul Wakefield

1
2016
4
0
0
0
0
N/A

text: Part-time drivers[edit]

text:
Driver

No.
Debut
Starts
Wins
Top 5s
Top 10s
Poles
Best Points Finish

Rayane Ait-Adjedjou

69
2016
2
0
0
0
0
N/A

Maik Barten

21
2016
2
0
0
1
0
N/A

Claudio Giudice

4
2016
2
0
0
0
0
N/A

Alexandre Guiod

88
2016
1
0
0
0
0
N/A

Barry Maessen

14
2016
0
0
0
0
0
N/A

Christian Malchárek

46
2015
8
0
0
2
0
17th (2015)

Mauro Serra

23
2016
0
0
0
0
0
N/A

Marko Stipp

14
2016
2
0
0
1
0
N/A

text: Whelen Modified Tour drivers[edit]

text: All statistics used in these tables are as of the end of the 2017 Sunoco World Series 150 (Race 16/16)

text: Full-time drivers[edit]

text:
Driver

No.
Debut
Starts
Wins
Top 5s
Top 10s
Poles
Best Points Finish

Justin Bonsignore

51
2007
121
12
54
78
5
2nd (2016)

Doug Coby

2
2002
204
23
75
115
21
1st (2012, 2014–2017)

Calvin Carroll

39
2016
18
0
0
0
0
12th (2017)

Wade Cole

33
1985
339
0
0
7
0
11th (2017)

Melissa Fifield

01
2014
57
0
0
0
0
15th (2017)

Eric Goodale

58
2008
134
3
20
64
2
5th (2017)

Craig Lutz

46
2014
36
0
0
7
1
10th (2017)

Rowan Pennink

3
2007
157
3
33
78
1
4th (2009, 2011, 2013, 2017)

Woody Pitkat

82
2007
131
3
23
67
4
3rd (2015)

Dave Sapienza

36
2014
47
0
4
11
0
7th (2017)

Timmy Solomito

16
2011
68
9
25
39
6
2nd (2017)

Rob Summers

64
1998
164
0
17
34
7
9th (2017)

Matt Swanson

89
2015
38
0
3
13
0
8th (2017)

text: Part-time drivers[edit]

text:
Driver

No.
Debut
Starts
Wins
Top 5s
Top 10s
Poles
Best Points Finish

John Baker

17
2017
1
0
0
0
0
64th (2017)

Vincent Biondolillo

06
2015
4
0
0
1
0
38th (2016)

Jimmy Blewett

76
2001
123
6
28
48
3
6th (2016)

Brendon Bock

29
2015
28
0
2
7
0
22nd (2016)

Danny Bohn

40
2017
2
0
0
1
0
44th (2017)

Kyle Bonsignore

22
2015
5
0
1
2
0
33rd (2017)

George Brunnhoelzl III

6
2002
19
0
1
4
1
17th (2010)

Gary Byington

38
2016
5
0
0
0
0
32nd (2016)

Danny Cugini

20
2017
1
0
0
0
0
60th (2017)

Bryan Dauzat

97
2010
7
0
0
0
0
36th (2017)

Spencer Davis

88
2014
11
0
0
3
0
26th (2014)

Manny Dias

38
2017
2
0
0
0
0
52nd (2017)

Chase Dowling

15
2015
41
0
9
20
1
9th (2015)

Kyle Ebersole

5
2013
5
0
0
1
0
35th (2017)

Lauren Edgerton

72
2017
1
0
0
0
0
63rd (2017)

Kyke Ellwood

38
2014
14
0
0
1
0
30th (2017)

Patrick Emerling

07
2011
80
1
13
33
3
5th (2015)

Jeremy Gerstner

75
2017
2
0
0
0
0
45th (2017)

Ken Heagy

18
1987
126
0
0
6
0
14th (2008)

Lester Hinckley III

00
2017
1
0
0
1
0
56th (2017)

Matt Hirschman

60
2005
93
2
19
49
5
2nd (2008)

Andrew Krause

24
2016
18
0
0
3
0
20th (2017)

C. J. Lehmann

74
2017
4
0
0
1
0
37th (2017)

Donny Lia

7
2001
191
17
64
98
22
1st (2007, 2009)

Brian Loftin

11
2005
3
0
0
0
0
50th (2008)

Gary McDonald

26
2008
101
0
0
1
0
18th (2014, 2016)

Jon McKennedy

00
2006
33
0
1
10
0
23rd (2012)

Burt Myers

11
1999
9
0
1
2
0
38th (2010)

Ryan Newman

77
2008
25
4
13
15
6
27th (2014)

Anthony Nocella

92
2015
17
0
1
3
0
24th (2015)

Cory Oslund

14
2017
2
0
0
0
0
49th (2017)

Austin Pickens

63
2017
3
0
0
0
0
46th (2017)

Gary Putnam

77
2014
12
0
0
1
0
25th (2017)

Jeff Rocco

85
2017
3
0
0
0
0
42nd (2017)

Tom Rogers Jr.

0
2004
24
0
2
10
2
27th (2011)

Dave Salzarulo

38
2013
29
0
0
0
0
20th (2014)

Bobby Santos III

44
2004
133
16
48
71
17
1st (2010)

Andy Seuss

00
2006
45
0
2
11
0
26th (2017)

Ronnie Silk

85
2003
169
10
61
99
10
1st (2011)

Jerry Solomito Jr.

10
2015
5
0
0
0
0
42nd (2015)

Shawn Solomito

20
2011
44
0
3
9
1
16th (2015)

Kyle Soper

48
2015
4
0
1
1
0
47th (2017)

Dillon Steuer

45
2017
3
0
0
2
0
40th (2017)

Walter Sutcliffe Jr.

78
2016
17
0
0
0
0
18th (2017)

Todd Szegedy

85
2000
212
19
86
130
11
1st (2003)

Jamie Tomaino

99
1985
618
3
91
248
6
1st (1990)

Roger Turbush

88
2017
1
0
0
0
0
61st (2017)

Brad Van Houten

09
2017
1
0
0
0
0
59th (2017)

Ronnie Williams

21
2015
11
0
0
1
0
21st (2017)

Max Zachem

20
2013
46
0
6
22
0
5th (2016)


document_title: Area code 772

question_text: de donde es el area 722 en usa

question_tokens: de donde es el area 722 en usa

text: Area code 772

text: Area code 772 serves the Treasure Coast of the state of Florida. It covers Sebastian, Fellsmere, Vero Beach, Fort Pierce, Port St. Lucie, Jensen Beach, Stuart, Hobe Sound, Indiantown, and other areas in east central Florida. It was created in 2002 as a split from area code 561 when there was a need for more phone numbers (due in part to the increase of cell phone users).

text: The region of this code has been under four different area codes in about a 15-year span. It spent 41 years as part of area code 305, until it became part of area code 407 in 1988, then it became part of 561 in 1996, and finally split off into 772 in 2002.  Despite the Treasure Coast's rapid growth, 772 is nowhere near exhaustion; under current projections, the region will not need another area code until 2046 at the earliest.


document_title: Government of Himachal Pradesh

question_text: who is the forest minister in himachal pradesh

text: Government of Himachal Pradesh

text: Council of Ministers(2017-22)[edit]

text:
Ministry of the State

Designation
Department
Name

Chief Minister
Finance, General Administrations, Home, Planning, Personnel and All other Departments not allotted to any other Minister
Jai Ram Thakur[2]

Irrigation & Public Health Minister
Irrigation & Public Health, Horticulture, Sainik Welfare
Mahender Singh Thakur

Food, Civil Supplies & Consumer Affair Minister
Food, Civil Supplies & Consumer Affair, Election
Kishan Kapoor

Education Minister
Higher Education, Elementary Education, Parliamentary Affairs, Law and Legal Remembrancer
Suresh Bhardwaj

MPP and Power Minister
Multi Purpose Projects and Power Minister, Non Conventional Energy Sources
Anil Sharma

Urban Development Minister
Urban Development, Town & Country Planning, Housing
Sarveen Chaudhary

Agriculture Minister
Agriculture, Tribal Development, Information and Technology
Ram Lal Markanda

Health and Family Welfare Minister
Health and Family Welfare, Medical Education, Ayurveda, Science and Technology
Vipin Singh Parmar

Rural Development & Panchayati Raj Minister
Rural Development, Panchayati Raj, Animal Husbandary, Fisheries
Virender Kanwar

Industries Minister
Industries, Labour & Employment, Technical Education, Vocational & Industrial Training
Bikram Singh

Forest Minister
Forest, Transport, Youth Services and Sports
Govind Singh

Social Justice & Empowerment Minister
Social Justice & Empowerment, Cooperation
Rajiv Saizal

text: State administrative structure[edit]

text:
State administrative structure

Administrative structure (2002)
Numbers

Districts
12

Tehsils
158

Subdivisions
69

Blocks
75

Villages
20118

Towns
57

Constituencies
Numbers

Lok Sabha
4

Rajya Sabha
3

Assembly constituencies
68

text: The Himachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly has no pre-Constitution history. The state itself is a post-independence creation. It first came into being as a centrally administered territory on 15 April 1948 by the integration of 30 erstwhile princely states.

text: Himachal Pradesh is governed through a parliamentary system of representative democracy, a feature the state shares with other Indian states. Universal suffrage is granted to residents.

text: The legislature of Himachal Pradesh is unicameral and at present, the Assembly has a strength of 68. The tenure of the Assembly is five years unless it is sooner dissolved. There are 14 House Committees in the Assembly.

text: In the assembly elections held in November 2012, the Congress secured an absolute majority.[3] The Congress won 36 of the 68 seats while the BJP won 26 of the 68 seats. Virbhadra Singh was sworn in as Himachal Pradesh's Chief Minister for a record sixth term in Shimla on 25 December 2012. Virbhadra Singh, who has held the top office in Himachal five times in the past, was administered the oath of office and secrecy by Governor Urmila Singh at an open ceremony at the historic Ridge Maidan in Shimla.[4]