document_title: NBA playoffs

question_text: who is the lowest seeded team to win an nba title

text: NBA playoffs

text: Format[edit]

text: In September 2015, the NBA announced changes to the formula used to determine the format of the 2016 NBA Playoffs. The top eight teams in each conference (East and West), ranked in order by win-loss records, qualify for the playoffs. The tie-break criteria for playoff seeding and home-court advantage have also changed; head-to-head results between the tied teams is the first tie-breaker, and whether a team won its division championship is the second tie-breaker.[1]

text: These seedings are used to create a bracket that determines the match-ups throughout the series. Once the playoffs start, the bracket is fixed; teams are never "reseeded", unlike in the National Football League (NFL) and Major League Soccer (MLS) where the strongest remaining teams face the weakest teams in subsequent rounds. The first round of the NBA playoffs, or conference quarterfinals, consists of four match-ups in each conference based on the seedings (1–8, 2–7, 3–6, and 4–5). The four winners advance to the second round, or conference semifinals, with a match-up between the 1–8 and 4–5 winners and a match-up between the 2–7 and 3–6 winners. The two winners advance to the third round, or conference finals. The winner from each conference will advance to the final round, or the NBA Finals.

text: All rounds are best-of-seven series. Series are played in a 2–2–1–1–1 format, meaning the team with home-court advantage hosts games 1, 2, 5, and 7, while their opponent hosts games 3, 4, and 6, with games 5–7 being played if needed. This format has been used since 2014, after NBA team owners unanimously voted to the change away from a 2–3–2 format on October 23, 2013.[2]

text:
First Round

Conference Semifinals

Conference Finals

NBA Finals

E1
Indiana*
4

E8
Boston
0

E1
Indiana*
4

E4
Miami
2

E4
Miami
4

E5
New Orleans
3

E1
Indiana*
2

Eastern Conference

E3
Detroit
4

E3
Detroit
4

E6
Milwaukee
1

E3
Detroit
4

E2
New Jersey*
3

E2
New Jersey*
4

E7
New York
0

E3
Detroit
4

W2
LA Lakers*
1

W1
Minnesota*
4

W8
Denver
1

W1
Minnesota*
4

W4
Sacramento
3

W4
Sacramento
4

W5
Dallas
1

W1
Minnesota*
2

Western Conference

W2
LA Lakers*
4

W3
San Antonio
4

W6
Memphis
0

W3
San Antonio
2

W2
LA Lakers*
4

W2
LA Lakers*
4

W7
Houston
1

text:
* Division winner
Bold Series winner
Italic Team with home-court advantage

text:
view
talk
edit

text: The most common criticism of the current structure is related to parity of conferences. On numerous occasions, Eastern Conference teams with losing records qualified for the playoffs, while Western Conference teams with winning records ended up missing them, including the 2011, 2013 and the 2015 NBA Playoffs.

text: History[edit]

text: The National Basketball Association was established in 1949 by merger of the Basketball Association of America (BAA) and National Basketball League but it recognizes the three BAA seasons as part of its own history. In all of its three years the BAA champion was finally determined in a best-of-seven series but its first two tournaments, the 1947 and 1948 BAA Playoffs, were otherwise quite different from the third, which 21st-century NBA playoffs nearly match. In 1947 and 1948, the Eastern and Western Division champions were matched in a best-of-seven series following the regular season, whose winner advanced to the championship round. Meanwhile, four runners-up played best-of-three series to determine the other finalist: the two second-place teams were matched in one short series and the two third-place teams in another; the winners of those two series played another one. In 1947 the Philadelphia Warriors won the runners-up bracket and beat the Western champion Chicago Stags four games to one, which the NBA recognizes as its first championship; in 1948 Baltimore won the runners-up and beat Eastern champion Philadelphia in the final. Both tournaments generated one finalist from the Eastern and one from the Western Division, but only by chance.[3]

text: In 1949 the third and last BAA tournament matched Eastern teams exclusively and Western teams exclusively, necessarily generating Eastern and Western playoff champions to meet in the final. At the same time, the number of playoff teams was increased from three to four from each Division; two rounds of best-of-three series were played, followed by a best-of-seven championship. The main idea was retained by the NBA. Even the 1950 tournament, following a transitional season with three divisions rather than two, initially determined one playoff champion from each division. The Central champion Minneapolis Lakers became the first league champion under the NBA name by defeating Anderson from the West in a best-of-three, with Syracuse from the East idle, and then knocking off the Syracuse Nationals in six games.[4]

text: The 1951 through 1953 playoffs changed the division finals into a best-of-five playoff. With only nine league members in 1953–54, the NBA cut its postseason tournament field from eight teams to six (from 1954 through 1966, the period of eight to nine league members). Round robins were played in 1954, uniquely in NBA history—a three-team round robin among the three playoff teams in each division. From 1955 to 1966, the first-place team in each division was idle while its two runners-up faced played a best-of-three. Division finals were expanded to best-of-seven in 1958 and division semifinals to best-of-five in 1961.

text: With ten league members again for the 1966–67 season, eight teams were again admitted to the tournament, providing a simple three-round knockout (8-team bracket). A year later, the division semifinals were changed to best-of-seven playoff. Then, in 1975 and 1977, respectively, a fifth and sixth team were added to each Division, necessitating an additional first round of best-of-three series.

text: Finally in 1984, the tournament expanded to its present 16-team, four-round knockout, and the now-complete set of first-round series were expanded to a best-of-five. In 2003 the first round was changed to also be best-of-seven. (Thus all playoff teams from 2003 to present, same as the two Division champions in 1947 and 1948, continue to play at the close of the regular season without idle team ("bye") and may be certain of four playoff games including two at home.)

text: Beginning with the 2004 season, with the addition of the thirtieth NBA franchise, the Charlotte Bobcats, the NBA realigned its divisions. The result was that each conference would have three divisions of five teams each, and the winner of each division was guaranteed a top-three playoff seed. This would change slightly after the 2005–06 season; while division winners still receive automatic playoff berths, they are guaranteed a top-four seed, as described above.

text: 2006 NBA playoffs controversy[edit]

text: The previous playoff format, in place for the 2004–05 and 2005–06 NBA playoffs, after the NBA was re-aligned into six divisions, created controversy during the 2005–06 season and playoffs, and would be changed prior to the 2006–07 NBA season.[5]

text: Prior to 2005, NBA division champions were seeded higher than the other teams in their conference, regardless of their record. Prior to 2004, when the NBA was aligned into two conferences with two divisions each, the division champions were guaranteed the top two seeds. This meant that top two teams in a conference (by record) would be seeded either first and second (if they were in opposite divisions) or first and third (if they were in the same division). Because of the NBA playoffs' preset matchups in the second round, this meant that the top two teams in a conference could never meet until the conference finals, assuming they both made it to that round.

text: After the NBA realigned its two conferences into three divisions each, the seeding rules remained largely unchanged. The top three seeds would now be reserved for division champions. However, this meant that if the top two teams (by record) in a conference were in the same division, they would be seeded first and fourth. Assuming no first-round upsets, this raised the prospect that the top two teams in the conference would face each other in the conference semifinals, instead of the conference finals.

text: In the second year of this format, the 2005–06 NBA season, the two teams with the best records in the Western Conference, the San Antonio Spurs and Dallas Mavericks of the Southwest Division, did just that. The Mavericks had the second-best record in the Western Conference and the third-best record in the entire league, behind the Detroit Pistons and San Antonio. However, they were seeded fourth because they finished second in the Southwest behind the Spurs. This turn of events led to the playoff format being criticized by many. Besides the prospect of a team losing earlier in the playoffs than its regular-season record or seeding would suggest, critics claimed that it also created an unfair advantage for teams in the 2-7/3-6 half of the Western Conference playoff bracket, who could advance to the conference finals without playing either of the two best teams in the conference in an earlier round.

text: The Phoenix Suns, winners of the Pacific Division and possessors of the third best record, were seeded second, while the Denver Nuggets, winners of the Northwest Division and tied for only the seventh-best record in the conference, were seeded third.

text: The Memphis Grizzlies and Los Angeles Clippers met in the second-to-last game of the regular season, after the top four seeds had been clinched. The two teams were already determined to be the fifth and sixth seeds, and had only to determine which rank higher. The fifth seed would likely need to defeat the best two teams in the conference without home-court advantage to advance to the conference finals, as it would face fourth-seeded Dallas in the first round and likely face first-seeded San Antonio if it managed to defeat Dallas. The sixth seed would play third-seeded Denver in the first round, but would have home-court advantage (since the Grizzlies had the fourth-best record in the conference and the Clippers had the fifth-best), and would not have to face either San Antonio or Dallas until the conference finals at the earliest.

text: This led to speculation about whether the Grizzlies or the Clippers would have much commitment to winning their match-up in the second-to-last game of the season, since it was clearly most advantageous to lose the game in order to obtain the 6th seed. The Clippers eventually lost to Memphis without much evidence to support the speculation that the Clippers had lost intentionally.[6] In the first round of the playoffs, the Clippers defeated the Nuggets in five games, while Memphis was swept by Dallas. Ultimately, Dallas and San Antonio did meet in the second round, with Dallas winning in seven games and advancing all the way to the NBA finals.

text: Timeline[edit]

text: 1947: The playoffs were instituted with a three-stage tournament, similar to the Stanley Cup playoffs of the 1930s; the two first-place teams qualified directly to one semifinal where they played each other in a best-of-7 series. Teams finishing second & third qualified for the best-of-3 quarterfinals, where the two second-placed teams were paired in one quarterfinal, as were the two third-placed teams, and the two quarterfinal winners played each other in a best-of-three semifinal. The two semifinal winners played each other in the Basketball Association of America (BAA) best-of-7 final series.

text:
Quarterfinals
Best-of-3

Semifinals
Best-of-3 (one series)
Best-of-7 (one series)

BAA finals
Best-of-7

E3

W3

E3

E2

W2

E2

E2

W1

W1

E1

text: There were no byes, or idle time, for the division champions – as there would be for higher-seeded playoff teams 1955–66 and 1975–83. All six 1947 participants played their first tournament games on Wednesday, April 2; in 1948 the two Eastern runners-up (E2, E3 in the figure) were idle for a few days only because there was a three-way Western tie to break. Both winners of the runners-up bracket, Philadelphia in 1947 and Baltimore in 1948, reached the final series having played fewer tournament games than their final opponents, Chicago in 1947 and Philadelphia in 1948, had played in the best-of-7 pairings of division champions. And both winners of the runners-up bracket won the final series. The "postseason" actually comprised 11 games played in a span of 21 days for the 1947 Chicago Stags and 13 games in 30 days for 1948 Philadelphia Warriors, the finalists who emerged from the pairing of division champions.[3]

text: 1949: The playoffs were reorganized to match Eastern Division teams exclusively, and Western Division teams exclusively – in two halves of the bracket, so to speak. Thus the BAA tournament generated a playoff champion in each Division. (So did the NBA in each of three 1950 divisions, and so it has done in each half of the league since then.) The top four teams from each of the two divisions qualified. The quarterfinals and semifinals were renamed division semifinals and division finals, respectively, and both rounds were best-of-3. Thus any playoff team might be eliminated in two games, one home game. The best-of-7 final was unchanged.

text:
Division semifinals
Best-of-3

Division finals
Best-of-3

BAA finals
Best-of-7

E1

E4

E1

Eastern Division

E2

E2

E3

E1

W2

W1

W4

W1

Western Division

W2

W2

W3

text:
1950: The BAA was renamed as the National Basketball Association (NBA). With a three-division setup, 12 teams now qualified for the playoffs, with the top four teams from each division meeting in the best-of-3 division semifinals. The winners met in the best-of-3 division finals. With three teams remaining, the surviving team with the best regular season record qualified directly for the finals while the other two teams met in a best-of-3 NBA semifinals.
1951: With the NBA reverting to a two-division setup; the division semifinals reverted to its original 1949 format with only eight teams qualifying. The division finals was extended to a best-of-5 format.

text:
Division semifinals
Best-of-3

Division finals
Best-of-5

NBA finals
Best-of-7

E1

E4

E4

Eastern Division

E2

E2

E3

E2

W3

W1

W4

W1

Western Division

W3

W2

W3

text:
1954: With only nine league members (soon to be eight), the number of playoff teams was cut down to six. The division semifinals was changed to a double round-robin format within the division, with the top three teams from each division qualifying (each team played four games). Following the round-robin games, the top two teams qualified for the best-of-three division finals, followed by the best-of-seven finals.
1955: The number of playoff teams remained at six, but the initial round-robin was dropped after one year in favor of giving the first-place team in each division a bye to the best-of-five division finals. Teams which placed second and third played a best-of-three division semifinal. In 1955 the byes provided five and six extra days idle for the first-place teams.[7]
1958: The division finals was extended to a best-of-seven format.
1961: The division semifinals were extended to a best-of-five format.

text:
Division semifinals
Best-of-3 (1955–1960),
Best-of-5 (1961–1966)

Division finals
Best-of-5 (1955–1957),
Best-of-7 (1958–1966)

NBA finals
Best-of-7

E1

Eastern Division

E3

E2

E3

E3

W1

W1

Western Division

W2

W2

W3

text: The 1961 to 1966 tournaments alone combined initial byes for seeded teams with best-of-five initial series for unseeded teams. The 1961 byes provided five and seven extra days idle for the first-place teams. By 1966 the schedule provided more rest for the first-round participants with byes of 11 and eight extra days idle.[8]

text:
1967: The number of playoff teams was expanded to eight once more. The division semifinals now included the fourth-best team in each conference. The first-placed teams no longer received a bye. They were matched against the fourth-placed teams in the best-of-5 division semifinals.
1968: The division semifinals was extended to a best-of-seven format.

text:
Division semifinals
Best-of-5 (1967),
Best-of-7 (1968–1970)

Division finals
Best-of-7 (1968–1970)

NBA finals
Best-of-7

E1

E4

Eastern Division

E2

E3

W1

W4

Western Division

W2

W3

text: 1970: With an increased number of teams, the divisions were upgraded into conferences, which were then split into two divisions. Eight teams still qualified, four from each conference. The two division winners were guaranteed at least a #2 seed, and the two best non-division winners from each conference qualified as third and fourth seeds. Hence, the division semifinals and division finals came to be known as conference semifinals and conference finals, respectively.

text:
Conference semifinals
Best-of-7

Conference finals
Best-of-7

NBA finals
Best-of-7

E1*

E4

Eastern Conference

E2*

E3

W1*

W4

Western Conference

W2*

W3

text: 1975: The number of playoff teams was expanded from eight to ten. A first round was introduced which matched the fourth and fifth seeds in each conference in a best-of-3 first round series, while the top three seeds received a bye. This is similar to the system used in the NFL from 1978 to 1989.

text:
First Round
Best-of-3

Conference semifinals
Best-of-7

Conference finals
Best-of-7

NBA finals
Best-of-7

E1*

E4

E4

E5

Eastern Conference

E2*

E3

W1*

W4

W4

W5

Western Conference

W2*

W3

text: 1977: The number of playoff teams was expanded from 10 to 12. The first round now included the sixth best team in each conference, which was matched against the third seed. Only the division winners received byes to the next round. This is similar to the format currently used by the NFL.

text:
First Round
Best-of-3

Conference semifinals
Best-of-7

Conference finals
Best-of-7

NBA finals
Best-of-7

E1*

E4

E5

Eastern Conference

E3

E6

E2*

W1*

W4

W5

Western Conference

W3

W6

W2*

text: The 1983 tournament is the latest to incorporate first-round byes for seeded teams. The first-round best-of-three series tapped off on Tuesday and Wednesday, April 19 and 20; the second-round best-of-sevens on Sunday to the following Wednesday, April 27. Counting from Tuesday the byes provided five to eight extra days idle.[9]

text: 1984: The playoffs were expanded from 12 teams to 16 teams. All teams now participated in the first round, which was extended to a best-of-five series.

text:
Conference quarterfinals
Best-of-5

Conference semifinals
Best-of-7

Conference finals
Best-of-7

NBA finals
Best-of-7

E1*

E8

E4

E5

Eastern Conference

E3

E6

E2*

E7

W1*

W8

W4

W5

Western Conference

W3

W6

W2*

W7

text: 2003: The first round was extended to a best-of-seven series. This change arguably benefitted the higher seeds as it reduced the likelihood of an upset by a lower seed. It also meant that a team that swept their series 4–0 might have to wait up to two weeks to play their next series against a team that had won 4–3.

text:
Conference quarterfinals
Best-of-7

Conference semifinals
Best-of-7

Conference finals
Best-of-7

NBA finals
Best-of-7

E1*

E8

E4

E5

Eastern Conference

E3

E6

E2*

E7

W1*

W8

W4

W5

Western Conference

W3

W6

W2*

W7

text: 2005: Each conference was realigned into three divisions with each division winner qualifying for a top-three seed regardless of record. The next best five teams from each conference also qualify for the playoffs.

text:
Conference quarterfinals
Best-of-7

Conference semifinals
Best-of-7

Conference finals
Best-of-7

NBA finals
Best-of-7

E1*

E8

E4

E5

Eastern Conference

E3*

E6

E2*

E7

W1*

W8

W4

W5

Western Conference

W3*

W6

W2*

W7

text:
2007: To address the criticisms of having each division champion guaranteed a top-three seed, regardless of record, the rules were changed such that the division winners are now only guaranteed a top-four seed. The team with the second-best record in the conference is now guaranteed the second seed, even if it finishes second in its own division. This ensures that the two best teams in the conference cannot meet until the conference finals at the earliest. The previous system raised the prospect of the two best teams in the conference being seeded 1 and 4 if they play in the same division, thus forcing them to play each other in the second round (given no upsets).

Note: In the example below, the East's #2 seed is not a division champion.

text:
Conference quarterfinals
Best-of-7

Conference semifinals
Best-of-7

Conference finals
Best-of-7

NBA finals
Best-of-7

E1*

E8

E5

E4*

Eastern Conference

E3*

E6

E2

E7

W1*

W8

W5

W4

Western Conference

W3*

W6

W2*

W7

text: 2016: While the playoff bracketing did not change, qualification criteria were changed. The teams with the eight best records in each conference receive playoff berths, with no automatic berths nor guaranteed top-four seed placement for division champions.

text: Team roster[edit]

text: Playoff teams must identify their postseason roster before the playoffs begin. They are allowed up to 15 players and can designate two as inactive for each game.[10] Players are eligible to be on a team's playoff roster provided they were on the team for at least one regular season game, and were not on another NBA team's roster after March 1.[11] Previously, playoff rosters were limited to 12 players who were named before the playoffs began.[10]

text: Records and statistics[edit]

text:
Only five 8th seeded teams have managed to win a series versus the number 1 seeded team: The Denver Nuggets eliminated the Seattle SuperSonics 3–2 in 1994. The New York Knicks eliminated the Miami Heat 3–2 in 1999. The Golden State Warriors defeated the Dallas Mavericks 4–2 in the 2007 Western Conference First Round (becoming the first 8 seed to beat a 1 seed in the best of 7 format). In 2011, the Memphis Grizzlies beat the San Antonio Spurs, 4–2 and in 2012, the Philadelphia 76ers beat the Chicago Bulls 4–2.
The 1999 Knicks are the only 8th seeded team ever to reach the NBA finals. No 8th seeded team has won the NBA finals yet.
The 1956–57 St. Louis Hawks, 1958–59 Minneapolis Lakers and the 1980–81 Houston Rockets are the only teams with losing records (34-38, 33–39 and 40–42, respectively) to make it to the NBA finals. In 1981 the Houston Rockets' opponent in the Western Conference Finals, the Kansas City Kings, also had a losing record (40–42).
The 1994–95 Houston Rockets, a sixth seed with a record of 47–35, were the lowest seeded team to win the NBA finals. In the NBA finals, the Rockets swept the Orlando Magic (57–25) in four games. In doing so, the Rockets defeated four teams that had won 50 or more games during the regular season (Utah Jazz at 60–22, Phoenix Suns at 59–23, San Antonio Spurs at 62–20 and Orlando at 57–25), which had never been done before. They are also the only team to have won an NBA title without having home-court advantage at all.
The Golden State Warriors own the longest NBA playoff winning streak for a single postseason with 15 straight wins in the 2017 playoffs.
Of all the teams with multiple NBA finals appearances, the Chicago Bulls are the only team to have never lost in the finals, winning 6.
The Boston Celtics possess the most overall NBA finals series wins with an overall record of 17–4. The Los Angeles/Minneapolis Lakers have played in the most NBA finals series (31) with an overall record of 16–15.
The longest playoff appearance streak currently belongs to the San Antonio Spurs with 20 consecutive appearances in the playoffs, beginning in the 1997–98 NBA season.The longest ever streak of playoffs appearances in a row belongs to the Syracuse Nationals/Philadelphia 76ers, who made the playoffs 22 straight years from the 1949–50 season to the 1970–71 season, while the longest playoff appearance streak in one city belonged to the Portland Trail Blazers, who made it for 21 straight years, from the 1982–83 to the 2002–03 seasons.
In 1999, under the best of 5-7-7-7 system, the team with the best postseason record to win the NBA Championship was San Antonio Spurs with a record of 14-2, having only lost one game each in round 1 and the Finals. It was surpassed by Los Angeles Lakers in 2001, having only lost in Game 1 of the Finals against Philadelphia 76ers.
In 2017, under the best of 7-7-7-7 system, the Golden State Warriors attained the best record of 16-1, losing only once to the Cleveland Cavaliers in the Finals.
In 2017, under the best of 7-7-7-7 system, the Golden State Warriors and the Cleveland Cavaliers came into the NBA Finals with a combined record of 24-1, with the Cavaliers losing only once to the Boston Celtics in the Eastern Conference Finals.

text: Playoff appearances[edit]

text: Current as of 2017 NBA Playoffs

text: Appearances by active teams[edit]

text:
Team
Appearances[12]

Los Angeles Lakers
60 [A]

Boston Celtics
54

Philadelphia 76ers
47 [B]

Atlanta Hawks
46 [C]

Detroit Pistons
41 [D]

New York Knicks
41

San Antonio Spurs
37 [E]

Chicago Bulls
35

Golden State Warriors
33 [F]

Portland Trail Blazers
33

Houston Rockets
31 [G]

Milwaukee Bucks
29

Oklahoma City Thunder
29 [H]

Phoenix Suns
29

Sacramento Kings
29 [I]

Washington Wizards
28 [J]

Utah Jazz
26 [K]

Denver Nuggets
24 [E]

Indiana Pacers
24 [E]

Cleveland Cavaliers
21

Dallas Mavericks
21

Brooklyn Nets
19 [E][L]

Miami Heat
19

Orlando Magic
14

Los Angeles Clippers
13 [M]

Charlotte Hornets
10 [N]

Memphis Grizzlies
10 [O]

Toronto Raptors
9

Minnesota Timberwolves
8

New Orleans Pelicans
6 [N]

text:
Jump up ^ Includes appearances as the Minneapolis Lakers (1947–1960).
Jump up ^ Includes appearances as the Syracuse Nationals (1946–1963).
Jump up ^ Includes appearances as the Tri-Cities Blackhawks (1946–1951), the Milwaukee Hawks (1951–1955), and the St. Louis Hawks (1955–1968).
Jump up ^ Includes appearances as the Fort Wayne Pistons (1949–1957).
^ Jump up to: a b c d Does not include appearances in the American Basketball Association (ABA) playoffs. Per the conditions of the ABA–NBA merger, the NBA does not officially recognize the ABA history, playoffs and records.
Jump up ^ Includes appearances as the Philadelphia Warriors (1946–1962) and the San Francisco Warriors (1962–1971).
Jump up ^ Includes appearances as the San Diego Rockets (1967–1971).
Jump up ^ As part of the 2008 relocation settlement with the City of Seattle, the Thunder officially shares its history with that of the Seattle SuperSonics (1967–2008).[13]
Jump up ^ Includes appearances as the Rochester Royals (1948–1957), the Cincinnati Royals (1957–1972), the Kansas City-Omaha Kings (1972–1975), and the Kansas City Kings (1975–1985).
Jump up ^ Includes appearances as the Chicago Packers (1961–1962), the Chicago Zephyrs (1962–1963), the Baltimore Bullets (1963–1973), the Capital Bullets (1973–1974), and the Washington Bullets (1974–1997).
Jump up ^ Includes appearances as the New Orleans Jazz (1974–1979).
Jump up ^ Includes appearances as the New Jersey Nets (1977–2012).
Jump up ^ Includes appearances as the Buffalo Braves (1970–1978) and the San Diego Clippers (1978–1984).
^ Jump up to: a b The New Orleans Pelicans were originally named the Charlotte Hornets, and moved to New Orleans in 2002. A new team, the Charlotte Bobcats, was then established in 2004. When the Charlotte team reclaimed the Hornets name in a 2014 agreement, the Charlotte team also reclaimed the history of the original Hornets; as such, the New Orleans Pelicans were established in 2002, and the Bobcats/Hornets rejoined the NBA in 2004.[14]
Jump up ^ Includes appearances as the Vancouver Grizzlies (1995–2001).


document_title: Tariffs in United States history

question_text: what type of tariff is prohibited by the u.s. constitution

question_tokens: what type of tariff is prohibited by the u.s. constitution

root

text: Tariffs in United States history

text: Historical trends[edit]

text: According to Michael Lind, protectionism was America's de facto policy from the passage of the Tariff of 1816 to World War II, "switching to free trade only in 1945, when most of its industrial competitors had been wiped out" by the war.[9]. It has been argued that one of the underlying motivations for the American Revolution itself was a desire to industrialize, and reverse the trade deficit with Britain, which had grown by a factor of ten in the space of a few decades, from £67,000 (1721–30) to £739,000 (1761–70).[10]

tag: p

text: Paul Bairoch states that since the end of the 18th century, the United States has been "the homeland and bastion of modern protectionism". In fact, the United States never adhered to free trade until 1945. A protectionist policy was adopted during the presidency of George Washington by Alexander Hamilton, the first US Treasury Secretary. Hamilton wrote the Report on Manufactures, which called for customs barriers to allow American industrial development and to help protect infant industries, including bounties (subsidies) derived in part from those tariffs. This text was one of the references of the German economist Friedrich List (1789–1846). This policy remained throughout the 19th century and the overall level of tariffs was very high (close to 50% in 1830). The victory of the protectionist states of the North over the free trade southern states at the end of the Civil War (1861–1865) perpetuated this trend, even during periods of free trade in Europe (1860–1880).[11]

text:
Hamilton explained that despite an initial "increase of price" caused by regulations that control foreign competition, once a "domestic manufacture has attained to perfection… it invariably becomes cheaper."
George Washington signed the Tariff Act of 1789, making it the Republic's second ever piece of legislation. Increasing the domestic supply of manufactured goods, particularly war materials, was seen as an issue of national security. Washington and Hamilton believed that political independence was predicated upon economic independence.[12]

text: In the 19th century, statesmen such as Senator Henry Clay continued Hamilton's themes within the Whig Party under the name "American System." The fledgling Republican Party led by Abraham Lincoln, who called himself a "Henry Clay tariff Whig", strongly opposed free trade, and implemented a 44-percent tariff during the Civil War—in part to pay for railroad subsidies and for the war effort, and to protect favored industries.[13]

text: From 1871 to 1913, "the average U.S. tariff on dutiable imports never fell below 38 percent [and] gross national product (GNP) grew 4.3 percent annually, twice the pace in free trade Britain and well above the U.S. average in the 20th century," notes Alfred Eckes Jr., chairman of the U.S. International Trade Commission under President Reagan.

text: In 1896, the GOP platform pledged to "renew and emphasize our allegiance to the policy of protection, as the bulwark of American industrial independence, and the foundation of development and prosperity. This true American policy taxes foreign products and encourages home industry. It puts the burden of revenue on foreign goods; it secures the American market for the American producer. It upholds the American standard of wages for the American workingman."

text: Colonial Era to 1789[edit]

text: In the colonial era, before 1775, nearly every colony levied its own tariffs, usually with lower rates for British products. There were taxes on ships (on a tonnage basis), import taxes on slaves, export taxes on tobacco, and import taxes on alcoholic beverages.[14] The London government insisted on a policy of mercantilism whereby only British ships could trade in the colonies. In defiance, some American merchants engaged in smuggling.[15][16]

text: During the Revolution, the British blockade from 1775 to 1783 largely ended foreign trade. In the 1783–89 Confederation Period, each state set up its own trade rules, often imposing tariffs or restrictions on neighboring states. The new Constitution, which went into effect in 1789, banned interstate tariffs or trade restrictions, as well as state taxes on exports.[17]

text: Early National period, 1789–1828[edit]

text: The framers of the United States Constitution gave the federal government authority to tax, stating that Congress has the power to "... lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises, pay the debts and provide for the common defense and general welfare of the United States." and also "To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes." Tariffs between states is prohibited by the U.S. Constitution, and all domestically made products can be imported or shipped to another state tax-free.

text: Responding to an urgent need for revenue and a trade imbalance with England that was fast destroying the infant American industries and draining the nation of its currency, the First United States Congress passed, and President George Washington signed, the Hamilton Tariff of 1789, which authorized the collection of duties on imported goods. Customs duties as set by tariff rates up to 1860 were usually about 80–95% of all federal revenue. Having just fought a war over taxation (among other things) the U.S. Congress wanted a reliable source of income that was relatively unobtrusive and easy to collect. It also sought to protect the infant industries that had developed during the war but which were now threatened by cheaper imports, especially from England. Tariffs and excise taxes were authorized by the United States Constitution and recommended by the first United States Secretary of the Treasury, Alexander Hamilton in 1789 to tax foreign imports and set up low excise taxes on whiskey and a few other products to provide the Federal Government with enough money to pay its operating expenses and to redeem at full value U.S. Federal debts and the debts the states had accumulated during the Revolutionary War. The Congress set low excise taxes on only a few goods, such as, whiskey, rum, tobacco, snuff and refined sugar. The tax on whiskey was highly controversial and set of massive protests by Western Farmers in the Whiskey Rebellion of 1794, which was suppressed by General Washington at the head of an army. The whiskey excise tax collected so little and was so despised it was abolished by President Thomas Jefferson in 1802.[18]

text: All tariffs were on a long list of goods (dutiable goods) with different customs rates and some goods on a "free" list. Congress spent enormous amounts of time figuring out these tariff import tax schedules.

text: With tariffs providing the basic federal revenue, an embargo on trade, or an enemy blockade, would threaten havoc. This happened in connection with the American economic warfare against Britain in the 1807–15 period. In 1807 imports dropped by more than half and some products became much more expensive or unobtainable. Congress passed the Embargo Act of 1807 and the Non-Intercourse Act (1809) to punish British and French governments for their actions; unfortunately their main effect was to reduce imports even more. The War of 1812 brought a similar set of problems as U.S. trade was again restricted by British naval blockades. The fiscal crisis was made much worse by the abolition of the First Bank of the U.S., which was the national bank. It was reestablished right after the war.[19]

text: The lack of imported goods relatively quickly gave very strong incentives to start building several U.S. industries in the Northeast. Textiles and machinery especially grew. Many new industries were set up and run profitably during the wars and about half of them failed after hostilities ceased and normal imports resumed. Industry in the U.S. was advancing up the skill set, innovation knowledge and organization curve.

text: The Tariff Act of 1789 imposed the first national source of revenue for the newly formed United States. The new U.S. Constitution ratified in 1789, allowed only the federal government to levy uniform tariffs. Only the federal government could set tariff rates (customs), so the old system of separate state rates disappeared. The new law taxed all imports at rates from 5 to 15 percent. These rates were primarily designed to generate revenue to pay the annual expenses of the federal government and the national debt and the debts the states had accumulated during the American War of Independence and to also promote manufactures and independence from foreign nations, especially for defense needs. Hamilton believed that all Revolutionary War debt should be paid in full to establish and keep U.S. financial credibility. In addition to income in his Report on Manufactures Treasury Secretary Alexander Hamilton proposed a far-reaching plan to use protective tariffs as a lever for rapid industrialization. In the late 18th century the industrial age was just starting and the United States had little or no textile industry—the heart of the early Industrial Revolution. The British government having just lost the Revolutionary War tried to maintain their near monopoly on cheap and efficient textile manufacturing by prohibiting the export of textile machines, machine models or the emigration of people familiar with these machines. Clothing in the early United States was nearly all hand made by a very time consuming and expensive process—just like it had been made for centuries before. The new textile manufacturing techniques in Britain were often over thirty times cheaper as well as being easier to use, more efficient and productive. Hamilton believed that a stiff tariff on imports would not only raise income but "protect" and help subsidize early efforts at setting up manufacturing facilities that could compete with British products.[20]

text: Samuel Slater in 1789 emigrated (illegally since he was familiar with textile manufacturing) from Britain. Looking for opportunities he heard of the failing attempts at making cotton mills in Pawtucket, Rhode Island. Contacting the owners he promised to see if he could fix their mills—they offered him a full partnership if he succeeded. Declaring their early attempts unworkable he proceeded from January 1790 to December 1790 to build the first operational textile manufacturing facility in the United States. The Industrial Revolution was off and running in the United States. Initially the cost of their textiles was slightly higher than the cost of equivalent British goods but the tariff helped protect their early start-up industry.[21]

text: The high protectionism tariffs Hamilton originally called for were not adopted until after the War of 1812, when nationalists such as Henry Clay and John C. Calhoun saw the need for more federal income and more industry. In wartime, they declared, having a home industry was a necessity to avoid shortages. Likewise owners of the small new factories that were springing up in the northeast to mass-produce boots, hats, nails and other common items wanted higher tariffs that would significantly protect them for a time from more efficient British producers. A 10% discount on the customs tax was offered on items imported in American ships, so that the American merchant marine would be supported.[22]

text: Once industrialization and mass production started, the demand for higher and higher tariffs came from manufacturers and factory workers. They believed that their businesses should be protected from the lower wages and more efficient factories of Britain and the rest of Europe. Nearly every northern Congressman was eager to logroll a higher tariff rate for his local industry. Senator Daniel Webster, formerly a spokesperson for Boston's merchants who imported goods (and wanted low tariffs), switched dramatically to represent the manufacturing interests in the Tariff of 1824. Rates were especially high for bolts of cloth and for bar iron, of which Britain was a low-cost producer. The culmination came in the Tariff of 1828, ridiculed by free traders as the "Tariff of Abominations", with import custom duties averaging over 25 percent. Intense political opposition to higher tariffs came from Southern Democrats and plantation owners in South Carolina who had little manufacturing industry and imported some products with high tariffs. They would have to pay more for imports. They claimed their economic interest was being unfairly injured. They attempted to "nullify" the federal tariff and spoke of secession from the Union (see the Nullification Crisis). President Andrew Jackson let it be known he would use the U.S. Army to enforce the law, and no state supported the South Carolina call for nullification. A compromise ended the crisis included a lowering of the average tariff rate over ten years to a rate of 15% to 20%.[23]

text: Second Party System, 1829–1859[edit]

text: Tariffs soon became a major political issue as the Whigs (1832–1852) and (after 1854) the Republicans wanted to protect their mostly northern industries and constituents by voting for higher tariffs and the Southern Democrats, which had very little industry but imported many goods voted for lower tariffs. Each party as it came into power voted to raise or lower tariffs under the constraints that the Federal Government always needed a certain level of revenues. The United States public debt was paid off in 1834 and President Andrew Jackson, a strong Southern Democrat, oversaw the cutting of the tariff rates roughly in half and eliminating nearly all federal excise taxes in about 1835.

text: Henry Clay and his Whig Party, envisioning a rapid modernization based on highly productive factories, sought a high tariff. Their key argument was that startup factories, or "infant industries", would at first be less efficient than European (British) producers. Furthermore, American factory workers were paid higher wages than their European competitors. The arguments proved highly persuasive in industrial districts. Clay's position was adopted in the 1828 and 1832 Tariff Acts. The Nullification Crisis forced a partial abandonment of the Whig position. When the Whigs won victories in the 1840 and 1842 elections, taking control of Congress, they re-instituted higher tariffs with the Tariff of 1842.[24] In examining these debates Moore finds that they were not precursors to Civil War. Instead they looked backward and continued the old debate whether foreign trade policy should embrace free trade or protectionism.[25]

text: Walker Tariff[edit]

text: The Democrats won in 1845, electing James K. Polk as president. Polk succeeded in passing the Walker tariff of 1846 by uniting the rural and agricultural factions of the entire country for lower tariffs. They sought a level of a "tariff for revenue only" that would pay the cost of government but not show favoritism to one section or economic sector at the expense of another. The Walker Tariff actually increased trade with Britain and others and brought in more revenue to the federal treasury than the higher tariff. The average tariff on the Walker Tariff was about 25%. While protectionists in Pennsylvania and neighboring states were angered, the South achieved its goal of setting low tariff rates before the Civil War.[26]

text: Low tariff of 1857[edit]

text: The Walker Tariff remained in place until 1857, when a nonpartisan coalition lowered them again with the Tariff of 1857 to 18%. This was in response to the British repeal of their protectionist "Corn Laws".[27]

text: The Democrats in Congress, dominated by Southern Democrats, wrote and passed the tariff laws in the 1830s, 1840s, and 1850s, and kept reducing rates, so that the 1857 rates were down to about 15%, a move that boosted trade so overwhelmingly that revenues actually increased, from just over $20 million in 1840 ($0.5 billion in 2016 dollars), to more than $80 million by 1856 ($1.7 billion).[28] The South had almost no complaints but the low rates angered many Northern industrialists and factory workers, especially in Pennsylvania, who demanded protection for their growing iron industry. The Republican Party replaced the Whigs in 1854 and also favored high tariffs to stimulate industrial growth; it was part of the 1860 Republican platform.

text: The Morrill Tariff significantly raising tariff rates became possible only after the Southern Senators walked out of Congress when their states left the Union, leaving a Republican majority. It was signed by Democratic President James Buchanan in early March 1861 shortly before President Abraham Lincoln took office. Pennsylvania iron mills and New England woolen mills mobilized businessmen and workers to call for high tariffs, but Republican merchants wanted low tariffs. The high tariff advocates lost in 1857, but stepped up their campaign by blaming the economic recession of 1857 on the lower rates. Economist Henry Charles Carey of Philadelphia was the most outspoken advocate, along with Horace Greeley and his influential newspaper, the New York Tribune. Increases were finally enacted in February 1861 after Southerners resigned their seats in Congress on the eve of the Civil War.[29][30]

text: Some historians in recent decades have minimized the tariff issue as a cause of the war, noting that few people in 1860–61 said it was of central importance to them. Compromises were proposed in 1860–61 to save the Union, but they did not involve the tariff.[31] Arguably, the effects of a tariff enacted in March 1861 could have made little impact upon any delegation which met prior to its signing. It is indicative of the Northern industrial supported and anti-agrarian position of that 1861 Republican controlled congress. Some secessionist documents do mention a tariff issue, though not nearly as often as the preservation of the impactful economic institution of slavery. However, a few libertarian economists place more importance on the tariff issue.[32]

text: Civil War[edit]

text: During the war far more revenue was needed, so the rates were raised again and again, along with many other taxes such as excise taxes on luxuries and income taxes on the rich.[33] By far most of the wartime government revenue came from bonds and loans ($2.6 billion), not taxes ($357 million) or tariffs ($305 million).[34]

text: The Morrill Tariff took effect a few weeks before the war began on April 12, 1861, and was not collected in the South. The Confederate States of America (CSA) passed its own tariff of about 15% on most items, including many items that previously were duty-free from the North. Previously tariffs between states were prohibited. The Confederates believed that they could finance their government by tariffs. The anticipated tariff revenue never appeared as the Union Navy blockaded their ports and the Union army restricted their trade with the Northern states. The Confederacy collected a mere $3.5 million in tariff revenue from the Civil War start to end and had to resort to inflation and confiscation instead for revenue.[35]

text: Reconstruction Era[edit]

text: Historian Howard K. Beale argued that high tariffs were needed during the Civil War, but were retained after the war for the benefit of Northern industrialists, who would otherwise lose markets and profits. To keep political control of Congress, Beale argued, Northern Industrialists worked through the Republican Party and supported Reconstruction policies that kept low-tariff Southern whites out of power. The Beale thesis was widely disseminated by the influential survey of Charles A. Beard, The Rise of American Civilization (1927).[36][37]

text: In the late 1950s historians rejected the Beale-Beard thesis by showing that Northern businessmen were evenly divided on the tariff, and were not using Reconstruction policies to support it.[38][39]

text: Politics of protection[edit]

text: The iron and steel industry, and the wool industry, were the well-organized interests groups that demanded (and usually obtained) high tariffs through support of the Republican Party. Industrial workers had much higher wages than their European counterparts, and they creditied it to the tariff and voted Republican.[40]

text: Democrats were divided on the issue, in large part because of pro-tariff elements in the Pennsylvania party who wanted to protect the growing iron industry, as well as pockets of high tariff support in nearby industrializing states.[41] However President Grover Cleveland made low tariffs the centerpiece of Democratic Party policies in the late 1880s. His argument is that high tariffs were an unnecessary and unfair tax on consumers. The South and West generally supported low tariffs, and the industrial East high tariffs.[42] Republican William McKinley was the outstanding spokesman for high tariffs, promising it would bring prosperity for all groups.[43][44]

text: After the Civil War, high tariffs remained as the Republican Party remained in office and the Southern Democrats were restricted from office. Advocates insisted that tariffs brought prosperity to the nation as a whole and no one was really injured. As industrialization proceeded apace throughout the Northeast, some Democrats, especially Pennsylvanians, became high tariff advocates.

text: Farmers and wool[edit]

text: The Republican high tariff advocates appealed to farmers with the theme that high-wage factory workers would pay premium prices for foodstuffs. This was the "home market" idea, and it won over most farmers in the Northeast, but it had little relevance to the southern and western farmers who exported most of their cotton, tobacco and wheat. In the late 1860s the wool manufacturers (based near Boston and Philadelphia) formed the first national lobby, and cut deals with wool-growing farmers in several states. Their challenge was that fastidious wool producers in Britain and Australia marketed a higher quality fleece than the careless Americans, and that British manufacturers had costs as low as the American mills. The result was a wool tariff that helped the farmers by a high rate on imported wool—a tariff the American manufacturers had to pay—together with a high tariff on finished woolens and worsted goods.[45]

text: U.S. industrial output[edit]

text: Apart from wool and woolens, American industry and agriculture—and industrial workers—had become the most efficient in the world by the 1880s as they took the lead in the worldwide Industrial Revolution. They were not at risk from cheap imports. No other country had the industrial capacity, large market, the high efficiency and low costs, or the complex distribution system needed to compete in the vast American market. Indeed, it was the British who watched in stunned horror as cheaper American products flooded their home islands. Wailed the London Daily Mail in 1900,

text:
"We have lost to the American manufacturer electrical machinery,
locomotives, steel rails, sugar-producing and agricultural machinery, and latterly even stationary engines, the pride and backbone of the British engineering industry."

text: Nevertheless, some American manufacturers and union workers demanded the high tariff be maintained. The tariff represented a complex balance of forces. Railroads, for example, consumed vast quantities of steel. To the extent tariffs raised steel prices, they paid much more making possible the U.S steel industry's massive investment to expand capacity and switch to the Bessemer process and later to the open hearth furnace. Between 1867 and 1900 U.S. steel production increased more than 500 times from 22,000 tons to 11,400,000 tons and Bessemer steel rails, first made in the U.S that would last 18 years under heavy traffic, would come to replace the old wrought iron rail that could only endure two years under light service.[46] Taussig says that in 1881, British steel rails sold for $31 a ton, and if Americans imported them they paid a $28/ton tariff, giving $59/ton for an imported ton of rails. American mills charged $61 a ton—and made a huge profit, which was then reinvested into increased capacity, higher quality steels and more efficient production.[47] By 1897 the American steel rail price had dropped to $19.60 per ton compared to the British price at $21.00—not including the $7.84 duty charge—demonstrating that the tariff had performed its purpose of giving the industry time to become competitive.[48] Then the U.S. steel industry became an exporter of steel rail to England selling below the British price and during WW I would become the largest supplier of steel to the allies. From 1915 through 1918, the largest American steel company, U.S. Steel, alone delivered more steel each year than Germany and Austria-Hungary combined, totalling 99,700,000 tons during WW I.[49] The Republicans became masters of negotiating exceedingly complex arrangements so that inside each of their congressional districts there were more satisfied "winners" than disgruntled "losers". The tariff after 1880 was an ideological relic with no longer any economic rationale.[45]

text: Cleveland tariff policy[edit]

text: Democratic President Grover Cleveland redefined the issue in 1887, with his stunning attack on the tariff as inherently corrupt, opposed to true republicanism, and inefficient to boot: "When we consider that the theory of our institutions guarantees to every citizen the full enjoyment of all the fruits of his industry and enterprise... it is plain that the exaction of more than [minimal taxes] is indefensible extortion and a culpable betrayal of American fairness and justice."[50] The election of 1888 was fought primarily over the tariff issue, and Cleveland lost.[51] Republican Congressman William McKinley argued,

text: "Free foreign trade gives our money, our manufactures, and our markets to other nations to the injury of our labor, our tradespeople, and our farmers. Protection keeps money, markets, and manufactures at home for the benefit of our own people."

text: Democrats campaigned energetically against the high McKinley tariff of 1890, and scored sweeping gains that year; they restored Cleveland to the White House in 1892. The severe depression that started in 1893 ripped apart the Democratic party. Cleveland and the pro-business Bourbon Democrats insisted on a much lower tariff. His problem was that Democratic electoral successes had brought in Democratic congressmen from industrial districts who were willing to raise rates to benefit their constituents. The Wilson-Gorman Tariff Act of 1894 did lower overall rates from 50 percent to 42 percent, but contained so many concessions to protectionism that Cleveland refused to sign it (it became law anyway).[52]

text: McKinley tariff policy[edit]

text: McKinley campaigned heavily in 1896 on the high tariff as a positive solution to depression. Promising protection and prosperity to every economic sector, he won a smashing victory. The Republicans rushed through the Dingley tariff in 1897, boosting rates back to the 50 percent level. Democrats responded that the high rates created government sponsored "trusts" (monopolies) and led to higher consumer prices. McKinley won reelection by an even bigger landslide and started talking about a post-tariff era of reciprocal trade agreements. Reciprocity went nowhere; McKinley's vision was a half century too early.[53] The Republicans split bitterly on the Payne-Aldrich Tariff of 1909. Republican President Theodore Roosevelt (1901–1909) saw the tariff issue was ripping his party apart, so he postponed any consideration of it. The delicate balance flew apart on under Republican William Howard Taft. He campaigned for president in 1908 for tariff "reform", which everyone assumed meant lower rates. The House lowered rates with the Payne Bill, then sent it to the Senate where Nelson Wilmarth Aldrich mobilized high-rate Senators. Aldrich was a New England businessman and a master of the complexities of the tariff, the Midwestern Republican insurgents were rhetoricians and lawyers who distrusted the special interests and assumed the tariff was "sheer robbery" at the expense of the ordinary consumer. Rural America believed that its superior morality deserved special protection, while the dastardly immorality of the trusts—and cities generally—merited financial punishment. Aldrich baited them. Did the insurgents want lower tariffs? His wickedly clever Payne-Aldrich Tariff Act of 1909 lowered the protection on Midwestern farm products, while raising rates favorable to his Northeast.[54][55]

text: By 1913 with the new income tax generating revenue, the Democrats in Congress were able to reduce rates with the Underwood Tariff. The outbreak of war in 1914 made the impact of tariffs of much less importance compared to war contracts. When the Republicans returned to power the returned the rates to a high level in the Fordney–McCumber Tariff of 1922. The next raise came with the Smoot–Hawley Tariff Act of 1930 at the start of the Great Depression.

text: Tariff with Canada[edit]

text: The Canadian-American Reciprocity Treaty increased trade between 1855 and its ending in 1866. When it ended Canada turned to tariffs. The National Policy was a Canadian economic program introduced by John A. Macdonald's Conservative Party in 1879 after it returned to power. It had been an official policy, however, since 1876. It was based on high tariffs to protect Canada's manufacturing industry. Macdonald campaigned on the policy in the 1878 election, and handily beat the Liberal Party, which supported free trade.

text: Efforts to restore free trade with Canada collapsed when Canada rejected a proposed reciprocity treaty in fear of American imperialism in the 1911 federal election. Taft negotiated a reciprocity agreement with Canada, that had the effect of sharply lowering tariffs. Democrats supported the plan but Midwestern Republicans bitterly opposed it. Barnstorming the country for his agreement, Taft undiplomatically pointed to the inevitable integration of the North American economy, and suggested that Canada should come to a "parting of the ways" with Britain. Canada's Conservative Party, under the leadership of Robert Borden, now had an issue to regain power from the low-tariff Liberals; after a surge of pro-imperial anti-Americanism, the Conservatives won. Ottawa rejected reciprocity, reasserted the National Policy and went to London first for new financial and trade deals. The Payne Aldrich Tariff of 1909 actually changed little and had slight economic impact one way or the other, but the political impact was enormous. The insurgents felt tricked and defeated and swore vengeance against Wall Street and its minions Taft and Aldrich. The insurgency led to a fatal split down the middle in 1912 as the GOP lost its balance wheel.[56]

text: 1913 to present[edit]

text: Woodrow Wilson made a drastic lowering of tariff rates a major priority for his presidency. The 1913 Underwood Tariff cut rates, but the coming of World War I in 1914 radically revised trade patterns. Reduced trade and, especially, the new revenues generated by the federal income tax (bolstered by the ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment in 1913) made tariffs much less important in terms of economic impact and political rhetoric.

text: The Wilson administration desired a 'revamping' of the current banking system, "...so that the banks may be the instruments, not the masters, of business and of individual enterprise and initiative.".[57] President Wilson achieved this in the Federal Reserve Act of 1913. Working with the bullish Senator Aldrich and former presidential candidate William Jennings Bryan, he perfected a way to centralize the banking system to allow Congress to closely allocate paper money production.[58] The Federal Reserve Act, with the Sixteenth Amendment of the Constitution, would create a trend of new forms of government funding.

text: When the Republicans regained power after the war they restored the usual high rates, with the Fordney-McCumber Tariff of 1922. When the Great Depression hit, international trade shrank drastically. The crisis baffled the GOP, and it tried to raise tariffs again with the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930. This time it backfired, as Canada, Britain, Germany, France and other industrial countries retaliated with their own tariffs and special, bilateral trade deals. American imports and exports both went into a tailspin. Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Dealers made promises about lowering tariffs on a reciprocal country-by-country basis (which they did), hoping this would expand foreign trade (which it did not.) Frustrated, they gave much more attention to domestic remedies for the depression; by 1936 the tariff issue had faded from politics, and the revenue it raised was small. In World War II both tariffs and reciprocity were insignificant compared to trade channeled through Lend Lease.[59]

text: Tariffs and Great Depression[edit]

text: Most economists hold the opinion that the tariff act did not greatly worsen the great depression:

text: Milton Friedman also held the opinion that the Smoot-Hawley tariff of 1930 did not cause the Great Depression. Douglas A. Irwin writes : "most economists, both liberal and conservative, doubt that Smoot Hawley played much of a role in the subsequent contraction."[60]

text: William Bernstein writes "most economic historians now believe that only a minuscule part of that huge loss of both world GDP and the United States’ GDP can be ascribed to the tariff wars "because trade was only nine percent of global output, not enough to account for the seventeen percent drop in GDP following the Crash. He thinks the damage done could not possibly have exceeded 2 percent of world GDP and tariff "didn't even significantly deepen the Great Depression."[61]

text: Peter Temin, explains a tariff is an expansionary policy, like a devaluation as it diverts demand from foreign to home producers. He notes that exports were 7 percent of GNP in 1929, they fell by 1.5 percent of 1929 GNP in the next two years and the fall was offset by the increase in domestic demand from tariff. He concludes that contrary the popular argument, contractionary effect of the tariff was small. (Temin, P. 1989. Lessons from the Great Depression, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass)[62]

text:
Nobel laureate Maurice Allais, thinks that tariff was rather helpful in the face of deregulation of competition in the global labor market and excessively loose credit prior to the Crash which, according to him, caused the crisis Financial and banking sectors.
He notes higher trade barriers were partly a means to protect domestic demand from deflation and external disturbances. He obserses domestic production in the major industrialized countries fell faster than international trade contracted; if contraction of foreign trade had been the cause of the Depression, he argues, the opposite should have occurred. So, the decline in trade between 1929 and 1933 was a consequence of the Depression, not a cause. Most of the trade contraction took place between January 1930 and July 1932, before the introduction of the majority of protectionist measures, excepting limited American measures applied in the summer of 1930. It was the collapse of international liquidity that caused of the contraction of trade.[63]

text: Trade liberalization[edit]

text: Tariffs up to the Smoot–Hawley Tariff Act of 1930, were set by Congress after many months of testimony and negotiations. In 1934, the U.S. Congress, in a rare delegation of authority, passed the Reciprocal Tariff Act of 1934, which authorized the executive branch to negotiate bilateral tariff reduction agreements with other countries. The prevailing view then was that trade liberalization may help stimulate economic growth. However, no one country was willing to liberalize unilaterally. Between 1934 and 1945, the executive branch negotiated over 32 bilateral trade liberalization agreements with other countries. The belief that low tariffs led to a more prosperous country are now the predominant belief with some exceptions. Multilateralism is embodied in the seven tariff reduction rounds that occurred between 1948 and 1994. In each of these "rounds", all General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) members came together to negotiate mutually agreeable trade liberalization packages and reciprocal tariff rates. In the Uruguay round in 1994, the World Trade Organization (WTO) was established to help establish uniform tariff rates.

text: Presently only about 30% of all import goods are subject to tariffs in the United States, the rest are on the free list. The "average" tariffs now charged by the United States are at a historic low. The list of negotiated tariffs are listed on the Harmonized Tariff Schedule as put out by the United States International Trade Commission.[64]

text: Post World War II[edit]

text: After the war the U.S. promoted the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) established in 1947, to minimize tariffs and other restrictions, and to liberalize trade among all capitalist countries. In 1995 GATT became the World Trade Organization (WTO); with the collapse of Communism its open markets/low tariff ideology became dominant worldwide in the 1990s.

text: American industry and labor prospered after World War II, but hard times set in after 1970. For the first time there was stiff competition from low-cost producers around the globe. Many rust belt industries faded or collapsed, especially the manufacture of steel, TV sets, shoes, toys, textiles and clothing. Toyota and Nissan threatened the giant domestic auto industry. In the late 1970s Detroit and the auto workers union combined to fight for protection. They obtained not high tariffs, but a voluntary restriction of imports from the Japanese government. Quotas were two-country diplomatic agreements that had the same protective effect as high tariffs, but did not invite retaliation from third countries. By limiting the number of Japanese automobiles that could be imported, quotas inadvertently helped Japanese companies push into larger, and more expensive market segments. The Japanese producers, limited by the number of cars they could export to America, opted to increase the value of their exports to maintain revenue growth. This action threatened the American producers' historical hold on the mid- and large-size car markets.[65]

text: The Chicken tax was a 1964 response by President Lyndon B. Johnson to tariffs placed by Germany (then West Germany) on importation of US chicken. Beginning in 1962, during the President Kennedy administration, the US accused Europe of unfairly restricting imports of American poultry at the request of West German chicken farmers. Diplomacy failed, and in January 1964, two months after taking office, President Johnson retaliated by imposing a 25 percent tax on all imported light trucks. This directly affected the German built Volkswagen vans. Officially it was explained that the light trucks tax would offset the dollar amount of imports of Volkswagen vans from West Germany with the lost American sales of chickens to Europe. But audio tapes from the Johnson White House reveal that in January 1964, President Johnson was attempting to convince United Auto Workers's president Walter Reuther, not to initiate a strike just prior the 1964 election and to support the president's civil rights platform. Reuther in turn wanted Johnson to respond to Volkswagen's increased shipments to the United States.[66]

text: 1980s to present[edit]

text: During the Reagan and George H. W. Bush administrations Republicans abandoned protectionist policies, and came out against quotas and in favor of the GATT/WTO policy of minimal economic barriers to global trade. Free trade with Canada came about as a result of the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement of 1987, which led in 1994 to the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). It was based on Reagan's plan to enlarge the scope of the market for American firms to include Canada and Mexico. President Bill Clinton, with strong Republican support in 1993, pushed NAFTA through Congress over the vehement objection of labor unions.[67][68]

text: Likewise, in 2000 Clinton worked with Republicans to give China entry into WTO and "most favored nation" trading status (i.e., the same low tariffs promised to any other WTO member). NAFTA and WTO advocates promoted an optimistic vision of the future, with prosperity to be based on intellectuals skills and managerial know-how more than on routine hand labor. They promised that free trade meant lower prices for consumers. Opposition to liberalized trade came increasingly from labor unions, who argued that this system also meant lower wages and fewer jobs for American workers who could not compete against wages of less than a dollar an hour. The shrinking size and diminished political clout of these unions repeatedly left them on the losing side.[69]

text: Despite overall decreases in international tariffs, some tariffs have been more resistant to change. For example, due partially to tariff pressure from the European Common Agricultural Policy, US agricultural subsidies have seen little decrease over the past few decades, even in the face of recent pressure from the WTO during the latest Doha talks.[70]

text: Smuggling and Coast Guard[edit]

text: Historically, high tariffs have led to high rates of smuggling. The United States Revenue Cutter Service was established by Secretary Hamilton in 1790 as an armed maritime law and custom enforcement service. Today it remains the primary maritime law enforcement force in the United States.

text: The U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) is a federal law enforcement agency of the United States Department of Homeland Security charged with regulating and facilitating international trade, collecting customs (import duties or tariffs approved by the U.S. Congress), and enforcing U.S. regulations, including trade, customs and immigration. They man most border crossing stations and ports. When shipments of goods arrive at a border crossing or port, customs officers inspect the contents and charge a tax according to the tariff formula for that product. Usually the goods cannot continue on their way until the custom duty is paid. Custom duties are one of the easiest taxes to collect, and the cost of collection is small.

text: Tariffs and historical American politicians[edit]

text: In 1896, the GOP platform pledged to “renew and emphasize our allegiance to the policy of protection, as the bulwark of American industrial independence, and the foundation of development and prosperity. This true American policy taxes foreign products and encourages home industry. It puts the burden of revenue on foreign goods; it secures the American market for the American producer. It upholds the American standard of wages for the American workingman.”

text: George Washington[edit]

text: "I use no porter or cheese in my family, but such as is made in America,” the inaugural President George Washington wrote, boasting that these domestic products are “of an excellent quality.”

text: One of the first acts of Congress Washington signed was a tariff among whose stated purpose was "the encouragement and protection of manufactures."[citation needed]

text: In his 1790 State of the Union Address, Washington justified his tariff policy for national security reasons:

text: A free people ought not only to be armed, but disciplined; to which end a uniform and well-digested plan is requisite; and their safety and interest require that they should promote such manufactories as tend to render them independent of others for essential, particularly military, supplies[71]

text: Thomas Jefferson[edit]

text: As President Thomas Jefferson wrote in explaining why his views had evolved to favor more protectionist policies: "In so complicated a science as political economy, no one axiom can be laid down as wise and expedient for all times and circumstances, and for their contraries."

text: After the War of 1812, Jefferson's position began to resemble that of Washington, some level of protection was necessary to secure the nation's political independence. He said:

text: experience has taught me that manufactures are now as necessary to our independence as to our comfort: and if those who quote me as of a different opinion will keep pace with me in purchasing nothing foreign where an equivalent of domestic fabric can be obtained, without regard to difference of price[72]

text: Henry Clay[edit]

text: In 1832, then the United States Senator from Kentucky, Henry Clay said about his disdain for "free traders"[9] that "it is not free trade that they are recommending to our acceptance. It is in effect, the British colonial system that we are invited to adopt; and, if their policy prevail, it will lead substantially to the re-colonization of these States, under the commercial dominion of Great Britain."

text: Clay said:

text: When gentlemen have succeeded in their design of an immediate or gradual destruction of the American System, what is their substitute? Free trade! Free trade! The call for free trade is as unavailing as the cry of a spoiled child, in its nurse's arms, for the moon, or the stars that glitter in the firmament of heaven. It never has existed; it never will exist. Trade implies, at least two parties. To be free, it should be fair, equal and reciprocal.

text: Clay explained that "equal and reciprocal" free trade "never has existed; [and] it never will exist." He warned against practicing "romantic trade philanthropy… which invokes us to continue to purchase the produce of foreign industry, without regard to the state or prosperity of our own." Clay made clear that he was "utterly and irreconcilably opposed" to trade which would "throw wide open our ports to foreign productions" without reciprocation.

text: Andrew Jackson[edit]

text: Henry Clay's longtime rival and political opponent, President Andrew Jackson, in explaining his support for a tariff, wrote:

text: We have been too long subject to the policy of the British merchants. It is time we should become a little more Americanized, and, instead of feeding the paupers and laborers of Europe, feed our own, or else, in a short time, by continuing our present policy, we shall all be paupers ourselves.

text: James Monroe[edit]

text: In 1822, President James Monroe observed that "whatever may be the abstract doctrine in favor of unrestricted commerce," the conditions necessary for its success—reciprocity and international peace—"has never occurred and can not be expected." Monroe said, "strong reasons… impose on us the obligation to cherish and sustain our manufactures."

text: Abraham Lincoln[edit]

text: President Abraham Lincoln declared, "Give us a protective tariff and we will have the greatest nation on earth." Lincoln warned that "the abandonment of the protective policy by the American Government… must produce want and ruin among our people."

text: Lincoln similarly said that, "if a duty amount to full protection be levied upon an article" that could be produced domestically, "at no distant day, in consequence of such duty," the domestic article "will be sold to our people cheaper than before."

text: Additionally, Lincoln argued that based on economies of scale, any temporary increase in costs resulting from a tariff would eventually decrease as the domestic manufacturer produced more.

text:
Lincoln did not see a tariff as a tax on low-income Americans because it would only burden the consumer according to the amount the consumer consumed.
By the tariff system, the whole revenue is paid by the consumers of foreign goods… the burthen of revenue falls almost entirely on the wealthy and luxurious few, while the substantial and laboring many who live at home, and upon home products, go entirely free.

text: Lincoln argued that a tariff system was less intrusive than domestic taxation: The tariff is the cheaper system, because the duties, being collected in large parcels at a few commercial points, will require comparatively few officers in their collection; while by the direct tax system, the land must be literally covered with assessors and collectors, going forth like swarms of Egyptian locusts, devouring every blade of grass and other green thing.[73]

text: William McKinley[edit]

text: President William McKinley stated the United States' stance under the Republican Party as:

text: Under free trade the trader is the master and the producer the slave. Protection is but the law of nature, the law of self-preservation, of self-development, of securing the highest and best destiny of the race of man[74]. [It is said] that protection is immoral.... Why, if protection builds up and elevates 63,000,000 [the U.S. population] of people, the influence of those 63,000,000 of people elevates the rest of the world. We cannot take a step in the pathway of progress without benefiting mankind everywhere. Well, they say, 'Buy where you can buy the cheapest'.... Of course, that applies to labor as to everything else. Let me give you a maxim that is a thousand times better than that, and it is the protection maxim: 'Buy where you can pay the easiest.' And that spot of earth is where labor wins its highest rewards.[75]

text: [Free trade] destroys the dignity and independence of American labor… It will take away from the people of this country who work for a living—and the majority of them live by the sweat of their faces—it will take from them heart and home and hope. It will be self-destruction.[76]

text: He also rejected the "cheaper is better" argument outright:

text: They [free traders] say, 'Buy where you can buy the cheapest.' That is one of their maxims… Of course, that applies to labor as to everything else. Let me give you a maxim that is a thousand times better than that, and it is the protection maxim: 'Buy where you can pay the easiest.' And that spot of earth is where labor wins its highest rewards.

text: They say, if you had not the Protective Tariff things would be a little cheaper. Well, whether a thing is cheap or whether it is dear depends on what we can earn by our daily labor. Free trade cheapens the product by cheapening the producer. Protection cheapens the product by elevating the producer.

text: The protective tariff policy of the Republicans… has made the lives of the masses of our countrymen sweeter and brighter, and has entered the homes of America carrying comfort and cheer and courage. It gives a premium to human energy, and awakens the noblest aspiration in the breasts of men. Our own experience shows that it is the best for our citizenship and our civilization and that it opens up a higher and better destiny for our people.[77]

text: Theodore Roosevelt[edit]

text: President Theodore Roosevelt believed that America's economic growth was due to the protective tariffs, which helped her industrialize. He acknowledged this in his State of the Union address from 1902:

text: The country has acquiesced in the wisdom of the protective-tariff principle. It is exceedingly undesirable that this system should be destroyed or that there should be violent and radical changes therein. Our past experience shows that great prosperity in this country has always come under a protective tariff.[78]


document_title: United States at the FIFA World Cup

question_text: when was the last time usa did not qualify for the world cup

text: United States at the FIFA World Cup

text: Record at the FIFA World Cup[edit]

text:
World Cup record

Year
Result
Position
Pld
W
D
L
GF
GA

 1930
Semi-finals
3rd[3]
3
2
0
1
7
6

 1934
Round 1
16th
1
0
0
1
1
7

 1938
Withdrew

 1950
Group stage
10th
3
1
0
2
4
8

 1954
Did not qualify

 1958

 1962

 1966

 1970

 1974

 1978

 1982

 1986

 1990
Group stage
23rd
3
0
0
3
2
8

 1994
Round of 16
14th
4
1
1
2
3
4

 1998
Group stage
32nd
3
0
0
3
1
5

  2002
Quarter-finals
8th
5
2
1
2
7
7

 2006
Group stage
25th
3
0
1
2
2
6

 2010
Round of 16
12th
4
1
2
1
5
5

 2014
Round of 16
15th
4
1
1
2
5
6

 2018
Did not qualify

 2022
To be determined

Total
10/21
0 Titles
33
8
6
19
37
62

tag: table

text: By Match[edit]

text:
World Cup
Round
Opponent
Score
Result
Scorers

1930
Group Stage
 Belgium
3-0
W
McGhee, Florie, Patenaude

 Paraguay
3-0
W
Patenaude (3)

Semi-Final
 Argentina
1-6
L
Brown

1934
First Round
 Italy
1-7
L
Donelli

1950
Group stage
 Spain
1–3
L
Pariani

 England
1–0
W
Gaetjens

 Chile
2-5
L
Wallace, Maca (pen.)

1990
Group stage
 Czechoslovakia
1–5
L
Caligiuri

 Italy
0–1
L

 Austria
1–2
L
Murray

1994
Group Stage
  Switzerland
1-1
D
Wynalda

 Colombia
2-1
W
Escobar (o.g.), Stewart

 Romania
0-1
L

Round of 16
 Brazil
0-1
L

1998
Group Stage
 Germany
0-2
L

 Iran
1-2
L
McBride

 Yugoslavia
0-1
L

2002
Group Stage
 Portugal
3-2
W
O'Brien, J. Costa (o.g.), McBride

 South Korea
1-1
D
Mathis

 Poland
1-3
L
Donovan

Round of 16
 Mexico
2-0
W
McBride, Donovan

Quarter-Final
 Germany
0-1
L

2006
Group Stage
 Czech Republic
0-3
L

 Italy
1-1
D
Zaccardo (o.g.)

 Ghana
1-2
L
Dempsey

2010
Group Stage
 England
1-1
D
Dempsey

 Slovenia
2-2
D
Donovan, Bradley

 Algeria
1-0
W
Donovan

Round of 16
 Ghana
1-2 (a.e.t.)
L
Donovan (pen.)

2014
Group Stage
 Ghana
2-1
W
Dempsey, Brooks

 Portugal
2-2
D
Jones, Dempsey

 Germany
0-1
L

Round of 16
 Belgium
1-2 (a.e.t.)
L
Green

text: Individual tournament results[edit]

text: Uruguay 1930[edit]

text:
[show]

v
t
e

United States squad – 1930 FIFA World Cup Third Place

MF Auld
FW Bookie
MF Brown
GK Douglas
FW Florie (c)
DF Gallagher
DF Gentle
MF Gonsalves
FW McGhee
DF Moorhouse
MF Oliver
FW Patenaude
MF Slone
DF Tracey
DF Vaughn
DF Wood
Coach: Millar

text: Group 4 final standings[edit]

text:
Team
Pld
W
D
L
GF
GA
GD
Pts

 United States
2
2
0
0
6
0
+6
4

 Paraguay
2
1
0
1
1
3
−2
2

 Belgium
2
0
0
2
0
4
−4
0

text: Games[edit]

text: All times local (UYT)

text: United States  v  Belgium

text:
July 13, 1930
3:00 p.m.
Group 4

text:
United States
3–0
 Belgium

Report

text:
Estadio Parque Central, Montevideo
Attendance: 18,346
Referee: José Macías (Argentina)

text: United States  v  Paraguay

text:
July 17, 1930
2:45 p.m.
Group 4

text:
United States
3–0
 Paraguay

Report

text:
Estadio Parque Central, Montevideo
Attendance: 18,306
Referee: José Macías (Argentina)

text: Argentina  v  United States

text:
July 26, 1930
2:45 p.m.
Semifinal

text:
Argentina
6–1
 United States

Report

text:
Estadio Centenario, Montevideo
Attendance: 72,886
Referee: John Langenus (Belgium)

text: Italy 1934[edit]

text:
[show]

v
t
e

United States squad – 1934 FIFA World Cup

MF Amrhein
DF Czerkiewicz
FW Dick
FW Donelli
MF Fiedler
MF Florie
MF Gallagher
MF Gonsalves
DF Harker
GK Hjulian
MF Lehman
MF Lynch
DF Martinelli
FW McLean
DF Moorhouse
FW Nilsen
MF Pietras
DF Rapp
FW Ryan
Coach: Gould

text: Game[edit]

text: Italy  v  United States

text:
May 27, 1934
4:30 p.m. (CEST)
Round of 16

text:
Italy
7–1
 United States

Report

text:
Stadio Nazionale PNF, Rome
Attendance: 25,000
Referee: Rene Mercet (Switzerland)

text: Brazil 1950[edit]

text:
[show]

v
t
e

United States squad – 1950 FIFA World Cup

GK Borghi
GK Gard
DF Annis
DF Coombes
DF Keough
DF Maca
MF Bahr
MF Colombo
MF McIlvenny
FW Craddock
FW DiOrio
FW Gaetjens
FW Pariani
FW E. Souza
FW J. Souza
FW Wallace
FW Wolanin
Coach: Jeffrey

text: Group 2 final standings[edit]

text:
Team
Pld
W
D
L
GF
GA
Pts

 Spain
3
3
0
0
6
1
6

 England
3
1
0
2
2
2
2

 Chile
3
1
0
2
5
6
2

 United States
3
1
0
2
4
8
2

text: Games[edit]

text: All times local BRT (UTC-03)

text: Spain  v  United States

text:
June 25, 1950
3:00 p.m.

text:
Spain
3–1
 United States

Report

text:
Estádio Durival de Britto, Curitiba
Attendance: 9,511
Referee: Mario Vianna (Brazil)

text: United States  v  England

text:
June 29, 1950
3:00 p.m.

text:
United States
1–0
 England

Report

text:
Estádio Independência, Belo Horizonte
Attendance: 10,151
Referee: Generoso Dattilo (Italy)

text: Chile  v  United States

text:
July 2, 1950
3:00 p.m.

text:
Chile
5–2
 United States

Report

text:
Estádio Ilha do Retiro, Recife
Attendance: 8,501
Referee: Mario Gardelli (Brazil)

text: Italy 1990[edit]

text:
[show]

v
t
e

United States squad – 1990 FIFA World Cup

1 Meola
2 Trittschuh
3 Doyle
4 Banks
5 Windischmann (c)
6 Harkes
7 Ramos
8 Bliss
9 Sullivan
10 Vermes
11 Wynalda
12 Krumpe
13 Eichmann
14 Stollmeyer
15 Armstrong
16 Murray
17 Balboa
18 Keller
19 Henderson
20 Caligiuri
21 Covone
22 Vanole
Coach: Gansler

text: Group A final standings[edit]

text:
Team
Pld
W
D
L
GF
GA
GD
Pts

 Italy
3
3
0
0
4
0
+4
6

 Czechoslovakia
3
2
0
1
6
3
+3
4

 Austria
3
1
0
2
2
3
−1
2

 United States
3
0
0
3
2
8
−6
0

text: Games[edit]

text: All times local (CEST/UTC+2)

text: United States  v  Czechoslovakia

text:
June 10, 1990
5:00 p.m.
Group A

text:
United States
1–5
 Czechoslovakia

Report

text:
Stadio Comunale, Florence
Attendance: 33,266
Referee: Kurt Röthlisberger (Switzerland)

text: Italy  v  United States

text:
June 14, 1990
9:00 p.m.
Group A

text:
Italy
1–0
 United States

Report

text:
Stadio Olimpico, Rome
Attendance: 73,423
Referee: Edgardo Codesal (Mexico)

text: Austria  v  United States

text:
June 19, 1990
9:00 p.m.
Group A

text:
Austria
2–1
 United States

Report

text:
Stadio Comunale, Florence
Attendance: 34,857
Referee: Jamal Al Sharif (Syria)

text: United States 1994[edit]

text:
[show]

v
t
e

United States squad – 1994 FIFA World Cup

1 Meola (c)
2 Lapper
3 Burns
4 Kooiman
5 Dooley
6 Harkes
7 Pérez
8 Stewart
9 Ramos
10 Wegerle
11 Wynalda
12 Sommer
13 Jones
14 Klopas
15 Moore
16 Sorber
17 Balboa
18 Friedel
19 Reyna
20 Caligiuri
21 Clavijo
22 Lalas
Coach: Milutinović

text: Group A final standings[edit]

text:
Pos
Team

v
t
e

Pld
W
D
L
GF
GA
GD
Pts
Qualification

1
 Romania
3
2
0
1
5
5
0
6
Advance to knockout stage

2
  Switzerland
3
1
1
1
5
4
+1
4

3
 United States (H)
3
1
1
1
3
3
0
4

4
 Colombia
3
1
0
2
4
5
−1
3

text: Ranking of third-placed teams[edit]

text:
Pos
Grp
Team

v
t
e

Pld
W
D
L
GF
GA
GD
Pts
Qualification

1
D
 Argentina
3
2
0
1
6
3
+3
6
Advance to knockout stage

2
F
 Belgium
3
2
0
1
2
1
+1
6

3
A
 United States
3
1
1
1
3
3
0
4

4
E
 Italy
3
1
1
1
2
2
0
4

5
B
 Russia
3
1
0
2
7
6
+1
3

6
C
 South Korea
3
0
2
1
4
5
−1
2

text: Games[edit]

text: United States  v   Switzerland

text:
June 18, 1994
11:30 a.m. EDT
Group A

text:
United States
1–1
  Switzerland

Report

text:
Pontiac Silverdome, Pontiac
Attendance: 73,425
Referee: Francisco Oscar Lamolina (Argentina)

text: United States  v  Colombia

text:
June 22, 1994
7:30 p.m. PDT
Group A

text:
United States
2–1
 Colombia

Report

text:
Rose Bowl, Pasadena
Attendance: 93,869
Referee: Fabio Baldas (Italy)

text: United States  v  Romania

text:
June 26, 1994
4:00 p.m. PDT
Group A

text:
United States
0–1
 Romania

Report

text:
Rose Bowl, Pasadena
Attendance: 93,869
Referee: Mario van der Ende (Netherlands)

text: Brazil  v  United States

text:
July 4, 1994
12:30 p.m. PDT
Round of 16

text:
Brazil
1–0
 United States

Report

text:
Stanford Stadium, Stanford
Attendance: 84,147
Referee: Joël Quiniou (France)

text: France 1998[edit]

text:
[show]

v
t
e

United States squad – 1998 FIFA World Cup

1 Friedel
2 Hejduk
3 Pope
4 Burns
5 Dooley (c)
6 Regis
7 Wegerle
8 Stewart
9 Moore
10 Ramos
11 Wynalda
12 Agoos
13 Jones
14 Preki
15 Deering
16 Sommer
17 Balboa
18 Keller
19 Maisonneuve
20 McBride
21 Reyna
22 Lalas
Coach: Sampson

text: Group F final standings[edit]

text:
Pos
Team

v
t
e

Pld
W
D
L
GF
GA
GD
Pts
Qualification

1
 Germany
3
2
1
0
6
2
+4
7
Advance to knockout stage

2
 Yugoslavia
3
2
1
0
4
2
+2
7

3
 Iran
3
1
0
2
2
4
−2
3

4
 United States
3
0
0
3
1
5
−4
0

text: Games[edit]

text: All times local (CEST/UTC+2)

text: Germany  v  United States

text:
June 15, 1998
9:00 p.m.
Group F

text:
Germany
2–0
 United States

Report

text:
Parc des Princes, Paris
Attendance: 45,500
Referee: Said Belqola (Morocco)

text: United States  v  Iran

text:
June 21, 1998
9:00 p.m.
Group F

text:
United States
1–2
 Iran

Report

text:
Stade de Gerland, Lyon
Attendance: 39,100
Referee: Urs Meier (Switzerland)

text: United States  v  Yugoslavia

text:
June 25, 1998
9:00 p.m.
Group F

text:
United States
0–1
 Yugoslavia

Report

text:
Stade de la Beaujoire, Nantes
Attendance: 35,500
Referee: Gamal Al-Ghandour (Egypt)

text: Korea-Japan 2002[edit]

text:
[show]

v
t
e

United States squad – 2002 FIFA World Cup

1 Friedel
2 Hejduk
3 Berhalter
4 Mastroeni
5 O'Brien
6 Regis
7 Lewis
8 Stewart
9 Moore
10 Reyna (c)
11 Mathis
12 Agoos
13 Jones
14 Cherundolo
15 Wolff
16 Llamosa
17 Beasley
18 Keller
19 Meola
20 McBride
21 Donovan
22 Sanneh
23 Pope
Coach: Arena

text: Group D final standings[edit]

text:
Pos
Team

v
t
e

Pld
W
D
L
GF
GA
GD
Pts
Qualification

1
 South Korea (H)
3
2
1
0
4
1
+3
7
Advance to knockout stage

2
 United States
3
1
1
1
5
6
−1
4

3
 Portugal
3
1
0
2
6
4
+2
3

4
 Poland
3
1
0
2
3
7
−4
3

text: Games[edit]

text: All times local (UTC+9)

text: United States  v  Portugal

text:
June 5, 2002
6:00 p.m.
Group D

text:
United States
3–2
 Portugal

Report

text:
Suwon World Cup Stadium, Suwon
Attendance: 37,306
Referee: Byron Moreno (Ecuador)

text: South Korea  v  United States

text:
June 10, 2002
3:30 p.m.
Group D

text:
South Korea
1–1
 United States

Report

text:
Daegu World Cup Stadium, Daegu
Attendance: 60,778
Referee: Urs Meier (Switzerland)

text: Poland  v  United States

text:
June 14, 2002
8:30 p.m.
Group D

text:
Poland
3–1
 United States

Report

text:
Daejeon World Cup Stadium, Daejeon
Attendance: 26,482
Referee: Lu Jun (China)

text: Mexico  v  United States

text:
June 17, 2002
3:30 p.m.
Round of 16

text:
Mexico
0–2
 United States

Report

text:
Jeonju World Cup Stadium, Jeonju
Attendance: 36,380
Referee: Vítor Melo Pereira (Portugal)

text: Germany  v  United States

text:
June 21, 2002
8:30 p.m.
QF

text:
Germany
1–0
 United States

Report

text:
Munsu Cup Stadium, Ulsan
Attendance: 37,337
Referee: Hugh Dallas (Scotland)

text: Germany 2006[edit]

text:
[show]

v
t
e

United States squad – 2006 FIFA World Cup

1 Howard
2 Albright
3 Bocanegra
4 Mastroeni
5 O'Brien
6 Cherundolo
7 Lewis
8 Dempsey
9 Johnson
10 Reyna (c)
11 Ching
12 Berhalter
13 Conrad
14 Olsen
15 Convey
16 Wolff
17 Beasley
18 Keller
19 Hahnemann
20 McBride
21 Donovan
22 Onyewu
23 Pope
Coach: Arena

text: Group E final standings[edit]

text:
Pos
Team

v
t
e

Pld
W
D
L
GF
GA
GD
Pts
Qualification

1
 Italy
3
2
1
0
5
1
+4
7
Advance to knockout stage

2
 Ghana
3
2
0
1
4
3
+1
6

3
 Czech Republic
3
1
0
2
3
4
−1
3

4
 United States
3
0
1
2
2
6
−4
1

text: Games[edit]

text: All times local (CEST/UTC+2)

text: United States  v  Czech Republic

text:
June 12, 2006
6:00 p.m.
Group E

text:
United States
0–3
 Czech Republic

Report

text:
FIFA WM Stadion Gelsenkirchen, Gelsenkirchen
Attendance: 52,000
Referee: Carlos Amarilla (Paraguay)

text: Italy  v  United States

text:
June 17, 12006
9:00 p.m.
Group E

text:
Italy
1–1
 United States

Report

text:
Fritz-Walter-Stadion, Kaiserslautern
Attendance: 46,000
Referee: Jorge Larrionda (Uruguay)

text: Ghana  v  United States

text:
June 22, 2006
4:00 p.m.
Group E

text:
Ghana
2–1
 United States

Report

text:
FIFA WM Stadion Nürnberg, Nuremberg
Attendance: 41,000
Referee: Markus Merk (Germany)

text: South Africa 2010[edit]

text:
[show]

v
t
e

United States squad – 2010 FIFA World Cup

1 Howard
2 Spector
3 Bocanegra (c)
4 M. Bradley
5 Onyewu
6 Cherundolo
7 Beasley
8 Dempsey
9 Gomez
10 Donovan
11 Holden
12 Bornstein
13 Clark
14 Buddle
15 DeMerit
16 Torres
17 Altidore
18 Guzan
19 Edu
20 Findley
21 Goodson
22 Feilhaber
23 Hahnemann
Coach: B. Bradley

text: Group C final standings[edit]

text:
Pos
Team

v
t
e

Pld
W
D
L
GF
GA
GD
Pts
Qualification

1
 United States
3
1
2
0
4
3
+1
5
Advance to knockout stage

2
 England
3
1
2
0
2
1
+1
5

3
 Slovenia
3
1
1
1
3
3
0
4

4
 Algeria
3
0
1
2
0
2
−2
1

text: Games[edit]

text: All times local (UTC+02)

text: England  v  United States

text:
June 12, 2010
8:30 p.m.
Group C

text:
England
1–1
 United States

Report

text:
Royal Bafokeng Stadium, Rustenburg
Attendance: 38,646
Referee: Carlos Simon (Brazil)[4]

text: Slovenia  v  United States

text:
June 18, 2010
4:00 p.m.
Group C

text:
Slovenia
2–2
 United States

Report

text:
Ellis Park Stadium, Johannesburg
Attendance: 45,573
Referee: Koman Coulibaly (Mali)[5]

text: United States  v  Algeria

text:
June 23, 2010
4:00 p.m.
Group C

text:
United States
1–0
 Algeria

Report

text:
Loftus Versfeld Stadium, Pretoria
Attendance: 35,827
Referee: Frank De Bleeckere (Belgium)

text: United States  v  Ghana

text:
June 26, 2010
8:30 p.m.
Round of 16

text:
United States
1–2 (a.e.t.)
 Ghana

Report

text:
Royal Bafokeng Stadium, Rustenburg
Attendance: 34,976
Referee: Viktor Kassai (Hungary)

text: Brazil 2014[edit]

text:
[show]

v
t
e

United States squad – 2014 FIFA World Cup

1 Howard
2 Yedlin
3 Gonzalez
4 Bradley
5 Besler
6 Brooks
7 Beasley
8 Dempsey (c)
9 Jóhannsson
10 Diskerud
11 Bedoya
12 Guzan
13 Jones
14 Davis
15 Beckerman
16 Green
17 Altidore
18 Wondolowski
19 Zusi
20 Cameron
21 Chandler
22 Rimando
23 Johnson
Coach: Klinsmann

text: Group G final standings[edit]

text:
Pos
Team

v
t
e

Pld
W
D
L
GF
GA
GD
Pts
Qualification

1
 Germany
3
2
1
0
7
2
+5
7
Advance to knockout stage

2
 United States
3
1
1
1
4
4
0
4

3
 Portugal
3
1
1
1
4
7
−3
4

4
 Ghana
3
0
1
2
4
6
−2
1

text: Games[edit]

text: Ghana  v  United States

text:
June 16, 2014
7:00 p.m. UTC−3
Group G

text:
Ghana
1–2
 United States

Report

text:
Arena das Dunas, Natal
Attendance: 39,760
Referee: Jonas Eriksson (Sweden)

text: United States  v  Portugal

text:
June 22, 2014
6:00 p.m. UTC−4
Group G

text:
United States
2–2
 Portugal

Report

text:
Arena da Amazônia, Manaus
Attendance: 40,123
Referee: Néstor Pitana (Argentina)

text: United States  v  Germany

text:
June 26, 2014
1:00 p.m. UTC−3
Group G

text:
United States
0–1
 Germany

Report

text:
Arena Pernambuco, Recife
Attendance: 41,876
Referee: Ravshan Irmatov (Uzbekistan)

text: Belgium  v  United States

text:
July 1, 2014
5:00 p.m. UTC−3
Round of 16

text:
Belgium
2–1 (a.e.t.)
 United States

Report

text:
Arena Fonte Nova, Salvador
Attendance: 51,227
Referee: Djamel Haimoudi (Algeria)

text: Record Players[edit]

text:
No.
Name
Matches
World Cups

1
Landon Donovan
12
2002, 2006 and 2010

2
Cobi Jones
11
1994, 1998 and 2002

Earnie Stewart
11
1994, 1998 and 2002

DaMarcus Beasley
11
2002, 2006, 2010 and 2014

5
Brian McBride
10
1998, 2002 and 2006

Claudio Reyna
10
1998, 2002 and 2006

Clint Dempsey
10
2006, 2010 and 2014

8
Tab Ramos
9
1990, 1994 and 1998

Eddie Pope
9
1998, 2002 and 2006

10
Marcelo Balboa
8
1990, 1994 and 1998

Eric Wynalda
8
1990, 1994 and 1998

Michael Bradley
8
2010 and 2014

Tim Howard
8
2010 and 2014

text: Top Goalscorers[edit]

text:
Player
Goals
1930
1934
1950
1990
1994
1998
2002
2006
2010
2014

Donovan, LandonLandon Donovan
5

2

3

Patenaude, BertBert Patenaude
4
4

Dempsey, ClintClint Dempsey
4

1
1
2

McBride, BrianBrian McBride
3

1
2

Bradley, MichaelMichael Bradley
1

1

Brown, JimJim Brown
1
1

Caligiuri, PaulPaul Caligiuri
1

1

Donelli, AldoAldo Donelli
1

1

Florie, TomTom Florie
1
1

Gaetjens, JoeJoe Gaetjens
1

1

Green, JulianJulian Green
1

1

Maca, JoeJoe Maca
1

1

Mathis, ClintClint Mathis
1

1

McGhee, BartBart McGhee
1
1

Murray, BruceBruce Murray
1

1

O'Brien, JohnJohn O'Brien
1

1

Pariani, GinoGino Pariani
1

1

Stewart, EarnieEarnie Stewart
1

1

Wallace, FrankFrank Wallace
1

1

Wynalda, EricEric Wynalda
1

1

Brooks, JohnJohn Brooks
1

1

Jones, JermaineJermaine Jones
1

1

~ !Own goals
3

1

1
1

Total
37
7
1
4
2
3
1
7
2
5
5

text: Jeff Agoos (scored for Portugal in 2002)