document_title: Tax protester statutory arguments

question_text: where is the law that requires income tax

question_tokens: where is the law that requires income tax

text: Tax protester statutory arguments

text: Definition of the terms "state" and "includes"[edit]

text: In connection with various arguments that the Federal income tax should not apply to citizens or residents within the fifty states, some tax protesters have argued about the meanings of the terms "state" and "includes".

text: Tax protester arguments[edit]

text: One argument is that the definitions of "state" and "United States" in most subparts and the general definition in the Internal Revenue Code are what other amending code sections[clarification needed][1][2] refer to as "a special definition of 'state'", where the statutory definitions include the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and some other territories, without mentioning the 50 states. Under this argument, the definition of "state" within the Code in general, or within those certain subparts of the Code, refers only to territories, or the possessions of the federal government, or the District of Columbia. Alaska and Hawaii were formerly included in the "special" definition of a "state" until each was removed from that general definition by the Alaska Omnibus Act[3] and the Hawaii Omnibus Act[2] when they were respectively admitted to the Union.

text: Under the following tax protester argument,[citation needed] the term "state" is used in an international meaning of "nation" or "sovereign." The argument is that this meaning refers to the foreign status of each state to every other state including the federal state, under private international law. Under this argument, all court opinions on the subject of states being foreign to each other (and also to the federal state and possessions) have upheld this concept,[citation needed] and have distinguished between meanings of foreignness by using the terms private international law and public international law. Under this argument, the latter term deals with the authority the 50 States delegated to the United States government to represent American interests outside of America, grouping all those that are bound by the United States Constitution as one body, relative to those that are not bound, such as France or Britain. Under this argument, the term "private international law" signifies the foreignness of the sovereign states, or nations, of the United States system to each other, within the system.

text: Tax protesters argue[citation needed] that the importance of the definition applies where the term "state" is the reference to the federal state as defined within a subpart or generally, then when "state" is referenced in other definitions (such as "employee") within relevant places, it has the same meaning. There are two Code sections that define "employee" within the whole of the Internal Revenue Code and both are found in parts of the Title where "state" is governed by this "special" definition. Tax protesters argue that each section defines the term "employee" as being limited to someone who works within or in the employ of a state, or who is an officer of a corporation, while the courts have ruled that the term "employee" is not limited to those persons.[citation needed] The definition of "wages" is that remuneration which is earned by an "employee."[citation needed] Tax protesters argue that normal income taxes are taxes on wages and some laws that require things like filing a return are only required of employees.

text: Tax protesters argue[citation needed] that there are also no conflicting definitions of "state" or "United States" to this interpretation in Title 26 of the United States Code (the Internal Revenue Code) -- that both of the two times either of these terms are defined as "the 50 states," the terms are localized to the subpart. Under this argument, in those two subparts that define "state" as the 50 states, there is no mention of the District of Columbia or any territories in that definition.

text: The Internal Revenue Code general definition of the term "state" in section 7701 is as follows:

text: The term "State" shall be construed to include the District of Columbia, where such construction is necessary to carry out provisions of this title.[4]

text: Some tax protesters argue that, in connection with the phrase "to include the District of Columbia," the term "include" generally should have the meaning of exclusivity of whatever is being listed if the list is made in a certain way.[citation needed] In such situations, of which the definition of "State" is an example, the argument goes that no things not in the list are included with what is included.

text: Other subparts of the Internal Revenue Code list the District of Columbia and territories of the United States in response to the definition of "State," or geographically, the "United States" (26 C.F.R § 31.3132 (e)-1)[5]

text: The Internal Revenue Code general definition of the terms "includes" and "including" is as follows:

text: The terms "includes" and "including" when used in a definition contained in this title shall not be deemed to exclude other things otherwise within the meaning of the term defined.[6]

text: Some tax protesters argue[citation needed] that in the 1911 case of Montello Salt Co. v. Utah,[7] the Supreme Court stated that the term "including" is generally interchangeable with "also" but not necessarily, and can sometimes have a meaning of exclusivity. The Montello Salt case was not a Federal tax case, and no issues involving the meaning of the terms "state" or "includes" or "including" as used in the Internal Revenue Code were presented to or decided by the Court. The word "tax" is not found in the text of the Montello Salt decision.

text: Court rulings on the Internal Revenue Code definitions of "state" and "includes"[edit]

text: In a 1959 tax case, the United States Supreme Court indicated that the term "includes" in the Internal Revenue Code (26 U.S.C. § 7701) is a term of expansion, not a term of exclusivity.[8] Subsection (c) of section 7701 provides:

text: The terms "includes" and "including" when used in a definition contained in this title shall not be deemed to exclude other things otherwise within the meaning of the term defined.

text: Similarly, in the case of United States v. Condo, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit stated:

text: [the taxpayer's] other tax theories are equally frivolous. His assertion that 26 U.S.C. § 7343 only applies to business entities and their employees ignores the word "includes" in the statute delineating the class of persons liable. The word "includes" expands, not limits, the definition of "person" to these entities.[9]

text: No federal court has upheld the argument that the term "state" as used in the Internal Revenue Code excludes the fifty states or that the term "state" means only the "District of Columbia." The argument that the term "state" as used in Federal income tax law means only the District of Columbia and the territories was specifically rejected by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in United States v. Ward.[10] Similarly, in the case of Nieman v. Commissioner, the taxpayer argued that "Congress excludes the 50 States from the definition of "United States", for the purposes of 26 U.S.C., Subtitle A." The United States Tax Court rejected that argument, stating:

text: Petitioner attempts to argue an absurd proposition, essentially that the State of Illinois is not part of the United States. His hope is that he will find some semantic technicality which will render him exempt from Federal income tax, which applies generally to all U.S. citizens and residents. Suffice it to say, we find no support in any of the authorities petitioner cites for his position that he is not subject to Federal income tax on income he earned in Illinois.[11]

text: See also United States v. Bell (taxpayer's argument -- that the term "United States" encompasses "only territories and possessions such as the 'Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, and American Samoa' [ . . . ] but not the contiguous 48 states, Hawaii and Alaska" by contending that the term "include" was a term of "limitation"—was rejected).[12] See also Friesen v. Commissioner (taxpayer's argument—that Nebraska was "without" the United States and that as a Nebraska resident the taxpayer was "alien to the foreign Federal jurisdiction" and therefore not subject to income tax—was rejected).[13]

text: The argument that the United States does not include all or a part of the physical territory of the fifty states, and variations of this argument, have been officially identified as legally frivolous Federal tax return positions for purposes of the $5,000 frivolous tax return penalty imposed under Internal Revenue Code section 6702(a).[14]

text: The private sector employee argument[edit]

text: An argument linked to the meaning of the words "includes" and "including" is the argument that for Federal income tax purposes, the term "employee" under Internal Revenue Code section 3401(c) does not include a regular, private-sector employee. The courts have uniformly rejected this argument. The text of section 3401(c), which deals only with the employer's withholding requirements and not with the employee's requirement to report Internal Revenue Code section 61 compensation for personal services (whether called wages, salaries, or any other term), is as follows:

text: For purposes of this chapter, the term "employee" includes an officer, employee, or elected official of the United States, a State, or any political subdivision thereof, or the District of Columbia, or any agency or instrumentality of any one or more of the foregoing. The term "employee" also includes an officer of a corporation.[15]

text: In Sullivan v. United States, taxpayer Grant W. Sullivan argued that he had not received "wages" and was not an "employee" under Internal Revenue Code section 3401(c). The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit ruled against Sullivan, stating:

text: To the extent Sullivan argues that he received no "wages" in 1983 because he was not an "employee" within the meaning of 26 U.S.C. §3401(c), that contention is meritless. Section 3401(c), which relates to income tax withholding, indicates that the definition of "employee" includes government officers and employees, elected officials, and corporate officers. The statute does not purport to limit withholding to the persons listed therein.[16]

text: In United States v. Ferguson, taxpayer Joy Ferguson argued that she was not an "employee" under section 3401(c), and that she therefore could not have "wages." The court ruled against her, stating:

text: The core of the dispute before the court is Ferguson's assertion that she was not an "employee" as defined by §3401(c) of the Internal Revenue Code, and therefore did not earn any "wages." [footnote omitted] As such, she argues that her Form 1040 and Form 4862 accurately reported her wages as zero. As noted by the government, Ferguson's interpretation of §3401(c) has been considered and rejected numerous times by many courts. This Court would agree with the overwhelming precedent on this issue, Ferguson's argument that she is not an employee as defined by §3401(c) is frivolous.[17]

text: In Luesse v. United States, taxpayer Chell C. Luesse of St. Louis Park, Minnesota, argued that he received no "wages" because he was not an "employee" under section 3401(c). The court ruled against Mr. Luesse.[18]

text: In Richey v. Stewart, the court stated:

text: Another familiar argument from Mr. Richey [the taxpayer] is that he is not an employee under the terms of the Internal Revenue Code, citing Section 3401(c), which states that the term "employee" includes government employees. What Mr. Richey misapprises in his reading of the statute is the inclusionary nature of the language. The Code does not exclude all other persons from taxation who are not government employees.[19]

text: In United States v. Charboneau, the court stated:

text: [ . . . ] Ms. Charboneau contends that the Code's definitions of "wage income" and "self employment income" only include income derived from individuals who work for the federal government, or whose work involves that of "the performance of the functions of a public office." Because Ms. Charboneau never worked for any federal or state government during the tax years in question, she claims that the IRS cannot make any tax assessments against her.

text: This nonsensical argument is belied by the plain language of the Internal Revenue Code itself. For example, 26 U.S.C. §3401 defines wages as "all remuneration (other than fees paid to a public official) for services performed by an employee for his employer...." 26 U.S.C. §3401(a) (emphasis added). The statute then goes on to define various exceptions to this broad definition of wages in certain categories of private employment, such as in the agricultural and domestic service fields, newspaper delivery, the clergy, and for wages incurred by individuals working for employers "other than the United States or an agency therof" within Puerto Rico or a possession of the United States. There is nothing in the statute limiting "wages" to solely publicly derived income. [footnotes omitted]

text: Ms. Charboneau, however, focuses on §3401(c), which states that:

text: the term "employee" includes an officer, employee, or elected official of the United States, a State, or any political subdivision thereof, or the District of Columbia, or any agency or instrumentality of any one or more of the foregoing. The term "employee" also includes an officer of a corporation.

text: 26 U.S.C. §3401(c). Setting aside the last sentence of this provision, which clearly states that officers of private corporations are considered employees for purposes of determining wages, it is obvious that within the context of this statute that the word "includes" is a term of enlargement, not of limitation, and the reference to certain public officers and employees was not intended to exclude all others. See also Sims v. United States, 359 U.S. 108, 112-13 (1959) (concluding that similar provision in 26 U.S.C. §6331 dealing with levies on salaries and wages does not exclude wages of private citizens); Sullivan v. United States, 788 F.2d 813,815 ("[Section 3401(c)] does not purport to limit withholding to persons listed therein"); United States v. Latham, 754 F.2d 747, 750 (7th Cir. 1985) (the Internal Revenue Code definition of "employee" in 26 U.S.C. §3401 does not exclude privately employed wage earners);. In addition, 26 U.S.C. §7701, which provides the definitions of terms used throughout the Internal Revenue Code, states that the "terms 'includes' and 'including' when used in a definition contained in this title shall not be deemed to exclude other things otherwise within the meaning of the term defined." 26 U.S.C. §7701(c).[20]

text: In McCoy v. United States, the court stated:

text: McCoy argues she should not have to pay taxes for 1996-98 because under Code Section 3401 she was not an "employee" which she contends is defined as an elected or appointed employee or official of the federal government. McCoy clearly misconstrues Section 3401(c). The definition of "employee" includes private-sector employees, employees of the federal government, as well as elected and appointed officials. The very language of the Code is inclusive, not limited to the examples of included persons.[21]

text: Joseph Alan Fennell's argument — that the compensation he received in exchange for "non-federally privileged private sector labor" was not taxable—was rejected by the United States Tax Court.[22] Fennell appealed his Tax Court loss, but the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit ruled that Fennell's challenges were "frivolous on the merits in any event."[23] Similarly, in United States v. Buras, the argument that the taxpayer can be subject to the federal income tax only if he benefits from a "privilege extended by a government agency" was ruled to be without merit.[24] See also Olson v. United States[25] and Nichols v. United States.[26]

text: A penalty of $1,000 under Internal Revenue Code section 6673 was imposed by the U.S. Tax Court on Patrick Michael Mooney for presenting frivolous arguments. The court rejected his argument that his wages earned from a private employer were not taxable. The court also rejected his argument that the term "employee" was limited to "someone performing the functions of a public office."[27]

text: The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit ruled that an argument by Robert S. Morse that his income was not subject to federal taxation because it was derived from employment in the "private sector" was frivolous, and that Morse was liable for monetary sanctions, under Rule 38 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, for making a frivolous argument.[28]

text: The argument that only certain types of taxpayers (such as only Federal government employees, corporations, nonresident aliens, residents of the District of Columbia, or residents of Federal territories) are subject to income tax and employment tax, and variations of this argument, have been officially identified as legally frivolous Federal tax return positions for purposes of the $5,000 frivolous tax return penalty imposed under Internal Revenue Code section 6702(a).[14]

text: Arguments about the legal obligation to pay tax[edit]

text: Some tax protesters argue that there is no law imposing a Federal income tax or requiring the filing of a return, or that the government is obligated to show the tax protesters the law or tell the protesters why they are subject to tax, or that the government has refused to disclose the law.

text: The Internal Revenue Code as a statute enacted by Congress[edit]

text: A New York Times article on July 31, 2006, states that when filmmaker Aaron Russo asked an IRS spokesman for the law requiring payment of income taxes on wages and was provided a link to various documents including title 26 of the United States Code (the Internal Revenue Code), Russo denied that title 26 was the law, contending that it consisted only of IRS "regulations" and had not been enacted by Congress.

text: The version of the Internal Revenue Code published as "title 26" of the United States Code is what the Office of Law Revision Counsel of the U.S. House of Representatives refers to as "non-positive law." It is one of a number; titles 2, 6–8, 12, 15, 16, 19–22, 24–27, 29, 30, 33, 34, 40–43, 45, 47, 48, and 50 are "non-positive law".[29] However, according to the United States Statutes at Large, the original version of the current 1986 code was enacted by the Eighty-Third Congress of the United States as the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, with the phrase "Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled." The Code was approved (signed into law) by President Dwight D. Eisenhower at 9:45 A.M., Eastern Daylight Time, on Monday, August 16, 1954, and was published as volume 68A of the United States Statutes at Large. Section 1(a)(1) of the enactment states: "The provisions of this Act set forth under the heading 'Internal Revenue Title' may be cited as the 'Internal Revenue Code of 1954'. Section 1(d) of the enactment is entitled "Enactment of Internal Revenue Title Into Law", and the text of the Code follows, beginning with the statutory Table of Contents. The enactment ends with the approval (enactment) notation on page 929. Section 2(a) of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 changed the name of the Code from the "1954" Code to the "1986" Code. The Internal Revenue Code is also separately published as title 26 of the United States Code.[30]

text: Regarding the legal status of the United States Statutes at Large, 1 U.S.C. § 112 provides (in part, with italics added):

text: The Archivist of the United States shall cause to be compiled, edited, indexed, and published, the United States Statutes at Large, which shall contain all the laws and concurrent resolutions enacted during each regular session of Congress; all proclamations by the President in the numbered series issued since the date of the adjournment of the regular session of Congress next preceding; and also any amendments to the Constitution of the United States proposed or ratified pursuant to article V thereof since that date, together with the certificate of the Archivist of the United States issued in compliance with the provision contained in section 106b of this title. [ . . . ] The United States Statutes at Large shall be legal evidence of laws, concurrent resolutions, treaties, international agreements other than treaties, proclamations by the President, and proposed or ratified amendments to the Constitution of the United States therein contained, in all the courts of the United States, the several States, and the Territories and insular possessions of the United States.

text: In the case of Ryan v. Bilby, the taxpayer, Dennis Ryan, had been convicted of failure to file tax returns. He therefore sued the district court judge, the prosecutor, his own attorney, two magistrates, and the IRS agents in the case. Ryan's lawsuit was thrown out. He then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which ruled against Ryan and stated:

text: Ryan's primary contention on appeal is that, as Congress has never enacted Title 26 of the United States Code into positive law, the defendants violated his constitutional rights by attempting to enforce it. [footnote omitted] Thus, he concludes, the district court erred by dismissing his suit. This contention is frivolous.

text: Congress's failure to enact a title [of the United States Code] into positive law has only evidentiary significance and does not render the underlying enactment invalid or unenforceable. See 1 U. S. C. §204(a) (1982) (the text of titles not enacted into positive law is only prima facie evidence of the law itself). Like it or not, the Internal Revenue Code is the law, and the defendants did not violate Ryan's rights by enforcing it.[31]

text: The Court of Appeals imposed penalties on Mr. Ryan under 28 U.S.C. section 1912, in the form of ordering him to pay double costs, for filing a frivolous appeal.[31]

text: Similarly, in Young v. Internal Revenue Service, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Indiana stated:

text: Plaintiff [the taxpayer, Jerry L. Young] asserts that the Internal Revenue Code does not apply to him. The basis for this claim is not easily found in the complaint. According to "plaintiff's answer to the court in re of defendant's pleadings," "It is a Fact that the Internal Revenue Code is NOT Postive [sic] Law. That U. S. C. Title 26 has NEVER been passed by Congress." (Emphasis in original).

text: The only support that the court can find for this argument amongst plaintiff's numerous filings is a letter dated May 7, 1981 from the American Law Division of the Congressional Research Service (plaintiff's Exhibit 7). That letter does say that the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 "was not enacted by Congress as a title of the U. S. Code." But this does not in any way support plaintiff's argument that the Internal Revenue Code is not positive law. First, that very same letter, in the very same sentence, states that "the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 is positive law . . .." Second, although Congress did not pass the Code as a title, it did enact the Internal Revenue Code as a separate Code, see Act of August 16, 1954, 68A Stat. 1, which was then denominated as Title 26 by the House Judiciary Committee pursuant to 1 U. S. C. §202(a). Finally, even if Title 26 was not itself enacted into positive law, that does not mean that the laws under that title are null and void. A law listed in the current edition of the United States Code is prima facie evidence of the law of the United States. See 1 U. S. C. §204(a). As the letter offered by the plaintiff points out, "The courts could require proof of the underlying statutes when a law is in a title of the code which has not been enacted into positive law." In short, this court has the discretion to recognize the Internal Revenue Code as the applicable law, or require proof of the underlying statute.

text: Consistent with that discretion, this court recognizes that the Internal Revenue Code is positive law applicable to disputes concerning whether taxes are owned by someone like the plaintiff. This court refuses to embrace the plaintiff's position that the tax laws of the United States are some kind of hoax designed by the IRS to violate the constitutional rights of United States citizens. Quite simply, the court finds plaintiff's position preposterous.[32]

text: Similarly, in United States v. McLain, the U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota stated:

text: [The taxpayer, Frances] McLain also contends that the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 is prima facie evidence of the law on which Title 26 is based. Docket No. 163 at 4. McLain is incorrect. The Internal Revenue Code of 1954 was enacted into positive law in the form of a separate code and, as amended, is the authoritative statement of the law. 1 U.S.C. § 204(a) & note; ch. 736, 68A Stat. 3, 3 (1954); Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085, 2095 (1986) (stating that the Internal Revenue Title enacted in 1954, as amended, may be cited as the Internal Revenue Code of 1986); Tax Analysts v. IRS, 214 F.3d 179, 182 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 2000). Moreover, while McLain is technically correct in arguing that Title 26 is merely prima facie evidence of the law, the distinction is largely academic because the relevant sections of Title 26 are identical to the relevant sections of the Internal Revenue Code.[33]

text: Similarly, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit has rejected the argument that "the Internal Revenue Code has not been enacted into 'positive law'".[34]

text: Some tax protesters have actually argued that the Internal Revenue Code itself says that the Code has "no legal effect." The courts have rejected this argument as well, and have imposed penalties for making this argument.[35]

text: The argument that the Internal Revenue Code is not "law," the argument that the Internal Revenue Code is not "positive law", the argument that nothing in the Internal Revenue Code imposes a requirement to file a return or pay tax, and similar arguments, have been identified as frivolous arguments for purposes of the $5,000 penalty for taking a frivolous position on a tax return.[14]

text: Specific Code provisions[edit]

text: Although the specific statutes imposing an income tax may be generally unknown to persons other than tax lawyers, certified public accountants, enrolled agents and other tax specialists, such statutes exist. Internal Revenue Code sections 1 (26 U.S.C. § 1) (relating to individuals, estates and trusts) and 11 (26 U.S.C. § 11) (relating to corporations) are examples of statutes that expressly impose an income tax on "taxable income" (with section 1(a), for example, expressly using the phrase "[t]here is hereby imposed on the taxable income of [ . . . ]" and section 11 stating: "A tax is hereby imposed for each taxable year on the taxable income of every corporation."). The term "taxable income" is in turn defined in section 63 (26 U.S.C. § 63) with reference to "gross income" which in turn is defined in 26 U.S.C. § 61.

text: In Holywell Corp. v. Smith, the United States Supreme Court (in a unanimous case) stated the legal significance of 26 U.S.C. § 6151:

text: The Internal Revenue Code ties the duty to pay federal income taxes to the duty to make an income tax return. See 26 U.S.C. 6151(a) ('when a return of a tax is required . . . the person required to make such return shall . . . pay such tax').[36]

text: Regarding civil monetary penalties for failure to timely pay taxes, 26 U.S.C. § 6651(a)(2) states (in part):

text: In case of failure—

text: (2) to pay the amount shown on tax on any return specified in paragraph (1) on or before the date prescribed for payment of such tax (determined with regard to any extension of time for payment), unless it is shown that such failure is due to reasonable cause and not due to willful neglect, there shall be added to the amount shown as tax on such return 0.5 percent of the amount of such tax if the failure is for not more than 1 month, with an additional 0.5 percent for each additional month or fraction thereof during which such failure continues, not exceeding 25 percent in the aggregate [ . . . ]

text: Regarding Federal income tax returns for single (unmarried) individuals, 26 U.S.C. § 6012 provides (in part):

text: Returns with respect to income taxes under subtitle A shall be made by the following: [ . . . ]

text: (A) Every individual having for the taxable year gross income which equals or exceeds the exemption amount, except that a return shall not be required of an individual—

text: Further provisions of section 6012 refer to tax return filings for other individual taxpayers (e.g., married persons filing joint returns, surviving spouses, heads of household, married persons filing separate returns) as well as for other entities such as corporations, estates, and trusts. See also 26 U.S.C. § 6011.

text: Civil monetary penalties for failure to timely file tax returns (denominated as "additions" to tax) are mentioned at 26 U.S.C. § 6651(a)(1). Under 26 U.S.C. § 6061, with specified, limited exceptions, "any return [ . . .] required to be made under any provision of the internal revenue laws or regulations shall be signed in accordance with forms or regulations prescribed by the Secretary" (emphasis added). The Treasury Regulations indicate that the individual's Federal income tax return must be filed on "Form 1040," "Form 1040A," etc.[37]

text: Criminal penalties for willful failure to timely file tax returns or pay taxes are mentioned at 26 U.S.C. § 7203:

text: Any person required under this title to pay any estimated tax or tax, or required by this title or by regulations made under authority thereof to make a return, keep any records, or supply any information, who willfully fails to pay such estimated tax or tax, make such return, keep such records, or supply such information, at the time or times required by law or regulations, shall, in addition to other penalties provided by law, be guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not more than $25,000 ($100,000 in the case of a corporation), or imprisoned not more than 1 year, or both, together with the costs of prosecution [ . . . ]

text: Under 26 U.S.C. § 7206:

text: Any person who—

text: shall be guilty of a felony and, upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not more than $100,000 ($500,000 in the case of a corporation), or imprisoned not more than 3 years, or both, together with the costs of prosecution.

text: See also 26 U.S.C. § 7207 and 18 U.S.C. § 1001.

text: The Federal tax evasion statute follows the language of statutory provisions such as Code section 1 (the imposition statute for the individual income tax), with both statutes using the word "imposed":[38]

text: Any person who willfully attempts in any manner to evade or defeat any tax imposed by this title or the payment thereof shall, in addition to other penalties provided by law, be guilty of a felony and, upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not more than $100,000 ($500,000 in the case of a corporation), or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both, together with the costs of prosecution.[39]

text: The "show me the law" argument[edit]

text: Some tax protesters such as Edward Brown [40] and tax protester organizations such as the We the People Foundation[41] have used the phrase "show me the law" to argue that the Internal Revenue Service refuses to disclose the laws that impose the legal obligation to file Federal income tax returns or pay Federal income taxes—and to argue that there must be no law imposing Federal income taxes.[42]

text: The official Internal Revenue Service web site contains references to specific code sections and case law,[43] including 26 U.S.C. § 6011 (duty to file returns in general); 26 U.S.C. § 6012 (duty to file income tax returns in particular); and 26 U.S.C. § 6151 (duty to pay tax at time return is required to be filed)[44] and 26 U.S.C. § 61 (definition of gross income) and 26 U.S.C. § 6072 (timing of duty to file).[44]

text: The year 2007 instruction book for Form 1040, U.S. Individual Income Tax Return, on page 83, contains references to 26 U.S.C. § 6001 (relating to record keeping); 26 U.S.C. § 6011 (general filing requirement); 26 U.S.C. § 6012(a) (specific income tax return filing requirement); and 26 U.S.C. § 6109 (duty to supply identification numbers).

text: The IRS web site includes a section on tax protester arguments with citations to statutes (including the 26 U.S.C. § 6151 duty to pay the tax) and court decisions and a page with a link to the entire Internal Revenue Code as published by the Legal Information Institute at Cornell University Law School.[45]

text: A related argument that has been raised is that the taxpayer may not be penalized for tax evasion unless the taxpayer knows that section 7201 is the specific section of the Internal Revenue Code that criminalizes the conduct. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has rejected this argument as "frivolous," and has stated:

text: [ . . . ] a person may be convicted of tax offenses only if he knows that the [Internal Revenue] Code requires him to pay. The jury was so instructed, and its verdict shows that it found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Patridge [the taxpayer] knew that he had to pay taxes on what he made from his business. It is scarcely possible to imagine otherwise: the system of offshore trusts, and the fictive "loans," show that Patridge was trying to hide income that he knew to be taxable. Why else all this folderol? Yet Patridge, in common with many other people who know what the law requires, could not say just which provisions of the Code make income taxable and prevent evasion. For that matter, many tax lawyers (and most judges) could not rattle off the citations without glancing at a book. This shortcoming of memory (perhaps, for Patridge, a deliberate avoidance of knowledge) prevents criminal punishment, [the lawyer for Patridge] insists.

text: But why would this be so? No statute says it; no opinion holds it. [ . . . Section] 7201 makes only "willful" tax evasion criminal. An act is willful for the purpose of tax law [ . . . ] when the taxpayer knows what the Code requires[,] yet sets out to foil the system. Knowledge of the law's demands does not depend on knowing the citation[,] any more than ability to watch a program on TV depends on knowing the frequency on which the signal is broadcast.[46]

text: The argument that an individual does not owe federal income tax because the Internal Revenue Service has failed to identify any federal taxing statute has been rejected by the U.S. Tax Court, and has been ruled to be frivolous.[47]

text: Demanding an explanation of tax obligations[edit]

text: A variation on the "show me the law" argument, the "there is no law requiring an income tax" argument, and the "IRS refuses to say what law makes U.S. citizens liable for income tax" argument is the contention that the IRS has an affirmative duty to respond to taxpayer demands for an answer as to why taxpayers must pay income taxes. This argument is based on tax protester theories about both constitutional law and statutory law, but the constitutional and statutory arguments will be described together here for purposes of presentation.

text: Some tax protesters claim the following language from a court decision in Schulz v. Internal Revenue Service (2005)[48] means that a taxpayer has a due process right to demand a response from the IRS as to why he or she is subject to taxation:

text: . . .absent an effort to seek enforcement through a federal court, IRS summonses apply no force to taxpayers, and no consequence whatever can befall a taxpayer who refuses, ignores, or otherwise does not comply with an IRS summons until that summons is backed by a federal court order. . . . any individual subject to [such a court order] must be given a reasonable opportunity to comply and cannot be held in contempt, arrested, detained, or otherwise punished for refusing to comply with the original IRS summons, no matter the taxpayer's reasons, or lack of reasons for so refusing."[49]

text: The taxpayer Robert L. Schulz filed motions in a federal court to quash administrative summonses[50] issued by the IRS seeking testimony and documents in connection with an IRS investigation. The court in Schulz did not rule that a taxpayer has a right to have the IRS explain why he or she is subject to taxation, and that issue was not presented to the court. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the taxpayer's motions for a lack of subject matter jurisdiction because there was no actual case or controversy as required by Article III of the Constitution. The court reasoned that the summonses posed no threat of injury to the taxpayer, as the IRS had not yet initiated enforcement proceedings against him. In other words, the taxpayer was not entitled to a court order to quash the summonses until the IRS went to court to demand that he comply with the summons or otherwise face sanctions—something the IRS had not yet done. Once the IRS took that action, the taxpayer would then have ample opportunity to challenge the validity of the summonses.

text: The court was emphasizing that the law requires the IRS to use the judicial process to punish lack of compliance with an administrative summons; the summons is not self-enforcing. This is true of any government request where the citizen is free to ignore the request until the government brings enforcement action. Courts adjudicate only actual controversies. In the Schulz case the court left open the possibility that the IRS might decide to drop the investigation and never enforce the summonses, or that the plaintiff might voluntarily comply with the request. Until the IRS took the taxpayer to court, the injury was merely "hypothetical."

text: While there is disagreement over exactly how "imminent" an injury has to be before a taxpayer can obtain relief from a court, this is separate from the obligation to timely file a tax return (which is imposed by statute). The Schulz court did not rule that the IRS was required to "explain" to the taxpayer why he had to pay taxes, but rather that the taxpayer could not obtain a court order to quash the summonses until the IRS first went to court against him. Additionally, the taxpayer was challenging requests for documents and testimony for an investigation (similar to challenging a subpoena or warrant), not demanding that the IRS explain to him why he was subject to taxation. The court did not rule that a taxpayer has no obligation to respond to a summons until the IRS undertakes proceedings against the taxpayer. The court essentially ruled that the taxpayer cannot be punished for failing to comply until the taxpayer has violated a court order mandating compliance.

text: A subsequent attempt by taxpayer Robert L. Schulz to obtain a court order quashing an IRS "third party" summons issued to the internet payment service known as PayPal was rejected by a Federal court in June 2006.[51]

text: In a separate case, Schulz and his We the People Foundation organization argued unsuccessfully that, based on the First Amendment right of the people to petition the government for a redress of grievances, the government should have a duty to respond to a taxpayer's demand for an explanation as to why taxpayers are subject to income tax. On May 8, 2007, the Schulz argument was rejected by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in We the People Foundation, Inc. v. United States.[52]

text: On August 9, 2007, the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York issued an order including an injunction permanently barring Schulz and his We the People Foundation from (1) advising or instructing persons or entities that they are not required to file federal tax returns or pay federal taxes; (2) selling or furnishing any materials purporting to enable individuals to discontinue or stop withholding or paying federal taxes; (3) instructing, advising or assisting anyone to stop withholding or stop paying federal employment or income taxes; and (4) obstructing or advising anyone to obstruct IRS examinations, collections, or other IRS proceedings.[53]

text: The "income taxes are voluntary" argument[edit]

text: Some tax protesters argue that filing of Federal income tax returns or payment of taxes is "voluntary" (in the sense of "not a legal obligation") based on language in the text of numerous court cases, such as the following: "Our system of taxation is based upon voluntary assessment and payment, not upon distraint" (from the U.S. Supreme Court case of Flora v. United States.[54])

text: Protesters cite documents that, they argue, stress the voluntary nature of taxes:

text: The taxpayer must be liable for the tax. Tax liability is a condition precedent to the demand. Merely demanding payment, even repeatedly, does not cause liability... For the condition precedent of liability to be met, there must be a lawful assessment, either a voluntary one by the taxpayer, or one procedurally proper, by the IRS. Because this country's income tax system is based on voluntary assessment, rather than distraint [levy by distress], the Service may assess the tax only in certain circumstances and in conformity with proper procedures.

text: Our tax system is based on individual self assessment and voluntary compliance.

text: The IRS's primary task is to collect taxes under a voluntary compliance system.

text: Let's not forget the delicate nature of the voluntary compliance tax system...

text: Let me point this out now: Your income tax is 100 percent voluntary tax, and your liquor tax is 100 percent enforced tax. Now, the situation is as different as night and day.

text: In Flora, the Supreme Court ruled that a Federal District Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction to hear a lawsuit by a taxpayer for a Federal income tax refund where the taxpayer has not paid the entire amount assessed (the rule, known as the Flora full payment rule, does not apply to U.S. Tax Court cases or bankruptcy cases). Tax protesters sometimes cite the language in cases like Flora for the contention that filing of tax returns and paying taxes is not legally required, i.e., that the filing of returns and paying of taxes is, in that sense, "voluntary".

text: In the Flora case the taxpayer did not contend, and the court did not rule, that there was no legal obligation to file Federal income tax returns or pay the related taxes. The Court's ruling in Flora was almost the opposite: the taxpayer was required to pay the full amount of tax claimed by the IRS to be owed by the taxpayer before the court would even hear a lawsuit by the taxpayer against the government to determine the correct amount of tax.

text: The quoted language from Flora refers to the Federal income tax: "Our system of taxation is based upon voluntary assessment and payment, not upon distraint." The key words are "voluntary" and "distraint." Like many legal terms, "voluntary" has more than one legal meaning. In the context of the quoted sentence, the income tax is voluntary in that the person bearing the economic burden of the tax is the one required to compute (assess) the amount of tax and file the related tax return. In this sense, a state sales tax is not a voluntary tax - i.e., the purchaser of the product does not compute the tax or file the related tax return. The store at which he or she bought the product computes the sales tax, charges the customer, collects the tax from him at the time of sale, prepares and files a monthly or quarterly sales tax return and remits the money to the taxing authority.

text: In Flora, the Court used the word "voluntary" in opposition to the word "distraint." Distraint is a legal term used in various contexts. For example, distraint is used to refer to the act of a landlord who withholds property of the tenant already in the landlord’s possession to secure payment of past due rent. The property "held for ransom," in a sense, is said to be "distrained," or "distressed." The key connotation of the word "distraint" is that there is often a taking of possession or withholding of property to induce a debtor to pay an obligation. Once the debt is paid, the property is released.

text: By contrast, the Internal Revenue Service does not seize the property of taxpayers each January to induce taxpayers to file a tax return and pay the tax by April 15. The IRS relies on "voluntary" compliance as the term is used in this sense.

text: In the separate sense of the word "voluntary" in which some tax protesters use the term, the obligation to pay the tax and file the return is not voluntary—for either income tax or sales tax. For example, the Internal Revenue Code is full of statutes specifically imposing the obligation to file returns and pay taxes, and imposing civil and criminal penalties for willful failure to do so on a timely basis (see above). The difference is that in the case of the income tax, the taxpayer files the return, whereas in the case of the sales tax, the seller (not the customer) files the return.

text: Likewise, the word "assessment" has more than one tax law meaning. In the quote from Flora the term "assessment" does not refer to a statutory assessment by the Internal Revenue Service under 26 U.S.C. § 6201 and 26 U.S.C. § 6322 and other statutes (i.e., a formal recordation of the tax on the books and records of the United States Department of the Treasury[55]). The term is instead used in the sense in which the taxpayer himself or herself "assesses" or computes his or her own tax in the process of preparing a tax return, prior to filing the return.

text: Similarly, the word "deficiency" has more than one technical meaning under the Internal Revenue Code: one kind of "deficiency" for purposes of 26 U.S.C. § 6211 relating to statutory notices of deficiency, U.S. Tax Court cases, etc. (meaning, usually, the excess of the amount that the IRS claims is the correct tax over the amount the taxpayer claims is the correct tax[56]—both computed without regard to how much of that tax has been paid[57]) as opposed to another kind of "deficiency" for purposes of the case law under the tax evasion and other criminal statutes (meaning, essentially, the amount of unpaid tax actually owed). Tax law, like other areas of law, is replete with words like "voluntary," "assessment," and "deficiency" that have varying meanings depending on the varying legal contexts in which those terms are used.

text: With respect to the use of the term "voluntary," no court has ever ruled that there is no legal obligation under the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to timely file Federal income tax returns or to timely pay Federal income taxes.

text: Failure to file tax return[edit]

text: Another argument that has been raised is the theory that the federal income tax cannot be assessed against an individual who has not filed the related federal income tax return. This argument was rejected in Carroll v. United States.[58]

text: Formal assessment of tax[edit]

text: Some tax protesters have argued that the tax must be formally assessed (officially recorded, under section 6203 of the Internal Revenue Code, on the books of the office of the U.S. Secretary of the Treasury[59]) by the Internal Revenue Service before a federal tax liability can exist. No court has upheld this argument. Internal Revenue Code section 6151(a) provides that:

text: when a return of tax is required under this title or regulations, the person required to make such return shall, without assessment or notice and demand from the Secretary [of the Treasury or his delegate], pay such tax to the internal revenue officer with whom the return is filed, and shall pay such tax at the time and place fixed for filing the return [ . . . ][60]

text: The argument that no tax is owed unless the tax is first officially assessed by the IRS was specifically rejected by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, which cited section 6151(a), in United States v. Ellett,[61] citing United States v. Daniel,[62] United States v. Hogan,[63] and United States v. Dack.[64]

text: Similarly, under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, there is no requirement that an otherwise valid federal tax be officially assessed to be considered valid in bankruptcy.[65] Indeed, until the enactment of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994,[66] the section 362(a)(6) prohibition on assessment without prior court approval applied to valid pre-petition taxes. With the 1994 Act, that restriction was eliminated by an amendment to section 362(b)(9), which now provides that although the taxing authority may assess a valid pre-petition tax without first obtaining court approval, a tax lien that would otherwise arise after the assessment will have no effect until certain specified events occur.[67] By contrast, there is no requirement that the IRS assess the tax in order for the tax to be considered a valid legal claim in the bankruptcy (i.e., in the absence of a tax lien securing the tax, an unassessed tax can be classified as a valid priority unsecured claim under 11 U.S.C. § 507 or a valid general unsecured claim, as applicable).

text: The argument that a person is not required to file a tax return or pay tax unless the Internal Revenue Service responds to the person's questions, etc., and variations of this argument, have been officially identified as legally frivolous Federal tax return positions for purposes of the $5,000 frivolous tax return penalty imposed under Internal Revenue Code section 6702(a).[14]

text: Implementing regulations[edit]

text: Another argument made by tax protesters is that a given section of the statute (i.e., a given section of the Internal Revenue Code) must be supported by an implementing regulation for that particular section in order for that section to be legally valid, or that the lack of an implementing regulation for that section makes that section unenforceable. This argument has been uniformly rejected by the courts.[68]

text: Argument that acquittal in a criminal tax case proves there is no law imposing tax liability[edit]

text: One tax protester argument is that the acquittal of a defendant in a Federal criminal tax case proves that there is no law imposing the Federal income tax liability, or that the acquittal relieves the defendant of liability for the Federal income tax. No court has accepted this argument.

text: One well-known example of the continuing tax problems for acquitted defendants is the case of Vernice Kuglin, who was acquitted in her year 2003 criminal trial on charges of Federal income tax evasion.[69] Kuglin's tax problems were not negated by her acquittal, and in 2004 she entered a settlement with the government in which she agreed to pay over $500,000 in taxes and penalties.[70] On April 30, 2007, the Memphis Daily News reported that Kuglin's tax problems continued with the filing of a Notice of Federal Tax Lien against her assets in the amount of $188,025. The Memphis newspaper also stated that Kuglin had "given up her fight against paying taxes, according to a Sept. 10, 2004, Commercial Appeal story."[71]

text: Arguments about the amount to be taxed[edit]

text: Some protesters have argued that tax should be based on amounts other than the amount of money or the fair market value of property or services received.

text: Value of gold or silver coins[edit]

text: Some people have argued that with respect to the receipt of gold or silver coins, taxpayers need only report as income the "face value," and not the higher actual fair market value, of the coins. In the Joslin case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit ruled that under 26 U.S.C. § 61 and 26 C.F.R. 1.61-2(d)(1), a taxpayer who bargains to be paid for his services in legal tender (in this case, silver dollar coins) must report the income at the fair market value (numismatic value), and not at the lower face value.[72] Similarly, in the Cordner case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled that a taxpayer who receives Double Eagle gold coins as a distribution from a corporation must report as income the fair market value of the coins, not the lower face value.[73] In this case, where a coin, by reason of its value to collectors or by reason of the intrinsic worth of its contents, has a fair market value in excess of its face value, it is treated as "property other than money" for purposes of 26 U.S.C. § 301, resulting in taxation at fair market value.[74]

text: The Ninth Circuit Court has ruled that under 26 U.S.C. § 1001, in the exchange of Swiss francs for U.S. Double Eagle gold coins, the taxpayer is taxed at the aggregate fair market value, and not the lower face value.[75] In this case, the taxpayer and the government argued about whether the Double Eagle coin was legal tender. The court stated that it would not have to decide the issue. The court stated: "Because the key element is the excess of market value over face value, it is immaterial that such coins may be legal tender at their face value."[75]

text: In still another case, a taxpayer’s argument – that gold and silver coins should, for Federal income tax purposes, be valued at their face value, while foreign coins, in general, should be valued according to their precious metal content – was rejected. The court stated: "Coins which are not currently circulating legal tender are property to be valued at their fair market value for purposes of section 1001(b) ... This result is unaffected by the fact that such coins may still be used as legal tender at their face value."[76]

text: Taxpayers have attempted to argue that the Cordner Doctrine (see above) should not apply where the coins remain in circulation, as the coins in the Cordner case (gold coins) had been withdrawn from circulation. This argument has been rejected. In the Stoecklin case, the court ruled that the taxpayer who receives coins (in this case, silver dollar coins) as compensation for services is taxed at the fair market value of the coins, not the lower face value, regardless of whether or not the coins have been withdrawn from circulation.[77] Similarly, in the case of United States v. Kahre, the criminal defendants’ arguments – that where gold or silver coins are currently circulating, the taxpayer may report the coins as income at their face value and not at the higher fair market value – were rejected.[78] The Kahre case also made news because although the defendants lost their argument that the receipt of circulating coins could be taxed at the lower face value, the defendants were not convicted of the criminal charges against them, with the main defendant drawing a hung jury.[79] Kahre was later convicted and is currently serving a 15-year sentence in a federal penitentiary.[80][81]

text: The 861 argument[edit]

text: The 861 argument refers to Internal Revenue Code section 861, entitled "Income from sources within the United States". This provision delineates what kinds of income shall be treated as income from sources within the United States when taxes are assessed of resident aliens, nonresident aliens, and foreign corporations. The provision does not apply to U.S. citizens, but the language of Section 861 is occasionally cited by tax protesters who claim that the statute excludes some portion of the income of U.S. citizens and resident aliens from taxation under the provisions of the Code.[82]

text: Courts have uniformly held this interpretation to be incorrect, and proponents of the argument who have used it as a basis for not paying taxes have been penalized and even jailed. For example, actor Wesley Snipes was found guilty on three misdemeanor counts of failing to file Federal income tax returns, although he was acquitted of charges to conspire to defraud the US government. He was sentenced to three years in prison. Snipes has appealed that conviction.)[83][84][85]

text: Arguing the law in court[edit]

text: One contention by some tax protesters is that a taxpayer should be allowed to introduce, as evidence in court, copies of statutes, cases or other materials to persuade the jury about what the law is. Courts do not allow this procedure as, under the U.S. legal system, the general rule is that neither side in a civil or criminal case is allowed to try to prove to the jury what the law is. For example, in a murder case the defendant is not allowed to persuade the jury that there is no law against murder, or to try to interpret the law for the jury. Likewise, the prosecution is not allowed to do this. Instead, disagreements about what the law is are argued by both sides before the judge, who then makes a ruling. Prior to jury deliberations, the judge instructs the jury on the law. Examples of applications of this rule in tax controversies are United States v. Ambort,[86] United States v. Bonneau,[87] and United States v. Willie.[88]

text: In a criminal tax case, a taxpayer is allowed to present evidence about what the taxpayer believes the law to be—but only in an attempt to demonstrate, as a defense, an actual good faith belief based on a misunderstanding caused by the complexity of the tax law, not to try to persuade the jury that the taxpayer's belief is correct. An actual good faith belief based on a misunderstanding caused by the complexity of the tax law negates the "willfulness" requirement for a conviction (see Cheek v. United States).


document_title: Battles of Saratoga

question_text: who became our allies after the battle of saratoga

root

text: Battles of Saratoga

text: Background

text: The American Revolutionary War was approaching the two-year point, and the British changed their plans. They decided to split the Thirteen Colonies and isolate New England from what they believed to be the more Loyalist middle and southern colonies. The British command devised a plan to divide the colonies with a three-way pincer movement in 1777.[10] The western pincer under the command of Barry St. Leger was to progress from Ontario through western New York, following the Mohawk River,[11] and the southern pincer was to progress up the Hudson River valley from New York City.[12] The northern pincer was to proceed southward from Montreal, and the three forces were to meet in the vicinity of Albany, New York, severing New England from the other colonies.[13]

tag: p

text: British situation

text: British General John Burgoyne moved south from the province of Quebec in June 1777 to gain control of the upper Hudson River valley. His campaign had become bogged down in difficulties following a victory at Fort Ticonderoga.[13] Elements of the army had reached the upper Hudson as early as the end of July, but logistical and supply difficulties delayed the main army at Fort Edward. One attempt to alleviate these difficulties failed when nearly 1,000 men were killed or captured at the August 16 Battle of Bennington.[14] Furthermore, news reached Burgoyne on August 28 that St. Leger's expedition down the Mohawk River valley had turned back after the failed Siege of Fort Stanwix.[15]

text: General William Howe had taken his army from New York City by sea on a campaign to capture Philadelphia instead of moving north to meet Burgoyne.[16] Most of Burgoyne's Indian support had fled following the loss at Bennington, and his situation was becoming difficult.[17] He needed to reach defensible winter quarters, requiring either retreat back to Ticonderoga or advance to Albany, and he decided to advance. He then deliberately cut communications to the north so that he would not need to maintain a chain of heavily fortified outposts between his position and Ticonderoga, and he decided to cross the Hudson River while he was in a relatively strong position.[18] He ordered Baron Riedesel, who commanded the rear of the army, to abandon outposts from Skenesboro south, and then had the army cross the Hudson just north of Saratoga between September 13 and 15.[19]

text: American situation

text: The Continental Army had been in a slow retreat since Burgoyne's capture of Ticonderoga early in July, under the command of Major General Philip Schuyler, and was encamped south of Stillwater, New York. On August 19, Major General Horatio Gates assumed command from Schuyler, whose political fortunes had fallen over the loss of Ticonderoga and the ensuing retreat.[20] Gates and Schuyler were from very different backgrounds and did not get along with each other; they had previously argued over command issues in the army's Northern Department.[21] The army was growing in size because of increased militia turnout following calls by state governors, the success at Bennington, and widespread outrage over the slaying of Jane McCrea, the fiancée of a Loyalist in Burgoyne's army by Indians under Burgoyne's command.[22]

text: General George Washington's strategic decisions also improved the situation for Gates' army. Washington was most concerned about the movements of General Howe. He was aware that Burgoyne was also moving, and he took some risks in July. He sent aid north in the form of Major General Benedict Arnold, his most aggressive field commander, and Major General Benjamin Lincoln, a Massachusetts man noted for his influence with the New England militia.[23] He ordered 750 men from Israel Putnam's forces defending the New York highlands to join Gates' army in August, before he was certain that Howe had indeed sailed south. He also sent some of the best forces from his own army: Colonel Daniel Morgan and the newly formed Provisional Rifle Corps, which comprised about 500 specially selected riflemen from Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Virginia, chosen for their sharpshooting ability.[24] This unit came to be known as Morgan's Riflemen.

text: On September 7, Gates ordered his army to march north. A site was selected for its defensive potential that was known as Bemis Heights, just north of Stillwater and about 10 miles (16 km) south of Saratoga; the army spent about a week constructing defensive works designed by Polish engineer Tadeusz Kościuszko. The heights had a clear view of the area and commanded the only road to Albany, where it passed through a defile between the heights and the Hudson River. To the west of the heights lay more heavily forested bluffs that would present a significant challenge to any heavily equipped army.[25]

text: First Saratoga: Battle of Freeman's Farm (September 19)

text: Prelude

text: Moving cautiously, since the departure of his Native American support had deprived him of reliable reports on the American position, Burgoyne advanced to the south after crossing the Hudson.[26] On September 18 the vanguard of his army had reached a position just north of Saratoga, about 4 miles (6.4 km) from the American defensive line, and skirmishes occurred between American scouting parties and the leading elements of his army.[27]

text: The American camp had become a bed of festering intrigue ever since Arnold's return from Fort Stanwix. While he and Gates had previously been on reasonably good terms in spite of their prickly egos, Arnold managed to turn Gates against him by taking on officers friendly to Schuyler as staff, dragging him into the ongoing feud between the two.[28] These conditions had not yet reached a boil on September 19, but the day's events contributed to the situation. Gates had assigned the left wing of the defenses to Arnold, and assumed command himself of the right, which was nominally assigned to General Lincoln, whom Gates had detached in August with some troops to harass the British positions behind Burgoyne's army.[29]

text: Both Burgoyne and Arnold understood the importance of the American left, and the need to control the heights there. After the morning fog lifted around 10 am, Burgoyne ordered the army to advance in three columns. Baron Riedesel led the left column, consisting of the German troops and the 47th Foot, on the river road, bringing the main artillery and guarding supplies and the boats on the river. General James Inglis Hamilton commanded the center column, consisting of the 9th, 20th, 21st, and 62nd regiments, which would attack the heights, and General Simon Fraser led the right wing with the 24th Regiment and the light infantry and grenadier companies, to turn the American left flank by negotiating the heavily wooded high ground north and west of Bemis Heights.[30]

text: Arnold also realized such a flanking maneuver was likely, and petitioned Gates for permission to move his forces from the heights to meet potential movements, where the American skill at woodlands combat would be at an advantage.[31] Gates, whose preferred strategy was to sit and wait for the expected frontal assault, grudgingly permitted a reconnaissance in force consisting of Daniel Morgan's men and Henry Dearborn's light infantry.[32] When Morgan's men reached an open field northwest of Bemis Heights belonging to Loyalist John Freeman, they spotted British advance troops in the field. Fraser's column was slightly delayed and had not yet reached the field, while Hamilton's column had also made its way across a ravine and was approaching the field from the east through dense forest and difficult terrain. Riedesel's force, while it was on the road, was delayed by obstacles thrown down by the Americans. The sound of gunfire to the west prompted Riedesel to send some of his artillery down a track in that direction. The troops Morgan's men saw were an advance company from Hamilton's column.[33]

text: Battle

text: Morgan placed marksmen at strategic positions, who then picked off virtually every officer in the advance company. Morgan and his men then charged, unaware that they were headed directly for Burgoyne's main army. While they succeeded in driving back the advance company, Fraser's leading edge arrived just in time to attack Morgan's left, scattering his men back into the woods.[34] James Wilkinson, who had ridden forward to observe the fire, returned to the American camp for reinforcements. As the British company fell back toward the main column, the leading edge of that column opened fire, killing a number of their own men.[35]

text: There was then a lull in the fighting around 1:00 pm as Hamilton's men began to form up on the north side of the field, and American reinforcements began to arrive from the south. Learning that Morgan was in trouble, Gates ordered out two more regiments (1st and 3rd New Hampshire) to support him,[36] with additional regiments (2nd New York, 4th New York, the 1st Canadian, and Connecticut militia) from the brigade of Enoch Poor to follow.[37] Burgoyne arrayed Hamilton's men with the 21st on the right, the 20th on the left, and the 62nd in the center, with the 9th held in reserve.[38]

text: The battle then went through phases alternating between intense fighting and breaks in the action. Morgan's men had regrouped in the woods, and picked off officers and artillerymen. They were so effective at reducing the latter that the Americans several times gained brief control of British field pieces, only to lose them in the next British charge. At one point it was believed that Burgoyne himself had been taken down by a sharpshooter; it was instead one of Burgoyne's aides, riding a richly dressed horse, who was the victim. The center of the British line was very nearly broken at one point, and only the intervention of General Phillips, leading the 20th, made it possible for the 62nd to reform.[39] In Roger Lamb's memoir, (a British soldier present at the battle), he wrote ''In this battle an unusual number of officers fell, as our army abounded with young men of respectability at this time, who after several years of general peace anterior to the American revolution, were attracted to the profession of arms. Three sulbalterns (officers) of the 20th regiment on this occasion, the oldest of whom did not exceed the age of seventeen years, were buried together''[40]

text: The final stroke of the battle belonged to the British. Around 3 pm, Riedesel sent a messenger to Burgoyne for instructions. He returned two hours later with orders to guard the baggage train, but also to send as many men as he could spare toward the American right flank. In a calculated risk, Riedesel left 500 men to guard the vital supply train and marched off toward the action with the rest of his column. Two of his companies advanced on the double and opened vicious fire on the American right,[41] and Fraser's force threatened to turn the American left flank. In response to the latter threat, Arnold requested more forces, and Gates allowed him to dispatch Ebenezer Learned's brigade (2nd, 8th and 9th Massachusetts). (If Arnold had been on the field, these forces might have instead faced the larger danger posed by Riedesel's force.)[42] Fortunately for the American right, darkness set in, bringing an end to the battle. The Americans retreated back to their defenses, leaving the British on the field.[7]

text: Burgoyne had gained the field of battle, but suffered nearly 600 casualties. Most of these were to Hamilton's center column, where the 62nd was reduced to the size of a single company, and three quarters of the artillerymen were killed or wounded.[43] American losses were nearly 300 killed and seriously wounded.[44]

text: It has been widely recounted in histories of this battle that General Arnold was on the field, directing some of the action. However, John Luzader, a former park historian at the Saratoga National Historical Park, carefully documents the evolution of this story and believes it is without foundation in contemporary materials, and that Arnold remained at Gates' headquarters, receiving news and dispatching orders through messengers.[45][46] Arnold biographer James Kirby Martin, however, disagrees with Luzader, arguing that Arnold played a more active role at Freeman's Farm by directing patriot troops into position and possibly leading some charges before being ordered back to headquarters by Gates.[47]

text: Interlude

text:
… an attack or even menace of an attack on Fort Montgomery must be of great use ...

Burgoyne to Clinton, September 23, 1777[48]

tag: div

text: Burgoyne's council discussed whether to attack the next day, and a decision was reached to delay further action at least one day, to September 21. The army moved to consolidate the position closer to the American line while some men collected their dead. The attack on the 21st was called off when Burgoyne received a letter dated September 12 from Henry Clinton, who was commanding the British garrison in New York City. Clinton suggested that he could "make a push at [Fort] Montgomery in about ten days." (Fort Montgomery was an American post on the Hudson River, in the New York Highlands south of West Point). If Clinton left New York on September 22, "about ten days" after he wrote the letter, he still could not hope to arrive in the vicinity of Saratoga before the end of the month. Burgoyne, running low on men and food, was still in a very difficult position, but he decided to wait in the hope that Clinton would arrive to save his army.[49] Burgoyne wrote to Clinton on September 23, requesting some sort of assistance or diversion to draw Gates' army away.[48] Clinton sailed from New York on October 3, and captured Forts Montgomery and Clinton on October 6.[50] The furthest north any of his troops reached was Clermont, where they raided the estate of the prominent Patriot Livingston family on October 16.[51]

text: Unknown to either side at Saratoga, General Lincoln and Colonel John Brown had staged an attack against the British position at Fort Ticonderoga. Lincoln had collected 2,000 men at Bennington by early September.[52] Brown and a detachment of 500 men captured poorly defended positions between Ticonderoga and Lake George, and then spent several days ineffectually bombarding the fort. These men, and some of the prisoners they freed along the way, were back in the American camp by September 29.[53][54]

text: In the American camp, the mutual resentment between Horatio Gates and Benedict Arnold finally exploded into open hostility. Gates quickly reported the action of September 19 to the Congress and Governor George Clinton of New York, but he failed to mention Arnold at all. The field commanders and men universally credited Arnold for their success. Almost all the troops involved were from Arnold's command and Arnold was the one directing the battle while Gates sat in his tent. Arnold protested, and the dispute escalated into a shouting match that ended with Gates relieving Arnold of his command and giving it to Benjamin Lincoln. Arnold asked for a transfer to Washington's command, which Gates granted, but instead of leaving he remained in his tent.[55] There is no documentary evidence for a commonly recounted anecdote that a petition signed by line officers convinced Arnold to stay in camp.[56]

text: During this period there were almost daily clashes between pickets and patrols of the two armies. Morgan's sharpshooters, familiar with the strategy and tactics of woodland warfare, constantly harassed British patrols on the western flank.[57]

text: As September passed into October it became clear that Clinton was not coming to help Burgoyne, who put the army on short rations on October 3.[58] The next day, Burgoyne called a war council in which several options were discussed, but no conclusive decisions were made. When the council resumed the next day, Riedesel proposed retreat, in which he was supported by Fraser. Burgoyne refused to consider it, insisting that retreat would be disgraceful. They finally agreed to conduct an assault on the American left flank with two thousand men, more than one-third of the army, on October 7.[59] The army he was attacking, however, had grown in the interval. In addition to the return of Lincoln's detachment, militiamen and supplies continued to pour into the American camp, including critical increases in ammunition, which had been severely depleted in the first battle.[60] The army Burgoyne faced on October 7 was more than 12,000 men strong[2] and was led by a man who knew how much trouble Burgoyne was in. Gates had received consistent intelligence from the stream of deserters leaving the British lines and had also intercepted Clinton's response to Burgoyne's plea for help.[61]

text: Second Saratoga: Battle of Bemis Heights (October 7)

text: British foray

text: While Burgoyne's troop strength was nominally higher, he likely had only about 5,000 effective, battle-ready troops on October 7, as losses from the earlier battles in the campaign and desertions following the September 19 battle had reduced his forces.[62] General Riedesel advised that the army retreat. Burgoyne decided to reconnoiter the American left flank to see if an attack was possible. As an escort, the generals took Fraser's Advanced Corps, with light troops and the 24th Foot on the right and the combined British grenadiers on the left, and a force drawn from all the German regiments in the army in the center. There were eight British cannon under Major Williams and two Hesse-Hanau cannon under Captain Pausch.[63] Leaving their camp between 10 and 11 am, they advanced about three-quarters of a mile (1 km) to Barber's wheat field on a rise above Mill Brook, where they stopped to observe the American position. While the field afforded some room for artillery to work, the flanks were dangerously close to the surrounding woods.[64]

text: Gates, following the removal of Arnold from the field command, assumed command of the American left and gave the right to General Lincoln. When American scouts brought news of Burgoyne's movement to Gates, he ordered Morgan's riflemen out to the far left, with Poor's men (1st, 2nd, and 3rd New Hampshire on the left; the 2nd and 4th New York Regiments) on the right, and Learned's (1st New York, 1st Canadian, 2nd, 8th and 9th Massachusetts Regiments, plus militia companies) in the center. A force of 1,200 New York militia under Brigadier General Abraham Ten Broeck was held in reserve behind Learned's line.[65] In all, more than 8,000 Americans took the field that day,[66] including about 1,400 men from Lincoln's command that were deployed when the action became particularly fierce.[67]

text: The opening fire came between 2 and 2:30 pm from the British grenadiers. Poor's men held their fire, and the terrain made the British shooting largely ineffective. When Major Acland led the British grenadiers in a bayonet charge, the Americans finally began shooting at close range. Acland fell, shot in both legs, and many of the grenadiers also went down. Their column was a total rout, and Poor's men advanced to take Acland and Williams prisoner and capture their artillery.[68] On the American left, things were also not going well for the British. Morgan's men swept aside the Canadians and Native Americans to engage Fraser's regulars. Although slightly outnumbered, Morgan managed to break up several British attempts to move west.[68] While General Fraser was mortally wounded in this phase of the battle,[69] a frequently told story claiming it to be the work of Timothy Murphy, one of Morgan's men, appears to be a 19th-century fabrication.[70] The fall of Fraser and the arrival of Ten Broeck's large militia brigade (which roughly equaled the entire British reconnaissance force in size), broke the British will, and they began a disorganized retreat toward their entrenchments. Burgoyne was also very nearly killed by one of Morgan's marksmen; three shots hit his horse, hat, and waistcoat.[71]

text: The first phase of the battle lasted about one hour and cost Burgoyne nearly 400 men, including the capture of most of the grenadiers' command, and six of the ten field pieces brought to the action.[71]

text: American attack

text: At this point, the Americans were joined by an unexpected participant. General Arnold, who was "betraying great agitation and wrath" in the American camp, and may have been drinking, rode out to join the action.[72][73] Gates immediately sent Major Armstrong after him with orders to return; Armstrong did not catch up with Arnold until the action was effectively over.[73] (A letter, written by a witness to proceedings in the camp, suggests that Arnold did in fact have authorization from Gates to engage in this action.)[74]

text: The defenses on the right side of the British camp were anchored by two redoubts. The outermost one was defended by about 300 men under the command of the Hessian Heinrich von Breymann, while the other was under the command of Lord Balcarres. A small contingent of Canadians occupied the ground between these two fortifications. Most of the retreating force headed for Balcarres' position, as Breymann's was slightly north and further away from the early action.[75]

text: Arnold led the American chase, and then led Poor's men in an attack on the Balcarres redoubt. Balcarres had set up his defenses well, and the redoubt was held, in action so fierce that Burgoyne afterwards wrote, "A more determined perseverance than they showed … is not in any officer's experience".[76] Seeing that the advance was checked, and that Learned was preparing to attack the Breymann redoubt, Arnold moved toward that action, recklessly riding between the lines and remarkably emerging unhurt. He led the charge of Learned's men through the gap between the redoubts, which exposed the rear of Breymann's position, where Morgan's men had circled around from the far side.[77] In furious battle, the redoubt was taken and Breymann was killed.[78] Arnold's horse was hit in one of the final volleys, and Arnold's leg was broken by both shot and the falling horse. Major Armstrong finally caught up with Arnold to officially order him back to headquarters; he was carried back in a litter.[79]

text: The capture of Breymann's redoubt exposed the British camp, but darkness was setting in. An attempt by some Germans to retake the redoubt ended in capture as darkness fell and an unreliable guide led them to the American line.[80]

text: Aftermath

text: Burgoyne's failed campaign, as may be seen by the titles of some of the books that cover it in detail, marked a major turning point in the war.[81] After the battle, he withdrew his men 10–15 miles north, near present-day Schuylerville, New York. General Burgoyne returned to England and was never given another commanding position in the British Army.[82]

text: Armies and casualties

text: Burgoyne lost 1,000 men in the two battles, leaving him outnumbered by roughly 3 to 1; American losses came to about 500 killed and wounded. Burgoyne had also lost several of his most effective leaders, his attempts to capture the American position had failed, and his forward line was now breached. That night he lit fires at his remaining forward positions and withdrew under the cover of darkness. On the morning of October 8, he was back in the fortified positions he had held on September 16. By October 13 he was surrounded at Saratoga, and on October 17 he surrendered his army. The remnants of his expedition retreated from Ticonderoga back to Quebec.

text: The British learned that the Americans would fight bravely and effectively. Said one British officer:

text: The courage and obstinacy with which the Americans fought were the astonishment of everyone, and we now became fully convinced that they are not that contemptible enemy we had hitherto imagined them, incapable of standing a regular engagement and that they would only fight behind strong and powerful works.[83]

text: In recognition of his contribution to the battles at Saratoga, General Arnold had his seniority restored (he had lost it after being passed over for promotion earlier in 1777).[84] His leg wound left Arnold bedridden for five months.[85] Later, while still unfit for field service but serving as military governor of Philadelphia, Arnold entered into treasonous correspondence with the British. He received command of the fort at West Point and plotted to hand it over to the British, only to flee into the British lines when the capture of his contact John Andre led to the exposure of the plot. Arnold went on to serve under William Phillips, the commander of Burgoyne's right wing, in a 1781 expedition into Virginia.[86]

text: Although he left the direction of the battle to subordinates, General Gates received a great deal of credit as the commanding general for the greatest American victory of the war to date. He may have conspired with others to replace George Washington as the commander-in-chief.[87] Instead, he received the command of the main American army in the South. He led it to a disastrous defeat at the 1780 Battle of Camden, where he was at the forefront of a panicked retreat.[88][89] Gates never commanded troops in the field again.

text: In response to Burgoyne's surrender, Congress declared December 18, 1777, as a national day "for solemn Thanksgiving and praise"; it was the nation's first official observance of a holiday with that name.[90][91]

text: French aid

text: Once news of Burgoyne's surrender reached France, King Louis XVI decided to enter into negotiations with the Americans that resulted in a formal Franco-American alliance and French entry into the war. This moved the conflict onto a global stage.[92] As a consequence, Britain was forced to divert resources used to fight the war in North America to theaters in the West Indies and Europe, and rely on what turned out to be the chimera of Loyalist support in its North American operations.[93] Being defeated by the British in the French and Indian War more than a decade earlier, France found an opportunity of revenge by aiding the colonists throughout the Revolutionary War. Prior to the Battle of Saratoga, France didn't fully aid the colonists. However, after the Battles of Saratoga were conclusively won by the colonists, France realized that the Americans had the hope of winning the war, and began fully aiding the colonists by sending soldiers, donations, loans, military arms, and supplies.[94]

text: Legacy

text: The battlefield and the site of Burgoyne's surrender have been preserved, and are now administered by the National Park Service as the Saratoga National Historical Park, which was listed on the National Register of Historic Places in 1966. The park preserves a number of the buildings in the area and contains a variety of monuments.[95] The Saratoga Monument obelisk has four niches, three of which hold statues of American commanders: Gates and Schuyler and of Colonel Daniel Morgan. The fourth niche, where Arnold's statue would go, is empty.[96] A more dramatic memorial to Arnold's heroism, that does not name him, is the Boot Monument. Donated by Civil War General John Watts de Peyster, it shows a boot with spurs and the stars of a major general. It stands at the spot where Arnold was shot on October 7 charging Breymann's redoubt and is dedicated to "the most brilliant soldier of the Continental Army".[97]

text: Six Army National Guard units (101st Eng Bn,[98] 102nd Inf,[99] 125th QM Co,[100] 181st Inf,[101] 182nd Inf[102] and 192nd MP Bn[103]) are derived from American units that participated in the Battle of Saratoga. There are now only thirty units in the U.S. Army with lineages that go back to the colonial era.

text: There are a number of ships named after the battles including USS Saratoga (1842), USS Saratoga (CV-3), and USS Saratoga (CV-60)[104]

text:
Saratoga Monument obelisk

View of the battlefield from the visitor center of Saratoga National Historic Park

Benjamin Franklin honored the victory in Saratoga by commissioning and designing an Augustin Dupré medallion. It was minted in Paris in 1783.[105]

The Surrender of General Burgoyne depicted on a 1927 US Postage Stamp

tag: table


document_title: List of people on multiple governing boards

question_text: who sits on the most board of directors

question_tokens: who sits on the most board of directors

text: Seven boards[edit]

text:
Sam Nunn - Center for Strategic and International Studies, ChevronTexaco, The Coca-Cola Company, Dell Computer, General Electric, Internet Security Systems, and Scientific-Atlanta
Kenneth Duberstein - The Boeing Company, ConocoPhillips, Fannie Mae, Fleming Companies, Inc., The St. Paul Companies, Inc, American Stock Exchange, and NASD.
Joshua Bekenstein - Bain Capital, Bombardier Recreational Products, Waters Corporation, Dollarama, Toys R Us, Burlington Coat Factory, and Bright Horizons Family Solutions.
Brian Mulroney - Barrick Gold Corporation, Quebecor Inc., TrizecHahn Corp., Archer Daniels Midland Co., Cendant, AOL Latin America, Inc., Cognicase Inc., and Wyndham Worldwide

tag: ul

text: Six boards[edit]

text:
Peter Godsoe - Barrick Gold Corporation, Fairmont Hotels and Resorts, Mount Sinai Hospital (Toronto), Onex Corporation, Rogers Communications, and Sobeys
Irvine O. Hockaday, Jr. - Aquila, Inc., Dow Jones & Company, Ford Motor Company, Kansas City Southern Industries, Sprint Nextel, and Estée Lauder Companies
Susan Bayh [1]
Elon Musk - SpaceX, PayPal (formerly), Tesla, Hyperloop, SolarCity, OpenAI

text: Five boards[edit]

text: This section is empty. You can help by adding to it. (January 2015)

text: Four boards[edit]

text:
Peter S. Hellman - Baxter International, Goodyear, Owens-Illinois, Qwest
Don Mazankowski - ATCO Ltd., Power Corporation of Canada, Shaw Communications, and Weyerhaeuser

text: Three boards[edit]

text:
James Cash, Jr. - Microsoft, Walmart, and General Electric
Kenneth Chenault - American Express, IBM, Procter & Gamble
Charlene Barshefsky - American Express, Estée Lauder Companies Inc., and Intel
Derek Burney - CanWest Global Communications, Quebecor World Inc., and Shell Canada
Richard Currie - Bell Canada Enterprises, CAE Inc., and Petro-Canada
James A. Firestone [2] - Goodyear, Nomura Partners Fund, Xerox
David A. Fisher - CBOE, InnerWorkings, OptionsXpress
Anthony Fell - Bell Canada Enterprises, CAE Inc., and Loblaw Companies Ltd.
Britt Glenn - Cardinal Health Inc., Time Warner Cable, Xerox
Vernon Jordan Jr. - American Express, Dow Jones & Company, and Lazard Ltd.
Raymond J. Lane - Carnegie Mellon University, Hewlett-Packard, and West Virginia University
William G. Parrett - The Blackstone Group, Eastman Kodak, Thermo Fisher Scientific
Gary L. Wilson - CB Richard Ellis, Northwest Airlines, and Yahoo!

text: Two boards[edit]

text:
Spencer Abraham - GenOn Energy, Occidental Petroleum
James P. Argyropoulos - Gaiam, Real Goods
George S. Barrett - Cardinal Health, Inc., Eaton Corp.
Willie Chiang - ConocoPhillips, Occidental Petroleum
Bruce Chizen - Adobe Systems, Oracle Corporation
George Cohon - Astral Media, Royal Bank of Canada
Peter Currie - Clearwire, Schlumberger
Martin R. Eden - Aon plc, CBOE
Paul Godfrey - Astral Media, CanWest Global Communications
James E. Hamilton - The Blackstone Group, Costco Wholesale Corp.
William J. Holden III - GenOn Energy, Medmira, Inc.
Robert J. Keegan - Goodyear, Xerox
Richard J. Kramer - Goodyear, Sherwin-Williams
Mary Ann Leeper - Female Health Company, Neenah Paper, Inc.
Ed Lumley - Bell Canada Enterprises, Magna International
Elizabeth A. Moler - GenOn Energy, Schlumberger
Barbara Mowry[3]- Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, Gaiam, Real Goods
Robert C. Murray - GenOn Energy, Medmira, Inc.
Richard Notebaert - Aon plc, Cardinal Health, Inc.
Dick Olver - BAE Systems, Reuters
Richard Parsons - Estée Lauder Companies Inc., Time Warner
Paul Pressler - Estée Lauder Companies Inc., Gap, Inc.
Robert Prichard - George Weston, Ltd., Onex Corporation
Robert D. Walter - American Express, Viacom
Werner Geissler - Goodyear,[2] Philip Morris International[4]


document_title: Two for the Price of One (ABBA song)

question_text: two for the price of one abba meaning

question_tokens: two for the price of one abba meaning

text: Two for the Price of One (ABBA song)

text: Synopsis[edit]

text: The Leader-Post explains that the song is about "our pathetic love-starved hero answering an ad for the girl of his dreams".[1]

text: Composition[edit]

text: Abba's Abba Gold describes it as the "obligatory Bjorn-sung track".[2]

text: Critical reception[edit]

text: ABBA - Uncensored on the Record says that "Two for the Price of One" is an "extraordinary song" and that it, along with another song from the album, "attracted some interest".[3] Abba's Abba Gold likened it to "Electric Light Orchestra doing an operetta, with superb multi-layered vocals on the chorus".[2] Keith Tuber of Orange Coast Magazine describes the song as his favourite on the album, describing it as a "humorous, clever ditty with a twist ending", and likens it to Rupert Holmes' "Escape (The Piña Colada Song)".[4]

text: The Leader-Post describes "Two for the Price of One" as a "novelty number", and a "witty little tune". Along with "When All Is Said and Done", he said it is one of two songs worth mentioning in the review.[1] L.A. Times talks about the album's melancholy vibe, noting that "even the album's two lighthearted cuts - "Two for the Price of One" and "Head over Heels" - are about out-of-synch relationships."[5]

text: Only Solitaire says "the Bjorn-sung "Two for the Price of One" is an absolute lyrical nadir with a banal pop melody that could have easily made it onto Ring Ring. In regard to the song's inclusion on ABBA's live album, it says "if you're gonna have one really really bad ABBA song on a live album, at least make it something goofy from the early days, like "King Kong" or "Nina Pretty Ballerina"! At least they were having fun with th[o]se ones."[6]