document_title: List of European Cup and UEFA Champions League top scorers

question_text: who scored the most goals in champions league

text: All-time top scorers

text:
The table below does not include goals scored in the qualification stage of the competition.
Bold indicates players active in the competition in the 2017–18 season and their current club.

text:
Player
Country
Goals
Apps
Ratio
Years
Clubs

1
Cristiano Ronaldo
 Portugal
107[a]
141
0.76
2003–
Manchester United
Real Madrid

2
Lionel Messi
 Argentina
96
116
0.83
2005–
Barcelona

3
Raúl
 Spain
71
142
0.5
1995–2011
Real Madrid
Schalke 04

4
Ruud van Nistelrooy
 Netherlands
56[b]
73
0.77
1998–2009
PSV Eindhoven
Manchester United
Real Madrid

5
Karim Benzema
 France
51
93
0.55
2006–
Lyon
Real Madrid

6
Thierry Henry
 France
50[c]
112
0.45
1997–2012
Monaco
Arsenal
Barcelona

7
Alfredo Di Stéfano
 Argentina
49
58
0.84
1955–1964
Real Madrid

8
Andriy Shevchenko
 Ukraine
48[d]
100
0.48
1994–2012
Dynamo Kyiv
Milan
Chelsea

Zlatan Ibrahimović
 Sweden
48[e]
119
0.4
2001–2016
Ajax
Juventus
Internazionale
Barcelona
Milan
Paris Saint-Germain

10
Eusébio
 Portugal
47
63
0.75
1961–1974
Benfica

11
Filippo Inzaghi
 Italy
46[f]
81
0.57
1997–2012
Juventus
Milan

12
Didier Drogba
 Ivory Coast
44
92
0.48
2003–2015
Marseille
Chelsea
Galatasaray

13
Alessandro Del Piero
 Italy
42[g]
89
0.47
1995–2009
Juventus

14
Robert Lewandowski
 Poland
41
62
0.66
2011–
Borussia Dortmund
Bayern Munich

15
Thomas Müller
 Germany
39
92
0.42
2008–
Bayern Munich

16
Ferenc Puskás
 Hungary
35
41[3]
0.85
1956–1966
Budapest Honvéd
Real Madrid

17
Gerd Müller
 West Germany
34
35[3]
0.97
1969–1977
Bayern Munich

18
Francisco Gento
 Spain
32
88
0.36
1955–1969
Real Madrid

19
Samuel Eto'o
 Cameroon
30[h]
78
0.38
1999–2014
Mallorca
Barcelona
Internazionale
Chelsea

Wayne Rooney
 England
30[i]
85
0.35
2004–2016
Manchester United

Kaká
 Brazil
30
86
0.35
2003–2014
Milan
Real Madrid

Fernando Morientes
 Spain
30[j]
88
0.34
1997–2009
Real Madrid
Monaco
Liverpool
Valencia

23
David Trezeguet
 France
29[k]
58
0.5
1997–2009
Monaco
Juventus

Roy Makaay
 Netherlands
29
61
0.48
2000–2007
Deportivo La Coruña
Bayern Munich

Patrick Kluivert
 Netherlands
29[l]
71
0.41
1994–2006
Ajax
Barcelona

Arjen Robben
 Netherlands
29[m]
98
0.3
2002–
PSV Eindhoven
Chelsea
Real Madrid
Bayern Munich

27
Jean-Pierre Papin
 France
28
37[3]
0.76
1989–1994
Marseille
Milan
Bayern Munich

Sergio Agüero
 Argentina
28[n]
55
0.51
2008–
Atlético Madrid
Manchester City

Ryan Giggs
 Wales
28[o]
141
0.2
1993–2014
Manchester United

29
Edinson Cavani
 Uruguay
27
45[4]
0.6
2011–
Napoli
Paris Saint-Germain

Rivaldo
 Brazil
27[p]
73
0.37
1997–2007
Barcelona
Milan
Olympiacos

31
Mario Gómez
 Germany
26[q]
44[5]
0.59
2007–2013
Stuttgart
Bayern Munich

32
Mário Jardel
 Brazil
25[r]
46[6]
0.54
1996–2001
Porto
Galatasaray

Robin van Persie
 Netherlands
25[s]
59
0.42
2002–2014
Arsenal
Manchester United

Hernán Crespo
 Argentina
25[t]
65
0.38
1997–2007
Parma
Lazio, Internazionale
Chelsea
Milan

Giovane Élber
 Brazil
25[u]
69
0.36
1997–2004
Bayern Munich
Lyon

37
José Altafini
 Brazil
24
28[3]
0.86
1959–1976
Milan
Juventus

Marco Simone
 Italy
24[v]
46[7]
0.52
1989–2001
Milan
Paris Saint-Germain
Monaco

Luís Figo
 Portugal
24
103
0.23
1997–2009
Barcelona
Real Madrid
Internazionale

Paul Scholes
 England
24[w]
124
0.19
1994–2013
Manchester United

41
Jari Litmanen
 Finland
23
57
0.4
1993–2003
Ajax
Liverpool

Frank Lampard
 England
23
105
0.22
2001–2015
Chelsea
Manchester City

43
Santillana
 Spain
22
46[8]
0.46
1971–1988
Real Madrid

Neymar
 Brazil
22
40[9]
0.55
2013–
Barcelona
Paris Saint-Germain

45
José Torres
 Portugal
21
33[10]
0.64
1959–1971
Benfica

Amancio
 Spain
21
52
0.4
1962–1976
Real Madrid

Steven Gerrard
 England
21[x]
73
0.29
2001–2015
Liverpool

Claudio Pizarro
 Peru
21[y]
73
0.29
2001–2014
Bayern Munich
Werder Bremen

49
Romário
 Brazil
20
32[11]
0.63
1988–1995
Barcelona
PSV Eindhoven

Paul van Himst
 Belgium
20
39[12]
0.51
1988–1995
Anderlecht

Luiz Adriano
 Brazil
20[z]
41[13]
0.49
2008–2015
Shakhtar Donetsk

Serhiy Rebrov
 Ukraine
20[aa]
43[14]
0.47
1993–2007
Dynamo Kyiv

Nicolas Anelka
 France
20
68
0.29
1998–2013
Arsenal
Real Madrid
Paris Saint-Germain
Chelsea

Fernando Torres
 Spain
20
72
0.28
2007–
Liverpool
Chelsea
Atlético Madrid

text:
Jump up ^ Ronaldo additionally scored one goal[2] in four qualification matches.
Jump up ^ Van Nistelrooy additionally scored four goals in eight qualification matches.
Jump up ^ Henry additionally scored one goal in three qualification matches.
Jump up ^ Shevchenko additionally scored 11 goals in 16 qualification matches.
Jump up ^ Ibrahimović additionally scored one goal in four qualification matches.
Jump up ^ Inzaghi additionally scored four goals in four qualification matches.
Jump up ^ Del Piero additionally scored two goals in three qualification matches.
Jump up ^ Eto'o additionally scored three goals in four qualification matches.
Jump up ^ Rooney additionally scored four goals in three qualification matches.
Jump up ^ Morientes additionally scored six goals in 11 qualification matches.
Jump up ^ Trezeguet additionally scored three goals in three qualification matches.
Jump up ^ Kluivert additionally scored one goal in four qualification matches.
Jump up ^ Robben additionally scored one goal in one qualification match.
Jump up ^ Agüero additionally scored six goals in four qualification matches.
Jump up ^ Giggs additionally scored two goals in 10 qualification matches.
Jump up ^ Rivaldo additionally scored four goals in five qualification matches.
Jump up ^ Gómez additionally scored one goal in two qualification matches.
Jump up ^ Jardel additionally scored three goals in two qualification matches.
Jump up ^ Van Persie additionally scored two goals in nine qualification matches.
Jump up ^ Crespo additionally scored three goals in five qualification matches.
Jump up ^ Élber additionally scored two goals in four qualification matches.
Jump up ^ Simone additionally scored one goal in two qualification matches.
Jump up ^ Scholes additionally scored one goal in six qualification matches.
Jump up ^ Gerrard additionally scored nine goals in 14 qualification matches.
Jump up ^ Pizarro additionally scored three goals in four qualification matches.
Jump up ^ Adriano additionally scored one goal in four qualification matches.
Jump up ^ Rebrov additionally scored 11 goals in 25 qualification matches.

text: Top scorers by seasons

text: The table below does not include goals scored in the qualification stage of the competition.[15]

text:
Season
Player
Country
Club
Goals

1955–56
Miloš Milutinović
 Yugoslavia
 Partizan
8

1956–57
Dennis Viollet
 England
 Manchester United
9

1957–58
Alfredo Di Stéfano
 Argentina
 Real Madrid
10

1958–59
Just Fontaine
 France
 Stade Reims
10

1959–60
Ferenc Puskás
 Hungary
 Real Madrid
12

1960–61
José Águas
 Portugal
 Benfica
11

1961–62
Heinz Strehl
 West Germany
 Nuremberg
8

1962–63
José Altafini
 Italy
 Milan
14

1963–64
Vladica Kovačević
 Yugoslavia
 Partizan
7

Sandro Mazzola
 Italy
 Internazionale

Ferenc Puskás
 Hungary
 Real Madrid

1964–65
Eusébio
 Portugal
 Benfica
9

José Torres
 Portugal
 Benfica

1965–66
Flórián Albert
 Hungary
 Ferencváros
7

Eusébio
 Portugal
 Benfica

1966–67
Jürgen Piepenburg
 East Germany
 Vorwärts Berlin
6

Paul Van Himst
 Belgium
 Anderlecht

1967–68
Eusébio
 Portugal
 Benfica
6

1968–69
Denis Law
 Scotland
 Manchester United
9

1969–70
Mick Jones
 England
 Leeds United
8

1970–71
Antonis Antoniadis
 Greece
 Panathinaikos
10

1971–72
Johan Cruyff
 Netherlands
 Ajax
5

Antal Dunai
 Hungary
 Újpesti Dózsa

Lou Macari
 Scotland
 Celtic

Silvester Takač
 Yugoslavia
 Standard Liège

1972–73
Gerd Müller
 West Germany
 Bayern Munich
11

1973–74
Gerd Müller
 West Germany
 Bayern Munich
8

1974–75
Gerd Müller
 West Germany
 Bayern Munich
5

Eduard Markarov
 Soviet Union
 Ararat Yerevan

1975–76
Jupp Heynckes
 West Germany
 Borussia Mönchengladbach
6

1976–77
Gerd Müller
 West Germany
 Bayern Munich
5

Franco Cucinotta
 Italy
 Zürich

1977–78
Allan Simonsen
 Denmark
 Borussia Mönchengladbach
5

1978–79
Claudio Sulser
 Switzerland
 Grasshopper
11

1979–80
Søren Lerby
 Denmark
 Ajax
10

1980–81
Terry McDermott
 England
 Liverpool
6

Graeme Souness
 Scotland
 Liverpool

Karl-Heinz Rummenigge
 West Germany
 Bayern Munich

1981–82
Dieter Hoeneß
 West Germany
 Bayern Munich
7

1982–83
Paolo Rossi
 Italy
 Juventus
6

1983–84
Viktor Sokol
 Soviet Union
 Dinamo Minsk
6

1984–85
Torbjörn Nilsson
 Sweden
 IFK Göteborg
7

Michel Platini
 France
 Juventus

1985–86
Torbjörn Nilsson
 Sweden
 IFK Göteborg
6

1986–87
Borislav Cvetković
 Yugoslavia
 Red Star Belgrade
7

1987–88
Gheorghe Hagi
 Romania
 Steaua Bucureşti
4

Jean-Marc Ferreri
 France
 Bordeaux

Rabah Madjer
 Algeria
 Porto

Ally McCoist
 Scotland
 Rangers

Míchel
 Spain
 Real Madrid

Rui Águas
 Portugal
 Benfica

1988–89
Marco van Basten
 Netherlands
 Milan
10

1989–90
Romário
 Brazil
 PSV Eindhoven
6

Jean-Pierre Papin
 France
 Marseille

1990–91
Peter Pacult
 Austria
 Tirol Innsbruck
6

Jean-Pierre Papin
 France
 Marseille

1991–92
Sergei Yuran
 Ukraine
 Benfica
7

Jean-Pierre Papin
 France
 Marseille

1992–93
Franck Sauzée
 France
 Marseille
5

1993–94
Hristo Stoichkov
 Bulgaria
 Barcelona
5

1994–95
George Weah
 Liberia
 Paris Saint-Germain
7

1995–96
Jari Litmanen
 Finland
 Ajax
9

1996–97
Milinko Pantić
 Yugoslavia
 Atlético Madrid
5

1997–98
Alessandro Del Piero
 Italy
 Juventus
10

1998–99
Andriy Shevchenko
 Ukraine
 Dynamo Kyiv
8

Dwight Yorke
 Trinidad and Tobago
 Manchester United

1999–00
Mário Jardel
 Brazil
 Porto
10

Rivaldo
 Brazil
 Barcelona

Raúl
 Spain
 Real Madrid

2000–01
Raúl
 Spain
 Real Madrid
7

2001–02
Ruud van Nistelrooy
 Netherlands
 Manchester United
10

2002–03
Ruud van Nistelrooy
 Netherlands
 Manchester United
12

2003–04
Fernando Morientes
 Spain
 Monaco
9

2004–05
Ruud van Nistelrooy
 Netherlands
 Manchester United
8

2005–06
Andriy Shevchenko
 Ukraine
 Milan
9

2006–07
Kaká
 Brazil
 Milan
10

2007–08
Cristiano Ronaldo
 Portugal
 Manchester United
8

2008–09
Lionel Messi
 Argentina
 Barcelona
9

2009–10
Lionel Messi
 Argentina
 Barcelona
8

2010–11
Lionel Messi
 Argentina
 Barcelona
12

2011–12
Lionel Messi
 Argentina
 Barcelona
14

2012–13
Cristiano Ronaldo
 Portugal
 Real Madrid
12

2013–14
Cristiano Ronaldo
 Portugal
 Real Madrid
17

2014–15
Neymar
 Brazil
 Barcelona
10

Cristiano Ronaldo
 Portugal
 Real Madrid

Lionel Messi
 Argentina
 Barcelona

2015–16
Cristiano Ronaldo
 Portugal
 Real Madrid
16

2016–17
Cristiano Ronaldo
 Portugal
 Real Madrid
12

text: By player

text:
Player
Titles
Seasons

 Cristiano Ronaldo
6
2007–08, 2012–13, 2013–14, 2014–15, 2015–16, 2016–17

 Lionel Messi
5
2008–09, 2009–10, 2010–11, 2011–12, 2014–15

 Gerd Müller
4
1972–73, 1973–74, 1974–75, 1976–77

 Eusébio
3
1964–65, 1965–66, 1967–68

 Jean-Pierre Papin
1989–90, 1990–91, 1991–92

 Ruud van Nistelrooy
2001–02, 2002–03, 2004–05

 Ferenc Puskás
2
1959–60, 1963–64

 Torbjörn Nilsson
1984–85, 1985–86

 Raúl
1999–00, 2000–01

 Andriy Shevchenko
1998–99, 2005–06

text: By country

text:
Country
Titles
Seasons

 Portugal
12
1960–61, 1964–65,[a] 1965–66, 1967–68, 1987–88, 2007–08, 2012–13, 2013–14, 2014–15, 2015–16, 2016–17

 West Germany
8
1961–62, 1972–73, 1973–74, 1974–75, 1975–76, 1976–77, 1980–81, 1981–82

 France
7
1958–59, 1984–85, 1987–88, 1989–90, 1990–91, 1991–92, 1992–93

 Argentina
6
1957–58, 2008–09, 2009–10, 2010–11, 2011–12, 2014–15

 Yugoslavia
5
1955–56, 1963–64, 1971–72, 1986–87, 1996–97

 Italy
1962–63, 1963–64, 1976–77, 1982–83, 1997–98

 Netherlands
1971–72, 1988–89, 2001–02, 2002–03, 2004–05

 Brazil
1989–90, 1999–2000, 1999–2000, 2006–07, 2014–15

 Hungary
4
1959–60, 1963–64, 1965–66, 1971–72

 Scotland
1968–69, 1971–72, 1980–81, 1987–88

 Spain
1987–88, 1999–2000, 2000–01, 2003–04

 England
3
1956–57, 1969–70, 1980–81

 Ukraine
1991–92, 1998–99, 2005–06

 Soviet Union
2
1974–75, 1983–84

 Denmark
1977–78, 1979–80

 Sweden
1984–85, 1985–86

text: Jump up ^ Two Portuguese players were joint top scorers.


document_title: U.S. history of alcohol minimum purchase age by state

question_text: when did drinking age go from 18 to 21

question_tokens: when did drinking age go from 18 to 21

root

text: The alcohol laws of the United States regarding minimum age for purchase have changed over time. The history is given in the table below. Unless otherwise noted, if different alcohol categories have different minimum purchase ages, the age listed below is set at the lowest age given (e.g. if the purchase age is 18 for beer and 21 for wine or spirits, as was the case in several states, the age in the table will read as "18", not "21"). In addition, the purchase age is not necessarily the same as the minimum age for consumption of alcoholic beverages, although they have often been the same.

tag: p

text: As one can see in the table below, there has been much volatility in the states' drinking ages since the repeal of Prohibition in 1933. Shortly after the ratification of the 21st amendment in December, most states set their purchase ages at 21 since that was the Voting age at the time. Most of these limits remained constant until the early 1970s. From 1969 to 1976, some 30 states lowered their purchase ages, generally to 18. This was primarily because the voting age was lowered from 21 to 18 in 1971 with the 26th amendment. A lot of states started to lower their minimum drinking age in response, most of this occurring in 1972 or 1973.[1][2][3] Twelve states kept their purchase ages at 21 since repeal of Prohibition and never changed them.

text: From 1976 to 1983, several states voluntarily raised their purchase ages to 19 (or, less commonly, 20 or 21), in part to combat drunk driving fatalities.[citation needed] In 1984, Congress passed the National Minimum Drinking Age Act, which required states to raise their ages for purchase and public possession to 21 by October 1986 or lose 10% of their federal highway funds. By mid-1988, all 50 states and the District of Columbia had raised their purchase ages to 21 (but not Puerto Rico, Guam, or the Virgin Islands, see Additional Notes below). South Dakota and Wyoming were the final two states to comply with the age 21 mandate. The current drinking age of 21 remains a point of contention among many Americans, because of it being higher than the age of majority (18 in most states) and higher than the drinking ages of most other countries. The National Minimum Drinking Age Act is also seen as a congressional sidestep of the tenth amendment. Although debates have not been highly publicized, a few states have proposed legislation to lower their drinking age,[4] while Guam has raised its drinking age to 21 in July 2010.[5]

text:
State
Pre-Prohibition
(prior to 1919)
Post-Prohibition
(after 1933)
1970s / 26th Amendment
(adopted in 1971)
1980s /
Drinking Age Act of 1984
21st century

Alabama
Pre 1881:
None
1881:
21 (none with consent of parent)[6]
21
1970:
Lowered to 19[7]
1986:
Raised to 21[8]
21 (no one underage is allowed consumption Section 28-1)

Alaska
 ?
21[7]
1970:
Lowered to 19[9]
1984:
Raised to 21 with grandfather clause (if born before January 1, 1965)[10][11]
21

Arizona
 ?
21[11]
1972:
Lowered to 19[12][13]
1985:
Raised to 21[8]
21

Arkansas
Pre 1925:
None[7]
1925:
21[7]
21
21[14]
21 [8]
21

California
Pre 1891:
Regulated by municipality/county (common age was 16)[15][16][17]
1891:
18 (statewide)[18]
1933:
21[7]
21
21 [8]
21 (except small amounts for religious ceremonies)

Colorado
None[11]
1945:
18: for beer
21: for wine and liquor[7]
18 [19]
Raised to 21 in 1987 [8]
21

Connecticut
 ?
21 [11]
1972:
Lowered to 18[20]
1982:
Raised to 19
1983:
Raised to 20
1985:
Raised to 21[21]
21 (exemptions: (1) a person over age eighteen who is an employee or permit holder under section 30-90a and who possesses alcoholic liquor in the course of such person’s employment or business, (2) a minor who possesses alcoholic liquor on the order of a practicing physician, or (3) a minor who possesses alcoholic liquor while accompanied by a parent, guardian or spouse of the minor, who has attained the age of twenty-one. Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to burden a person’s exercise of religion under section 3 of article first of the Constitution of the state in violation of subsection (a) of section 52-571b.[22]

Delaware
 ?
21 [11]
1972:
Lowered to 20[13]
1984:
Raised to 21[8]
21

District of Columbia
 ?
18: for beer and wine[11]
21: for liquor[23][24]
18: for beer and wine[13][24]
21: for liquor
1986:
Raised to 21 with grandfather clause.[25][26]
21

Florida
 ?
18[7]
1972:
19 [27]
1985:
Raised to 21 with grandfather clause [27]
21 [28]

Georgia
 ?
21 [11]
1972:
Lowered to 18[12]
1984:
Raised to 19[14]
1985:
Raised to 20[14]
1986:
Raised to 21[14]
21

Hawaii
 ?
21[7]
1972:
Lowered to 18[13]
1986:
Raised to 21[8]
21

Idaho
 ?
20: for beer[29][30]
21: for wine and liquor[11][31]
1972:
Lowered to 19 (all)[13][32]
1987:
Raised to 21 in 1987 (Apr 11) with grandfather clause[8][33]
21

Illinois
1872:
Age of majority
(none with written consent of parent)[34]
pre 1961: Age of majority 1961: Raised to 21 [35]
1973:
Lowered to 19: for beer and wine
21: for liquor[36]
1980:
Raised to 21[37]
21

Indiana
 ?
Post-1934:
21[7]
21[14]
21[8]
21

Iowa
 ?
21[7]
1972:
Lowered to 19 in 1972 (Jul 1)
1973:
Lowered to 18 in 1973 (Jul 1)
1978:
Raised to 19 in 1978 (Jul 1)[38]
1986:
Raised to 21 in 1986 (Jul 1) with grandfather clause.[14][38]
21

Kansas
 ?
1949:
18: for beer and wine with less than 4% ABV
21: for liquor[7]
18: for beer and wine with less than 4% ABV[14]
21: for beer and wine with 4% ABV or more[14]
21: for liquor[14][19]
1985:
Raised to 21[8]
21 (However, anyone under 21 may consume cereal malt beverages with parental supervision on their own property)

Kentucky
 ?
1938:
21[7]
21[14]
21[8]
21

Louisiana
 ?
As of 1948:
18[13]
18[19]
1987:
Raised to 21 de jure in 1987,[8]
but de facto age was still 18 until 1995 due to a sale loophole.
1995:
De facto age raised to 21 in 1995 when loophole was closed.[39]
1996:
In 1996, briefly lowered by Louisiana Supreme Court to 18 until it reversed its decision, raising to 21 three months later.[40]
Other exceptions still remain.[41]
21

Maine
 ?
21[7]
1969:
Lowered to 20
1972:
Lowered to 18[12]
1977:
Raised to 20[8][42]
1985:
Raised to 21[8]
21

Maryland
 ?
21[7]
1974:
Lowered to 18: for beer and wine
21: for liquor[43][44]
1982:
Raised to 21 with grandfather clause [8][45]
21 (however anyone can drink when parents, spouses, teachers are present)

Massachusetts
 ?
21 [11]
1973:
Lowered to 18
1979:
Raised to 20 in 1979 (Apr 16)[46][47][48]
Raised to 21 in 1985 [8]
21

Michigan
 ?
21[7]
1972:
Lowered to 18 in 1972 (Jan 1)[49]
1978:
Raised to 19 in 1978 (Dec 3)[50][51]
1978:
Raised to 21 in 1978 (Dec 21), 18 days later.[8]
First state to raise age to 21 since it was lowered
21

Minnesota
 ?
21 [11]
1973:
Lowered to 18
1976:
Raised to 19[52]
First state to raise age after lowering.
1986:
Raised to 21[53]
21

Mississippi
 ?
1966:
18: for beer and wine
21: for liquor[7]
(alcohol not legalized until 1966)
18[19]
Raised to 21 in 1986 [8]
21

Missouri
 ?
1945:
21[7]
21
21 [8]
21

Montana
 ?
21 [11]
1971:
Lowered to 19[54]
1973:
Lowered to 18[55][56]
1979:
Raised to 19
1987:
Raised to 21[8][57]
21

Nebraska
 ?
21[58]
1969:
Lowered to 20
1972:
Lowered to 19[58]
1980:
Raised to 20[14]
1985:
Raised to 21[14]
21

Nevada
 ?
1933:
21[7]
21
21[8]
21

New Hampshire
 ?
21[11]
1973:
Lowered to 18[59]
1979:
Raised to 20
1985:
Raised to 21[8][21]
21

New Jersey
Before 1880:
None
Post-1880:
18 (penalties only against businesses)[60][61][62]
21[citation needed]
1973:
Lowered to 18 [12]
1980:
Raised to 19
1983:
Raised to 21[8][63]
21

New Mexico
 ?
1934:
21[7]
21[14]
21[8]
21

New York
21
18[64]
18
1982:
Raised to 19 in 1982 (Dec)
1985:
Raised to 21 in 1985 (Dec)[21][65][66]
21

North Carolina
 ?
18[11]
18: for beer and wine[19]
21: for liquor
1983:
19: for beer and wine
21: for liquor
1986:
Raised to 21 in 1986 (Sep 1)[8][26]
21

North Dakota
 ?
1936:
21[7]
21[14]
21 [67]
21

Ohio
 ?
1935:
18: for 3.2% ABW beer
21: for beer stronger than 3.2% ABW, wine and liquor[68]
18: for 3.2% ABW beer
21: for beer stronger than 3.2% ABW, wine and liquor
1982 (Aug. 19 to Oct. 1):
19: for 3.2% ABW beer[14]
21: for beer stronger than 3.2% ABW, wine and liquor[14]
1982 (From Oct. 1):
19: beer
21: wine and liquor[69]
1988:
21[14]
21 (However, anyone can drink with parents or legal-age spouse)

Oklahoma
 ?
Men:
21
Women:
18: 3.2% ABW beer
21: for beer stronger than 3.2% ABW, wine and liquor[70]
1976:
Lowered to 18 (for 3.2% ABW beer) for both sexes in 1976 (Dec) [71]
Last state to lower the drinking age.
1983:
Raised to 21[11][72]
21

Oregon
 ?
1933:
21[7]
21
21 [8]
21

Pennsylvania
 ?
1935:
21[7]
21
21 [8][51]
21

Rhode Island
 ?
21[11]
1970:
Lowered to 18[12][73]
1980:
Raised to 19
1981:
Raised to 20
1984:
Raised to 21[21]
21

South Carolina
21[74]
1935:
18: for beer and wine
21: for liquor[7]
18: for beer and wine[19]
21: for liquor
1984:
19: for beer and wine[7]
21: for liquor
1986:
Raised to 21[8]
21

South Dakota
 ?
1934:
21 (all)
1939:
Lowered to 18: for 3.2% beer
Raised to 19: for 3.2% beer[75]
1972:
18: for beer and wine
21: for liquor[13]
1984:
19: for beer and wine
21: for liquor[8]
1988:
Raised to 21[57]
21

Tennessee
Pre 1881:
None
1881:
21[76]
21[7]
1964:
Lowered to 18[7]
1979:
Raised to 19
1984:
Raised to 21[8]
21

Texas
Pre 1909:
21
None (with written permission of parent or guardian)
Post 1909:
21[77][78]
21[7]
1973:
Lowered to 18[79]
1981:
Raised to 19[80]
1986:
Raised to 21 in 1986 (Sep 1)[8][26]
21

Utah
 ?
1935:
21[7]
21[14]
21 [8]
21

Vermont
 ?
21[7]
1971:
Lowered to 18[81][82]
1986:
Raised to 21[21][82]
21

Virginia
 ?
21[83]
1974:
Lowered to 18: for beer and wine
(21: for liquor remained)[83]
1981:
Raised to 19 for off-premises consumption
1983:
Raised to 19 (all beer)
1985:
Raised to 21[83]
21

Washington
"Age of majority"
since 1877 [84]
21[citation needed]
21
21 [8]
21

West Virginia
 ?
18: for beer and wine
21: for liquor[11]
1972:
Lowered to 18 (all)[85]
1983:
Raised to 19
(& 21 for non-residents)[8][42]
1986:
Raised to 21[8]
21

Wisconsin
1839–1866:
18: for wine and liquor
None: for beer
Post-1866:
21 (all)[86]
18: for beer
21: for wine and spirits
1957:
21: for residents of bordering states with age limit 21.[87]
1963:
Raised to 21 (off-premises beer sales, remained 18 for on-premises).[87]
1972:
Lowered to 18 (all) in 1972 (Mar)[87]
1977:
Border state restriction lifted.[87]
1984:
Raised to 19
1986:
Raised to 21 (September 1, 1986)[87]
21 (however anyone can drink when parents, spouses, teachers are present)[citation needed]

Wyoming
 ?
21[7]
1973:
Lowered to 19[13]
1988:
Raised to 21 in 1988 (Jul 1)[88][89]
Last state to raise de jure drinking age to 21
21

American Samoa
 ?
 ?
 ?
21?
21 [90]

Northern Mariana Islands
–
–
 ?
21?
21 [91]

Puerto Rico
 ?
18
18
Kept at 18
despite 10% highway funding
penalty under Drinking Age Act.
18 [92]

Virgin Islands
 ?
 ?
 ?
18
18 [93]

Guam
 ?
21?
18
18
Raised to 21 in 2010 [5]

tag: table

text: Additional notes[edit]

text:
Contrary to popular belief, since the National Minimum Drinking Age Act of 1984, not all states specifically prohibit minors' and young adults' consumption of alcohol in private settings. That is because the federal law is concerned only with purchase and public possession, not private consumption, and contains several exceptions. As of January 1, 2007, 14 states and the District of Columbia ban underage consumption outright, 19 states do not specifically ban underage consumption outright, and 17 states have family member or location exceptions to their underage consumption laws. Federal law explicitly provides for religious, medical, employment and private club possession exceptions; as of 2005, 31 states have family member or location exceptions to their underage possession laws.[41]
In the 1960s the age for buying or drinking beer and wine in the District of Columbia (Washington, D.C.) was 18; the age for hard liquor was 21.[23][24] Residents from Virginia and Maryland would often drive to D.C. to obtain alcohol. In Louisiana, the 1987 law raising the age from 18 to 21 was deliberately written solely to comply with the National Minimum Drinking Age Act of 1984 to avoid losing highway funding, while still allowing 18- to 20-year-olds to drink as before. Not only did it still allow 18- to 20-year-olds to consume in private, it contained a major loophole allowing bars and stores to sell alcohol to 18- to 20-year-olds without penalty (despite purchase being technically illegal) which meant that the de facto age was still 18.[39] In other words, the drinking age was 21 only on paper. This loophole was closed in 1995, but in 1996 the Louisiana Supreme Court declared a drinking age of 21 unconstitutional.[39] That briefly lowered the de jure purchase age to 18, causing an uproar which prompted the Louisiana Supreme Court to reverse its decision, raising the age to 21 three months later.[40] Other exceptions still remain to this day, including drinking in a private residence,[41] and Louisiana still has some of the most liberal general alcohol laws of any state.
Some states were "dry" well before national Prohibition was enacted in 1919, in some cases since achieving statehood. Also, some states did not become fully "wet" until several years after the repeal of Prohibition in 1933 (e.g. Mississippi in 1966). Since 1966, all states and territories of the USA have been "wet", but dry counties and towns still exist in some states.

tag: ul


document_title: American game show winnings records

question_text: who is the biggest winner on the price is right

text: American game show winnings records

text: Daytime game shows[edit]

text: Most daytime game show top prizes were limited to $25,000 during the 1960s and 1970s, a restriction made for both budgetary concerns and to assuage criticism from scandals that arose surrounding prime-time game shows in the 1950s. The single day record for shows in daytime television was set by Michael Larson in 1984, who won $110,237 (equivalent to $254,000 in 2016)[1] on Press Your Luck. Larson achieved his record by memorizing the show's board patterns. He repeatedly hit the board's squares that awarded contestants money and an additional spin. That spin would in turn replace the spin he had just used, effectively allowing him to spin the board in the second round as long as wanted. Because of this, his game had to be split into two episodes (which aired June 8 and June 11, 1984), as his turn caused the game to go well over the show's half-hour allotted time. In 2003, Game Show Network produced a documentary about the event.[2]

text: In 2006, Larson was succeeded by Vickyann Chrobak-Sadowski, who set the record by winning $147,517 on the 35th season premiere of The Price Is Right in 2006.[3] Chrobak-Sadowski's record was later broken by Sheree Heil from her appearance on The Price Is Right in 2013. She won $170,345 in cash and prizes on the episode that aired December 30, 2013, including an Audi R8 won in the pricing game "Gas Money", $10,000 cash, and Prada shoes.[3][4][5]

text: On the October 28, 2016 episode of The Price Is Right, which aired during Big Money Week, Christen Freeman won $210,000 in cash during a playing of Cliff Hangers. During the episode, game rules were modified to offer a top prize of $250,000, which was reduced by $10,000 for every step the mountain climber took. In addition to her One Bid prize and an additional $1,000 won during the Showcase Showdown, Freeman's grand total was $212,879, setting a new daytime record.[6]

text: Overall winnings record[edit]

text: While the 1950s had multiple big winners (Herb Stempel and Charles Van Doren of Twenty One being two of the most notable),[7][8] Teddy Nadler set the overall record during the 1956–57 television season, who set a record that would stand for the next two decades by winning $264,000 (equivalent to $2,326,000 in 2016)[1] on The $64,000 Challenge.[9] The quiz show scandals of 1958 and 1959 prompted the cancellation of most of the big-budget game shows and the imposition of strict limits on prize amounts, which meant that through the 1960s and 1970s, game show contestants could not match their 1950s counterparts.

text: It was not until 1980 that Nadler's record fell. During the summer of that year, a U.S. Naval officer named Thom McKee began a run on Tic-Tac-Dough that carried over into the following season. Since champions on Tic Tac Dough played until they were defeated, and games on the show could end in ties with the pot carrying over, McKee was able to keep building his total as long as he kept playing and winning. McKee won $312,700 (equivalent to $909,000 in 2016)[1] in cash and prizes in 43 games, which included eight cars (on Tic Tac Dough and its sister show, The Joker's Wild, a contestant automatically won a car after every fifth game they won).[10]

text: While McKee was the biggest solo winner until 1999, nine couples on The $1,000,000 Chance of a Lifetime won the show's top prize of $1,000,000 (equivalent to $2,108,000 in 2016),[1] in a combination of prizes and a long-term annuity, during the show's run in syndication from January 1986 to September 1987.[11] However, this program had no solo players.

text: 1999–2004: The million-dollar game show boom[edit]

text: In 1999, McKee was passed by Michael Shutterly, who was the biggest winner in the first airing of Who Wants to Be a Millionaire in the United States. Shutterly was the first contestant on the show to get to the 15th and final question, but elected to walk instead with $500,000 (equivalent to $719,000 in 2016),[1] which made him the biggest winner in American game show history at the time. Shutterly had previously won $49,200 as a 4 day champion on Jeopardy! in 1988, making his career winnings total $549,200. [12]

text: During the second season of Millionaire in the United States, the show crowned its first million-dollar winner. On November 19, 1999, John Carpenter won the show's top prize without using any lifelines, save for a phone call on the final question to tell his father he was going to win the million dollars. After Carpenter answered the final question, which concerned Richard Nixon's appearance on Laugh-In in 1968,[13] host Regis Philbin proclaimed Carpenter the show's (and worldwide format's) first top prize winner.

text: Carpenter's record remained intact until the following year. In early 2000, Rahim Oberholtzer, a contestant on the revival of Twenty One, won four games in his appearances on the show, along with $120,000 in the show's "Perfect 21" bonus round, for a total of $1,120,000.[14] For surpassing Carpenter's mark, host Maury Povich proclaimed Oberholtzer "the TV Game Show King."[15]

text: Late in its run, the Fox show Greed brought back some of its previous winners to try for an extra $1,000,000. Curtis Warren, who was part of the first team to win $1,000,000 on the show (of which his share was $400,000, plus $10,000 for winning a terminator round), was one of the contestants brought back to do so on February 11, 2000.[16] Warren was given a question about TV shows that had been made into movies, with 8 choices (of which he had to identify the four correct answers). He successfully did so, giving himself $1,410,000 and the record for the time being.[16]

text: Warren's record was even shorter lived than Oberholtzer's had been, lasting only four days. Three days before Warren's win, David Legler, who also appeared on NBC's Twenty One, began a run as champion on the show. Four days after Warren's win, the run continued, with Legler having earned a grand total of $1,765,000 in six wins to surpass Warren's record and become the third contestant in two months to top $1,000,000 on a game show.[17]

text: Legler held the record for well over a year. As 2000 ended and 2001 began, the producers of Millionaire decided that it had been too long (71 games over a five-month period) since their top prize had been won, and instituted an accumulating jackpot which added $10,000 to the grand prize amount for each game it was not won. Kevin Olmstead claimed the top prize on April 10, 2001, winning a jackpot of $2,180,000. Olmstead became the first contestant to top $2,000,000 in total winnings on a game show and supplanted Legler as the all-time leader.[18]

text: In 2004, ABC launched an ultra high-stakes version of Millionaire entitled Who Wants to Be a Super Millionaire, with a $10,000,000 top prize. Two separate Super Millionaire series aired, one in February and one in May of that year. However, despite the higher stakes and the potential for someone to top the all-time record for winnings, the largest prize awarded was $1,000,000 won by Robert Essig.[19]

text: 2004–present: Jennings vs. Rutter[edit]

text: One week after Super Millionaire came to an end, Ken Jennings of Salt Lake City, Utah, became the new champion on Jeopardy! The episode, broadcast on June 2, 2004, was the first in a long winning streak for the software engineer, made possible due to a change at the beginning of that season (the show's twentieth on air in syndication), eliminating the longstanding rule limiting consecutive appearances for a champion to five. With no limit to his appearances, Jennings began to break many game show records. As his streak continued deeper into the 21st season, Jennings was inching closer and closer to Olmstead's record. Jennings topped Olmstead's Millionaire winnings with his 65th consecutive win, finishing the day with $45,099 and a new cumulative total of $2,197,000.[20]

text: Jennings won nine more games before his streak came to an end on November 30, 2004. He had extended his record total to $2,520,700 at the time of his defeat, after which he was awarded an additional $2,000 for finishing in second place per Jeopardy! rules.[21] Shortly after Jennings' defeat, Jeopardy! decided to see how he would fare in tournament play. On February 9, 2005, the show launched its Ultimate Tournament of Champions, inviting back 144 other past champions to compete over the next three months in a five-round single-elimination tournament with a $2,000,000 grand prize. The field included the highest-winning five-time champions and winners of some previous tournaments, though not all invitees were able to participate. Jennings received a bye into the finals of the tournament, where he faced semi-final winners Jerome Vered and Brad Rutter in a three-game, cumulative total match. Vered had set a single-day scoring record during his appearance on the show in 1992,[22] while Rutter had won the 2001 Tournament of Champions[23] and the 2002 Million Dollar Masters tournament and was the show's highest-earning contestant of all-time before Jennings.[24]

text: In the tournament's three-day final, Rutter defeated Jennings and Vered to win the tournament and $2,000,000, and in the process he supplanted Jennings as the winningest all time American game show contestant. Including the $1.18 million he had won in his previous Jeopardy! appearances (five regular season games, a Tournament of Champions win, the Million Dollar Masters win, and three matches in the earlier rounds of the Ultimate Tournament of Champions), Rutter's total stood at $3,255,102,[25] while Jennings was now second with $3,022,700 having gained an additional $500,000 for his second-place finish in the tournament.

text: Jennings slowly began to chip away at Rutter's record, first by winning $714.29 in 2006 as part of the Mob on NBC's 1 vs. 100.[26] A year later, Jennings won the Grand Slam tournament on Game Show Network and the $100,000 top prize by defeating Ogi Ogas in the final round.[27] Finally, on October 10, 2008, Jennings passed Rutter by winning $500,000 on Are You Smarter Than a 5th Grader?.[28] He extended the record by winning $300,000 in The IBM Challenge, where he and Rutter took on IBM supercomputer Watson in a special 2011 Jeopardy! event. Rutter won $200,000 in the challenge, in which both he and Jennings pledged half of their winnings to charity.[29] He then added $100,000 more later in 2011 when he appeared on Million Dollar Mind Game,[30] raising his total to $3,555,102, second only to Jennings' $3,923,414.29.

text: In 2014, Jennings and Rutter were both invited to play in the Jeopardy! Battle of the Decades, a tournament conducted by the producers of Jeopardy! to celebrate its thirtieth season in syndication. Both men advanced to the two-day tournament final with Roger Craig filling the third position. Needing a win to reclaim his record, Rutter took the top prize in the tournament after Jennings, who needed to answer the second day's Final Jeopardy clue correctly to win (after making a sufficient wager), failed to do so. Rutter won the top prize of $1,000,000 while Jennings won the $100,000 second prize.[31]

text: Jennings later appeared on Millionaire in November 2014. Winning the top prize was the only way he could have reclaimed the record from Rutter; however, Jennings finished with only $100,000, leaving him in second place.[32] Jennings later appeared on the ABC prime time show 500 Questions in 2016; however, as he only lasted four questions, he was unable to add to his total.[33]

text: Top ten winnings list[edit]

text:
Rank
Name
Total winnings
Show(s)
Notes

1
Brad Rutter
$4,555,102
Jeopardy!, $4,455,102[31][34]
Rutter's total includes $55,102 during his initial appearance on Jeopardy! in 2001, $100,000 in 2002's Tournament of Champions, two separate $1,000,000 prizes (one for winning the Million Dollar Masters tournament in 2002 and one for winning the Battle of the Decades in 2014), $2,100,000 during the Ultimate Tournament of Champions in 2005, and $200,000 ($100,000 of which was donated to charity) for finishing third in the 2011 Jeopardy! IBM Challenge.

Million Dollar Mind Game, $100,000[30]

2
Ken Jennings
$4,123,414.29
Jeopardy!, $3,422,700[21][29][31][35]
Jennings won $2,522,700 in his original run on Jeopardy!,[21] $500,000 for his second-place finish in the Ultimate Tournament of Champions,[35] $300,000 ($150,000 of which was donated to charity) in the 2011 IBM Challenge,[29] and $100,000 for finishing second in the Battle of the Decades.[31] In addition to his appearances on other shows, Jennings also competed on 500 Questions in 2016; however, he did not add to his total, lasting only four questions.[33]

Are You Smarter than a 5th Grader?, $500,000[28]

Grand Slam, $100,000[27]

Who Wants to Be a Millionaire, $100,000[32]

1 vs. 100, $714.29[26]

3
Andrew Kravis
$2,656,550
The Million Second Quiz, $2,600,000[36]
Kravis won $326,346 in the main competition as one of the top four finalists, then won a $2,000,000 grand prize plus an additional $273,654 as champion to bring his total to $2.6 million, surpassing the amount of money won by Jennings during his original run on Jeopardy!.

Wheel of Fortune, $50,550[37]

Jeopardy!, $5,000[38]

Who Wants to Be a Millionaire, $1,000[39]

4
Kevin Olmstead
$2,207,000
Who Wants to Be a Millionaire, $2,180,000[40]
Olmstead's primary win occurred during the progressive jackpot shows on Who Wants to Be a Millionaire? in 2001. Following this win, Olmstead held the record as the biggest winner in American television for over three years until it was broken by Ken Jennings. He also held the record as the biggest winner on a primetime game show in U.S. television history for over twelve years until it was broken by Andrew Kravis on September 19, 2013.

Jeopardy!, $27,000[40]

5
Ed Toutant
$1,871,401
Who Wants to Be a Millionaire, $1,860,000[40]
Toutant was another contestant during the progressive jackpot shows on Who Wants to Be a Millionaire? in 2001. After missing a question which was later revealed to be flawed, Toutant was invited back to continue playing for the jackpot at the same level he was playing for during his original appearance. Toutant was able to complete the remaining questions and win a jackpot of $1.86 million.

Jeopardy!, $11,401[40]

6
Ashlee Register
$1,795,000
Duel, $1,795,000[41]
Register won $75,000 plus an accumulating $1,720,000 jackpot, giving her the record for most winnings by a female contestant on a game show in U.S. television history.

7
David Legler
$1,765,000
Twenty One, $1,765,000[17]
Legler won $1,765,000 over six wins on the 2000 revival of Twenty One, making him the show's biggest winner.

8
Curtis Warren
$1,546,988
Greed, $1,410,000[16]
Warren's then-record-setting win came in a Million Dollar Moment on Greed, bringing his total winnings on the show to $1,410,000. Warren also appeared on Sale of the Century, Win Ben Stein's Money, and Jeopardy!, although he failed to win any money while competing on the latter program.[42]

Sale of the Century, $136,288[43]

Win Ben Stein's Money, $700[44]

9
John Carpenter
$1,250,000
Who Wants to Be a Millionaire, $1,250,000[45]
Carpenter's winnings include $1,000,000 as first ever top prize winner on the show, and $250,000 ($125,000 of which was donated to charity) in the champions edition of the show.

10
Adam Rose
$1,153,908
The Price Is Right, $1,153,908[3][46]
Rose's total was achieved on a $1,000,000 Spectacular special episode, winning $153,903 in cash and prizes including both of that evening's Showcases, which earned him a $1,000,000 cash bonus.


question_text: piaget's second of four stages of cognition is

question_tokens: piaget 's second of four stages of cognition is

text: Nature of intelligence: operative and figurative[edit]

text: Piaget noted that reality is a dynamic system of continuous change and, as such, is defined in reference to the two conditions that define dynamic systems. Specifically, he argued that reality involves transformations and states.[6] Transformations refer to all manners of changes that a thing or person can undergo. States refer to the conditions or the appearances in which things or persons can be found between transformations. For example, there might be changes in shape or form (for instance, liquids are reshaped as they are transferred from one vessel to another, and similarly humans change in their characteristics as they grow older), in size (for example, a series of coins on a table might be placed close to each other or far apart), or in placement or location in space and time (e.g., various objects or persons might be found at one place at one time and at a different place at another time). Thus, Piaget argued, if human intelligence is to be adaptive, it must have functions to represent both the transformational and the static aspects of reality.[7] He proposed that operative intelligence is responsible for the representation and manipulation of the dynamic or transformational aspects of reality, and that figurative intelligence is responsible for the representation of the static aspects of reality.[8]

text: Operative intelligence is the active aspect of intelligence. It involves all actions, overt or covert, undertaken in order to follow, recover, or anticipate the transformations of the objects or persons of interest.[9] Figurative intelligence is the more or less static aspect of intelligence, involving all means of representation used to retain in mind the states (i.e., successive forms, shapes, or locations) that intervene between transformations. That is, it involves perception, imitation, mental imagery, drawing, and language.[10] Therefore, the figurative aspects of intelligence derive their meaning from the operative aspects of intelligence, because states cannot exist independently of the transformations that interconnect them. Piaget stated that the figurative or the representational aspects of intelligence are subservient to its operative and dynamic aspects, and therefore, that understanding essentially derives from the operative aspect of intelligence.[9]

text: At any time, operative intelligence frames how the world is understood and it changes if understanding is not successful. Piaget stated that this process of understanding and change involves two basic functions: assimilation and accommodation.[10][11][12][13]

text: Assimilation and accommodation[edit]

text: Through his study of the field of education, Piaget focused on two processes, which he named assimilation and accommodation. To Piaget, assimilation meant integrating external elements into structures of lives or environments, or those we could have through experience. Assimilation is how humans perceive and adapt to new information. It is the process of fitting new information into pre-existing cognitive schemas.[14] Assimilation in which new experiences are reinterpreted to fit into, or assimilate with, old ideas.[15] It occurs when humans are faced with new or unfamiliar information and refer to previously learned information in order to make sense of it. In contrast, accommodation is the process of taking new information in one's environment and altering pre-existing schemas in order to fit in the new information. This happens when the existing schema (knowledge) does not work, and needs to be changed to deal with a new object or situation.[16] Accommodation is imperative because it is how people will continue to interpret new concepts, schemas, frameworks, and more.[17] Piaget believed that the human brain has been programmed through evolution to bring equilibrium, which is what he believed ultimately influences structures by the internal and external processes through assimilation and accommodation.[14]

text: Piaget's understanding was that assimilation and accommodation cannot exist without the other.[18] They are two sides of a coin. To assimilate an object into an existing mental schema, one first needs to take into account or accommodate to the particularities of this object to a certain extent. For instance, to recognize (assimilate) an apple as an apple, one must first focus (accommodate) on the contour of this object. To do this, one needs to roughly recognize the size of the object. Development increases the balance, or equilibration, between these two functions. When in balance with each other, assimilation and accommodation generate mental schemas of the operative intelligence. When one function dominates over the other, they generate representations which belong to figurative intelligence.[19]

text: Sensorimotor stage[edit]

text: Cognitive development is Jean Piaget's theory. Through a series of stages, Piaget proposed four stages of cognitive development: the sensorimotor, preoperational, concrete operational and formal operational period.[20] The sensorimotor stage is the first of the four stages in cognitive development which "extends from birth to the acquisition of language".[21] In this stage, infants progressively construct knowledge and understanding of the world by coordinating experiences (such as vision and hearing) with physical interactions with objects (such as grasping, sucking, and stepping).[22] Infants gain knowledge of the world from the physical actions they perform within it.[23] They progress from reflexive, instinctual action at birth to the beginning of symbolic thought toward the end of the stage.[23]

text: Children learn that they are separate from the environment. They can think about aspects of the environment, even though these may be outside the reach of the child's senses. In this stage, according to Piaget, the development of object permanence is one of the most important accomplishments.[14] Object permanence is a child's understanding that objects continue to exist even though he or she cannot see or hear them.[23] Peek-a-boo is a good test for that. By the end of the sensorimotor period, children develop a permanent sense of self and object.[24]

text: Piaget divided the sensorimotor stage into six sub-stages".[24]

text:
Sub-Stage
Age
Description

1 Simple reflexes
Birth-6 weeks
"Coordination of sensation and action through reflexive behaviors".[24] Three primary reflexes are described by Piaget: sucking of objects in the mouth, following moving or interesting objects with the eyes, and closing of the hand when an object makes contact with the palm (palmar grasp). Over the first six weeks of life, these reflexes begin to become voluntary actions. For example, the palmar reflex becomes intentional grasping.[25]

2 First habits and primary circular reactions phase
6 weeks-4 months
"Coordination of sensation and two types of schema: habits (reflex) and primary circular reactions (reproduction of an event that initially occurred by chance). The main focus is still on the infant's body".[24] As an example of this type of reaction, an infant might repeat the motion of passing their hand before their face. Also at this phase, passive reactions, caused by classical or operant conditioning, can begin.[25]

3 Secondary circular reactions phase
4–8 months
Development of habits. "Infants become more object-oriented, moving beyond self-preoccupation; repeat actions that bring interesting or pleasurable results".[24] This stage is associated primarily with the development of coordination between vision and prehension. Three new abilities occur at this stage: intentional grasping for a desired object, secondary circular reactions, and differentiations between ends and means. At this stage, infants will intentionally grasp the air in the direction of a desired object, often to the amusement of friends and family. Secondary circular reactions, or the repetition of an action involving an external object begin; for example, moving a switch to turn on a light repeatedly. The differentiation between means and ends also occurs. This is perhaps one of the most important stages of a child's growth as it signifies the dawn of logic.[25]

4 Coordination of secondary circular reactions stages
8–12 months
"Coordination of vision and touch—hand-eye coordination; coordination of schemas and intentionality".[24] This stage is associated primarily with the development of logic and the coordination between means and ends. This is an extremely important stage of development, holding what Piaget calls the "first proper intelligence". Also, this stage marks the beginning of goal orientation, the deliberate planning of steps to meet an objective.[25]

5 Tertiary circular reactions, novelty, and curiosity
12–18 months
"Infants become intrigued by the many properties of objects and by the many things they can make happen to objects; they experiment with new behavior".[24] This stage is associated primarily with the discovery of new means to meet goals. Piaget describes the child at this juncture as the "young scientist," conducting pseudo-experiments to discover new methods of meeting challenges.[25]

6 Internalization of schemas
18–24 months
"Infants develop the ability to use primitive symbols and form enduring mental representations".[24] This stage is associated primarily with the beginnings of insight, or true creativity. This marks the passage into the preoperational stage.

text: Pre-operational stage[edit]

text: Piaget's second stage, the pre-operational stage, starts when the child begins to learn to speak at age two and lasts up until the age of seven. During the Pre-operational Stage of cognitive development, Piaget noted that children do not yet understand concrete logic and cannot mentally manipulate information.[26] Children's increase in playing and pretending takes place in this stage. However, the child still has trouble seeing things from different points of view. The children's play is mainly categorized by symbolic play and manipulating symbols. Such play is demonstrated by the idea of checkers being snacks, pieces of paper being plates, and a box being a table. Their observations of symbols exemplifies the idea of play with the absence of the actual objects involved. By observing sequences of play, Piaget was able to demonstrate that, towards the end of the second year, a qualitatively new kind of psychological functioning occurs, known as the Pre-operational Stage.[27][28]

text: The pre-operational stage is sparse and logically inadequate in regard to mental operations. The child is able to form stable concepts as well as magical beliefs. The child, however, is still not able to perform operations, which are tasks that the child can do mentally, rather than physically. Thinking in this stage is still egocentric, meaning the child has difficulty seeing the viewpoint of others. The Pre-operational Stage is split into two substages: the symbolic function substage, and the intuitive thought substage. The symbolic function substage is when children are able to understand, represent, remember, and picture objects in their mind without having the object in front of them. The intuitive thought substage is when children tend to propose the questions of "why?" and "how come?" This stage is when children want to understand everything.[28]

text: Symbolic function substage[edit]

text: At about two to four years of age, children cannot yet manipulate and transform information in a logical way. However, they now can think in images and symbols. Other examples of mental abilities are language and pretend play. Symbolic play is when children develop imaginary friends or role-play with friends. Children's play becomes more social and they assign roles to each other. Some examples of symbolic play include playing house, or having a tea party. Interestingly, the type of symbolic play in which children engage is connected with their level of creativity and ability to connect with others.[29] Additionally, the quality of their symbolic play can have consequences on their later development. For example, young children whose symbolic play is of a violent nature tend to exhibit less prosocial behavior and are more likely to display antisocial tendencies in later years.[30]

text: In this stage, there are still limitations, such as egocentrism and precausal thinking.

text: Egocentrism occurs when a child is unable to distinguish between their own perspective and that of another person. Children tend to stick to their own viewpoint, rather than consider the view of others. Indeed, they are not even aware that such a concept as "different viewpoints" exists.[31] Egocentrism can be seen in an experiment performed by Piaget and Swiss developmental psychologist Bärbel Inhelder, known as the three mountain problem. In this experiment, three views of a mountain are shown to the child, who is asked what a traveling doll would see at the various angles. The child will consistently describe what they can see from the position from which they are seated, regardless of the angle from which they are asked to take the doll's perspective. Egocentrism would also cause a child to believe, "I like Sesame Street, so Daddy must like Sesame Street, too".

text: Similar to preoperational children's egocentric thinking is their structuring of a cause and effect relationships. Piaget coined the term "precausal thinking" to describe the way in which preoperational children use their own existing ideas or views, like in egocentrism, to explain cause-and-effect relationships. Three main concepts of causality as displayed by children in the preoperational stage include: animism, artificialism and transductive reasoning.[32]

text: Animism is the belief that inanimate objects are capable of actions and have lifelike qualities. An example could be a child believing that the sidewalk was mad and made them fall down, or that the stars twinkle in the sky because they are happy. Artificialism refers to the belief that environmental characteristics can be attributed to human actions or interventions. For example, a child might say that it is windy outside because someone is blowing very hard, or the clouds are white because someone painted them that color. Finally, precausal thinking is categorized by transductive reasoning. Transductive reasoning is when a child fails to understand the true relationships between cause and effect.[28][33] Unlike deductive or inductive reasoning (general to specific, or specific to general), transductive reasoning refers to when a child reasons from specific to specific, drawing a relationship between two separate events that are otherwise unrelated. For example, if a child hears the dog bark and then a balloon popped, the child would conclude that because the dog barked, the balloon popped.

text: Intuitive thought substage[edit]

text: At between about the ages of 4 and 7, children tend to become very curious and ask many questions, beginning the use of primitive reasoning. There is an emergence in the interest of reasoning and wanting to know why things are the way they are. Piaget called it the "intuitive substage" because children realize they have a vast amount of knowledge, but they are unaware of how they acquired it. Centration, conservation, irreversibility, class inclusion, and transitive inference are all characteristics of preoperative thought. Centration is the act of focusing all attention on one characteristic or dimension of a situation, whilst disregarding all others. Conservation is the awareness that altering a substance's appearance does not change its basic properties. Children at this stage are unaware of conservation and exhibit centration. Both centration and conservation can be more easily understood once familiarized with Piaget's most famous experimental task.

text: In this task, a child is presented with two identical beakers containing the same amount of liquid. The child usually notes that the beakers do contain the same amount of liquid. When one of the beakers is poured into a taller and thinner container, children who are younger than seven or eight years old typically say that the two beakers no longer contain the same amount of liquid, and that the taller container holds the larger quantity (centration), without taking into consideration the fact that both beakers were previously noted to contain the same amount of liquid. Due to superficial changes, the child was unable to comprehend that the properties of the substances continued to remain the same (conservation).

text: Irreversibility is a concept developed in this stage which is closely related to the ideas of centration and conservation. Irreversibility refers to when children are unable to mentally reverse a sequence of events. In the same beaker situation, the child does not realize that, if the sequence of events was reversed and the water from the tall beaker was poured back into its original beaker, then the same amount of water would exist. Another example of children's reliance on visual representations is their misunderstanding of "less than" or "more than". When two rows containing equal amounts of blocks are placed in front of a child, one row spread farther apart than the other, the child will think that the row spread farther contains more blocks.[28][34]

text: Class inclusion refers to a kind of conceptual thinking that children in the preoperational stage cannot yet grasp. Children's inability to focus on two aspects of a situation at once inhibits them from understanding the principle that one category or class can contain several different subcategories or classes.[32] For example, a four-year-old girl may be shown a picture of eight dogs and three cats. The girl knows what cats and dogs are, and she is aware that they are both animals. However, when asked, "Are there more dogs or animals?" she is likely to answer "more dogs". This is due to her difficulty focusing on the two subclasses and the larger class all at the same time. She may have been able to view the dogs as dogs or animals, but struggled when trying to classify them as both, simultaneously.[35][36] Similar to this is concept relating to intuitive thought, known as "transitive inference".

text: Transitive inference is using previous knowledge to determine the missing piece, using basic logic. Children in the preoperational stage lack this logic. An example of transitive inference would be when a child is presented with the information "A" is greater than "B" and "B" is greater than "C". This child may have difficulty here understanding that "A" is also greater than "C".

text: Concrete operational stage[edit]

text: The concrete operational stage is the third stage of Piaget's theory of cognitive development. This stage, which follows the preoperational stage, occurs between the ages of 7 and 11 (preadolescence) years,[37] and is characterized by the appropriate use of logic. During this stage, a child's thought processes become more mature and "adult like". They start solving problems in a more logical fashion. Abstract, hypothetical thinking is not yet developed in the child, and children can only solve problems that apply to concrete events or objects. At this stage, the children undergo a transition where the child learns rules such as conservation.[38] Piaget determined that children are able to incorporate Inductive reasoning. Inductive reasoning involves drawing inferences from observations in order to make a generalization. In contrast, children struggle with deductive reasoning, which involves using a generalized principle in order to try to predict the outcome of an event. Children in this stage commonly experience difficulties with figuring out logic in their heads. For example, a child will understand that "A is more than B" and "B is more than C". However, when asked "is A more than C?", the child might not be able to logically figure the question out in his or her head.

text: Two other important processes in the concrete operational stage are logic and the elimination of egocentrism.

text: Egocentrism is the inability to consider or understand a perspective other than one's own. It is the phase where the thought and morality of the child is completely self focused.[39] During this stage, the child acquires the ability to view things from another individual's perspective, even if they think that perspective is incorrect. For instance, show a child a comic in which Jane puts a doll under a box, leaves the room, and then Melissa moves the doll to a drawer, and Jane comes back. A child in the concrete operations stage will say that Jane will still think it's under the box even though the child knows it is in the drawer. (See also False-belief task.)

text: Children in this stage can, however, only solve problems that apply to actual (concrete) objects or events, and not abstract concepts or hypothetical tasks. Understanding and knowing how to use full common sense has not yet been completely adapted.

text: Piaget determined that children in the concrete operational stage were able to incorporate inductive logic. On the other hand, children at this age have difficulty using deductive logic, which involves using a general principle to predict the outcome of a specific event. This includes mental reversibility. An example of this is being able to reverse the order of relationships between mental categories. For example, a child might be able to recognize that his or her dog is a Labrador, that a Labrador is a dog, and that a dog is an animal, and draw conclusions from the information available, as well as apply all these processes to hypothetical situations.[40]

text: The abstract quality of the adolescent's thought at the formal operational level is evident in the adolescent's verbal problem solving ability.[40] The logical quality of the adolescent's thought is when children are more likely to solve problems in a trial-and-error fashion.[40] Adolescents begin to think more as a scientist thinks, devising plans to solve problems and systematically test opinions.[40] They use hypothetical-deductive reasoning, which means that they develop hypotheses or best guesses, and systematically deduce, or conclude, which is the best path to follow in solving the problem.[40] During this stage the adolescent is able to understand love, logical proofs and values. During this stage the young person begins to entertain possibilities for the future and is fascinated with what they can be.[40]

text: Adolescents also are changing cognitively by the way that they think about social matters.[40] Adolescent egocentrism governs the way that adolescents think about social matters, and is the heightened self-consciousness in them as they are, which is reflected in their sense of personal uniqueness and invincibility.[40] Adolescent egocentrism can be dissected into two types of social thinking, imaginary audience that involves attention-getting behavior, and personal fable, which involves an adolescent's sense of personal uniqueness and invincibility.[40] These two types of social thinking begin to affect a child's egocentrism in the concrete stage. However, it carries over to the formal operational stage when they are then faced with abstract thought and fully logical thinking.

text: Testing for concrete operations[edit]

text: Piagetian tests are well known and practiced to test for concrete operations. The most prevalent tests are those for conservation. There are some important aspects that the experimenter must take into account when performing experiments with these children.

text: One example of an experiment for testing conservation is an experimenter will have two glasses that are the same size, fill them to the same level with liquid, which the child will acknowledge is the same. Then, the experimenter will pour the liquid from one of the small glasses into a tall, thin glass. The experimenter will then ask the child if the taller glass has more liquid, less liquid, or the same amount of liquid. The child will then give his answer. The experimenter will ask the child why he gave his answer, or why he thinks that is.

text:
Justification: After the child has answered the question being posed, the experimenter must ask why the child gave that answer. This is important because the answers they give can help the experimenter to assess the child's developmental age.[41]
Number of times asking: Some argue that if a child is asked if the amount of liquid in the first set of glasses is equal then, after pouring the water into the taller glass, the experimenter asks again about the amount of liquid, the children will start to doubt their original answer. They may start to think that the original levels were not equal, which will influence their second answer.[42]
Word choice: The phrasing that the experimenter uses may affect how the child answers. If, in the liquid and glass example, the experimenter asks, "Which of these glasses has more liquid?", the child may think that his thoughts of them being the same is wrong because the adult is saying that one must have more. Alternatively, if the experimenter asks, "Are these equal?", then the child is more likely to say that they are, because the experimenter is implying that they are.

text: Formal operational stage[edit]

text: The final stage is known as the formal operational stage (adolescence and into adulthood, roughly ages 11 to approximately 15–20): Intelligence is demonstrated through the logical use of symbols related to abstract concepts. This form of thought includes "assumptions that have no necessary relation to reality."[43] At this point, the person is capable of hypothetical and deductive reasoning. During this time, people develop the ability to think about abstract concepts.

text: Piaget stated that "hypothetico-deductive reasoning" becomes important during the formal operational stage. This type of thinking involves hypothetical "what-if" situations that are not always rooted in reality, i.e. counterfactual thinking. It is often required in science and mathematics.

text:
Abstract thought emerges during the formal operational stage. Children tend to think very concretely and specifically in earlier stages, and begin to consider possible outcomes and consequences of actions.
Metacognition, the capacity for "thinking about thinking" that allows adolescents and adults to reason about their thought processes and monitor them.[44]
Problem-solving is demonstrated when children use trial-and-error to solve problems. The ability to systematically solve a problem in a logical and methodical way emerges.

text: While children in primary school years mostly used inductive reasoning, drawing general conclusions from personal experiences and specific facts, adolescents become capable of deductive reasoning, in which they draw specific conclusions from abstract concepts using logic. This capability results from their capacity to think hypothetically.[45]

text: "However, research has shown that not all persons in all cultures reach formal operations, and most people do not use formal operations in all aspects of their lives".[46]

text: Experiments[edit]

text: Piaget and his colleagues conducted several experiments to assess formal operational thought.[47]

text: In one of the experiments, Piaget evaluated the cognitive capabilities of children of different ages through the use of a scale and varying weights. The task was to balance the scale by hooking weights on the ends of the scale. To successfully complete the task, the children must use formal operational thought to realize that the distance of the weights from the center and the heaviness of the weights both affected the balance. A heavier weight has to be placed closer to the center of the scale, and a lighter weight has to be placed farther from the center, so that the two weights balance each other.[45] While 3- to 5- year olds could not at all comprehend the concept of balancing, children by the age of 7 could balance the scale by placing the same weights on both ends, but they failed to realize the importance of the location. By age 10, children could think about location but failed to use logic and instead used trial-and-error. Finally, by age 13 and 14, in early adolescence, some children more clearly understood the relationship between weight and distance and could successfully implement their hypothesis.[48]

text: The stages and causation[edit]

text: Piaget sees children's conception of causation as a march from "primitive" conceptions of cause to those of a more scientific, rigorous, and mechanical nature. These primitive concepts are characterized as supernatural, with a decidedly non-natural or non-mechanical tone. Piaget has as his most basic assumption that babies are phenomenists. That is, their knowledge "consists of assimilating things to schemas" from their own action such that they appear, from the child's point of view, "to have qualities which, in fact, stem from the organism". Consequently, these "subjective conceptions," so prevalent during Piaget's first stage of development, are dashed upon discovering deeper empirical truths.

text: Piaget gives the example of a child believing that the moon and stars follow him on a night walk. Upon learning that such is the case for his friends, he must separate his self from the object, resulting in a theory that the moon is immobile, or moves independently of other agents.

text: The second stage, from around three to eight years of age, is characterized by a mix of this type of magical, animistic, or "non-natural" conceptions of causation and mechanical or "naturalistic" causation. This conjunction of natural and non-natural causal explanations supposedly stems from experience itself, though Piaget does not make much of an attempt to describe the nature of the differences in conception. In his interviews with children, he asked questions specifically about natural phenomena, such as: "What makes clouds move?", "What makes the stars move?", "Why do rivers flow?" The nature of all the answers given, Piaget says, are such that these objects must perform their actions to "fulfill their obligations towards men". He calls this "moral explanation".[49]

text: Practical applications[edit]

text: Parents can use Piaget's theory when deciding how to determine what to buy in order to support their child's growth.[50] Teachers can also use Piaget's theory, for instance, when discussing whether the syllabus subjects are suitable for the level of students or not.[51] For example, recent studies have shown that children in the same grade and of the same age perform differentially on tasks measuring basic addition and subtraction fluency. While children in the preoperational and concrete operational levels of cognitive development perform combined arithmetic operations (such as addition and subtraction) with similar accuracy,[52] children in the concrete operational level of cognitive development have been able to perform both addition problems and subtraction problems with overall greater fluency.[53]

text: The stage of cognitive growth of a person differ from another. It affects and influences how someone thinks about everything including flowers. A 7-month old infant, in the sensorimotor age, flowers are recognized by smelling, pulling and biting. A slightly older child has not realized that a flower is not fragrant, but similar to many children at her age, her egocentric, two handed curiosity will teach her. In the formal operational stage of an adult, flowers are part of larger, logical scheme. They are used either to earn money or to create beauty. Cognitive development or thinking is an active process from the beginning to the end of life. Intellectual advancement happens because people at every age and developmental period looks for cognitive equilibrium. To achieve this balance, the easiest way is to understand the new experiences through the lens of the preexisting ideas. Infants learn that new objects can be grabbed in the same way of familiar objects, and adults explain the day's headlines as evidence for their existing worldview.[54]

text: However, the application of standardized Piagetian theory and procedures in different societies established widely varying results that lead some to speculate not only that some cultures produce more cognitive development than others but that without specific kinds of cultural experience, but also formal schooling, development might cease at certain level, such as concrete operational level. A procedure was done following methods developed in Geneva. Participants were presented with two beakers of equal circumference and height, filled with equal amounts of water. The water from one beaker was transferred into another with taller and smaller circumference. The children and young adults from non-literate societies of a given age were more likely to think that the taller, thinner beaker had more water in it. On the other hand, an experiment on the effects of modifying testing procedures to match local cultural produced a different pattern of results.[55]

text: Postulated physical mechanisms underlying schemas and stages[edit]

text: In 1967, Piaget considered the possibility of RNA molecules as likely embodiments of his still-abstract schemas (which he promoted as units of action)—though he did not come to any firm conclusion.[56] At that time, due to work such as that of Swedish biochemist Holger Hydén, RNA concentrations had, indeed, been shown to correlate with learning, so the idea was quite plausible.

text: However, by the time of Piaget's death in 1980, this notion had lost favor. One main problem was over the protein which, it was assumed, such RNA would necessarily produce, and that did not fit in with observation. It was determined that only about 3% of RNA does code for protein.[57] Hence, most of the remaining 97% (the "ncRNA") could theoretically be available to serve as Piagetian schemas (or other regulatory roles in the 2000s under investigation). The issue has not yet been resolved experimentally, but its theoretical aspects were reviewed in 2008[57] — then developed further from the viewpoints of biophysics and epistemology.[58][59] Meanwhile, this RNA-based approach also unexpectedly offered explanations for other several biological issues unresolved, thus providing some measure of corroboration.[citation needed]

text: Relation to psychometric theories of intelligence[edit]

text: Piaget designed a number of tasks to verify hypotheses arising from his theory. The tasks were not intended to measure individual differences, and they have no equivalent in psychometric intelligence tests. Notwithstanding the different research traditions in which psychometric tests and Piagetian tasks were developed, the correlations between the two types of measures have been found to be consistently positive and generally moderate in magnitude. A common general factor underlies them. It has been shown that it is possible to construct a battery consisting of Piagetian tasks that is as good a measure of general intelligence as standard IQ tests.[60][61][62]

text: Challenges to Piagetian stage theory[edit]

text: Piagetian accounts of development have been challenged on several grounds. First, as Piaget himself noted, development does not always progress in the smooth manner his theory seems to predict. Décalage, or progressive forms of cognitive developmental progression in a specific domain, suggest that the stage model is, at best, a useful approximation.[63] Furthermore, studies have found that children may be able to learn concepts and capability of complex reasoning that supposedly represented in more advanced stages with relative ease (Lourenço & Machado, 1996, p. 145).[64][65] More broadly, Piaget's theory is "domain general," predicting that cognitive maturation occurs concurrently across different domains of knowledge (such as mathematics, logic, and understanding of physics or language).[63] Piaget did not take into account variability in a child's performance notably how a child can differ in sophistication across several domains.

text: During the 1980s and 1990s, cognitive developmentalists were influenced by "neo-nativist" and evolutionary psychology ideas. These ideas de-emphasized domain general theories and emphasized domain specificity or modularity of mind.[66] Modularity implies that different cognitive faculties may be largely independent of one another, and thus develop according to quite different timetables, which are "influenced by real world experiences".[66] In this vein, some cognitive developmentalists argued that, rather than being domain general learners, children come equipped with domain specific theories, sometimes referred to as "core knowledge," which allows them to break into learning within that domain. For example, even young infants appear to be sensitive to some predictable regularities in the movement and interactions of objects (for example, an object cannot pass through another object), or in human behavior (for example, a hand repeatedly reaching for an object has that object, not just a particular path of motion), as it becomes the building block of which more elaborate knowledge is constructed.

text: Piaget's theory has been said to undervalue the influence that culture has on cognitive development. Piaget demonstrates that a child goes through several stages of cognitive development and come to conclusions on their own but in reality, a child's sociocultural environment plays an important part in their cognitive development. Social interaction teaches the child about the world and helps them develop through the cognitive stages, which Piaget neglected to consider.[67][68]

text: More recent work has strongly challenged some of the basic presumptions of the "core knowledge" school, and revised ideas of domain generality—but from a newer dynamic systems approach, not from a revised Piagetian perspective. Dynamic systems approaches harken to modern neuroscientific research that was not available to Piaget when he was constructing his theory. One important finding is that domain-specific knowledge is constructed as children develop and integrate knowledge. This enables the domain to improve the accuracy of the knowledge as well as organization of memories.[66] However, this suggests more of a "smooth integration" of learning and development than either Piaget, or his neo-nativist critics, had envisioned. Additionally, some psychologists, such as Lev Vygotsky and Jerome Bruner, thought differently from Piaget, suggesting that language was more important for cognition development than Piaget implied.[66][69]

text: Post-Piagetian and neo-Piagetian stages[edit]

text: In recent years, several theorists attempted to address concerns with Piaget's theory by developing new theories and models that can accommodate evidence which violates Piagetian predictions and postulates.

text:
The neo-Piagetian theories of cognitive development, advanced by Robbie Case, Andreas Demetriou, Graeme S. Halford, Kurt W. Fischer, Michael Lamport Commons, and Juan Pascual-Leone, attempted to integrate Piaget's theory with cognitive and differential theories of cognitive organization and development. Their aim was to better account for the cognitive factors of development and for intra-individual and inter-individual differences in cognitive development. They suggested that development along Piaget's stages is due to increasing working memory capacity and processing efficiency by "biological maturation".[70] Moreover, Demetriou´s theory ascribes an important role to hypercognitive processes of "self-monitoring, self-recording, self-evaluation, and self-regulation", and it recognizes the operation of several relatively autonomous domains of thought (Demetriou, 1998; Demetriou, Mouyi, Spanoudis, 2010; Demetriou, 2003, p. 153).[71]
Piaget's theory stops at the formal operational stage, but other researchers have observed the thinking of adults is more nuanced than formal operational thought. This fifth stage has been named post formal thought or operation.[72][73] Post formal stages have been proposed. Michael Commons presented evidence for four post formal stages in the model of hierarchical complexity: systematic, meta-systematic, paradigmatic, and cross-paradigmatic (Commons & Richards, 2003, p. 206–208; Oliver, 2004, p. 31).[74][75][76] There are many theorists, however, who have criticized "post formal thinking," because the concept lacks both theoretical and empirical verification. The term "integrative thinking" has been suggested for use instead.[77][78][79][80][81]

text:
A "sentential" stage, said to occur before the early preoperational stage, has been proposed by Fischer, Biggs and Biggs, Commons, and Richards.[82][83]
Searching for a micro-physiological basis for human mental capacity, Robert R. Traill (1978, Section C5.4; 1999, Section 8.4) proposed that there may be "pre-sensorimotor" stages ("M−1L", "M−2L", …), which are developed in the womb and/or transmitted genetically.[84][85]
Jerome Bruner has expressed views on cognitive development in a "pragmatic orientation" in which humans actively use knowledge for practical applications, such as problem solving and understanding reality.[86]
Michael Lamport Commons proposed the model of hierarchical complexity (MHC) in two dimensions: horizontal complexity and vertical complexity (Commons & Richards, 2003, p. 205).[75][87][88]
Kieran Egan has proposed five stages of understanding: "somatic", "mythic", "romantic", "philosophic", and "ironic", which is developed through cognitive tools such as "stories", "binary oppositions", "fantasy" and "rhyme, rhythm, and meter" to enhance memorization to develop a long-lasting learning capacity.[89]
Lawrence Kohlberg developed three stages of moral development: "Preconventional", "Conventional" and "Postconventional".[89][90] Each level is composed of two orientation stages, with a total of six orientation stages: (1) "Punishment-Obedience", (2) "Instrumental Relativist", (3) "Good Boy-Nice Girl", (4) "Law and Order", (5) "Social Contract", and (6) "Universal Ethical Principle".[89][90]
Andreas Demetriou has expressed neo-Piagetian theories of cognitive development.
Jane Loevinger's stages of ego development occur through "an evolution of stages".[91] "First is the Presocial Stage followed by the Symbiotic Stage, Impulsive Stage, Self-Protective Stage, Conformist Stage, Self-Aware Level: Transition from Conformist to Conscientious Stage, Individualistic Level: Transition from Conscientious to the Autonomous Stage, Conformist Stage, and Integrated Stage".[91]
Ken Wilber has incorporated Piaget's theory in his multidisciplinary field of integral theory. The human consciousness is structured in hierarchical order and organized in "holon" chains or "great chain of being", which are based on the level of spiritual and psychological development.[92]

text:
The process of initiation is a modification of Piaget's theory integrating Abraham Maslow's concept of self-actualization.[93]
Cheryl Armon has proposed five stages of " the Good Life": "Egoistic Hedonism", "Instrumental Hedonism", "Affective/Altruistic Mutuality", "Individuality", and "Autonomy/Community" (Andreoletti & Demick, 2003, p. 284) (Armon, 1984, p. 40–43).[94][95]
Christopher R. Hallpike proposed that human evolution of cognitive moral understanding had evolved from the beginning of time from its primitive state to the present time.[96][97]
Robert Kegan extended Piaget's developmental model to adults in describing what he called constructive-developmental psychology.[98]