document_title: List of women's One Day International cricket records

question_text: who holds the record for the highest odi innings score by an indian woman cricketer

text: Team records[edit]

text: Team wins, losses, and ties[edit]

text: Most wins[edit]

text: Teams are sorted by most wins, then most matches, then by alphabetical order.

text:
Ranking
Team
Span
Matches
Won
Lost
Tied
NR
%Win*

1
 Australia
1973–2017
308
238
62
2
6
79.13

2
 England
1973–2017
324
190
122
2
10
58.64

3
 New Zealand
1973–2017
317
160
149
2
6
51.76

4
 India
1978–2018
254
138
111
1
4
54.33

5
 South Africa
1997–2017
170
82
79
2
7
50.90

6
 West Indies
1979–2017
156
74
77
1
4
49.01

7
 Sri Lanka
1997–2017
149
55
89
0
5
38.19

8
 Pakistan
1997–2018
150
44
104
0
2
29.33

9
 Ireland
1987–2017
145
39
100
0
6
28.05

10
 Netherlands
1984–2011
101
19
81
0
1
19.00

11
 Bangladesh
2011–2017
30
7
21
0
2
25.00

12
 Denmark
1989–1999
33
6
27
0
0
18.18

13
International XI
1973–1982
18
3
14
0
1
17.64

14
 Trinidad and Tobago
1973-1973
6
2
4
0
0
33.33

15
 Scotland
2001–2003
8
1
7
0
0
12.50

16
Young England
1973-1973
6
1
5
0
0
16.66

17
 Jamaica
1973-1973
5
1
4
0
0
20.00

18
 Japan
2003-2003
5
0
5
0
0
0.00

text: Source: Cricinfo.com. Last updated 21 July 2017.

text: * The percentage excludes no results and counts ties as half a win.

text: Most consecutive wins[edit]

text:
Rank
Wins
Team
Period

1
17
 Australia
12 December 1997 to 7 February 1999

2
16
 Australia
25 February 1999 to 18 December 2000

16
 India
7 February 2016 to 17 May 2017

4
13
 England
19 July 1989 to 20 July 1991

5
12
 Australia
1 January 1978 to 30 January 1982

12
 Sri Lanka
20 January 2002 to 23 March 2003

12
 Australia
3 March 2002 to 17 February 2004

Source: Cricinfo.com. Last updated 27 June 2017.

text: Most consecutive defeats[edit]

text:
Rank
Defeats
Team
Period

1
22
 Netherlands
19 August 2005 to 26 April 2011

2
20
 Netherlands
26 July 1998 to 14 April 2001

3
19
 Sri Lanka
18 May 2015 to 7 February 2017

4
15
 Pakistan
28 January 1997 to 1 August 2000

15
 Pakistan
29 March 2004 to 26 January 2007

Source: Cricinfo.com. Last updated 27 June 2017.

text: Team scoring records[edit]

text: Highest innings totals[edit]

text:
Rank
Score
Teams
Venue
Season

1
455–5 (50 overs)
 New Zealand v Pakistan
Christchurch
1997–1998

2
412–3 (50 overs)
 Australia v Denmark
Mumbai
1997–1998

3
397–4 (50 overs)
 Australia v Pakistan
Melbourne
1996–1997

4
378–5 (50 overs)
 England v Pakistan
Worcester
2016

5
377–7 (50 overs)
 England v Pakistan
Leicester
2017

Source: Cricinfo.com. Last updated 27 June 2017.

text: Highest match aggregate[edit]

text:
Rank
Score
Teams
Venue
Season

1
678–14 (100 overs)
 England v  South Africa
Bristol
2017

2
577–12 (96.4 overs)
 Australia v  New Zealand
Sydney
2012–13

3
570–14 (98.0 overs)
 New Zealand v  Australia
Hamilton
2008–09

4
563–16 (98.2 overs)
 England v  New Zealand
Chennai
2006–07

5
551–15 (97.5 overs)
 New Zealand v  Australia
Auckland
2016–17

Source: Cricinfo.com. Last updated: 5 July 2017.

text: Largest successful run chases[edit]

text:
Rank
Score
Teams
Venue
Season

1
289–6 (46.4 overs)
 Australia v  New Zealand
Sydney
2012–13

2
276–5 (49.1 overs)
 New Zealand v  Australia
Auckland
2016–17

3
273–5 (49.2 overs)
 Australia v  New Zealand
Mount Maunganui
2016–17

4
269–4 (46.4 overs)
 Australia v  England
Chennai
2006–07

269–6 (49.3 overs)
 Australia v  England
Hobart
2013–14

Source: Cricinfo.com. Last updated 27 June 2017

text: Lowest team totals[edit]

text:
Rank
Score
Teams
Venue
Season

1
22 (23.4 overs)
 Netherlands v West Indies
Deventer
2008

2
23 (24.1 overs)
 Pakistan v Australia
Melbourne
1996–97

3
24 (21.3 overs)
 Scotland v England
Reading
2001

4
26 (19.1 overs)
 India v New Zealand
St Saviour
2002

5
27 (13.4 overs)
 Pakistan v Australia
Hyderabad (Deccan)
1997–98

Source: Cricinfo.com. Last updated 27 June 2017.

text: Individual records[edit]

text: This section shows individual players records. All players still available for selection on international matches appear in bold.

text: Batting[edit]

text: Most career runs[edit]

text:
Runs
Player
Innings
Average
ODI Career Span

6,373
Mithali Raj
175
50.18
1999–present

5,992
Charlotte Edwards
180
38.16
1997–2016

4,844
Belinda Clark
114
47.49
1991–2005

4,814
Karen Rolton
132
48.14
1995–2009

4,230
Stafanie Taylor
110
44.06
2008–present

Source:Cricinfo. Last updated: 19 March 2018.

text: Highest career average[edit]

text:
Batting average
Player
Innings
Career Runs
ODI Career Span

58.45
Rachael Heyhoe-Flint
20
643
1973–1982

57.44
Lindsay Reeler
23
1,034
1984–1988

53.40
Bronwyn Calver
21
534
1991–1998

53.00
Meg Lanning
66
3,074
2011–present

51.83
Ellyse Perry
75
2,540
2007–present

Qualification: Minimum of 20 innings.
Source:Cricinfo. Last updated: 19 March 2018.

text: Most career centuries[edit]

text:
Position
Name
Team
100's
Innings

1
Meg Lanning
 Australia
11
62

2
Charlotte Edwards
 England
9
180

3
Suzie Bates
 New Zealand
8
99

Claire Taylor
 England
8
120

Karen Rolton
 Australia
8
132

6
Amy Satterthwaite
 New Zealand
6
95

Mithali Raj
 India
6
170

8
Jan Brittin
 England
5
59

Sarah Taylor
 England
5
101

Stafanie Taylor
 West Indies
5
104

Belinda Clark
 Australia
5
114

text: Source Cricinfo.com – Last updated 27 June 2017

text: Most career fifties[edit]

text:
Position
Name
Team
50+
50's
100's
Innings

1
Mithali Raj
 India
56
50
6
170

2
Charlotte Edwards
 England
55
46
9
180

3
Karen Rolton
 Australia
41
33
8
132

4
Debbie Hockley
 New Zealand
38
34
4
115

5
Belinda Clark
 Australia
35
30
5
114

6
Stafanie Taylor
 West Indies
31
26
5
98

7
Claire Taylor
 England
31
23
8
120

8
Suzie Bates
 New Zealand
30
22
8
95

9
Alex Blackwell
 Australia
26
23
3
116

10
Lisa Keightley
 Australia
25
21
4
78

text: Highest individual score[edit]

text:
Position
Name
Runs
Team
Opponent
Date

1
Belinda Clark
229*
 Australia
 Denmark
16 December 1998

2
Deepti Sharma
188
 India
 Ireland
15 May 2017

3
Chamari Atapattu
178
 Sri Lanka
 Australia
29 June 2017

4
Charlotte Edwards
173*
 England
 Ireland
16 December 1997

5
Harmanpreet Kaur
171*
 India
 Australia
20 July 2017

Stafanie Taylor
171
 West Indies
 Sri Lanka
3 February 2013

7
Tammy Beaumont
168*
 England
 Pakistan
27 June 2016

Suzie Bates
168
 New Zealand
 Pakistan
19 March 2009

9
Rachel Priest
157
 New Zealand
 Sri Lanka
7 November 2015

10
Lisa Keightley
156*
 Australia
 Pakistan
7 February 1997

Claire Taylor
156*
 England
 India
14 August 2006

text: Source Cricinfo.com – Updated 20 July 2017

text: Most runs in a calendar year[edit]

text:
Position
Name
Team
Runs
Year

1
Belinda Clark
 Australia
970
1997

2
Debbie Hockley
 New Zealand
880
1997

3
Amy Satterthwaite
 New Zealand
853
2016

4
Belinda Clark
 Australia
842
2000

5
Claire Taylor
 England
807
2005

6
Meg Lanning
 Australia
761
2016

7
Ellyse Perry
 Australia
732
2016

8
Emily Drumm
 New Zealand
722
2000

9
Stafanie Taylor
 West Indies
707
2013

10
Mithali Raj
 India
684
2006

text: Bowling[edit]

text: Best figures in a match[edit]

text:
Position
Name
Figures
(wickets – runs)
Team
Opposition
Date

1
Sajjida Shah
7–4
 Pakistan
 Japan
21 July 2003

2
Jo Chamberlain
7–8
 England
 Denmark
19 July 1991

3
Anisa Mohammed
7–14
 West Indies
 Pakistan
26 November 2011

4
Shelley Nitschke
7–24
 Australia
 England
19 August 2005

5
Jackie Lord
6–10
 New Zealand
 India
14 January 1982

Mamatha Maben
6–10
 India
 Sri Lanka
25 April 2004

Shabnim Ismail
6–10
 South Africa
 Netherlands
18 November 2011

8
Glenys Page
6–20
 New Zealand
 Trinidad and Tobago
23 June 1973

Deepti Sharma
6–20
 India
 Sri Lanka
19 February 2016

10
Jhulan Goswami
6–31
 India
 New Zealand
5 July 2011

text: Source Cricinfo.com – Updated 27 June 2017

text: Most career wickets[edit]

text:
Position
Name
Team
Wickets
Average
Best
(wickets-runs)
5w
4W

1
Jhulan Goswami
 India
201
21.67
6–31
2
5

2
Cathryn Fitzpatrick
 Australia
180
16.79
5–14
4

3
Lisa Sthalekar
 Australia
146
24.97
5–35
1

4
Anisa Mohammed
 West Indies
145
19.46
7–14
5

5
Neetu David
 India
141
16.34
5–20
2
4

6
Jenny Gunn
 England
135
27.77
5–22
2

7
Stafanie Taylor
 West Indies
130
19.44
4–17
0

Ellyse Perry
 Australia
130
25.62
5–19
2

9
Katherine Brunt
 England
127
23.80
5–18
4

10
Dane van Niekerk
 South Africa
121
18.31
5–17
2

text: Source Cricinfo.com – Last updated 19 March 2018

text: Most wickets in a calendar year[edit]

text:
Position
Name
Team
Wickets
Year

1
Anisa Mohammed
 West Indies
37
2011

Suné Luus
 South Africa
37
2016

3
Charmaine Mason
 Australia
36
2000

4
Neetu David
 India
33
2005

Neetu David
 India
33
2004

6
Stefanie Taylor
 West Indies
31
2013

7
Dane van Niekerk
 South Africa
28
2013

Clare Taylor
 England
28
2000

9
Laura Marsh
 England
26
2009

Rachel Pullar
 New Zealand
26
2000

text: Fielding records[edit]

text: Most dismissals by a wicketkeeper in ODI career[edit]

text:
Position
Name
Team
Dismissals
Catches
Stumpings

1
Trisha Chetty
 South Africa
135
93
42

2
Rebecca Rolls
 New Zealand
133
89
44

3
Jane Smit
 England
114
69
45

4
Sarah Taylor
 England
113
73
40

5
Julia Price
 Australia
99
69
30

6
Batool Fatima
 Pakistan
97
51
46

7
Merissa Aguilleira
 West Indies
87
67
20

8
Rachel Priest
 New Zealand
86
67
19

9
Anju Jain
 India
81
30
51

10
Jodie Fields
 Australia
74
55
19

text: Most catches by a fielder in ODI career[edit]

text:
Position
Name
Team
Catches
Innings

1
Jhulan Goswami
 India
59
162

2
Alex Blackwell
 Australia
54
141

3
Suzie Bates
 New Zealand
52
98

Lydia Greenway
 England
52
123

Charlotte Edwards
 England
52
187

6
Stafanie Taylor
 West Indies
49
99

Lisa Sthalekar
 Australia
49
125

8
Jenny Gunn
 England
47
135

10
Belinda Clark
 Australia
45
117

Mithali Raj
 India
45
186

text: Source Cricinfo.com – Last updated 20 July 2017

text: Most matches played[edit]

text:
Position
Name
Team
Matches

1
Mithali Raj
 India
191

Charlotte Edwards
 England
191

3
Jhulan Goswami
 India
166

4
Alex Blackwell
 Australia
144

5
Jenny Gunn
 England
142

6
Karen Rolton
 Australia
141

7
Sara McGlashan
 New Zealand
134

8
Anjum Chopra
 India
127

9
Lydia Greenway
 England
126

Claire Taylor
 England
126

text: Partnerships records[edit]

text: Highest wicket partnerships by wicket[edit]

text:
Wicket
Runs
Team
Partners
Opposition
Date

1st
320
 India
Poonam Raut & Deepti Sharma
 Ireland
15 May 2017

2nd
275
 England
Tammy Beaumont & Sarah Taylor
 South Africa
5 July 2017

3rd
244
 Australia
Karen Rolton & Lisa Sthalekar
 Ireland
31 July 2005

4th
224*
 South Africa
Johmari Logtenberg & Mignon du Preez
 Netherlands
5 August 2007

5th
188*
 England
Claire Taylor & Jane Smit
 Sri Lanka
12 December 2000

6th
142
 South Africa
Suné Luus & Chloe Tryon
 Ireland
5 August 2016

7th.
104*
 New Zealand
Sarah Tsukigawa & Nicola Browne
 England
23 February 2007

104
 England
Natalie Sciver & Danielle Hazell
 Sri Lanka
17 November 2016

8th
85*
 England
Sarah Clarke & Nicky Shaw
 Scotland
10 August 2001

9th
73
 England
Lynsey Askew & Isa Guha
 New Zealand
3 March 2007

10th
76
 Australia
Alex Blackwell & Kristen Beams
 India
20 July 2017


document_title: Cost curve

question_text: why long run cost curve is flatter than short run cost curve

root

text: Cost curve

text: Short-run average variable cost curve (SRAVC)[edit]

text: Average variable cost (which is a short-run concept) is the variable cost (typically labor cost) per unit of output: SRAVC = wL / Q where w is the wage rate, L is the quantity of labor used, and Q is the quantity of output produced. The SRAVC curve plots the short-run average variable cost against the level of output and is typically drawn as U-shaped. However, whilst this is convenient for economic theory, it bears little relationship to the real world. Estimates show that, at least for manufacturing, the proportion of firms reporting a U-shaped cost curve is in the range of 5 to 11 percent.[1][2]

tag: p

text: Short-run average total cost curve (SRATC or SRAC)[edit]

text: The average total cost curve is constructed to capture the relation between cost per unit of output and the level of output, ceteris paribus. A perfectly competitive and productively efficient firm organizes its factors of production in such a way that the factors of production is at the lowest point. In the short run, when at least one factor of production is fixed, this occurs at the output level where it has enjoyed all possible average cost gains from increasing production. This is at the minimum point in the diagram on the right.

text: Short-run total cost is given by

text:
S
T
C
=

P

K

.
K
+

P

L

.
L

{\displaystyle STC=P_{K}.K+P_{L}.L}

,

text: where PK is the unit price of using physical capital per unit time, PL is the unit price of labor per unit time (the wage rate), K is the quantity of physical capital used, and L is the quantity of labor used. From this we obtain short-run average cost, denoted either SATC or SAC, as STC / Q:

text: where APK = Q/K is the average product of capital and APL = Q/L is the average product of labor.[3]:191

text: Within the graph shown in the figure, The Marginal cost curve, Average Fixed Cost curve and Average Variable cost curve can not start with zero as at quantity zero, these values are not defined.

text: Short run average cost equals average fixed costs plus average variable costs. Average fixed cost continuously falls as production increases in the short run, because K is fixed in the short run. The shape of the average variable cost curve is directly determined by increasing and then diminishing marginal returns to the variable input (conventionally labor).[4]:210

text: Short-run marginal cost curve (SRMC)[edit]

text: A short-run marginal cost curve graphically represents the relation between marginal (i.e., incremental) cost incurred by a firm in the short-run production of a good or service and the quantity of output produced. This curve is constructed to capture the relation between marginal cost and the level of output, holding other variables, like technology and resource prices, constant. The marginal cost curve is usually U-shaped. Marginal cost is relatively high at small quantities of output; then as production increases, marginal cost declines, reaches a minimum value, then rises. The marginal cost is shown in relation to marginal revenue (MR), the incremental amount of sales revenue that an additional unit of the product or service will bring to the firm. This shape of the marginal cost curve is directly attributable to increasing, then decreasing marginal returns (and the law of diminishing marginal returns). Marginal cost equals w/MPL.[3]:191 For most production processes the marginal product of labor initially rises, reaches a maximum value and then continuously falls as production increases. Thus marginal cost initially falls, reaches a minimum value and then increases.[4]:209 The marginal cost curve intersects both the average variable cost curve and (short-run) average total cost curve at their minimum points. When the marginal cost curve is above an average cost curve the average curve is rising. When the marginal costs curve is below an average curve the average curve is falling. This relation holds regardless of whether the marginal curve is rising or falling.[5]:226

text: Long-run marginal cost curve (LRMC)[edit]

text: The long-run marginal cost curve shows for each unit of output the added total cost incurred in the long run, that is, the conceptual period when all factors of production are variable so as minimize long-run average total cost. Stated otherwise, LRMC is the minimum increase in total cost associated with an increase of one unit of output when all inputs are variable.[6]

text: The long-run marginal cost curve is shaped by returns to scale, a long-run concept, rather than the law of diminishing marginal returns, which is a short-run concept. The long-run marginal cost curve tends to be flatter than its short-run counterpart due to increased input flexibility as to cost minimization. The long-run marginal cost curve intersects the long-run average cost curve at the minimum point of the latter.[3]:208 When long-run marginal costs are below long-run average costs, long-run average costs are falling (as to additional units of output).[3]:207 When long-run marginal costs are above long run average costs, average costs are rising. Long-run marginal cost equals short run marginal-cost at the least-long-run-average-cost level of production. LRMC is the slope of the LR total-cost function.

text: Graphing cost curves together[edit]

text: Cost curves can be combined to provide information about firms. In this diagram for example, firms are assumed to be in a perfectly competitive market. In a perfectly competitive market the price that firms are faced with would be the price at which the marginal cost curve cuts the average cost curve.

text: Cost curves and production functions[edit]

text: Assuming that factor prices are constant, the production function determines all cost functions.[4] The variable cost curve is the inverted short-run production function or total product curve and its behavior and properties are determined by the production function.[3]:209 [nb 1] Because the production function determines the variable cost function it necessarily determines the shape and properties of marginal cost curve and the average cost curves.[4]

text: If the firm is a perfect competitor in all input markets, and thus the per-unit prices of all its inputs are unaffected by how much of the inputs the firm purchases, then it can be shown that at a particular level of output, the firm has economies of scale (i.e., is operating in a downward sloping region of the long-run average cost curve) if and only if it has increasing returns to scale.[7][8][9] Likewise, it has diseconomies of scale (is operating in an upward sloping region of the long-run average cost curve) if and only if it has decreasing returns to scale, and has neither economies nor diseconomies of scale if it has constant returns to scale. In this case, with perfect competition in the output market the long-run market equilibrium will involve all firms operating at the minimum point of their long-run average cost curves (i.e., at the borderline between economies and diseconomies of scale).

text: If, however, the firm is not a perfect competitor in the input markets, then the above conclusions are modified. For example, if there are increasing returns to scale in some range of output levels, but the firm is so big in one or more input markets that increasing its purchases of an input drives up the input's per-unit cost, then the firm could have diseconomies of scale in that range of output levels. Conversely, if the firm is able to get bulk discounts of an input, then it could have economies of scale in some range of output levels even if it has decreasing returns in production in that output range.

text: Relationship between different curves[edit]

text:
Total Cost = Fixed Costs (FC) + Variable Costs (VC)
Marginal Cost (MC) = dC/dQ; MC equals the slope of the total cost function and of the variable cost function
Average Total Cost (ATC) = Total Cost/Q
Average Fixed Cost (AFC) = FC/Q
Average Variable Cost (AVC) = VC/Q.
ATC = AFC + AVC
The MC curve is related to the shape of the ATC and AVC curves:[10]:212

At a level of Q at which the MC curve is above the average total cost or average variable cost curve, the latter curve is rising.[10]:212
If MC is below average total cost or average variable cost, then the latter curve is falling.
If MC equals average total cost, then average total cost is at its minimum value.
If MC equals average variable cost, then average variable cost is at its minimum value.

tag: ul

text: Relationship between short run and long run cost curves[edit]

text: Basic: For each quantity of output there is one cost minimizing level of capital and a unique short run average cost curve associated with producing the given quantity.[11]

text:
Each STC curve can be tangent to the LRTC curve at only one point. The STC curve cannot cross (intersect) the LRTC curve.[4]:230[10]:228–229 The STC curve can lie wholly “above” the LRTC curve with no tangency point.[12]:256
One STC curve is tangent to LRTC at the long-run cost minimizing level of production. At the point of tangency LRTC = STC. At all other levels of production STC will exceed LRTC.[13]:292–299
Average cost functions are the total cost function divided by the level of output. Therefore, the SATC curveis also tangent to the LRATC curve at the cost-minimizing level of output. At the point of tangency LRATC = SATC. At all other levels of production SATC > LRATC[13]:292–299 To the left of the point of tangency the firm is using too much capital and fixed costs are too high. To the right of the point of tangency the firm is using too little capital and diminishing returns to labor are causing costs to increase.[14]
The slope of the total cost curves equals marginal cost. Therefore, when STC is tangent to LTC, SMC = LRMC.
At the long run cost minimizing level of output LRTC = STC; LRATC = SATC and LRMC = SMC,.[13]:292–299
The long run cost minimizing level of output may be different from minimum SATC,.[10]:229[15]:186
With fixed unit costs of inputs, if the production function has constant returns to scale, then at the minimal level of the SATC curve we have SATC = LRATC = SMC = LRMC.[13]:292–299
With fixed unit costs of inputs, if the production function has increasing returns to scale, the minimum of the SATC curve is to the right of the point of tangency between the LRAC and the SATC curves.[13]:292–299 Where LRTC = STC, LRATC = SATC and LRMC = SMC.
With fixed unit costs of inputs and decreasing returns the minimum of the SATC curve is to the left of the point of tangency between LRAC and SATC.[13]:292–299 Where LRTC = STC, LRATC = SATC and LRMC = SMC.
With fixed unit input costs, a firm that is experiencing increasing (decreasing) returns to scale and is producing at its minimum SAC can always reduce average cost in the long run by expanding (reducing) the use of the fixed input.[13]:292–99 [15]:186
LRATC will always equal to or be less than SATC.[3]:211
If production process is exhibiting constant returns to scale then minimum SRAC equals minimum long run average cost. The LRAC and SRAC intersect at their common minimum values. Thus under constant returns to scale SRMC = LRMC = LRAC = SRAC .
If the production process is experiencing decreasing or increasing, minimum short run average cost does not equal minimum long run average cost. If increasing returns to scale exist long run minimum will occur at a lower level of output than SRAC. This is because there are economies of scale that have not been exploited so in the long run a firm could always produce a quantity at a price lower than minimum short run average cost simply by using a larger plant.[16]
With decreasing returns, minimum SRAC occurs at a lower production level than minimum LRAC because a firm could reduce average costs by simply decreasing the size or its operations.
The minimum of a SRAC occurs when the slope is zero.[17] Thus the points of tangency between the U-shaped LRAC curve and the minimum of the SRAC curve would coincide only with that portion of the LRAC curve exhibiting constant economies of scale. For increasing returns to scale the point of tangency between the LRAC and the SRAC would have to occur at a level of output below level associated with the minimum of the SRAC curve.

text: These statements assume that the firm is using the optimal level of capital for the quantity produced. If not, then the SRAC curve would lie "wholly above" the LRAC and would not be tangent at any point.

text: U-shaped curves[edit]

text: Both the SRAC and LRAC curves are typically expressed as U-shaped.[10]:211; 226 [15]:182;187–188 However, the shapes of the curves are not due to the same factors. For the short run curve the initial downward slope is largely due to declining average fixed costs.[4]:227 Increasing returns to the variable input at low levels of production also play a role,[18] while the upward slope is due to diminishing marginal returns to the variable input.[4]:227 With the long run curve the shape by definition reflects economies and diseconomies of scale.[15]:186 At low levels of production long run production functions generally exhibit increasing returns to scale, which, for firms that are perfect competitors in input markets, means that the long run average cost is falling;[4]:227 the upward slope of the long run average cost function at higher levels of output is due to decreasing returns to scale at those output levels.[4]:227

text: In reality[edit]

text: Evidence shows that cost curves are not typically U-shaped. In a survey by Wilford J. Eiteman and Glenn E. Guthrie in 1952 managers of 334 companies were shown a number of different cost curves, and asked to specify which one best represented the company’s cost curve. 95% of managers responding to the survey reported cost curves with constant or falling costs.[1]

text: Alan Blinder, former vice president of the American Economics Association, conducted the same type of survey in 1998, which involved 200 US firms in a sample that should be representative of the US economy at large. He found that about 40% of firms reported falling variable or marginal cost, and 48.4% reported constant marginal/variable cost.[19]


document_title: Miranda v. Arizona

question_text: in miranda v arizona which amendments did the supreme court rule were violated

text: Miranda v. Arizona

text: Background[edit]

text: Legal aid movement[edit]

text: During the 1960s, a movement which provided defendants with legal aid emerged from the collective efforts of various bar associations.

text: In the civil realm, it led to the creation of the Legal Services Corporation under the Great Society program of President Lyndon Baines Johnson. Escobedo v. Illinois, a case which closely foreshadowed Miranda, provided for the presence of counsel during police interrogation. This concept extended to a concern over police interrogation practices, which were considered by many[who?] to be barbaric and unjust. Coercive interrogation tactics were known in period slang as the "third degree".[citation needed]

text: Arrest and conviction[edit]

text: On March 13, 1963, Ernesto Miranda was arrested, by the Phoenix Police Department, based on circumstantial evidence linking him to the kidnapping and rape of an eighteen-year-old woman ten days earlier.[2] After two hours of interrogation by police officers, Miranda signed a confession to the rape charge on forms that included the typed statement: "I do hereby swear that I make this statement voluntarily and of my own free will, with no threats, coercion, or promises of immunity, and with full knowledge of my legal rights, understanding any statement I make may be used against me."[3]

text: However, at no time was Miranda told of his right to counsel. Before being presented with the form on which he was asked to write out the confession he had already given orally, he was not advised of his right to remain silent, nor was he informed that his statements during the interrogation would be used against him. At trial, when prosecutors offered Miranda's written confession as evidence, his court-appointed lawyer, Alvin Moore, objected that because of these facts, the confession was not truly voluntary and should be excluded. Moore's objection was overruled and based on this confession and other evidence, Miranda was convicted of rape and kidnapping. He was sentenced to 20–30 years of imprisonment on each charge, with sentences to run concurrently. Moore filed Miranda's appeal to the Arizona Supreme Court, claiming that Miranda's confession was not fully voluntary and should not have been admitted into the court proceedings. The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision to admit the confession in State v. Miranda, 401 P.2d 721 (Ariz. 1965). In affirmation, the Arizona Supreme emphasized heavily the fact that Miranda did not specifically request an attorney.[4]

text: Attorney John Paul Frank, former law clerk to Justice Hugo Black, represented Miranda in his appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court.[5]

text: Opinion of the Supreme Court[edit]

text: Chief Justice Earl Warren, a former prosecutor, delivered the opinion of the Court[6], ruling that due to the coercive nature of the custodial interrogation by police (Warren cited several police training manuals which had not been provided in the arguments), no confession could be admissible under the Fifth Amendment self-incrimination clause and Sixth Amendment right to an attorney unless a suspect had been made aware of his rights and the suspect had then waived them:

text: The person in custody must, prior to interrogation, be clearly informed that he has the right to remain silent, and that anything he says will be used against him in court; he must be clearly informed that he has the right to consult with a lawyer and to have the lawyer with him during interrogation, and that, if he is indigent, a lawyer will be appointed to represent him.[7]

text: Thus, Miranda's conviction was overturned. The Court also made clear what had to happen if the suspect chose to exercise his or her rights:

text: If the individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease... If the individual states that he wants an attorney, the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present. At that time, the individual must have an opportunity to confer with the attorney and to have him present during any subsequent questioning.

text: Warren pointed to the existing practice of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the rules of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, both of which required notifying a suspect of his right to remain silent; the FBI warning included notice of the right to counsel.

text: However, the dissenting justices accused the majority of overreacting to the problem of coercive interrogations, and anticipated a drastic effect. They believed that, once warned, suspects would always demand attorneys, and deny the police the ability to gain confessions.

text: Clark's concurrence in part, dissent in part[edit]

text: In a separate concurrence in part, dissent in part, Justice Tom C. Clark argued that the Warren Court went "too far too fast". Instead, Justice Clark would use the "totality of the circumstances" test enunciated by Justice Goldberg in Haynes v. Washington. Under this test, the court would:

text: consider in each case whether the police officer prior to custodial interrogation added the warning that the suspect might have counsel present at the interrogation and, further, that a court would appoint one at his request if he was too poor to employ counsel. In the absence of warnings, the burden would be on the State to prove that counsel was knowingly and intelligently waived or that in the totality of the circumstances, including the failure to give the necessary warnings, the confession was clearly voluntary.

text: Harlan's dissent[edit]

text: In dissent, Justice John Marshall Harlan II wrote that "nothing in the letter or the spirit of the Constitution or in the precedents squares with the heavy-handed and one-sided action that is so precipitously taken by the Court in the name of fulfilling its constitutional responsibilities". Harlan closed his remarks by quoting former Justice Robert H. Jackson: "This Court is forever adding new stories to the temples of constitutional law, and the temples have a way of collapsing when one story too many is added."

text: White's dissent[edit]

text: Justice Byron White took issue with the court announcing a new constitutional right when it had no "factual and textual bases" in the Constitution or previous opinions of the Court for the rule announced in the opinion. He stated: "The proposition that the privilege against self-incrimination forbids in-custody interrogation without the warnings specified in the majority opinion and without a clear waiver of counsel has no significant support in the history of the privilege or in the language of the Fifth Amendment." Nor did Justice White believe it had any basis in English common law.

text: White further warned of the dire consequences of the majority opinion:

text: I have no desire whatsoever to share the responsibility for any such impact on the present criminal process.

text: In some unknown number of cases, the Court's rule will return a killer, a rapist or other criminal to the streets and to the environment which produced him, to repeat his crime whenever it pleases him. As a consequence, there will not be a gain, but a loss, in human dignity.

text: Subsequent developments[edit]

text: Retrial[edit]

text: Miranda was retried in 1967 after the original case against him was thrown out. This time the prosecution, instead of using the confession, introduced other evidence and called witnesses. One witness was Twila Hoffman, a woman with whom Miranda was living at the time of the offense; she testified that he had told her of committing the crime.[8][9] Miranda was convicted in 1967 and sentenced to serve 20 to 30 years.[9] The Supreme Court of Arizona affirmed,[10] and the United States Supreme Court denied review.[11] Miranda was paroled in 1972. After his release, he returned to his old neighborhood and made a modest living autographing police officers' "Miranda cards" which contained the text of the warning, for reading to arrestees. He was stabbed to death during an argument in a bar on January 31, 1976.[12] A suspect was arrested, but he, unlike Miranda, exercised his right to remain silent. With no evidence against him, he was released.[13]

text: Another three defendants whose cases had been tied in with Miranda's – an armed robber, a stick-up man, and a bank robber – either made plea bargains to lesser charges or were found guilty again despite the exclusion of their confessions.[14]

text: Reaction[edit]

text: The Miranda decision was widely criticized when it came down, as many felt it was unfair to inform suspected criminals of their rights, as outlined in the decision. Richard Nixon and other conservatives denounced Miranda for undermining the efficiency of the police, and argued the ruling would contribute to an increase in crime. Nixon, upon becoming President, promised to appoint judges who would be "strict constructionists" and who would exercise judicial restraint. Many supporters of law enforcement were angered by the decision's negative view of police officers.[citation needed]

text: Miranda warning[edit]

text: After the Miranda decision, the nation's police departments were required to inform arrested persons or suspects of their rights under the ruling prior to custodial interrogation.[15] Such information is called a Miranda warning. Since it is usually required that the suspects be asked if they understand their rights, courts have also ruled that any subsequent waiver of Miranda rights must be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.[16]

text: Many American police departments have pre-printed Miranda waiver forms which a suspect must sign and date (after hearing and reading the warnings again) if an interrogation is to occur.[17][18]

text: Data from the FBI Uniform Crime Reports shows a sharp reduction in the clearance rate of violent and property crimes after Miranda.[19] However, according to other studies from the 1960s and 1970s, "contrary to popular belief, Miranda had little, if any, effect on detectives’ ability to solve crimes."[9]

text: Legal developments[edit]

text: The federal Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 purported to overrule Miranda for federal criminal cases and restore the "totality of the circumstances" test that had prevailed previous to Miranda.[20] The validity of this provision of the law, which is still codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3501, was not ruled on for another 30 years because the Justice Department never attempted to rely on it to support the introduction of a confession into evidence at any criminal trial.[citation needed]

text: Miranda was undermined by several subsequent decisions which seemed to grant exceptions to the "Miranda warnings", challenging its claim to be a necessary corollary of the Fifth Amendment. The exceptions and developments that occurred over the years included:

text:
The Court found in Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971), that a confession obtained in violation of the Miranda standards may nonetheless be used for purposes of impeaching the defendant's testimony: that is, if the defendant takes the stand at trial and the prosecution wishes to introduce the defendant's confession as a prior inconsistent statement to attack the defendant's credibility, the Miranda holding will not prohibit this.
The Court found in Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980), that a "spontaneous" statement made by a defendant while in custody, even though the defendant has not been given the Miranda warnings or has invoked the right to counsel and a lawyer is not yet present, is admissible in evidence, as long as the statement was not given in response to police questioning or other conduct by the police likely to produce an incriminating response.
The Court found in Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (1984), that a person subjected to custodial interrogation is entitled to the benefit of the procedural safeguards enunciated in Miranda, regardless of the nature or severity of the offense of which he is suspected or for which he was arrested.
The Court found in New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984), that there is also a "public safety" exception to the requirement that Miranda warnings be given before questioning: for example, if the defendant is in possession of information regarding the location of an unattended gun or there are other similar exigent circumstances which require protection of the public, the defendant may be questioned without warning and his responses, though incriminating, will be admissible in evidence. In 2009, the California Supreme Court upheld the conviction of Richard Allen Davis, finding that the public safety exception applied despite the fact that 64 days had passed from the disappearance of the girl later found to be murdered.[21]
The Court found in Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986), that the words "knowing, intelligent, and voluntary" mean only that suspects reasonably appear to understand what they are doing and are not being coerced into signing the waiver; the Court ruled that it is irrelevant whether the suspect may actually have been insane at the time.

text: United States v. Garibay (1998) pointed out an important matter in regards to expansion of Miranda. Garibay barely spoke English and clearly showed a lack of understanding; indeed, "the agent admitted that he had to rephrase questions when the defendant appeared confused."[22] The U.S. Court of Appeals ruled a "clear error" when the district court found that Garibay had "knowingly and intelligently waived his Miranda rights" due to the defendant’s low I.Q. and poor English language skills.[23] The court investigated many facets of his waiver and discovered that Mr. Garibay was missing all items that they were looking for: he never signed a waiver, he only received his warnings verbally and in English, and no interpreter was provided although they were available. With an opinion that stressed "the requirement that a defendant 'knowingly and intelligently' waive his Miranda rights", the Court reversed Garibay's conviction and remanded his case.[23]

text: Miranda survived a strong challenge in Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000), where the validity of Congress's overruling of Miranda through § 3501 was tested. At issue was whether the Miranda warnings were actually compelled by the Constitution, or were rather merely measures enacted as a matter of judicial policy.[citation needed] In Dickerson, the Court, speaking through Chief Justice Rehnquist, upheld Miranda 7–2 and stated that "the warnings have become part of our national culture". In dissent, Justice Scalia argued Miranda warnings were not constitutionally required. He cited several cases demonstrating a majority of the then-current court, counting himself, and Justices Kennedy, O'Connor, and Thomas, as well as the Chief Justice (who had just delivered a contrary opinion), "[were] on record as believing that a violation of Miranda is not a violation of the Constitution".[citation needed]

text: Over time, interrogators began to think of techniques to honor the "letter" but not the "spirit" of Miranda. In the case of Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 (2004), the Supreme Court halted one of the more controversial practices. Missouri police were deliberately withholding Miranda warnings and questioning suspects until they obtained confessions, then giving the warnings, getting waivers, and getting confessions again. Justice Souter wrote for the plurality: "Strategists dedicated to draining the substance out of Miranda cannot accomplish by training instructions what Dickerson held Congress could not do by statute."[24]

text: Berghuis v. Thompkins (2010) is a ruling where the Supreme Court held that a suspect's "ambiguous or equivocal" statement or no statements do not mean that police must end an interrogation.[25] At least one scholar has argued that Thompkins effectively gutted Miranda. In The Right to Remain Silent, Charles Weisselberg wrote that "the majority in Thompkins rejected the fundamental underpinnings of Miranda v. Arizona’s prophylactic rule and established a new one that fails to protect the rights of suspects" and that

text: But in Thompkins, neither Michigan nor the Solicitor General were able to cite any decision in which a court found that a suspect had given an implied waiver after lengthy questioning. Thompkins persevered for almost three hours before succumbing to his interrogators. In finding a waiver on these facts, Thompkins gives us an implied waiver doctrine on steroids.[1]