document_title: Balance of power (international relations)

question_text: who came up with the balance of power theory

question_tokens: who came up with the balance of power theory

text: Balance of power (international relations)

text: History[edit]

text: The principle involved in preserving the balance of power as a conscious goal of foreign policy, as David Hume pointed out in his Essay on the Balance of Power, is as old as history, and was used by Greeks such as Thucydides both as political theorists and as practical statesmen.[6]

text: It resurfaced in Renaissance among the Italian city-states in the 15th century. Francesco Sforza, Duke of Milan, and Lorenzo de' Medici, ruler of Florence, were the first rulers actively to pursue such a policy, with the Italic League, though historians have generally[citation needed] attributed the innovation to the Medici rulers of Florence.[7] Discussion of the Florentine activity can be found in De Bello Italico, by Bernardo Rucellai, a Medici son-in-law.[7] This was a history of the invasion of Italy by Charles VIII of France, and introduced the phrase balance of power to historical analysis.[7]

text: Universalism, which was the dominant direction of European international relations prior to the Peace of Westphalia, gave way to the doctrine of the balance of power. The term gained significance after the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713, where it was specifically mentioned.[citation needed]

text: It was not until the beginning of the 17th century, when the science of international law assumed the discipline of structure, in the hands of Grotius and his successors, that the theory of the balance of power was formulated as a fundamental principle of diplomacy. In accordance with this new discipline, the European states formed a sort of federal community, the fundamental condition of which was the preservation of a balance of power, i.e., such a disposition of things that no one state, or potentate, should be able absolutely to predominate and prescribe laws to the rest. And, since all were equally interested in this settlement, it was held to be the interest, the right, and the duty of every power to interfere, even by force of arms, when any of the conditions of this settlement were infringed upon, or assailed by, any other member of the community.[8]

text: This balance-of-power principle, once formulated, became an axiom of political science. Fénelon, in his Instructions, impressed the axiom upon the young Louis, Dauphin of France, Duke of Burgundy. Frederick the Great, in his Anti-Machiavel, proclaimed the 'balance of power' principle to the world. In 1806 Friedrich von Gentz re-stated it with admirable clarity, in Fragments on the Balance of Power. The principle formed the basis of the coalitions against Louis XIV and Napoleon, and the occasion, or the excuse, for most of the wars which Europe experienced between the Peace of Westphalia (1648) and the Congress of Vienna (1814), especially from the British vantage point (including, in part, World War I).[6]

text: During the greater part of the 19th century, the series of national upheavals which remodelled the map of Europe obscured the balance of power. Yet, it underlaid all the efforts of diplomacy to stay, or to direct, the elemental forces of nationalism let loose by the French Revolution. In the revolution's aftermath, with the restoration of comparative calm, the principle once more emerged as the operative motive for the various political alliances, of which the ostensible object was the preservation of peace.[6] Regarding the era 1848–1914, English diplomatic historian A.J.P. Taylor argued:

text: Regarding the last quarter-century of the period outlined by Taylor, his American colleague, diplomatic historian Edward Mead Earle, argued: “During the quarter-century beginning about 1890, Europe and the Far East lived under a precarious balance of power with the result … that the world moved crazily from one crisis to another and finally to catastrophe.” Earle concludes: “The balance of power may well land us all in crematory.”[10] The balance of power theory prepared catastrophe in 1939 as in 1914, wrote Clarence Streit in his famous Union Now. There is “no more sterile, illusory, fantastic, exploded and explosive peace policy than the balance of power."[11]

text: Since 1945, the arguments of Streit and Earle has prevailed over that of Taylor. Atomic scientists launched all-out attack on the balance-of-power concept:

text: The balance-of-power system is discredited today. References to it, even by professional historians and international lawyers, commonly imply either that it was a system for war which repeatedly failed or that it was a system for making war which often succeeded in its purpose … During the period of its dominance as a European system, say, 1648 to 1918, its record in preventing war was certainly not striking. Indeed, it probably was itself responsible for starting more wars than it prevented.[12]

text: Former German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer interpreted the core of the concept of Europe after 1945 as the rejection of the European balance-of-power principle and the hegemonic ambitions of individual states that had emerged following the Peace of Westphalia in 1648: "European integration was the response to centuries of a precarious balance of powers on this continent which again and again resulted in terrible hegemonic wars and culminated in the two World Wars between 1914 and 1945."[13] Former US Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney expressed the same for Europe and other democracies: "It is not in our interest or those of the other democracies to return to earlier periods in which multiple military powers balanced one against another in what passed for security structures, while regional, or even global peace hung in the balance."[14] NATO Secretary General, Manfred Wörner, outlined the European alternative at the end of the Cold War:

text: Europe has a basic choice: either it lapses back into the old power politics and balance of power diplomacy of past centuries or it moves ahead along the road leading to a new order of peace and freedom, whether this be based on multinational or supranational cooperation. Our choice is clear: we are going forward.[15]

text: England[edit]

text: It has been argued by historians that, in the sixteenth century, England came to pursue a foreign policy which would preserve the equilibrium between Spain and France, which evolved into a balance-of-power policy:

text: The continental policy of England [after 1525] was fixed. It was to be pacific, mediating, favourable to a balance which should prevent any power from having a hegemony on the continent or controlling the Channel coasts. The naval security of England and the balance of power in Europe were the two great political principles which appeared in the reign of Henry VIII and which, pursued unwaveringly, were to create the greatness of England.[16]

text: In 1579 the first English translation of Francesco Guicciardini's Storia d'Italia ("History of Italy") popularised Italian balance of power theory in England. This translation was dedicated to Elizabeth I of England and claimed that "God has put into your hand the balance of power and justice, to poise and counterpoise at your will the actions and counsels of all the Christian kings of your time".[17]

text: Statesman Richard Cobden labeled balance of power "a chimera" due to its unclear meaning: "It is not a fallacy, a mistake, an imposture—it is an undescribed, indescribable, incomprehensible nothing." The only point on which writers on the balance of power agree "is in the fundamental delusion that such a system was ever acceded to by the nations of Europe." They imply long, uninterrupted, peaceful and prosperous co-existence. Instead, for centuries "Europe has (with only just sufficient intervals to enable the combatants to recruit their wasted energies) been one vast and continued battle-field…"[18] He criticized Lord Bacon for his adherence to the balance of power as a universal rule:

text: As for the rule of Lord Bacon: were the great enemy of mankind himself to summon a council, to devise a law of nations which should convert this fair earth, with all its capacity for life, enjoyment, and goodness, into vast theater of death and misery, more dismal than his own Pandemonium, the very words of the philosopher would compose that law! It would reduce us even below the level of animals… [T]his rule would, if acted upon universally, plunged us into a war of annihilation … nor would the levelling strife cease until either the rule were abrogated, or mankind had been reduced to the only pristine possessions—teeth and nails! [Under such grounds] the question of the balance of power might be dismissed from further considerations.[19]

text: Sir Esme Howard wrote that England adopted the balance of power as "a corner-stone of English policy, unconsciously during the sixteenth, subconsciously during the seventeenth, and consciously during the eighteenth, nineteenth and twentieth centuries, because for England it represented the only plan of preserving her own independence, political and economic".[20] With the coming of World War II, however, Edward Carr found that today the balance of power badly preserves the independence of England:

text: The size of the units which count effectively in international politics grows steadily larger. There is no longer room in Europe today for those three or four important and strong countries whose more or less equal rivalries enabled Great Britain in the past to secure herself through the policy of the balance of power. Much nonsense has been talked in recent years about the balance of power. But the confusion of thought resulting from the attempt to brand it as a morally reprehensive policy has been less serious than the confusion resulting from the assumption that it is a policy which can be applied at all times and in all circumstances. The principal military reason why … is that the balance of power in Europe has hopelessly broken down... The possibility of restoring the balance did not exist after 1919; and British policy, based on a false premise, ended in disaster.[21]

text: In 1941, Winston Churchill was criticized by his rival, Adolf Hitler, for his adherence to the balance of power:

text: Churchill is a man with an out-of-date political idea—that of the European balance of power. It no longer belongs to the sphere of realities. And yet it's because of this superstition that Churchill stirred England up to war.[22]

text: On another occasion he added: Without the Wehrmacht, a "wave would have swept over Europe that would have taken no care of the ridiculous British idea of the balance of power in Europe in all its banality and stupid tradition—once and for all."[23]

text: In fact, Churchill shortly adopted a similar view: Our Russian friends and Allies, he spoke in 1946, most admire strength and least respect military weakness. “For that reason the old doctrine of a balance of power is unsound. We cannot afford … to work on narrow margins, offering temptations to a trial of strength.” If the Western Democracies do not stand together “then indeed catastrophe may overwhelm us all.” If, however, “the population of the English-speaking Commonwealths be added to that of the United States with all that such co-operation implies in the air, on the sea, all over the globe and in science and in industry, and in moral force, there will be no quivering, precarious balance of power to offer its temptation to ambition or adventure. On the contrary, there will be an overwhelming assurance of security.”[24]

text: Historical evidence against the balance of power theory and implications[edit]

text: In an attempt to disprove the balance of power theory, some realists have pointed to cases in international systems other than modern Europe where balancing failed and a hegemon arose. William Wohlforth, Richard Little and Stuart Kaufman, point to the failure of state like units to balance against Assyria in the first millennium BCE; the Hellenic successor states of Alexander the Great to balance against Rome; the Warring States to balance against the Qin dynasty in ancient China and five other cases. [25] This cross-cultural research concludes:

text: Given that the version of the theory we are testing is universalistic in its claims — that ‘hegemony leads to balance … through all of the centuries we can contemplate’ — case selection is unimportant. Any significant counterexample falsifies the universal claim; eight such examples demolish it.[26]

text: Wohlforth, Little and Kaufman state that systemic hegemony is likely under two historically common conditions: First when the rising hegemon develops the ability to incorporate and effectively administer conquered territories. And second, when the boundaries of the international system remain stable, and no new major powers emerge from outside the system. When the leading power can administer conquests effectively so they add to its power and when the system’s borders are rigid, the probability of hegemony is high.[25] The argument of universal reproduction of anarchy can be correct in the European context, "whereas a systematic survey of world history reveals that multipolarity has frequently given way to unipolarity or hegemony."[27] Henry Kissinger, Historian by profession, noted that "theories of the balance of power often leave the impression that it is the natural form of international relations. In fact, balance-of-power systems have existed only rarely in history." Yet based on these rare occurrences, many realists "elevate a fact of life … into a guiding principle of world order."[28] Earlier, political scientist Martin Wight had drawn a conclusion with unambiguous implication for the modern world:

text: Most states systems have ended in universal empire, which has swallowed all the states of the system. The examples are so abundant that we must ask two questions: Is there any states system which has not led fairly directly to the establishment of a world empire? Does the evidence rather suggest that we should expect any states system to culminate in this way? …It might be argued that every state system can only maintain its existence on the balance of power, that the later is inherently unstable, and that sooner or later its tensions and conflicts will be resolved into a monopoly of power.[29]

text: Still earlier, Quincy Wright, concluded on the balance of power in world history:

text: The predominance of the balance of power in the practice of statesmen for three centuries … should not obscure the fact that throughout world history periods dominated by the balance-of-power policies have not been the rule. The balance of power scarcely existed anywhere as a conscious principle of international politics before 1500…[30]

text: Evoking examples of the ancient Chinese and Roman civilizations, Quincy Wright added:

text: Balance of power systems have in the past tended, through the process of conquest of lesser states by greater states, towards reduction in the number of states involved, and towards less frequent but more devastating wars, until eventually a universal empire has been established through the conquest by one of all those remaining.[31]

text: The post-Cold War period represents an anomaly to the balance of power theory too. Rousseau defined the theoretical limit how far balance of power can be altered: “Will it be supposed that two or three potentates might enter into agreement to subdue the rest? Be it so. These three potentates, whoever they may be, will not possess half the power of all Europe.”[32] Within two-and-a-half centuries, only one potentate possessed half the power of all the world, including Europe. In 2008, US military expenditures, including supplemental spending, exceeded those of the rest of the world combined.”[33][34]

text: Since 2000, the founder of Neorealism, Kenneth Waltz, confessed that "the present condition of international politics is unnatural."[35] “Clearly something has changed.”[36] Wohlforth, Little and Kaufman undertook the above-mentioned historical study after they had coped with what they called the "puzzle" of the unipolar stability. Elsewhere, Richard Little wrote: Events since the end of the Cold War "create a potential anomaly" for the theory because the outcome has "left the United States as the sole superpower in a unipolar world ... A major puzzle for realists ... is the fact that unipolarity has not provoked a global alarm to restore a balance of power."[37] The same anomaly stressed seventeen other experts on alliances, Stephen Walt, Randall Schweller, Xiaoyu Pu,[38] John Ikenberry, Robert Pape, T. V. Paul, Jack S. Levy, William R. Thompson, John Lewis Gaddis, David A. Lake, Campbell Craig, Fareed Zakaria, John M., Owen, Michael Mastanduno, Thomas S. Mowle, David H. Sacko and Terry Narramore:[39]

text: To date, at least, there is little sign of a serious effort to forge a meaningful anti-American alliance ... From the traditional perspective of balance-of-power theory, this situation is surely an anomaly. Power in the international system is about as unbalanced as it has ever been, yet balancing tendencies are remarkably mild. It is possible to find them, but one has to squint pretty hard to do it.[40]

text: [N]o peer competitor has yet emerged more than a decade after the end of US-Soviet bipolarity to balance against the United States. Contrary to realist predictions, unipolarity has not provided global alarm to restore a balance of power.[41]

text: Resistance has in fact appeared and may be growing. But it is remarkable that despite the sharp shifts in the distribution of power, the other great powers have not yet responded in a way anticipated by balance-of-power theory.[42]

text: Historically, major powers have rarely balanced against the United States and not at all since the 1990s when it has become the sole superpower.[43]

text: Traditional balance of power theory … fails to explain state behavior in the post-Cold War era. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has been expanding its economic and political power. More recently, it has begun to engage in increasingly unilateralist military policy… [Y]et despite these growing material capabilities, major powers such as China, France, Germany, India and Russia have not responded with significant increases in their defense spending. Nor have they formed military coalitions to counterveil US power, as traditional balance of power theory would predict.[44]

text: The end of the Cold War and the emergence of the “unipolar moment” have generated considerable debate about how to explain the absence of a great-power balancing coalition against the United States… That the United States, which is generally regarded as the “greatest superpower ever,” has not provoked such a balancing coalition is widely regarded as a puzzle for balance of power theory.[45]

text: Whether or not realists got the Cold War right, they have most certainly got the warm peace wrong. A decade after the Berlin Wall collapsed… their dark vision of the future has not come to pass. The United States remains the world’s only superpower; unipolarity was not a fleeting moment ... Most important, despite its continued predominance and political activism, and the first rumbling of international opposition in response to missteps in Kosovo, no coalition has emerged to balance against it … [T]he United States today defies the supposedly immutable laws of realpolitik.”[46]

text: The persistence of American unipolar predominance in the international system since the end of the Cold War has caused a rupture in the American school of Realist … theory ... Yet the ongoing failure of potential rivals to the US, such as China, Russia, or the EU to develop military capabilities that come anywhere close to those of the US seems to have defied this prediction. Despite the apparently radical imbalance of the international political system, smaller states are not trying to build up their military power to match that of the US or forming formal alliance systems to oppose it… The absence of balancing against the US constitutes a serious anomaly for neorealist theory.[47]

text: Fareed Zakaria asks, “Why is no one ganging up against the United States?”[48] And John Ikenberry[49] and John M. Owen ask the same question.[50] Prominent Historian of the Cold War, John Lewis Gaddis, poses a more general question and replies: Do the weak always unite against the strong? “In theory, yes, but in practice and in history, not necessarily.” One of the issues the discipline of political science “has been wrestling with recently is why there is still no anti-American coalition despite the overwhelming dominance of the United States since the end of the Cold War.”[51] French or Chinese officials publicly denounce “hyperpower” and aspire for "multipolarity" but refrain from forming a counterbalancing coalition.[52] "Rhetorically, leaders and publics want the United States to be balanced" but "we find very little balancing."[53] French academic Michel Winock said: “Before we could say we were on American side. Not Now. There is no counterbalance.”[54] Two American Neoconservative thinkers, Robert Kagan and William Kristol, completely agree: “Today’s international system is built not around a balance of power but around American hegemony.”[55]

text: Christopher Layne published two articles on the post-Cold War case, "The Unipolar Illusion…" (1993)[56] and "The Unipolar Illusion Revisited" (2006).[57] The former predicted imminent anti-American balancing as balance of power theorists expected; the latter explains "why balance of power theorists got it wrong."[58]

text: Realism and balancing[edit]

text: The balance of power theory is a core tenet of both classical and neorealist theory and seeks to explain alliance formation. Due to the neorealist idea of anarchism as a result of the international system, states must ensure their survival through maintaining or increasing their power in a self-help world. With no authority above the state to come to its rescue in the event of an attack by a hegemon, states attempt to prevent a potential hegemon from arising by balancing against it. According to Kenneth Waltz, founder of neorealism, "balance-of-power politics prevail wherever two, and only two requirements are met: that the order be anarchic and that it be populated by units wishing to survive".[59] They can do this either through "internal balancing" , where a state uses internal efforts such as moving to increase economic capability, developing clever strategies and increasing military strength,[60] or through "external balancing", which occurs when states take external measures to increase their security by forming allies. States happy with their place in the system are known as "status quo" states, while those seeking to alter the balance of power in their favor are generally referred to as "revisionist states" and aspire for hegemony, thus repairing the balance.[61]

text: Balancing versus bandwagoning[edit]

text: States choose to balance for two reasons. First, they place their survival at risk if they fail to curb a potential hegemon before it becomes too strong; to ally with the dominant power means placing one’s trust in its continued benevolence. Secondly, joining the weaker side increases the likelihood that the new member will be influential within the alliance.[62] States choose to bandwagon because it may be a form of appeasement as the bandwagoner may hope to avoid an attack by diverting it elsewhere—a defensive reason—or because it may align with the dominant side in wartime to share the spoils of victory—an offensive reason.[62]

text: Realists claim that balancing is when states ally against the prevailing threat and results in a more secure world whereas in a bandwagoning world security is scarce as rising hegemons are not kept in check.[63] With bandwagoning, the threatened state abandons hope of preventing the aggressor from gaining power at its expense and instead joins forces with its dangerous foe to get at least some small portion of the spoils of war.[64]

text: The weaker the state the more likely it is to bandwagon than to balance as they do little to affect the outcome and thus must choose the winning side. Strong states may change a losing side into a winning side and thus are more likely to balance. States will be tempted to bandwagon when allies are unavailable, however excessive confidence in allied support encourages weak states to free ride relying on the efforts of others to provide security. Since bandwagoning "requires placing trust in the aggressors continued forbearance" some realists believe balancing is preferred to bandwagoning.[65] According to Stephen Walt, states are more likely to balance in peacetime but if they are on the losing side of a war they may defect and bandwagon in the hopes that they will "share the fruits of victory".[66]

text: Chain ganging[edit]

text: Chain-ganging occurs when a state sees its own security tied to the security of its alliance partner.[67] It chains itself by deeming any attack on its ally the equivalent of an attack on itself. This is another aspect of the balance of power theory, whereby the smaller states could drag their chained states into wars that they have no desire to fight. A key example of this was the chain-ganging between states prior to World War I, dragging the entire European continent to war over a dispute between the relatively major power of Austria-Hungary and the minor power of Serbia. Thus states "may chain themselves unconditionally to reckless allies whose survival is seen to be indispensable to the maintenance of the balance".[68]

text: Buck passing and bloodletting[edit]

text: Balancing and buck passing are the main strategies for preserving the balance of power and preventing a potential hegemon’s rise.[69] Instead of balancing against an aggressor, some states instead choose to "pass the buck" whereby instead of taking action to prevent a potential hegemon's rise, it will pass the responsibility on to another state. John Mearsheimer, a prominent offensive realist, claims that threatened states can take four measures to facilitate buck passing, including: seeking good diplomatic relations with the aggressor in the hope that it will divert its attention to the "buck-catcher"; maintaining cool relations with the buck-catcher so as not to get dragged into the war with the buck-catcher and as a result possibly increase positive relations with the aggressor; increasing military strength to deter the aggressive state and help it focus on the buck-catcher; and facilitating the growth in power of the intended buck-catcher.[70]

text: In the case that a state is an enemy with both the aggressor and the intended buck-catcher, a buck-passer can implement a bait and bleed strategy whereby the state causes two rivals to engage in a protracted war while the baiter remains on the sideline.[71] This form of buck passing enables the state to increase in relative strength at the expense of the two rivals. Bloodletting, a further variant whereby a state does what it can to increase the cost duration of the conflict can further increase the buck-passer’s relative power.[72] Thus, threatened states usually prefer buck-passing to balancing as the buck-passer avoids the costs of fighting the aggressor in the event of war.[64]

text: Some realists believe there is a strong tendency to buck-pass or free-ride within balancing coalitions themselves, usually leaving their alliance partners to assume the heavy burden of wearing down the enemy, leaving the free-rider’s military fresh to win the final battles of the war and thus be in a better position to dictate the peace, such as the UK’s light involvement in the early stages of World War I.[73] Likewise, buck-passers can enter wars late after both sides have been worn down, allowing the buck-passer to dominate the post-war world.[74]

text: A potential drawback of the strategy occurs if the buck-catcher fails to check the aggressor, as the buck-passer will be in a much more vulnerable situation. Proponents of the theory point to the Soviet Union’s role in World War II whereby it passed the buck to the UK and France through the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact with Nazi Germany. After eliminating France the Germans had no Western front to divide their forces, allowing them to concentrate their forces against the USSR.[75]

text: Offensive and defensive realism[edit]

text: Defensive realism[edit]

text: Defensive realists emphasize that if any state becomes too powerful, balancing will occur as other powers would build up their militaries and form a balancing coalition.[76] Because this resulting security dilemma would leave the aspiring hegemon less secure, defensive realists maintain that it is in a state's interest to maintain the status quo rather than maximize its power.[77]

text: Offensive realism[edit]

text: Offensive realists accept that threatened states usually balance against dangerous foes, however, they maintain that balancing is often inefficient and that this inefficiency provides opportunities for a clever aggressor to take advantage of its adversaries.[77] Buck passing, rather than joining a balancing coalition, is another tactic offensive realists point to when disputing the balance of power theory.[77]

text: Offensive realists believe that internal balancing measures such as increasing defense spending, implementing conscription, are only effective to a certain extent as there are usually significant limits on how many additional resources a threatened state can muster against an aggressor.[70] However, since offensive realists theorize that states are always seeking to maximize their power, states are "effectively engaged in internal balancing all the time".[70]

text: Balance of threat[edit]

text: The balance of threat theory is an offshoot of the balancing, coined in 1985 by Stephen M. Walt in an attempt to explain why balancing against rising hegemons has not always been consistent in history. In contrast to traditional balance of power theorists, Walt suggests that states balance against threats, rather than against power alone.[78] The “balance-of-power theory is not wrong; it is merely incomplete. Power is one of the factors that affects the propensity to balance, although it is not the only one nor always the most important.”[79] The theory acknowledges that power is an extremely important factor in the level of threat posed by a state, but also includes geographic proximity, offensive capabilities, and perceived intentions.[78]

text: Soft balancing[edit]

text: Soft balancing was developed in the 2000s to cope with the current anomaly of the unipolar unbalanced world.

text: Thomas Mowle and David Sacko describe "soft balancing" as "balancing that does not balance at all.” These theoretical efforts are counter-productive, since Realism and unipolarity are compatible and structural realism should rather develop a set of hypotheses for a unipolar world: “Scholars do not need to desperately search for signs of balancing, they do not need to soften balancing beyond recognition, and they do not need to stand watch for the first glimmering of a new multipolar dawn.”[80]

text: Campbell Craig explained the development of soft balancing theory on the Thomas Kuhn's three-stage model how scholarly communities respond to anomalies that seem clearly to defy their core theoretical predictions:

text: 1. Leading theorists, wedded to the standard interpretations that allow them to dominate their field, tend first to deny that the anomaly exists; at most, it is a 'blip', an unimportant or transient factor. Initially, structural Realists sought to deny that unipolarity was enduring or important, and predicted its quick demise. Waltz, Mearsheimer, and Layne all predicted in the early 1990s that other powers would soon emerge to balance the US.

text: Significance[edit]

text: It is the net effect, or result, produced by a state system in which the independent state as sovereign members are free to join or to refrain from joining alliances and alignments as each seeks to maximize its security and to advance its national interest.

text: Preponderance of power[edit]

text: Preponderance of power has been suggested as an alternative to balance of power since World War II. In his 1940 article, "War, Peace and the Balance of Power", Frederick L. Schuman included a chapter titled "Necessity for Preponderance of Power". It argued:

text: [A]n overwhelming preponderance of power [...] will remain wholly unattainable unless the Allies win the present war and the United States assumes responsibilities commensurate with its power—in the war, in the peace after the war and in the maintenance and improvement of the new order after the peace. The necessary preponderance of power is unlikely to emerge from any international combination other than a permanent alliance of the United States, the British Commonwealth of Nations, and the French Republic, with the addition of such Latin American states and such European democracies as may care to join. Such a coalition, if stable and permanent, could put an end to the world balance of power and oblige outside powers to abandon the game of power politics. No other coalition presently in prospect would seem to offer any comparable hope.[82]

text: In 1941, Alfred Vagts wrote an article, titled "The United States and the Balance of Power," in which he recalled the words of Thomas Jefferson:

text: I wish that all nations may recover and retain their independence; that those which are overgrown may not advance beyond safe measure of power, that a salutary balance may ever be maintained among nations and that our peace, commerce, and friendship, may be sought and cultivated by all.... Not in our day, but at no distant one, we may shake a rod over the heads of all, which may make the stoutest of them tremble.[83]

text: In 1942, Robert Strausz-Hupé found that it "is in the interests of the United States no less than that of humanity" that the United States should be the only one "geographical power nucleus" from which a "balancing and stabilizing" power of arbiter be exercised. This "will pave the way for a new and universal order."[84] Writing the same year in Life magazine, Joseph Thorndike tells about "many observers" seeking "preponderant power in the postwar world" to replace balance of power:

text: Balance of power is indeed the time-honored (or dishonored) policy of the European states. But it is not the only policy which has been historically successful. Rome was not a balance of power. It was a preponderant power. There are many observers who think the US and the British Empire, acting together, can hold preponderant power in the postwar world. At the time of the peace conference this may well be the case.[85]

text: However, Thorndike added in the same 1942 article, many may wonder whether, over the years, Russia and China "will not rival Anglo-America". The following year, the founder of the Paneuropean Union, Richard von Coudenhove-Kalergi, also invoked the example of the two-centuries long “Pax Romana” which, he suggested, could be repeated if based on the preponderant US air power and inter-regional organization:

text: At the end of the war the crushing superiority of American plane production will be an established fact… The solution of the problem … is by no means ideal, nor even satisfactory. But it is the minor evil, compared with the alternative of several competing air forces fighting each other… [in wars] aimed not at the conquest but at the utter annihilation of all enemy towns and lands… This danger can … only be prevented by the air superiority of a single power … This is the only realistic hope for a lasting peace … The peaceful organization of the postwar world would rest on a double basis: on the working Commonwealth of the World, established on regional grounds, and on the American supremacy in the skies, making international wars almost impossible… This double-method … can lead to a long period of peace and prosperity throughout the globe…[86]

text: The same year, Nathaniel Peffer criticized the idea of preponderance of power:

text: Whatever may be the tendencies and inclinations, it must be emphasized that if America seeks to dictate to other powers their actions and policies, it can do so only by maintaining a preponderance of power manifested in extension of political and economic control … But in the light of all recent history he who would consciously, deliberately elect that course is either unread, incapable of deductions from his reading or perverse.[87]

text: In self-contradiction, Peffer ended the article recommending for the postwar period a preponderance of power of offensive kind backed by total national effort: The United Stataes will need “a larger permanent military establishment,” alliances with other powers having common interests and an alliance with Great Britain that would be not only defensive but also “outright, unconditional offensive.” It means full-scale power politics and to it “must be accommodated and sometimes subordinated everything else in the nation’s life."[88]

text: On September 24, 1946, Truman's Special Counsel Clark M. Clifford submitted a report "American Relations with the Soviet Union…" advocating a preponderant power:

text: It must be made apparent to the Soviet Government that our strength will be sufficient to repel any attack and sufficient to defeat the USSR decisively if a war should start. The prospect of defeat is the only sure means of deterring the Soviet Union.[89]

text: In the early Cold War, US Secretary of State Dean Acheson combined the concepts of preponderance and bandwagoning. As he put it, the United States was going to have to be “the locomotive at the head of mankind,” while the rest of the world was going to be “the caboose.”[90]

text: While arguing that equilibrium was essential to justice, Reinhold Niebuhr asserted that "nothing but the preponderance of power in the non-Communist world can preserve the peace."[91]

text: Melvyn Leffler describes the US strategy throughout the Cold War as a strategy of preponderance. In its last year, he summarized: Backed by strategic preponderance, the United States integrated and rearmed the Eurasian industrial areas, shored up the Eurasian periphery and rolled back the Iron Curtain.[92]

text: Already during the Cold War, some scholars stressed that the pattern accords the preponderance of power rather than balance of power. The balance of power presupposes such a distribution of power in the system that no single state is preponderant. In this sense, during the period 1945–1965 if "there was any threat to the general balance of power [...] it was from the United States rather than from the Soviet Union that this came."[93]

text: Stephen Walt observed in the 1980s that most states, including all developed states, ally with, rather than balance against, the preponderant power. Noting this "anomaly", Walt suggested his balance of threat hypothesis:

text: At first glance, this result would seem to contradict the assertion that states choose alliance partners in order to balance against the strongest. Focusing solely on aggregate power would lead us to expect more states to ally with the Soviet Union, in order to prevent the United States from using its superior overall resources in harmful ways. Judging from the preponderance of aggregate power favoring the West, many states appear to have 'bandwagoned' rather than balanced by aligning with the United States. This is even more striking when one remembers that the United States was overwhelmingly the world's most powerful country in the immediate postwar period, yet was able to bring most of the other industrial powers into alignment with rather than against it.[94]

text: In 1986, still not envisaging the end of the Cold War in sight, Zbigniew Brzezinski emphasized the historical uniqueness of the current period regarding the preponderance of power: "[N]ever before would the eclipse of one of the major rival powers have given to the other effective global preponderance."[95]

text: In the first post-Cold War year, Leffler advocated for the United States to continue its strategy of "preponderance of power".[96] Christopher Layne claims that the preponderance of power has been the dominant US strategy during both the Cold War and the post-Cold War periods. "Preponderance's strategic imperatives are the same as they were during the post-World War II era: pacification and reassurance in Europe and East Asia, and protection of these regions from instability in the periphery."[97][98] The post-Cold War strategy of preponderance holds that "only a preponderance of US power ensures peace" which is "the result of an imbalance of power in which US capabilities are sufficient, operating on their own, to cow all potential challengers and to comfort all coalition partners. It is not enough consequently to be primus inter pares [...] One must be primus solus."[99]

text: Layne since the beginning of the post-Cold war period expects the preponderance of power to trigger counterbalancing. He finds that "it was the bipolar structure of the postwar system that allowed Washington to pursue a strategy of preponderance successfully" and thereby smother the emergence of other great powers. But the preponderance of power which "others found merely irritating in a bipolar world may seem quite threatening in a unipolar world."[100] Because of these structural factors, "an American strategy of preponderance [...] is doomed to failure"; it will "cause other states to balance against the United States".[101]

text: Overturning the scholarly conventional wisdom, however, the current preponderant power seems to render inoperative the counterbalancing long central to research in international relations.[102] By the preponderance of American power and the absence of balance of power William Wohlforth explains the peacefulness and stability of the present world order.[103] No distribution of power rules out war. "The greater the preponderance of power, however, the more extreme the values of other variables must be to produce war [...]"[104] Campbell Craig believes that "Power Preponderance theory" will become one of the dominant American IR schools of the post-Cold War era:

text: ...Power Preponderance is going to replace balance-of-power neorealism and become the dominant brand of American Realism for the foreseeable future. Unipolarity is too central of a problem for neorealism to finesse, especially as confident predictions of its early demise have been proven wrong and the gap between the US and other rivals continues to grow.[105]

text: Expecting anti-American balancing, Waltz drew a much-cited analogy: "As nature abhors vacuum, so international politics abhors unbalanced power."[106] Craig paraphrased:

text: Theory abhors an explanatory vacuum, and Power Preponderance is filling it. The essence of Power Preponderance is its claim that would-be rivals have strong incentives to accept the status quo of American primacy rather than to attempt to overturn the unipolar order… The argument … distinguishes itself from deterministic claims made by some structural realists that a balance of power is certain to recur...[107]

text: US National Security Strategy of 2002 uses repeatedly the term ‘balance of power’ favoring freedom. The author of the Preponderance of Power… (1992), Melvyn Leffler, was puzzled: A balance of power is linked historically to the evolution of the Westphalian state system and “envisions equilibrium, while the Bush administration yearns for hegemony.” When they invoke the language of power balancing, Bush's advisers obfuscate more than they clarify:

text: Whose power is to be balanced? Today, no nation or group challenges American power … In fact, should the balance of power operate in its classical form, it would trigger countermoves by states seeking to pose a counterweight to America's expressed ambitions.[108]

text: According to Leffler's exegesis, Bush has invoked a balance of power vocabulary in purpose to integrate the tradition with the hegemonic dilemma.[109] British Orwell Prize-winning policy analyst, Anatol Lieven, comments: In this conception, however, a phrase “was a form of Orwellian doublespeak. The clear intention actually was to be so strong that other countries had no choice but to rally to the side of the United States, concentrating all real power and freedom of action in the hands of America.”[110] The surprising rehabilitation of the balance-of-power term in the 2002 NSS “can be accounted for in terms of mythopoetic function that the terminology serves in the document.” It keeps alive the traditional concept in a new unipolar world.[111]

text: Robert Kagan cited Theodore Roosevelt saying after the Spanish War: The United States had become “more and more the balance of power of the whole globe.”[112] Colin Gray titled his 2005 chapter by question, "Where Is the Balance of Power?" The chapter opens: "The short answer is that the United States is the balance of power."[113]


document_title: World energy consumption

question_text: what percentage of the world's energy is fossil fuels

question_tokens: what percentage of the world 's energy is fossil fuels

root

text: World energy consumption

text: Overview[edit]

text: Energy supply, consumption and electricity[edit]

text:
Key figures (TWh)

Year
Primary energy
supply (TPES)1
Final energy
consumption1
Electricity
generation
Ref

1973

71,013
(Mtoe 6,106)

54,335
(Mtoe 4,672)

6,129
[2]

1990
102,569
–
11,821
–

2000
117,687
–
15,395
–

2010

147,899
(Mtoe 12,717)

100,914
(Mtoe 8,677)

21,431
[5]

2011

152,504
(Mtoe 13,113)

103,716
(Mtoe 8,918)

22,126
[6]

2012

155,505
(Mtoe 13,371)

104,426
(Mtoe 8,979)

22,668
[7]

2013

157,482
(Mtoe 13,541)

108,171
(Mtoe 9,301)

23,322
[8]

2014

155,481
(Mtoe 13,369)

109,613
(Mtoe 9,425)

23,816
[9]

2015

168,519
(Quad BTU 575)

[10]

1 converted from Mtoe into TWh (1 Mtoe = 11.63 TWh)
and from Quad BTU into TWh (1 Quad BTU = 293.07 TWh)

tag: table

text: World total primary energy supply (TPES), or "primary energy" differs from the world final energy consumption because much of the energy that is acquired by humans is lost as other forms of energy during the process of its refinement into usable forms of energy and its transport from its initial place of supply to consumers. For instance, when oil is extracted from the ground it must be refined into gasoline, so that it can be used in a car, and transported over long distances to gas stations where it can be used by consumers. World final energy consumption refers to the fraction of the world's primary energy that is used in its final form by humanity.

tag: p

text: In 2014, world primary energy supply amounted to 155,481 terawatt-hour (TWh) or 13,541 Mtoe, while the world final energy consumption was 109,613 TWh or about 29.5% less than the total supply.[9] World final energy consumption includes products as lubricants, asphalt and petrochemicals which have chemical energy content but are not used as fuel. This non-energy use amounted to 9,404 TWh (809 Mtoe) in 2012.[11]

text: By the end of 2014, the total installed global power generating capacity is nearly 6.142 TW (million MW) which does not include the DG sets not connected to local electricity grids.[12] In 2014, world energy consumption for electricity generation was coal 40.8%, natural gas 21.6%, nuclear 10.6%, hydro 16.4%, 'others' (solar, wind, geothermal, biomass, etc.) 6.3% and oil 4.3%. Coal and natural gas were the most popular energy fuels for generating electricity. The world's electricity consumption was 18,608 TWh[citation needed] in 2012. This figure is about 18% smaller than the generated electricity, due to grid losses, storage losses, and self-consumption from power plants (gross generation). Cogeneration (CHP) power stations use some of the energy that is otherwise wasted for heating buildings or in industrial processes.

text: 2014 World electricity generation (23,816 TWh) by source (IEA, 2016)[13]

text: The United States Energy Information Administration regularly publishes a report on world consumption for most types of primary energy resources. For 2013, estimated world energy consumption was 5.67 × 1020 joules, or 157,481 TWh. According to the IEA the total world energy consumption was 143,851 TWh in 2008, 133,602 TWh in 2005, 117,687 TWh in 2000, and 102,569 TWh in 1990. Total world electricity consumption was 19,504 TWh in 2013, 16,503 TWh in 2008, 15,105 TWh in 2005, and 12,116 TWh in 2000.[2] In 2012 approximately 22% of world energy was consumed in North America, 5% was consumed South and Central America, 23% was consumed in Europe and Eurasia, 3% was consumed in Africa, and 40% was consumed in the Asia Pacific region.[1]

text: Recently there has been a large increase in international agreements and national Energy Action Plans, such as the EU 2009 Renewable Energy Directive, to increase the use of renewable energy due to the growing concerns about pollution from energy sources that come from fossil fuels such as oil, coal, and natural gas.[3][14] One such initiative was the United Nations Development Programme's World Energy Assessment in 2000 that highlighted many challenges humanity would have to overcome in order to shift from fossil fuels to renewable energy sources.[3] From 2000–2012 renewable energy grew at a rate higher than any other point in history, with a consumption increase of 176.5 million tonnes of oil. During this period, oil, coal, and natural gas continued to grow and had increases that were much higher than the increase in renewable energy. The following figures illustrate the growth in consumption of fossil fuels such as oil, coal, and natural gas as well as renewable sources of energy during this period.[1]

text: Trends[edit]

text: The energy consumption growth in the G20 slowed down to 2% in 2011, after the strong increase of 2010. The economic crisis is largely responsible for this slow growth. For several years now, the world energy demand is characterized by the bullish Chinese and Indian markets, while developed countries struggle with stagnant economies, high oil prices, resulting in stable or decreasing energy consumption.[18]

text: According to IEA data from 1990 to 2008, the average energy use per person increased 10% while world population increased 27%. Regional energy use also grew from 1990 to 2008: the Middle East increased by 170%, China by 146%, India by 91%, Africa by 70%, Latin America by 66%, the USA by 20%, the EU-27 block by 7%, and world overall grew by 39%.

text: In 2008, total worldwide primary energy consumption was 132,000 terawatt-hours (TWh) or 474 exajoules (EJ).[19] In 2012, primary energy demand increased to 158,000 TWh (567 EJ).[20]

text: Energy consumption in the G20 increased by more than 5% in 2010 after a slight decline of 2009. In 2009, world energy consumption decreased for the first time in 30 years by 1.1%, or about 130 million tonnes of oil equivalent (Mtoe), as a result of the financial and economic crisis, which reduced world GDP by 0.6% in 2009.[21]

text: This evolution is the result of two contrasting trends: Energy consumption growth remained vigorous in several developing countries, specifically in Asia (+4%). Conversely, in OECD, consumption was severely cut by 4.7% in 2009 and was thus almost down to its 2000 levels. In North America, Europe and the CIS, consumptions shrank by 4.5%, 5% and 8.5% respectively due to the slowdown in economic activity. China became the world's largest energy consumer (18% of the total) since its consumption surged by 8% during 2009 (up from 4% in 2008). Oil remained the largest energy source (33%) despite the fact that its share has been decreasing over time. Coal posted a growing role in the world's energy consumption: in 2009, it accounted for 27% of the total.

text: Most energy is used in the country of origin, since it is cheaper to transport final products than raw materials. In 2008, the share export of the total energy production by fuel was: oil 50% (1,952/3,941 Mt), gas 25% (800/3,149 bcm) and hard coal 14% (793/5,845 Mt).[22]

text: Most of the world's high energy resources are from the conversion of the sun's rays to other energy forms after being incident upon the planet. Some of that energy has been preserved as fossil energy, some is directly or indirectly usable; for example, via solar PV/thermal, wind, hydro- or wave power. The total solar irradiance is measured by satellite to be roughly 1361 watts per square meter (see solar constant), though it fluctuates by about 6.9% during the year due to the Earth's varying distance from the sun. This value, after multiplication by the cross-sectional area intercepted by the Earth, is the total rate of solar energy received by the planet; about half, 89,000 TW, reaches the Earth's surface.[23]

text: The estimates of remaining non-renewable worldwide energy resources vary, with the remaining fossil fuels totaling an estimated 0.4  yottajoule (YJ) or 4 × 1023 joules, and the available nuclear fuel such as uranium exceeding 2.5 YJ. Fossil fuels range from 0.6 to 3 YJ if estimates of reserves of methane clathrates are accurate and become technically extractable. The total power flux from the sun intercepting the Earth is 5.5 YJ per year, though not all of this is available for human consumption. The IEA estimates for the world to meet global energy demand for the two decades from 2015 to 2035 it will require investment of $48 trillion and "credible policy frameworks."[24]

text: According to IEA (2012) the goal of limiting warming to 2 °C is becoming more difficult and costly with each year that passes. If action is not taken before 2017, CO2 emissions would be locked-in by energy infrastructure existing in 2017. Fossil fuels are dominant in the global energy mix, supported by $523 billion subsidies in 2011, up almost 30% on 2010 and six times more than subsidies to renewables.[25]

text:
Regional energy use (kWh/capita & TWh) and growth 1990–2008 (%)[26][27]

kWh/capita
Population (million)
Energy use (1,000 TWh)

Region
1990
2008
Growth
1990
2008
Growth
1990
2008
Growth

USA
89,021
87,216
−2%
250
305
22%
22.3
26.6
20%

EU-28
40,240
40,821
1%
473
499
5%
19.0
20.4
7%

Middle East
19,422
34,774
79%
132
199
51%
2.6
6.9
170%

China
8,839
18,608
111%
1,141
1,333
17%
10.1
24.8
146%

Latin America
11,281
14,421
28%
355
462
30%
4.0
6.7
66%

Africa
7,094
7,792
10%
634
984
55%
4.5
7.7
70%

India
4,419
6,280
42%
850
1,140
34%
3.8
7.2
91%

Others*
25,217
23,871
nd
1,430
1,766
23%
36.1
42.2
17%

The World
19,422
21,283
10%
5,265
6,688
27%
102.3
142.3
39%

Source: IEA/OECD, Population OECD/World Bank

Energy use = kWh/capita* Mrd. capita (population) = 1000 TWh
Others: Mathematically calculated, includes e.g. countries in Asia and Australia. The use of energy varies between the "other countries": E.g. in Australia, Japan, or Canada energy is used more per capita than in Bangladesh or Burma.

text: Emissions[edit]

text: Global warming emissions resulting from energy production are an environmental problem. Efforts to resolve this include the Kyoto Protocol, which is a UN agreement aiming to reduce harmful climate impacts, which a number of nations have signed. Limiting global temperature increase to 2 degrees Celsius, thought to be a risk by the SEI, is now doubtful.

text: To limit global temperature to a hypothetical 2 degrees Celsius rise would demand a 75% decline in carbon emissions in industrial countries by 2050, if the population is 10 billion in 2050.[28] Across 40 years, this averages to a 2% decrease every year. In 2011, the emissions of energy production continued rising regardless of the consensus of the basic problem. Hypothetically, according to Robert Engelman (Worldwatch institute), in order to prevent collapse, human civilization would have to stop increasing emissions within a decade regardless of the economy or population (2009).[29]

text: Greenhouse gases are not the only emissions of energy production and consumption. Large amounts of pollutants such as sulphurous oxides (SOx), nitrous oxides (NOx), and particulate matter (PM) are produced from the combustion of fossil fuels and biomass; the World Health Organisation estimates that 7 million premature deaths are caused each year by air pollution.[30] Biomass combustion is a major contributor.[30][31][32] In addition to producing air pollution like fossil fuel combustion, most biomass has high CO2 emissions.[33]

text: By source[edit]

text: Total primary energy supply of 13,699 mega-toe by source in 2014 (IEA, 2016)[13][7]:28

text: Fossil fuels[edit]

text: The twentieth century saw a rapid twenty-fold increase in the use of fossil fuels. Between 1980 and 2006, the worldwide annual growth rate was 2%.[19] According to the US Energy Information Administration's 2006 estimate, the estimated 471.8 EJ total consumption in 2004, was divided as given in the table above, with fossil fuels supplying 86% of the world's energy:

text: Coal[edit]

text: In 2000, China accounted for 28% of world coal consumption, other Asia consumed 19%, North America 25% and the EU 14%. The single greatest coal-consuming country is China. Its share of the world coal production was 28% in 2000 and rose to 48% in 2009. In contrast to China's ~70% increase in coal consumption, world coal use increased 48% from 2000 to 2009. In practice, the majority of this growth occurred in China and the rest in other Asia.[34] China's energy consumption is mostly driven by the industry sector, the majority of which comes from coal consumption.[35]

text: World annual coal production increased 1,905 Mt or 32% in 6 years in 2011 compared to 2005, of which over 70% was in China and 8% in India. Coal production was in 2011 7,783 Mt, and 2009 6,903 Mt, equal to 12.7% production increase in two years.[36]

text: If production and consumption of coal continue at the rate as in 2008, proven and economically recoverable world reserves of coal would last for about 150 years. This is much more than needed for an irreversible climate catastrophe. Coal is the largest source of carbon dioxide emissions in the world. According to James Hansen the single most important action needed to tackle the climate crisis is to reduce CO2 emissions from coal.[37] Indonesia and Australia exported together 57.1% of the world coal export in 2011. China, Japan, South Korea, India and Taiwan had 65% share of all the world coal import in 2011.[38]

text:
Regional coal supply (TWh), share 2010 (%) and share of change 2000–2010[34][39]

Region
2000
2008
2009*
2010*
 %*
Change
2000–2009*

North America
6,654
6,740
6,375
6,470
16%
−1.2%

Asia excl. China
5,013
7,485
7,370
7,806
19%
18.9%

China
7,318
16,437
18,449
19,928
48%
85.5%

EU
3,700
3,499
3,135
3,137
8%
−3.8%

Africa
1,049
1,213
1,288
1,109
3%
0.4%

Russia
1,387
1,359
994
1,091
3%
−2.0%

Others
1,485
1,763
1,727
1,812
4%
2.2%

Total
26,607
38,497
39,340
41,354
100%
47.9%

Source: IEA, *in 2009, 2010 BP
*Change 2000–2009: Region's share of the world change +12,733 TWh from 2000 to 2009

text:
Top 10 coal exporters (Mt)[40]

Rank
Nation
2010
2011
Share
% 2011
2012

1
Indonesia
162
309
29.7%
383

2
Australia
298
285
27.4%
302

3
Russia
89
99
9.5%
103

4
US
57
85
8.2%
106

5
Colombia
68
76
7.3%
82

6
South Africa
68
70
6.7%
72

7
Kazakhstan
33
34
3.3%
32

8
Canada
24
24
2.3%
25

9
Vietnam
21
23
2.2%
18

10
Mongolia
17
22
2.1%
22

x
Others
19
14
1.3%

Total (Mt)
856
1,041

1,168

Top ten
97.8%
98.7%

text: Oil[edit]

text: Coal fueled the industrial revolution in the 18th and 19th century. With the advent of the automobile, aeroplanes and the spreading use of electricity, oil became the dominant fuel during the twentieth century. The growth of oil as the largest fossil fuel was further enabled by steadily dropping prices from 1920 until 1973. After the oil shocks of 1973 and 1979, during which the price of oil increased from 5 to 45 US dollars per barrel, there was a shift away from oil.[41] Coal, natural gas, and nuclear became the fuels of choice for electricity generation and conservation measures increased energy efficiency. In the U.S. the average car more than doubled the number of miles per gallon. Japan, which bore the brunt of the oil shocks, made spectacular improvements and now has the highest energy efficiency in the world.[42] From 1965 to 2008, the use of fossil fuels has continued to grow and their share of the energy supply has increased. From 2003 to 2008, coal was the fastest growing fossil fuel.[43]

text: It is estimated that between 100 and 135 billion tonnes of oil has been consumed between 1850 and the present.[44]

text: Natural Gas[edit]

text: In 2009, the world use of natural gas grew 31% compared to 2000. 66% of this growth was outside EU, North America, Latin America, and Russia. Others include the Middle East, Asia, and Africa. The gas supply increased also in the previous regions: 8.6% in the EU and 16% in the North America 2000–2009.[45]

text:
Regional gas supply (TWh) and share 2010 (%)[39][45]

Land
2000
2008
2009
2010
 %

North America
7,621
7,779
8,839
8,925
27%

Asia excl. China
2,744
4,074
4,348
4,799
14%

China
270
825
1,015
1,141
3%

EU
4,574
5,107
4,967
5,155
16%

Africa
612
974
1,455
1,099
3%

Russia
3,709
4,259
4,209
4,335
13%

Latin America
1,008
1,357
958
nd
nd

Others
3,774
5,745
6,047
7,785
23%

Total
24,312
30,134
31,837
33,240
100%

Source: IEA, in 2009, 2010 BP

text: Nuclear power[edit]

text: As of 1 July 2016, the world had 444 operable grid-electric nuclear power reactors with 62 others under construction.[46] Since commercial nuclear energy began in the mid 1950s, 2008 was the first year that no new nuclear power plant was connected to the grid, although two were connected in 2009.[47][48]

text: Annual generation of nuclear power has been on a slight downward trend since 2007, decreasing 1.8% in 2009 to 2558 TWh, and another 1.6% in 2011 to 2518 TWh, despite increases in production from most countries worldwide, because those increases were more than offset by decreases in Germany and Japan. Nuclear power met 11.7% of the world's electricity demand in 2011. Source: IEA/OECD[6]

text: Renewable energy[edit]

text: Renewable energy is generally defined as energy that comes from resources that are not significantly depleted by their use, such as sunlight, wind, rain, tides, waves and geothermal heat.[50] Renewable energy is gradually replacing conventional fuels in four distinct areas: electricity generation, hot water/space heating, motor fuels, and rural (off-grid) energy services.[51]

text: Based on REN21's 2014 report, renewables contributed 19 percent to our energy consumption and 22 percent to our electricity generation in 2012 and 2013, respectively. This energy consumption is divided as 9% coming from traditional biomass, 4.2% as heat energy (non-biomass), 3.8% hydro electricity and 2% electricity from wind, solar, geothermal, and biomass. Worldwide investments in renewable technologies amounted to more than US$214 billion in 2013, with countries like China and the United States heavily investing in wind, hydro, solar and biofuels.[52] Renewable energy resources exist over wide geographical areas, in contrast to other energy sources, which are concentrated in a limited number of countries. Rapid deployment of renewable energy and energy efficiency is resulting in significant energy security, climate change mitigation, and economic benefits.[53] In international public opinion surveys there is strong support for promoting renewable sources such as solar power and wind power.[54] At the national level, at least 30 nations around the world already have renewable energy contributing more than 20 percent of energy supply. National renewable energy markets are projected to continue to grow strongly in the coming decade and beyond.[55]

text: The following table shows increasing nameplate capacity, and has capacity factors that range from 11% for solar, to 40% for hydropower.[56]

text:
Selected renewable energy global indicators
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015

Investment in new renewable capacity (annual) (109 USD)[57]
182
178
237
279
256
232
270
285

Renewables power capacity (existing) (GWe)
1,140
1,230
1,320
1,360
1,470
1,578
1,712
1,849

Hydropower capacity (existing) (GWe)
885
915
945
970
990
1,018
1,055
1,064

Wind power capacity (existing) (GWe)
121
159
198
238
283
319
370
433

Solar PV capacity (grid-connected) (GWe)
16
23
40
70
100
138
177
227

Solar hot water capacity (existing) (GWth)
130
160
185
232
255
373
406
435

Ethanol production (annual) (109 litres)
67
76
86
86
83
87
94
98

Biodiesel production (annual) (109 litres)
12
17.8
18.5
21.4
22.5
26
29.7
30

Countries with policy targets
for renewable energy use
79
89
98
118
138
144
164
173

Source: The Renewable Energy Policy Network for the 21st Century (REN21)–Global Status Report[58][59][60][61][62]

text:
Renewable energy 2000-2013 (TWh) [63]

2000
2010
2013

North-America
1,973
2,237
2,443

EU
1,204
2,093
2,428

Russia
245
239
271

China
2,613
3,374
3,847

Asia (-China)
4,147
4,996
5,361

Africa
2,966
3,930
4,304

Latin America
1 502
2,127
2,242

Other
567
670
738

Total renewable
15,237
19,711
21,685

Total energy
116,958
148,736
157,485

Share
13.0%
13.3%
13.8%

Total nonrenewable
101,721
129,025
135,800

text: From 2000 to 2013 the total renewable energy use has increased 6,450 TWh and total energy use 40,500 TWh.

text: Hydro[edit]

text: Hydroelectricity is the term referring to electricity generated by hydropower; the production of electrical power through the use of the kinetic energy of falling or flowing water. In 2015 hydropower generated 16.6% of the world's total electricity and 70% of all renewable electricity,[64] which continues the rapid rate of increase experienced between 2003 and 2009.[65] Hydropower is produced in 150 countries, with the Asia-Pacific region generating 32 percent of global hydropower in 2010. China is the largest hydroelectricity producer, with 2,600 PJ (721 TWh) of production in 2010, representing around 17% of domestic electricity use. There are now three hydroelectricity plants larger than 10 GW: the Three Gorges Dam in China, Itaipu Dam in Brazil, and Guri Dam in Venezuela.[65] Nine of the worlds top 10 renewable electricity producers are primarily hydroelectric, one is wind.

text: Marine energy[edit]

text: Marine energy, also known as ocean energy and marine and hydrokinetic energy (MHK) includes tidal and wave power and is a relatively new sector of renewable energy, with most projects still in the pilot phase, but the theoretical potential is equivalent to 4–18 million tonne of oil equivalent (toe). MHK development in U.S. and international waters includes projects using devices such as, wave energy converters in open coastal areas with significant waves, tidal turbines placed in coastal and estuarine areas, in-stream turbines in fast-moving rivers, ocean current turbines in areas of strong marine currents, and ocean thermal energy converters in deep tropical waters.[66]

text: Wind[edit]

text: Wind power is growing at the rate of 17% annually, with a worldwide installed capacity of 432,883 megawatts (MW) at the end of 2015,[67][68][69] and is widely used in Europe, Asia, and the United States.[70][71] Several countries have achieved relatively high levels of wind power penetration, such as 21% of stationary electricity production in Denmark,[72] 18% in Portugal,[72] 16% in Spain,[72] 14% in Ireland[73] and 9% in Germany in 2010.[72][74] As of 2011, 83 countries around the world are using wind power on a commercial basis.[74] Continuing strong growth, by 2016 wind generated 3% of global power annually.[75]

text: Solar[edit]

text: Solar energy, radiant light and heat from the sun, has been harnessed by humans since ancient times using a range of ever-evolving technologies. Solar energy technologies include solar heating, solar photovoltaics, concentrated solar power and solar architecture, which can make considerable contributions to solving some of the most urgent problems the world now faces. The International Energy Agency projected that solar power could provide "a third of the global final energy demand after 2060, while CO2 emissions would be reduced to very low levels."[76] Solar technologies are broadly characterized as either passive solar or active solar depending on the way they capture, convert and distribute solar energy. Active solar techniques include the use of photovoltaic systems and solar thermal collectors to harness the energy. Passive solar techniques include orienting a building to the Sun, selecting materials with favorable thermal mass or light dispersing properties, and designing spaces that naturally circulate air. From 2012 to 2016 solar capacity tripled and now provides 1.3% of global energy.[77]

text: Geothermal[edit]

text: Geothermal energy is used commercially in over 70 countries.[78] In 2004, 200 petajoules (56 TWh) of electricity was generated from geothermal resources, and an additional 270 petajoules (75 TWh) of geothermal energy was used directly, mostly for space heating. In 2007, the world had a global capacity for 7010100000000000000♠10 GW of electricity generation and an additional 7010280000000000000♠28 GW of direct heating, including extraction by geothermal heat pumps.[79][80] Heat pumps are small and widely distributed, so estimates of their total capacity are uncertain and range up to 7011100000000000000♠100 GW.[78]

text: Bio energy[edit]

text: Until the beginning of the nineteenth century biomass was the predominant fuel, today it has only a small share of the overall energy supply. Electricity produced from biomass sources was estimated at 44 GW for 2005. Biomass electricity generation increased by over 100% in Germany, Hungary, the Netherlands, Poland, and Spain. A further 220 GW was used for heating (in 2004), bringing the total energy consumed from biomass to around 264 GW. The use of biomass fires for cooking is excluded.[79] World production of bioethanol increased by 8% in 2005 to reach 33 gigalitres (8.7×109 US gal), with most of the increase in the United States, bringing it level to the levels of consumption in Brazil.[79] Biodiesel increased by 85% to 3.9 gigalitres (1.0×109 US gal), making it the fastest growing renewable energy source in 2005. Over 50% is produced in Germany.[79]

text: By country[edit]

text: World total final consumption of 13,699 Mtoe by region in 2014 (IEA, 2016)[13]

text: Energy consumption is loosely correlated with gross national product and climate, but there is a large difference even between the most highly developed countries, such as Japan and Germany with an energy consumption rate of 6 kW per person and the United States with an energy consumption rate of 11.4 kW per person. In developing countries, particularly those that are sub-tropical or tropical such as India, the per person energy use rate is closer to 0.7 kW. Bangladesh has the lowest consumption rate with 0.2 kW per person.

text: The US consumes 25% of the world's energy with a share of global GDP at 22% and a share of the world population at 4.59%.[81] The most significant growth of energy consumption is currently taking place in China, which has been growing at 5.5% per year over the last 25 years. Its population of 1.3 billion people (19.6% of the world population[81]) is consuming energy at a rate of 1.6 kW per person.

text: One measurement of efficiency is energy intensity. This is a measure of the amount of energy it takes a country to produce a dollar of gross domestic product.

text: Oil[edit]

text: Saudi Arabia, Russia and the United States accounted for 34% of oil production in 2011. Saudi Arabia, Russia and Nigeria accounted for 36% of oil export in 2011.

text:
Top 10 oil producers (Mt)[40]

Rank
Nation
2005
2008
2009
2010
2011
Share %
2011
2012

1
Saudi Arabia
519
509
452
471
517
12.9%
544

2
Russia
470
485
494
502
510
12.7%
520

3
United States
307
300
320
336
346
8.6%
387

4
Iran
205
214
206
227
215
5.4%
186

5
China
183
190
194
200
203
5.1%
206

6
Canada
143
155
152
159
169
4.2%
182

7
UAE
nd
136
120
129
149
3.7%
163

8
Venezuela
162
137
126
149
148
3.7%
162

9
Mexico
188
159
146
144
144
3.6%
nd

10
Nigeria
133
nd
nd
130
139
3.5%
nd

x
Kuwait
nd
145
124
nd
nd
nd
152

x
Iraq
nd
nd
114
140
nd
nd
148

x
Norway
139
nd
nd
nd
nd
nd
nd

Total
3,923
3,941
3,843
3,973
4,011
100%

Top ten
62%
62%
61%
62%
63%

text:
Top 10 oil exporters (Mt)[82]

Rank
Nation
2011
Share %
2011
2012

1
Saudi Arabia
333
17.0%

2
Russia
246
12.5%

3
Nigeria
129
6.6%

4
Iran
126
6.4%

5
UAE
105
5.4%

6
Iraq
94
4.8%

7
Venezuela
87
4.4%

8
Angola
84
4.3%

9
Norway
78
4.0%

10
Mexico
71
3.6%

x
Others
609
31.0%

Total (Mt)
1,962

text: Coal[edit]

text:
Top 10 coal producers (Mt)[40]

Rank
Nation
2005
2008
2009
2010
2011
Share %
2011
2012

1
China
2,226
2,761
2,971
3,162
3,576
46%
3,549

2
US
1,028
1,076
985
997
1,004
13%
935

3
India
430
521
561
571
586
8%
595

4
Australia
372
397
399
420
414
5%
421

5
Indonesia
318
284
301
336
376
5%
443

6
Russia
222
323
297
324
334
4%
354

7
South Africa
315
236
247
255
253
3%
259

8
Germany
nd
nd
nd
nd
189
2%
197

9
Poland
160
144
135
134
139
2%
144

10
Kazakhstan
79
108
101
111
117
2%
126

11
Colombia
65
79
73
74
1%
nd
nd

Total
5,878
6,796
6,903
7,229
7,783
100%
7,831

Top ten
89%
87%
88%
88%
nd
90%

*include hard coal and brown coal

text:
Top 10 coal importers (Mt)[83]

Rank
Nation
2005
2008
2009
2010
2011

1
China
25
nd
114
157
177

2
Japan
178
186
165
187
175

3
South Korea
77
100
103
119
129

4
India
37
58
66
88
101

5
Taiwan
61
66
60
63
66

6
Germany
38
46
38
45
41

7
UK
44
43
38
26
32

8
Turkey
nd
19
20
27
24

9
Italy
24
25
19
22
23

10
Malaysia
nd
nd
nd
19
21

x
Spain
25
19
16
nd
nd

x
France
nd
21
nd
nd
nd

x
US
28
nd
nd
nd
nd

Total
778
778
819
949
1,002

Top ten
69%
75%
78%
79%
79%

Import of production
16%
13%
14%
15%
13%

*2005–2010 hard coal

text: Natural gas[edit]

text:
Top 10 natural gas producers (bcm)[82]

Rank
Nation
2005
2008
2009
2010
2011
Share %
2011

1
Russia
627
657
589
637
677
20.0%

2
US
517
583
594
613
651
19.2%

3
Canada
187
175
159
160
160
4.7%

4
Qatar
nd
79
89
121
151
4.5%

5
Iran
84
121
144
145
149
4.4%

6
Norway
90
103
106
107
106
3.1%

7
China
nd
76
90
97
103
3.0%

8
Saudi Arabia
70
nd
nd
82
92
2.7%

9
Indonesia
77
77
76
88
92
2.7%

10
Netherlands
79
85
79
89
81
2.4%

x
Algeria
93
82
81
nd
nd
nd

x
UK
93
nd
nd
nd
nd
nd

Total
2,872
3,149
3,101
3,282
100%
3,388

Top ten
67%
65%
65%
65%
67%

bcm = billion cubic meters

text:
Top 10 natural gas importers (bcm)[82]

Rank
Nation
2005
2008
2009
2010
2011
Share %
2011

1
Japan
81
95
93
99
116
13.9%

2
Italy
73
77
69
75
70
8.4%

3
Germany
91
79
83
83
68
8.2%

4
US
121
84
76
74
55
6.6%

5
South Korea
29
36
33
43
47
5.6%

6
Ukraine
62
53
38
37
44
5.3%

7
Turkey
27
36
35
37
43
5.2%

8
France
47
44
45
46
41
4.9%

9
UK
nd
26
29
37
37
4.4%

10
Spain
33
39
34
36
34
4.1%

x
Netherlands
23
nd
nd
nd
nd
nd

Total
838
783
749
820
834
100%

Top ten
70%
73%
71%
69%
67%

Import of production
29%
25%
24%
25%
25%

bcm = billion cubic meters

text: Wind power[edit]

text:
Top 10 countries
by nameplate windpower capacity
(2011 year-end)[84]

Country
Windpower capacity
(MW) ǂprovisional
 % world total

China
62,733ǂ
26.3

United States
46,919
19.7

Germany
29,060
12.2

Spain
21,674
9.1

India
16,084
6.7

France
6,800ǂ
2.8

Italy
6,747
2.8

United Kingdom
6,540
2.7

Canada
5,265
2.2

Portugal
4,083
1.7

(rest of world)
32,446
13.8

World total
238,351 MW
100%

text:
Top 10 countries
by windpower electricity production
(2010 totals)[85]

Country
Windpower production
(TWh)
 % world total

United States
95.2
27.6

China
55.5
15.9

Spain
43.7
12.7

Germany
36.5
10.6

India
20.6
6.0

United Kingdom
10.2
3.0

France
9.7
2.8

Portugal
9.1
2.6

Italy
8.4
2.5

Canada
8.0
2.3

(rest of world)
48.5
14.1

World total
344.8 TWh
100%

text: By sector[edit]

text:
World energy use by sector, 2012[86]

Sector
1015Btu
Petawatt-hours
percentage

Residential
53.0
15.5
13

Commercial
29.3
8.6
7

Industrial
222.3
65.1
54

Transportation
104.2
30.5
26

Total*
408.9
119.8
100

Source: US DOE. PWh from 0.293 times Btu column.
Numbers are the end use of energy

text: The table to the right shows the amounts of energy consumed worldwide in 2012 by four sectors, according to the Energy Information Administration of the US Department of Energy:

text:
Residential (heating, lighting, and appliances)
Commercial (lighting, heating and cooling of commercial buildings, and provision of water and sewer services)
Industrial users (agriculture, mining, manufacturing, and construction)
Transportation (passenger, freight, and pipeline)

tag: ul

text: Of the total 120 PWh (7020432000000000000♠120×1015 Wh) consumed, 19.4 were in the form of electricity, but this electricity required 61.7 PWh to produce. Thus the total energy consumption was around 160 PWh (ca 7020580280718941000♠550×1015 Btu).[86] The efficiency of a typical existing power plant is around 38%.[87] The new generation of gas-fired plants reaches a substantially higher efficiency of 55%. Coal is the most common fuel for the world's electricity plants.[88]

text: Another report gives different values for the sectors, apparently due to different definitions. According to this, total world energy use per sector in 2008 was industry 28%, transport 27% and residential and service 36%. Division was about the same in the year 2000.[89]

text:
World energy use per sector[89]

Year
2000
2008
2000
2008

Sector
TWh
 %*

Industry
21,733
27,273
26.5
27.8

Transport
22,563
26,742
27.5
27.3

Residential and service
30,555
35,319
37.3
36.0

Non-energy use
7,119
8,688
8.7
8.9

Total*
81,970
98,022
100
100

Source: IEA 2010, Total is calculated from the given sectors
Numbers are the end use of energy
Total world energy supply (2008) 143,851 TWh

text: European Union[edit]

text: The European Environmental Agency (EEA) measures final energy consumption (does not include energy used in production and lost in transportation) and finds that the transport sector is responsible for 31.8% of final energy consumption, households 26.2%, industry 25.6%, services 13.5% and agriculture 2.9% in 2012.[90] The use of energy is responsible for the majority of greenhouse gas emissions (79%), with the energy sector representing 31%, transport 19%, industry 13%, households 9% and others 7%.[91]

text: While efficient energy use and resource efficiency are growing as public policy issues, more than 70% of coal plants in the European Union are more than 20 years old and operate at an efficiency level of between 32–40%.[92] Technological developments in the 1990s have allowed efficiencies in the range of 40–45% at newer plants.[92] However, according to an impact assessment by the European Commission, this is still below the best available technological (BAT) efficiency levels of 46–49%.[92] With gas-fired power plants the average efficiency is 52% compared to 58–59% with best available technology (BAT), and gas and oil boiler plants operate at average 36% efficiency (BAT delivers 47%).[92] According to that same impact assessment by the European Commission, raising the efficiency of all new plants and the majority of existing plants, through the setting of authorisation and permit conditions, to an average generation efficiency of 51.5% in 2020 would lead to a reduction in annual consumption of 15 km3 (3.6 cu mi) of natural gas and 25 Mt (25,000,000 long tons; 28,000,000 short tons) of coal.[92]